The literature on human happiness has long noted a paradox: although at any given time in any country the rich are significantly happier than the poor, the average level of happiness changes very little over time, despite the growth of total wealth. From this fact it is often concluded that happiness depends on relative rather than absolute income.
I propose a slightly different interpretation: the happiness that would result from rising absolute income is often not realized because people in prosperous countries spend their money poorly.
Essentially, I'm going to give two different answers to the question "Can you buy happiness?" If we use an increase in income only to buy a bigger house and a more expensive car, then our happiness, as a rule, will not increase. But if increased income allows for less obvious gains - such as the ability to reduce daily travel or free yourself from unpleasant work - then a completely different picture emerges. The less we spend on ordinary consumer goods, the more money we can spend on freeing up time and devoting leisure to family and friends, physical education, sleep, travel, etc. Such a redistribution of time and money clearly leads to a healthier, longer and longer life. happy life.
The main method psychologists use to assess well-being is by conducting surveys that ask people whether they consider themselves very happy, relatively happy, or unhappy. Most respondents readily answer this question, and not all consider themselves “very happy,” even in the United States, where it is considered useful to declare oneself a completely happy person. Many people call themselves relatively happy, while others admit that they are unhappy. As a rule, the same people give the same answers in subsequent surveys.
The results of such surveys and other psychological studies tend to be confirmed by the kind of behavior that we associate with well-being. For example, if you are happy, you communicate with friends more often, are more likely to respond to requests for help, suffer less from psychosomatic illnesses (digestive disorders, stress, headaches, cardiovascular diseases), are less likely to take time off from work or start conflicts at work. . Finally, you are less likely to commit suicide, that extreme expression of unhappiness. It turns out that human happiness is a real phenomenon that can be measured.
How does happiness depend on income? As noted above, when total income increases, it has little effect on welfare. For example, Japan in 1960 was a very poor country. Until the end of the 1980s. its per capita income nearly quadrupled, becoming one of the highest in the industrial world. However, according to Japanese data, the average level of happiness in 1987 was no higher than in 1960. The Japanese have many more washing machines, cars, cameras and other things, but this has not led to a significant increase in happiness levels.
The same pattern invariably appears in other countries, surprising economists. If higher incomes don't make people happier, why are they so eager to become richer?
It turns out that if we measure the relationship between income and happiness using a different method, we get exactly what economists have long suspected. By comparing the average level of happiness with the average income for different groups of people in a given country at a given time, we see that rich people are much happier than poor people.
Therefore, if the amount of income affects happiness, then only relative income matters, not absolute income. Some social scientists who have reflected on this pattern have concluded that - at least for residents of the most prosperous countries - further accumulation of wealth has no rational purpose.
At first glance, this conclusion seems surprising, since extra money seems to give us access to many useful things. Wouldn't we be happier if, say, the environment was cleaner, if we had a little more free time, or if at least some of the worries of everyday life were eliminated? For people from the richest countries, these additional opportunities are open at least in principle, but at the same time, oddly enough, they do not have a noticeable impact on overall well-being.
Independent evidence suggests that extra money is a good thing, as long as it is spent appropriately. The idea is that while outwardly we are rapidly adapting to the general increase in the supply of most material goods, there are specific categories in which our ability to adapt is limited. It appears that additional spending in these categories makes the greatest contribution to a noticeable increase in our well-being.
The human ability to adapt to sudden changes is amazing. People who become disabled initially fall into extreme depression and lose the meaning of life. However, what is surprising is the speed and extent to which these unfortunates adapt to new circumstances. After a year, many paralyzed people experience almost the same moods and emotions as healthy people. In addition, it is known that the blind, mentally retarded and deformed people are much better adapted to their condition than most of us think.
We quickly adapt not only to losses, but also to gains. People who win large sums in the lottery usually experience euphoria for several weeks. However, studies carried out several years later show that these people are no more, and in many cases less happy, than before.
In short, our remarkable ability to adapt may explain why absolute living standards become less important once we escape extreme poverty. This interpretation corresponds to the impressions of people who have traveled and lived abroad for a long time and have seen that the struggle to improve one's status has the same psychological effect in rich countries as in countries with more modest levels of wealth.
These observations provide grist to the mill of those social critics who are offended by the apparent extravagance of the recent US consumer boom. However, what most of these critics tend to forget is that adaptability is a double-edged sword. It explains why bigger houses and faster cars don't make us happier, but if we can be quite adaptable to the unpleasant things we sometimes have to go through to get more money, then what's the problem? It is possible that social critics have chosen the wrong target for attack.
However, I believe that underestimating the absolute standard of living is a serious mistake. What the data suggests is that when national income rises, people spend the extra money in ways that do not provide significant, lasting improvements in life satisfaction. However, the absolute level of income can have a dual impact.
