The creation of the Presidential Commission on Combating the Falsification of History to the detriment of the interests of Russia was met rather positively, and this suggests that the interpretation of the past again becomes exciting and generally significant. Indeed, every era in its own way comprehends the past, asks him new questions, highlights its various aspects and problems. The processes of active rethinking of history go among all the peoples of the post -Soviet space, and Russia would naturally draw attention to this, to identify its positions here. And the need for this is hardly new - rather, it has long been overripe. However, in the formation of this commission there are a number of moments that make you think about the adequacy of its organization - and, in fact, the problems of historical knowledge, and these most mentioned processes in our recently our space. And the matter not only in the composition of this commission that has already caused many skeptical comments, almost completely compiled of people, by the genus of their activities not engaged in historical research. The problem is deeper.
The new Russian historical policy , as it is loosened in connection with the creation of this commission, brings all the features of Russian foreign policy in relation to neighbors . Firstly, it is not even hidden that the need for “work on history” in this case is in no way determined by the internal needs of Russia, but is only a response to external stimuli. That is, this policy is fundamentally reactive, it is designed only to respond to all new challenges from the outside. Secondly, the new Russia does not offer its understanding of the past at all, it only expresses the willingness to protect the old Soviet historiography, which, incidentally, has already condemned itself more recently. And thirdly-there is no orientation to study history at all, such a task is not even set.
Nationalization of the past
The whole rethinking of the past that goes among the peoples of the former USSR has one common line: this is the nationalization of the past, the formation of national historiographical traditions, a national view of events relevant to each people. Hence the frequent answer to the Russian side: “We are not interested in your general view, we only talk about what happened to our people!” And this is normal - look at the historiography of any Western peoples, everywhere the situation is about the same. This is natural: historical synthesis is always a project of statehood, there was no other thing. History is not written without a subject of historical action, and this is exactly the subject, on the identity of which the state’s policy (real or desired) is based, its motivation for internal and external activities, its self -reliance.
It would seem that it would be natural to take part in the new Russia on an equal footing in the rethinking of the past, because the forms and ideology of the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union have changed dramatically . In the new reality, it would be worth it to realize their historical place and their relations with neighbors in a new way, enter into dialogue with them, try to hear and understand what is happening with them. But Russia does not offer anything its own, its readings and its interpretations at all: at first it tried to live as if “without history”, defining it all as a very “dark past”, and now only protects the old Soviet historiography in its Moscow anal version. Russia, as it were, wants to close in its borders as a kind of reserve “Memory of the USSR” and hang the signs “Do not bother!” On the gate. So the actual slogan of this newly created commission is not “let's understand the current issues of the past!”, But “You do not touch us!”
Meanwhile, no matter how it may be comfortable to live in memories of the USSR, the problem of relations with neighbors in the current reality will not go anywhere, but will only worsen. And the lack of its identity, its state project and its understanding of history will be increasingly manifested in the strategic uncertainty of Russia's foreign policy, in the absence of a established dialogue and understandable relationships with at least its neighbors.
So far, the ideological gap with the near abroad forces Russia to simply close informationally . We will not see on the book shelves abundantly published Ukrainian literature according to their version of history, we do not translate Polish or Georgian writings on the topic of relations with Russia, we do not take interviews from ideologists of anti -Russian orientation. In the Russian information space, the voice of neighbors almost does not sound. Russians learn about the view of the official regimes of our former “fraternal republics” from news releases, occasionally giving information about the next manifestations of “Friendship of Peoples against Russia”. This information hurts the consciousness of Russians, but the reaction is limited to a negative review of the protracted “growth diseases” and the old -time complexes of new independent states.
History as a problem of foreign policy
Misunderstanding and - let's say directly - the unwillingness to understand the social processes in the former Soviet republics led to the actual loss of them from Russian foreign policy. All post -Soviet years of Russian politics in their regard were built as continuing policies of relations with the Western community. The West is aggressive - the need to keep the neighboring abroad is aware, and then the options for holding it are going on. The national ideologies of neighbors, which have an almost always pronounced anti -Russian nature, are perceived only as annoying interference associated with the action of propaganda of Western competitors . At the same time, Russia, unlike them, does not work at all with the public opinion of neighboring peoples, counting only on business interaction with their elites.
This approach of Russia to the space of its former dominance is due to rather serious causes of a long -playing nature. And not least, this concerns an almost complete absence in Russia of an instructualized study of the former Soviet republics. Russia inherited the system of education and science from the USSR, in which the history, culture and languages of the Union peoples were studied only in the relevant republics. Ukraine was studied in Ukraine, Georgia in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan in Kyrgyzstan. It is clear that in this study, national personnel who speak languages completely prevailed. As a result, after the collapse of the Union, Russia faced the fact that it simply did not have its own centers for the study of neighboring peoples. It would seem that all this was supposed to serve as an occasion for the active formation of their own institutions, the training of their own personnel, but still nothing has been done in this area. In Russia there are no specializations on the peoples of the former USSR, we even formally do not have such specialties. Russia does not have any state research institute, focusing on the study of, for example, the history and culture of the countries of Central Asia, Transcaucasia or Ukraine. All working in these countries, which are, have other specializations or are connected with them with their origin. Specialists are not prepared, there are no research teams, there is no Russian school of study.
In those few cases when a specialist is still required with knowledge of the language and history of a neighboring country, the authorities or the media turn to immigrants from it or directly to foreign experts. Of course, a person for whom the homeland is not Russia, but a country of study, can hardly be an expert adequate to Russian national interests. As a result, Russia has almost no embassies in the near abroad that would speak the title languages of these countries, because there are simply nowhere to take such people from. Employees of Russian diplomatic missions cannot conduct independent monitoring of the media in title languages, often simply do not understand the ideological context of certain actions of the authorities or opposition. As a result, you can often see a very painful reaction to some statements by Moscow and its diplomats, completely not calculated to such a reaction.
