The end of the trilogy and Lukashenko nearby

On May 10, the annual message to the Federal Assembly of the President was appointed. According to the announcement of the presidential administration, "the main theme of the current message will be the foreign policy course of the country and the place of Russia in the world." The Vedomosti got the explanatory information from the Kremlin, according to which “the 2006 message will end the trilogy: in 2004, the president in the message focused on the economy (affordable housing, quality medicine and education, the development of transport infrastructure), in 2005 - on politics (strengthening the federation, development of democracy and civil society), and now we are talking about the international situation of Russia” (“ Evaum to the West ”).

From the comments, the historical approach of the Political Committee is curious, which drew attention to the following: “It is interesting that such a“ three -part ”corresponds to the phased struggle of the Kremlin with one or another threats or challenges of time” (“ Preface to the G8 ”, Tatyana Stanovaya).

It is meant that in 2004 the message was read out against the background of the “Yukos case” with the subsequent building of the topic “Social responsibility of the business”. In 2005, the message was read out against the background of the alteration of the “intra-Russian political space” after Beslan, the background was there the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution”, “setting in one of the central places in the Kremlin policy the task of minimizing the western influence within Russia” (“Political Committee”). Then the direct elections of the governors were canceled, the Public Chamber was formed, the electoral system was reformed, and intellectuals talked about how much these changes were associated with terrorism and the struggle with it. The same “political officer” drew attention to the stylistics: “... in the 2005 Epistle, liberal rhetoric was strong. Now, when it is almost washed from official statements, and the need for state ideology is being said more and more openly, last year’s the message seems to be an anachronism.”

So all previous messages, it turns out, were quite effective in terms of influence on the main topics declared in them. No sooner said than done. Therefore, it is curious that now it will be with the West after the message of Putin, in which it will be about relations with him. But the message will occur on the eve of the G8 summit, so it’s not at the time to be especially rebuilding geopolitics.

However, all these were assumptions, as it were, advanced media. In the squares of the "folk media" everything is different, others are priority there. For example, "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (" Putin will be harshly on May 10 ) again broadcasts a rumor that took place two weeks ago. The fact that "Putin has rejected the text written by Kremlin speaker and began to work on it himself, making it more critical. If not to say - tough." Immediately, completely pathos advertising: "There are already assumptions that this message will become almost a new, already political" national project ". Some analysts even say about its sensation and do not exclude that the Russian national idea of ​​the 21st century will finally be voiced." But the direction of the main blow: "But still, the most acute topic in the president’s speech will most likely be devoted to Russian bureaucracy. The main portion of criticism is waiting for officials."
The same is the “AiF” (“ ACTRICTION OF PROVING ”): “Meanwhile, it becomes more obvious that you can’t do without flogging. A critical mass of dissatisfaction with the government has been thickening in society ... Only in the last month more than 2000 publications appeared in the press and the requirements of the premiere’s resignation ... according to sociologists from the Romir research group, today is not even poverty, but the unprepared power of the authorities And 5%is the distrust of the government, 2%, the prosecutor’s office is more than the question: what kind of state we have for power?

Of course, in the message and several sections, in order to talk about foreign policy in one, and in the other - about corruption. But if we are talking about positioning Russia as a full -fledged member of the "eight" and in general as an energy guarantor, then publicly sneezing the state administration apparatus is also not by the time. So where does such a discrepancy in the views come from? It seems to have exclusively media bases. At the same time, events are taking place around the media, not inferior to the intrigue around the message (we will consider the divergence of expectations by intrigue).

At a time when Putin transferred his message - it was planned to be on the 25th, it seems, April (or on the 26th), Vladimir Pozner spoke with his message to the federal viewer. Actually, this was not a message, but an interview to the S. Varshavchik from NG, and “NG” put up an interview as a message : “Vladimir Pozner: the first, second and fourth channels are wrapped in the population.”