First, people can spend money in other ways that will make them happier, but for various reasons they are unwilling or unable to do so. Secondly, subjective assessments of well-being alone may not be enough. Let's imagine two parallel universes: one exactly corresponding to ours, and a second in which the income level of any person is twice as high as here. Let's assume that in both cases you are a member of the middle class with an annual income of 100 thousand dollars in one case, and 200 thousand in the other. Let us further assume that you will feel equally happy in both universes (a completely reasonable assumption). And finally, let's say you know that people in a richer universe spend more money on dealing with toxic waste, which will lead to longer and healthier, if not happier, lives. Would anyone doubt that it would be better to live in a richer universe?
My point is that while the emerging science of subjective well-being has much to tell us about the factors that influence life satisfaction, even its most ardent proponents dare not claim that it has the last word. The question of whether it is good for national income to grow can only be decided with the help of eyewitness accounts.
And the evidence is, in essence, more than enough. In particular, they clearly demonstrate that, after a certain point, general increases in spending on certain types of material goods do not lead to any lasting increase in subjective well-being. Let us imagine people from two societies that are identical in every respect except one: in society A everyone lives in houses with an area of 4 thousand square feet, while in society B the houses have an area of only 3 thousand square feet. ft. If these two societies are completely isolated from each other, there is no reason for psychologists to detect any significant difference in the average level of subjective well-being in both societies. Rather, it is to be expected that each society will develop its own local idea of good housing and that people in each society will be equally satisfied with their homes and other aspects of life.
Moreover, we have no reason to suppose that there are any other significant reasons for considering life in society A preferable to life in society B. Thus, larger houses in society A will not lead to a longer and healthier life, nor to any other significant advantages over life in society B. When the size of the house reaches a given threshold, the ability of people to adapt to a further general increase in living space is practically unlimited.
Of course, in order to build larger houses, real resources are needed. A society that builds houses of 4 thousand square meters for everyone. feet, can instead build houses of 3 thousand square meters. ft., freeing up significant funds that can be spent on something else. This begs the question: Are there alternative ways to spend these funds that would lead to lasting improvements in human well-being?
An affirmative answer would be logically impossible if our ability to adapt to any other possible changes were as great as our ability to adapt to larger houses. However, it turns out that the ability to adapt varies across different domains. There are some factors - such as noise - to which we can consciously adapt relatively quickly, but our bodies continue to react to them in noticeable ways many years later. There are also factors to which we do not adapt, but on the contrary, we become more sensitive: for example, these are various biochemical allergens - but only that. So, a rude co-worker who first pestered you in two weeks can do the same thing in a couple of seconds a few months later.
From the fact that we can adapt better to some factors than others, it follows that by moving resources from one area to another, long-term changes in well-being can be achieved. And there is a lot of evidence of this.
Let's conduct some thought experiments in which we again compare two hypothetical societies. These two societies have the same level of wealth, but spend it differently. Let us again assume that members of society A live in houses with an area of 4 thousand square meters. feet, and members of society B - in houses with an area of 3 thousand square meters. ft.
In any case, the residents of society B use the resources saved on building houses in order to somehow change their living conditions. What would you choose: society A, whose residents live in larger houses, but have to spend an hour to get to work by car through continuous traffic jams, or society B, where the houses are not so large, but they can get to work in 15 minutes by expressway transport?
A reasonable person, faced with such a choice, will want to consider the pros and cons of each option. As for the psychological costs of living in small houses, there is no reason to believe that if you and everyone else live in houses of 3 thousand square meters. feet, your subjective well-being will be lower than when living in houses of 4 thousand square meters. ft. Of course, if you move from society B to society A, then at first you will be glad of the additional living space. But you can be sure that over time you will get used to it and consider a larger house to be the norm.
A person moving from Society B to Society A will also initially experience stress as he encounters problems in commuting. Over time, awareness of the discomfort may decrease. But there is an important difference here: adaptation to a larger house will be complete, but adaptation to a long commute to work will be only partial. The available evidence clearly shows that even after many years of habit, people find it very burdensome to have to commute to work every day through continuous congestion. An extensive scientific literature has documented many symptoms of stress as a result of frequent travel on congested streets.
Long-term exposure to traffic-related stress suppresses immune function and reduces life expectancy. Traveling by car increases the risk of cancer, especially lung cancer, probably due to the fact that the outdoor atmosphere is poisoned by exhaust fumes. The likelihood of these and other illnesses is proportional to the length of travel and is significantly reduced in those who travel by bus or train, and even lower in those who do not regularly commute to work. Finally, the risk of death and injury from accidents also depends on the length of travel, and is more likely for passengers in cars rather than in public transport.
The bottom line is that long commutes on busy streets lead to serious and long-lasting health damage. It is unlikely that it will be possible to prove that residents of society A will be less satisfied with life than residents of society B, but it is quite reasonable to assume that subjective well-being in society A will be lower.
Therefore, based on the available data, we can conclude that a reasonable person would choose to live in society B. And yet, despite this, the United States is steadily moving in the direction of society A. The size of houses in the country continues to grow, and commutes to work are getting longer.
