
There is nothing more productive than reflecting on your own failures.
Today's Moscow crowd is a buzzing hive. Every day I receive invitations by email - to seminars, round tables, public lectures, press clubs... Intellectual bohemia - I deliberately abolish the word "elite" - chews on the catastrophe of politics, which it still understands only at the level of its own class loss territories.
Just yesterday these people were politicians, opinion leaders, cultural authorities, “experts” who together constituted the political class - the base of power. And suddenly, all of them - even those who were born in the late 70s and came into politics as yesterday's schoolchildren in the second half of the 90s - turned into a community of pensioners in a communal kitchen, unnecessary, yesterday's and powerless.
And instead of them, faceless and tongueless people - partly with calluses from epaulettes on their shoulders, partly with the bathing blemishes of the “owners”, partly with traces of tattoos on their hairy fingers - sort things out among themselves in some kind of biological dialogue of fluids, on a fundamentally non-verbal and the supraconscious language of feelings and instincts.
No one had time to understand how the bohemians managed to surrender power so shamefully and mediocrely - that part of the power that is meant when they pronounce formulas like “rulers of thoughts.” They, as life has shown, turned out to have no power even over their own thoughts - what can we say about power over the thoughts of others? Above the country's thought?
People threw the bohemians into the trash heap, handing over their destinies to the class of big-haired people; Bohemians were not even considered enemies, but harmful, but harmless, in essence, parasites. The nineties are the story of how bohemia, having received virtually absolute power over the country for nothing, sold it off cheaply: for smiles and sausage - to the West, for small loot - to the lads and Komsomol members, for fear - to detachments of “werewolves in uniform”, for opportunity experiment with economic models on living people - social protest; for laziness, that is, for no reason - to feudal peasants, thieves and impostors. And so, the seemingly eternal Samotlor, from which black, oily power flowed like a fountain, dried up. His last, heavily watered convulsions can still be heard - in Ukrainian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, etc. elections, but it is clear that this will soon end.
When this flow was still alive, but had already weakened considerably, Naishul appeared and said: yes, all this, they say, is because we have no political language ! That concepts have their own meaning for everyone, and we cannot agree on more than two... And mobilization does not work, and political thought does not exist, and the newspapers all lie, and right-left and liberalism-conservatism creates a feeling of noodles (aka " PR")...
Excuse me, but just fifteen years ago millions gathered in Moscow squares, without the “lands” and “kings” pulled out from the local history museum! How did we manage to forget how to speak in such a period of time - less than half a generation? What happened, that the single Russian social language, in which Perestroika was carried out, slipped through the fingers of bohemia, broke up into a whole assortment of tiny discourse dictionaries and dictionaries, from two or three concepts, significant only for fan clubs of several dozen specially trained people ?
“The high Russian political language of the 16th century...” What, in general, is the Russian sixteenth century like for those who studied in our modern “Soviet” school, created by the European nineteenth and twentieth?
Only by looking at it from this angle do you understand the futility of current bohemian reflection. She - a bohemian - is looking for an imaginary past for herself, inventing it no worse than the teenagers from the "elf house", because her real past , the true reality of the historical past, is a taboo, rejected and repressed zone. No one has the courage to admit the truth and talk to each other on behalf of themselves - people shaped by Soviet history. History, the central figure of which - the most hushed up, mythologized and distorted - is not Lenin, Hitler, Zhukov, Gorbachev or Sakharov, but Joseph Stalin.
Psychoanalysis, rejected and spat upon by intellectuals, nevertheless taught them one absolutely useful thing. The fact that it is impossible to defeat a complex by simply forgetting about it - on the contrary, displacing a problem from consciousness into the subconscious is the surest way to translate it into a chronicle. This is very useful to remember for all those who have acquired the habit of talking about the Soviet past in the language of ressentimental pathos or ressentimental banter.
That is why the only possible point of assembly of the Russian political language lies in the very plane of taboo meanings - in the rethinking and renaming of the Soviet one. Until the apophatic perestroika glossary, with the help of which we operate with the history of our own fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers (not metaphorical, but literal), is scrapped, it is impossible to restore the continuity of state building in Russia.
It is impossible to call the civil war, which continued into the 30s within the community of the victors of the 20s, “Stalinist repressions” or the “era of great terror” - this is a murderous self-deception, referring more to the 60s and 80s than to the 30s. It is impossible to call Stalin a “dictator”, “father of nations”, “leader of the world proletariat”, etc. evaluative epithets. It is impossible to find out until you are blue in the face who attacked whom - the USSR against Germany or Germany against the USSR. It is impossible to live by sticking one label with another and not explaining anything in essence.
Finally, it is impossible to create a social and, especially, a political language without having a historical language.
This last point requires clarification.
Making tongue
When they say that generals (as well as politicians) prepare only for past wars, this is only an insignificant part of the iceberg of truth. It itself is much broader: the whole culture, in a sense, is nothing more than a toolkit for combating the challenges of the past. Institutions, traditions, ways of life are just ways of transmitting the experience of past generations in solving certain problems that once faced people - this is why culture is always so defenseless against the future.
Power in its coercive, violent aspect is, more than anything else, a system for overcoming time. This is very easy to see in the example given by Alexander Auzan about English lighthouses, created with private money, but then handed over to the management of the state. Things that are intended to combat threats that once arose and were overcome are transferred to power in order for it to preserve them, although the threats themselves no longer exist - and, therefore, there is no subject who would have a vested interest in maintaining them. Power in this understanding is a museum, a collection of all sorts of antiquities, unnecessary neither to anyone individually, nor even to everyone together - but still preserved, no matter how expensive such preservation may be.