In the amount of the interview, it is an introduction to the system of opinions expressed by Posner during the discussion, which was between him and E. Kiselev a month ago. Posner formulated his position: “... working on such a channel, I still manage to do what I think is necessary. Some probably believe that you need to show the cuckoo and to scold someone there and carry something there. I have a different opinion: I do not think that journalism can be blessed and can protect only one point of view. Journalism should give the viewer the opportunity to listen to both this and another and another and another and another and another and another and another and another and another and another and another. draw your own conclusions. " Quite harmonious.

But there is also a diagnosis of dysfunction: "... the following happens: state channels - the first, second, fourth, which is also state -owned through the state Gazprom - in fact, observe one approach to information. At the same time, they are controlled in one way or another instructions from the presidential administration and do not affect a number of tables of them. Thus, maybe this is a strong word, but they are focusing, since the population does not know, because the population does not know, since the population does not know, since the population does not know, since the population does not know, since the population does not know, since the population does not know, since the population does not What is happening in the country ... And somehow it is necessary to bring to the attention of the authorities that what they do in fact, the power does not cope with what is happening in the country because it deals with the population, which is becoming more and more cynical and less ready to believe in anything and therefore inert and indifferent. "

What is curious, Pozner’s statements immediately began to be considered not at all in a professional frame - why, in general, he advanced (“But the way critics often write about it, including television, does not bring benefits, because they do not offer how to make it so that it is different”). For example, according to the logic of the Political Committee ( "Riot of Liberals in the Political Elite" , Tatyana Stanovaya), "Pozner's statement fits into the general context of leaching of liberals from shelter structures. Liberals, like immigrants from the 90s, experience severe discomfort due to the fact that the authorities are increasingly distant from their basic ideas, considering them not as ideologists affecting decision-making, but only as “functional” figures that can improve the image of the Kremlin in the West. A special rejection of the liberals is caused by an obvious tendency to design state ideology based on non -liberal principles. "

And then they "prefer to leave, before that, having been in the role of" internal dissidents "for some time, becoming a kind of" Anfan Terryble "existing regime. But as an example, only A. Illarionov is mentioned here, who else? Further, only vague trends: “This process can also be observed in relation to the United Russia party. The“ liberal wing ”in the party, the creation of which was announced last year, almost imperceptibly, the dominant ideology (if not monopoly) became the social -conservatism of Boris Gryzlov.” But representatives of the “liberal wing” “EP” in the role of “Anfan Terrieg” and internal dissidents have not yet been seen. However, a survey, conducted and released the day before the Poznerov interview, also adds to Poserov’s history, which is why history clearly switches to a media territory, and does not concern “political elites” at all.

As for the survey, then, according to Kommersant (“ Russian authorities measured in seconds ”): “In March, TsEZ monitored news issues from 18 hours to midnight on five federal channels (“ first ”,“ Russia ”, NTV, TVC and Ren-TV), and also analyzed publications in four All-Russian newspapers ... Experts were studied with special attention. Experts. Experts. Experts. Experts. It was found that about 90% of the main news is dedicated to the authorities. Democrats and the Communists got 2% of the time.

CEZH is an extreme journalism center. Igor Yakovenko, the head of the Union of Journalists, he presented the results of the survey, believes that the higher objectivity of the REN-TV, controlled by the Severstal-Group Kremlin, is simply connected with the fact that “power, in his opinion, tightly controls the channels with the greatest coverage of the audience, that is,“ First ”,“ Russia ”and NTV, and allows us to be objective, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, we say Ren-TV and Echo of Moscow.

The moral from Yakovenko is this: "All five television channels are not the media on all professional characteristics." Because they do not inform, but "build parallel reality, where everything positive is connected only with the president, and all the negative comes from the opposition." For this reason, he does not consider to be journalists to be journalists. "They have another profession - a propagandist." Actually, in the end, it turns out just a dispute relative to the terms. Moreover, if these people are propagandists, then what are the claims to them? Of course, in this regard, Pozner’s further fate is curious, but in the near future it will not be possible to find out - “times” on vacation until May 14. But we note the difference: Posner nevertheless said that in the circumstances the circumstances can be invented. Although it is not clear what.

