Igor Jadan. Generation-T

Generation-T
Features of educational work among terrorists of the latest generation

Igor Jadan

Date of publication: October 29, 2002

After a decade of friendship and the recent anniversary of demonstrations of American support at the American embassy in Moscow, Americans continue to call terrorists operating on Russian soil "guerrillas" ( guerrillas ). So far, no crowd of sympathizers is visible at the Russian embassy in the United States, while, it would seem, nothing prevents Americans from gathering and expressing their solidarity with Russia, using the latest events as a convenient occasion. Even Arafat expressed full understanding that in this case we are talking specifically about terrorists, but the United States has not yet matured to fully understand this! True, they started talking about the possible addition of Chechen separatists to the list of terrorist organizations. As it now turns out, the Russian Foreign Ministry has been demanding this for at least a year, only very quietly (probably fearing public attention). Now, of course, everything will be different: Russian politicians have already expressed bewilderment at the state support provided to Chechen terrorist organizations in Europe. A little more - and the level of indignation will reach the official note of protest.

Feeling the sympathy of Europe and America, the terrorists got down to business...

The new format of terror, which has been observed more and more clearly in the last 10 years, apparently requires an urgent revision of the entire methodology of the struggle. We already wrote about this a year ago, citing as evidence of this thesis a number of examples in which the failure of attempts to control the actions of terrorists based on old methods was especially obvious. It makes sense to recall just one example: the core of Al-Qaeda, nurtured by the joint efforts of the United States, Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, actually outplayed its recruiters. Now CIA specialists modestly call the war declared on America by its former agents the “blowback effect” of the policy of “initiating” Islamic fundamentalism in the past (as a counterweight to the communist, social democratic and moderate nationalist - “Baathist” - currents in the crescent countries ). One of the lessons learned from this (among others) is this: it makes no sense to try to control people who have decided for themselves that they are ready to die with money or threats to their safety.

Indeed, a number of recent works in criminology well support this conclusion: see, for example, Brent L. Smith, Kelly R. Damphouse, Freedom Jackson, and Amy Sellers " The Prosecution and Punishment of International Terrorists in Federal Courts: 1980-1998 " . The authors of this study examined data obtained during a project called the American Terrorism Study, which collected and systematized information about trials in which domestic and international terrorists were brought before American criminal courts. It turned out that although international terrorists received much more severe punishments compared to local ones, their tendency to repent was minimal. However, local terrorists were much less inclined to admit their guilt than criminals. The study showed the ineffectiveness of the regular judicial system in relation to criminals who are ready to use violence for political reasons. This is even though the results of other studies (Brent L Smith, Kelly R. Dumphousse. Punishing Political Offenders: The Effect of Political Motive on Federal Sentencing Decisions) show: in the United States, the label “terrorist” is a statistically significant predictor of more severe punishment in comparison with completely similar criminal acts for which this label was not applied. Despite all this, it must be recognized that each trial, by giving terrorists another opportunity to propagate their views, only provokes new acts of terror. The authors of the first study conclude that the transition to a military tribunal in relation to terrorists is justified and even inevitable. In addition, when discussing the possibility of control over terrorists, one should also take into account that there is no confirmation that political terrorists have, at least to some extent, that “shift” in behavior that is determined in ordinary criminals: the so-called “associated behavior " (" analogous behaviors "), expressed in a penchant for drinking or drugs, gambling - those qualities that would be easiest to "catch on to."

Most authors in the West prefer to say that in the case of the latest generation of terrorists we are dealing with irrational behavior. Therefore, the following conclusion is drawn: suicide terrorists (which, apparently, should also include terrorists who take hostages in a situation where the threat of an assault is high) cannot be restrained by methods of punishment or encouragement, but can only be destroyed every single one. The problem, however, is that it is impossible to actually destroy every single terrorist, especially terrorists of the technological era, when, in fact, anyone with ingenuity and a sense of self-sacrifice can become a famous terrorist: for this, an advertisement on the Internet and knowledge is enough would be one way to cause a man-made disaster.

The success of the strategy of eliminating terrorism through the destruction of terrorists without changing the factors of the environment in which terror spontaneously originates, the more difficult it is to believe, the more data suggests that terrorism of the latest generation is very weakly connected (contrary to the statements of the current American administration) with government support. This trend of “multi-focality” was noticed by prominent experts on international terrorism back in the late 90s. For example, one of the authors believes that the latest generation of terrorists should be recognized as “freelances” rather than dependent on any organizational structures. He calls them "armed prophets" - Armed Prophets.

From the above, two important conclusions should be drawn: 1) it is impossible to completely end terrorism, such a goal in itself is illusory, and the task of combating terrorism should be formulated differently; 2) just the physical destruction of the latest generation of terrorists is just as ineffective as the already proven ineffective attempts to scare them away from engaging in terrorism through more severe punishments or through bribery.