In this sense, we have always understood democracy very strangely. It always seemed to us that sovereignty over the earth belongs only to the totality of those living today. For some reason, those who lived on it before us are always excluded from the list of copyright holders. According to this logic, the Bolsheviks demolished churches and built toilets in their place - on the grounds that “now” religious buildings are no longer relevant. The simple thought that your great-great-grandfather, who built this temple for decades in order to pray to God here, also has the right to claim participation in resolving the issue of this place, never occurred to me. But the Bolshevik system, in fact, positioned itself from the very beginning as an anti-power, a counter-state, built from the future, and not from the past, and therefore opposed to it.
The economic expansion of man, his permanent reorganization of the world, is always an anarchic thing; it is always a rebellion, an adventure, an overcoming of everyday life. But the most difficult task in such a matter is to separate what needs to be rearranged from what needs to be kept unchanged; carry through time. The totality of what is preserved constitutes culture - the space of images and samples, eternal standards, from which momentary copies are constantly made for the needs of the day. Thus, when using a word, we create and use, consume such a copy - the original is stored in the collective memory of the community of native speakers and changes over centuries and generations. The creation of new words - not just inventing, but introducing them into the collective memory of society - is a cultural act, a timeless creativity.
In this sense, current political and, more broadly, social language is exactly the same copy from the historical language. Speaking about the political “now,” we superimpose images from the timeless “always” of our collective memory onto the current political moment - and only in this case do we gain the technical opportunity to meaningfully engage in politics.
Even the dead, artificial, political language of the European democracies of the modern era, which now explains absolutely nothing, all these “right” and “left”, “liberalism” and “socialism”, “conservatism” and “modernism”, even the most “authoritarianism” and “ democracy" - there are concepts that exist exactly to the extent that they are filled with living history, right down to jokes - "who sat in parliament on the right hand of the king, and who on the left."
For some reason, it seems to us that a political language can be created artificially - simply developed, like Esperanto: come up with a dictionary, write texts in it, “promote” it somehow - and off we go! Actually, all the bohemians, in their free time from selling off power, did just that, breaking up into circles and interest groups - they composed and published dictionaries: “liberal”, “conservative”, “patriotic”, “left”, etc... However, all this word creation has never stood the test of reality, because it is impossible to invent something that does not exist - you can only give a name to what exists .
And there is only one place - in the historical reality of one’s own country, existing in its collective memory. And as long as the living history of the Russian twentieth century is tabooed, and in fact given over to mythologies, we will continue to exist in the “bad infinity” of social languagelessness. In the kitchen.
New historicism
One of the main problems of bohemia, which makes it impossible to even talk about history, is the exhaustion of genres. We can endlessly comment on the news, write articles and long essays, give and take interviews, even compose and publish books - any such impulse stalls, because even a book, with the current turnover of the printed products market, today has too short a time horizon for active action.
Apparently, solving precisely this problem, Gleb Pavlovsky rediscovered a new-old genre by publishing a collection of his conversations with Mikhail Gefter - “ History Training ”. The text itself is a book of questions, where each plot unfolds into ten others, operable within the framework of dialogue formats and open to it. In other words, “Training” is not a book, but rather a genre: what is needed now more than ever by all those dreaming of the “Russian public language” project is an extension of the time horizon of thinking through regular, systematic training in history.
Gefter and Pavlovsky in the book are alternativeists in relation to the alternative itself, dissidents from the dissent. The language with which this position allows us to describe the drama of power and the category of Russianness turns out - even then, in the second half of the 80s - to be “other” both in relation to the Soviet and in relation to the anti-Soviet and all the replicas to it. A book that begins with a confession of readiness to sign the notes “for a dog, a dog’s death,” which the security officers put in the pockets of Kamenev and Zinoviev who were being shot, and ends with a manifesto for the decentralization of Russia, a project of the Russian World as a “country of countries,” looks like a provocation even now; It’s not hard to imagine what this would have sounded like in ’89. However, then there was simply no one to read it.
Now, having slobbered all over the word “globalization,” we are not afraid of the way of thinking in which Russian territory is, in a sense, the whole world. The world is built from Russia and is exhausted by it, and any Spanish or Chinese event is at the same time its own, universally Russian. At the same time, the consciousness of the Russian Jew Gefter is structured in such a way that for him the formal control of a national or imperial administration over a territory and its inclusion in the World are two different things; he is not afraid to think about Russian in diaspora categories, understanding with a flexible mind that power can be exercised in a variety of ways and, as Churchill put it, “prefers the essence of power to its form.”
Another feature is that “Russian” for Gefter is a civilizational, not a national category. In other words, there are Russian Armenians, Russian Jews and Russian Ukrainians; however, Russian Russians do not exist and cannot arise - there are Russian Donets, Russian Siberians, Russian northerners, and so on. His vision of the future development of Russia is cultural, structural and administrative regionalization while maintaining the unity of the central government - which, however, is not engaged in unification, but in increasing and harmonizing the diversity of territories.
Gefter decisively breaks one of the main taboos that has survived even in modern consciousness almost untouched since the 20th Congress - the taboo on a neutral assessment of Stalin. His Stalin is “not the Georgian punks who broke into the temple of the Silver Age,” but number one on the list of creators of world history at the end of the millennium. All the more furiously does he attack the contemporary perestroika-debunkers of tyranny precisely because Stalinism was never overcome within themselves.
Actually, this is the main strength of the “training” genre - the ability to operate history for one’s own purposes precisely as the past, and not as an endlessly repeating one (“happy new year ’37” - that’s what they’ve been saying since the time of Brezhnev). The formula of the new historicism is that the present can only be reconstructed from the past, restoring the connection with it in all its continuity, recognizing it entirely, without a single exception.
I'm looking forward to more history training.