Yakovenko’s print media has not yet refused the right to be the media. But the “Vedomosti”, already turning to the “paper”, states that “and print media are turning into a rupe of the ruling party“ United Russia ”. Of course, in this regard, the well -known news is reported that the Izvestia newspaper has become an informational partner of United Russia, and the head of the party’s information administration Ilya Kiselev was determined there. Indeed, it is not yet fashionable to recognize the motivation for the purpose of the purpose), then the chief of the Izvestia, V. Mamontov, has already given several interviews, in which he categorically refused to connect Kiselev with the party line, for example, in an interview with Radio Liberty. I crossed, the first reaction will be: everything is clear, "United Russia" strengthens its positions there. Ilya Kiselev, a journalist, in fact, in his first education, was a lot of economics, frankly, we count on him ... Suppose, Ilya Kiselev would work in some other party, now, now they would say that some other party has strengthened Izvestia? No. We take it according to professional qualities and on those tasks that ... I would like to solve it in the Economic Bloc in Izvestia.

In the same interview, Mamontov said that Kiselev came instead of Andrei Kolesnikov. And why Kolesnikov leaves, Mamontov advised to ask himself. Kolesnikov, however, refuses comments.

Returning to two conflicting versions of the presidential message, we can assume that now there are two types of media. "Advanced" and "folk", working - quoting Yakovenko - in two different, and parallel, realities. You can even clarify that "advanced" - for persons operating in a market economy, and "people's" - for state employees. This does not look too populist assumption, especially since these two economies are precisely completely parallel to reality. At the same time, corruption is easily explained in this scheme: the same state employees simply want to participate in the market. What definitely demonstrates their liberal inclinations, regardless of the nature of their rhetoric.

There is a statement that directly connects corruption and television. Mr. Gref at a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Fund for the Development of a Public Television and Radio Broadcasting Fund said : "We see the development of public television as an important tool for establishing corruption in Russia." From these words it follows that Gref waved his hand at the rest of the television, since he hopes only for a public, which is not. And he needs objective journalism: "There is no other means of overcoming corruption, except for the openness and accessibility of all processes in the authorities," does not exist. "

And another media mystery associated with various social orientation of the media. The riddle is that both media that will be discussed belong to the "folk sector". And they parted dramatically, and at the point of view on Belarus. This is how the AiF completed its opus about the need to punish officials as a class: “The last of the fun of our liberals is to scold“ Lukashenko ”. But how to explain to people that our Russian democracy is better than“ Lukashenkovskaya ”, if in small Belarusia, more than five years of housing has been built more than in Russia and Ukraine, which is the explanation on the surface. Luke “puts its stained officials in Kutuzka, and in Russia 92% of land for housing construction is allocated according to corruption schemes. And as with a goose water!”

Meanwhile, in the "postscript" Pushkov on the TVC on April 29, an incredible occurred. The program put an ultimatum to the state of Belarus and specifically - its President Lukashenko A.G. The incredity of this event is obvious - no other media was about A.G. Lukashenko with such trepidation, turning into adoration. And now ... they seriously undertook, reproach for reproach: "First, the Lukashenko politician gives promises, then the strong business executiveman Lukashenko denies all this." "You cannot take into account the international reputation of Lukashenko." But from Mr. Jurgens: "There is such an expression - a son of a bitch, but - our bitch son. So, he is not our son, he all years very successfully bred us for the maximum number of benefits from Russia and minimal return." "With such a dad, Belarus has every chance to stay in the old virgins" - the resume of "postscript".

But after all, the "postscript" cannot be attributed to liberals! What is such a disagreement? Should it be assumed that in AiF is still not in the subject of a relatively changed attitude to Belarus? Or there is no such change, but is Pushkov got excited? But it is the attitude to Belarus that looks like a connecting link between the topic of foreign policy of the Russian Federation and bureaucrats. In this context ...