And one more important note: to call the actions of terrorists “irrational” would mean, among other things, to fall into the mistake of underestimating the enemy, denying the enemy any intelligence in advance. It would be more correct to accept, at least as a working hypothesis, that the system of terrorist behavior is rational in its own way. Let's call this peculiar rationality “terrorist rationality” and try to reveal it. At least, we don’t lose anything from trying to reveal it, while by labeling terrorists as “irrationalists,” we gain nothing, leaving them as a “thing in themselves,” initially inaccessible to our understanding, that is, while reassuring ourselves, we don’t notice some opportunities to influence the situation in the right direction.

Let us assume that the terrorists' actions are rational in their own way. Then the actions of the authorities must be related to the task of destroying this rationality. When applied to Chechen terrorism, its rationality can obviously have two components, two “great projects”: “serving the independence of Ichkeria” and “serving world Islam.” Based on this, the countermeasures strategy must include a set of measures to undermine the motivation of terrorists by undermining their belief that terrorist methods can bring these two goals closer.

Thus, terrorists and their accomplices must be convinced every time that the base necessary for the implementation of the first of the two “great projects” is irreversibly destroyed with each terrorist act. These may be territorial, demographic or symbolic (in the form of a decrease in legislative status) losses, but they must be indisputable. Terrorists, after a certain number of terrorist attacks, must see with their own eyes that they are making the political project dear to their hearts increasingly unattainable with their own hands.

However, first one must be mentally prepared to purposefully inflict irreversible damage to the enemy cause as a whole over a long period of time, without retreating under the pressure of psychic attacks and without forgiving a single episode. You should teach yourself to be vindictive and petty when it comes to these issues, demanding material and political compensation that is difficult for the “terrorist project” for each attack. To do this, the state elite must show sufficient determination.

Thus, the most promising principle in the fight against terrorism of the latest type is strikes on the “project”. Strikes against the terrorists themselves are effective only in combination with strikes against the “project.”

As for the Islamic component of terrorist rationality, here the strategy of destroying motivation can be based on isolating the interests of the “Ichkerian project” from the “pan-Islamic” project. For this purpose, a special foreign policy is needed, aimed at creating (restoring) the image of Russia as an ally of Islamic nations and states (naturally, only those that do not support terrorism in the Russian and not any other sense). In this sense, it is good to take into account the experience of Israel, which happily helps every Muslim country that is ready to accept help from the Jewish state. These, however, are few in number, for a reason that will be discussed below.

When the Islamic peoples are once again convinced that Russia is their ally, the Ichkerian “fighters for the Islamic cause” will turn in their eyes into a bunch of separatists trying, in the interests of some forces in the West, to drive a wedge between Russia and the cultures of the Middle East.

The fact that it took so long for Chechen militants to be recognized as a terrorist organization in the United States suggests that the American masters of diplomatic games are signaling to the Islamists about the possibility of returning a separate truce between them and America. Even if now, as many expect , this will change, we can say that the message has already been conveyed to the recipient. It seems that Russia's allies in the terrorist coalition believe that they have discovered a new strategy for destroying the motivation of world evil by establishing partnerships with it. That is, with regard to Russia, we are talking, above all, about the urgent formation of a counter-strategy in a game, the rules of which other players are trying to establish in their favor.

If this does not happen, global terrorism, still searching for the “weakest link,” will turn its attention to Russia alone. It is also necessary to more actively counteract the strategy of Europe, which itself has every reason to fear being perceived as a “weak link” and, apparently, is therefore especially trying to “turn the arrows” of fundamentalist terror on others, including Russia. Having a large and politically mature Islamic population (which is still quite loyal), Russia cannot afford to be less sensitive to the interests of the Islamic world than France. Naturally, we are talking about those cases when these interests are completely legitimate in nature and in the form of their expression.

It is bad if urgent domestic policy measures to combat terrorism are not accompanied by coordinated foreign policy steps. In this case, there is a real danger for Russia of being recorded in the Islamic consciousness as another “enemy of Islam” after Israel. Then the same obstacles that prevent, say, Israel from developing relations with the Islamic world in the paradigm of mutually beneficial cooperation immediately stand in the way of the positive development of relations between Russia and the Islamic world. Emotional factors of rejection by public opinion turn out to be stronger than rational considerations of the benefits of cooperation, putting the government of an Islamic country, trying to pursue a policy friendly to Israel, under the threat of political terror.

Besides the question “what should I do?” We must approach the question “what not to do?” with the same seriousness. There is a danger that in an atmosphere of indignation at the actions of terrorists, some interested parties will try to persuade the authorities to take measures that clearly will not help reduce the danger, but will help solve the private problems of certain political forces. For example, voices were immediately heard calling for a tightening of the registration regime in Moscow, as if there was some evidence that this would help (for example, in Israel, with much stricter and more targeted passport control towards national minorities and searches right on the street, only a complete ban on entry of a certain population group into Israeli territory). In this particular case, this should likely lead to the fact that the police will have even less time to work on preventing terrorist activity. It is important that the age-old Russian mistake not be repeated - the tendency to do what is easy to do and what catches the eye, instead of doing what should be done.