Table 1
Four thought experiments: explicit consumption in society A versus implicit consumption in society B.
Society A
Society B
1. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 4 thousand square meters. ft. Nobody has time for daily exercise.
1. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 3 thousand square meters. ft. Everyone has 45 minutes every day. for physical education.
2. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 4 thousand square meters. feet and can meet with friends once a month.
2. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 3 thousand square meters. feet and can meet with friends once a week.
3. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 4 thousand square meters. ft. and receive a week's vacation annually.
3. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 3 thousand square meters. ft. and receive a month's leave annually.
4. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 4 thousand square meters. ft. and have relatively low levels of independence at work.
4. Everyone lives in houses with an area of 3 thousand square meters. ft. and have a relatively high level of independence at work.
Table 1 lists four thought experiments that ask people to choose between societies with different combinations of wealth and leisure time. In each case, a specific use of free time is implied (and if this option does not suit you, you can replace it with some other).
Each of the four thought experiments involves a choice between explicit consumption (in the form of larger houses) and what, for lack of a better term, I would call implicit consumption: freedom from traffic congestion, time to spend with family and friends, time to go on vacation. and various favorable working conditions. In each case, subjective well-being appears to be higher in societies with higher levels of implicit consumption. But, nevertheless, real consumption trends in the United States are directed in the opposite direction.
The list of items of implicit consumption can be significantly expanded. Thus, one might wonder whether living in slightly smaller houses would not be a reasonable price to pay for a healthier atmosphere, more urban green space, cleaner drinking water, lower crime rates, and medical research that increases life expectancy. And in each case the answer will be the same as in the options listed above.
I didn't use these thought experiments to show that implicit consumption is always preferable to explicit consumption. In each case, we can expect that there will be a small number of reasonable people who will prefer society A to B. Some people simply do not need independence at work, others do not like physical exercise, others have no interest in socializing with family and friends. But if we agree that a small reduction in the size of housing has almost no effect on the level of subjective well-being, we are faced with the question of whether a reasonable person could find a more productive use of the resources thus saved. If we take into account the absolute size of the houses involved in the thought experiment, the answer is definitely yes.
It seems only natural that when per capita income rises sharply, as has happened in many countries since at least the Second World War, most people will increase both explicit and implicit consumption. Let's say the cars we buy today are not only faster and more luxurious, but also more reliable and safe. However, if both forms of consumption are growing, and if implicit consumption increases the level of subjective well-being, then why has this level not risen in recent decades?
Probably the fact is that some forms of implicit consumption expanded, while others, on the contrary, narrowed, sometimes very sharply. Over the past two decades, the United States has seen an increase in work hours; traffic became even more intense; Savings levels plummet; the rate of personal bankruptcies is higher than ever; Finally, there is a widespread belief that autonomy in the workplace has sharply decreased and the threat of unemployment has sharply increased. Declines in these and other forms of implicit consumption may well have offset the effects of growth in other areas.
Why can't we use our funds more wisely? If we can live longer, healthier, more enjoyable lives just by changing our consumption patterns, why aren't we doing it?
As even the most zealous free-market economists recognize, no invisible force will help achieve the best results in cases where each person's well-being depends on the actions of other people with whom he does not directly interact. This restriction was previously considered important only in a few cases - primarily, it related to activities that lead to environmental pollution. However, we now understand that the mutual connections between people are much more pervasive. Many of life's important goods—access to the best schools, the most desirable marriage partners, and even food in times of famine—depend on how closely our choices resemble those of other people. In most cases, a person who spends two hours more at the office than others in order to afford a home closer to a relatively better school does not have the conscious intention of making it more difficult for other people to achieve the same goal. However, this is precisely what becomes the inevitable consequence of his choice. The rest also have to work two hours longer in order to maintain their current status quo. But inexorable mathematical logic tells us that only 10 percent of all children are likely to get into the top 10 percent of schools—no matter how many hours their parents work.
Many purchases become attractive to us when others make them, and therefore consumption has much in common with the arms race. Each family can choose how much of its money to spend, but cannot choose how much others should spend. Buying a smaller than average car means you have a greater risk of dying in a car accident. Buying a relatively cheap suit means a greater risk of not getting a good job. However, when everyone starts buying big cars and expensive suits, the overall result is equally disappointing, as when all countries join the arms race. Spending less - on bombs or on material consumption - helps free up funds for other urgent expenditures, but only if everyone does so.
In fact, why do countries spend so much money on weapons? The point is not that military spending usually pays off more than peaceful spending. Losing an arms race often means losing political independence - which is obviously much more painful than the inconvenience of using toasters designed for fewer toasts.
So, a confident choice in favor of one of the two types of activity should be expected when it pays off much more significantly than the other. The satisfaction that comes from many types of explicit consumption is more serious than the satisfaction that comes from many types of implicit consumption. If this is the case, it explains why absolute increases in income and consumption levels in recent decades have not translated into corresponding increases in measurable well-being.
The MIT Press
Translation by Nikolai Edelman