This situation is extremely atypical. Usually the most significant centers for the study of countries that were in units of large European empires are located in the former metropolis. The old imperial centers of Europe to this day have the richest schools of the study of the previously controlled peoples, and in various fields of knowledge. They have a large state of experts, allowing them to pursue a competent and well -thought -out policy against these countries. Russia is a unique exception. Although even before revolutions, we had such schools, and they were the best. The main amount of information that the European nations about Central Asia and Transcaucasia was drawn from Russian sources. Why in Soviet times these schools were either destroyed or transferred to the Union Centers - a separate issue, which has its own explanations. It is difficult to explain why the new Russia is not trying to correct this situation. Instead of studying their history and culture, it forms bureaucratic commissions, which, obviously, "and so everything is clear." Our neighbors really declared us a kind of historical war, which Russia was not ready .
The case of the formation of new schools for the study of former Russian/Soviet peoples is a very laborious and expensive task, but also extremely important. However, the illiteracy of modern Russian authorities regarding the countries of the near abroad is so great that it does not even allow to realize the presence of the problem itself. For example, it has already been put forward by the ideas of writing joint textbooks on history, which first of all demonstrates the complete misunderstanding of the situation that, for example, the same Ukrainian version of history is fundamentally incompatible with traditional domestic (both Soviet and pre -revolutionary) both in its ethnonomination and in the factual structure. But, in addition to this, our ministers are obviously not known that in Russia there are simply no sufficient number of trained specialists in the history of neighboring states who could be entrusted with the writing of such textbooks. Although, in general, it is clear how this problem can be solved: several journalists are hired, who compile the desired “story” from the existing material ...
Holodomor
Recently, we have noticed (could not not notice) the efforts of Ukraine about the recognition of the famine of 1932-33 by the genocide of the Ukrainian people. It is clear why in Russia they suddenly paid attention to this. And the point here is not in history or moral aspect, just after the international recognition of the “genocide of the Ukrainian people”, Russia as the successor of the USSR will have to suffer rather serious financial and image losses. Meanwhile, the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine is already preparing documents on other events of our common history, which now has a genocidal interpretation. Mersing these topics has a serious influence on public opinion, developing anti -Russian sentiments in it, and the latter turns into serious political consequences.
Against this background, Russian politics looks completely helpless. And this helplessness is due to the fact that Russia is simply difficult to object. We do not have a single institution that would officially train specialists in the history of Ukraine. No, again, neither the specialties of such, nor textbooks, no courses, have their own concepts. All modern Russian Ukrainianism is created by enthusiasts who are specialists either in Russia or in Poland . Recently, some centers -oriented centers at a number of universities have appeared, but the naked initiative on which this activity is based has almost no financial and organizational support from the state. It is quite funny to watch how they are now trying to prepare political scientists in Ukraine, really not giving them knowledge either in history, nor in culture and language.
Russia does not consider it necessary to study the history of Western Rus', spend money on creating its own scientific schools. But only on the Holodomor, if the centers of the study of this problem were created in a timely manner, it would be given an order for specialization, normal financial and organizational grounds would be brought under this, then in the foreseeable future Russia would have their own schools who could enter the dialogue with the Ukrainian-Caaddese school on this issue. Now, Russia is forced to use the achievements of several scientists who were engaged in adjacent topics back in Soviet times and able to object something else. But, of course, in terms of research, this is a drop in the sea compared to what is done in this area in Ukraine and in Ukrainianist centers in the West.
The case of the formation of Russian Ukrainianism (in philology, history, political science, etc.) remains a task for a distant future. But the formation of a system of training specialists is only the first step. It requires the creation of a whole network of analytical centers on a fairly wide range of issues. The Russian expert tradition should be formed, common to most Russian experts the properties of reality receptions, which have roots in a certain view of the national interests and identity of the country, their problematic and discussion field. And this applies, of course, not only Ukraine, but also all countries that were part of the USSR. And now Russia does not actually have its expert network in these countries, does not work at all with the information space in the national languages of neighboring countries, does not work with the self -awareness of their population, with public opinion. Now, if Poland has its own centers for the study of eastern neighbors with dozens of well -paid experts in the states, as well as a large network of educational institutions preparing these specialists, then in Russia the creation of such institutions is not listed in plans . And even if now it is seriously concerned about this issue and investing really good money in this business, we, with great efforts, will approach the level of Poland not earlier than ten to fifteen years later.
Fashion for historical policy
“Historical Policy”, which Poland infected in the 1990s almost all former Soviet republics in the 1990s, still remains something incomprehensible and alien to the Russian political community. Mersing the tops of Katyn, the Molotov-Ribbentrop, occupation, hunger, repression, all kinds of old historical grievances and claims are considered as “growth diseases” that will leave over time, you only need to wait. Meanwhile, this is precisely the aspect of the policy of our neighbors, which is the function of national identity and will never leave by itself.
The new historical policy of the neighbors of Russia is a very long -term reality indicating the failure of the entire Moscow policy in the Posper Pepper space. Moscow remains its center, but rather the center of repulsion than the attraction. She all the time is forced to experience the failures of her policy in relations with the elites and the public of the countries of the former USSR and the social camp. The only way to be successful in modern international politics is a good awareness based on the activities of large research centers . How can one count on luck in historical disputes with the same Baltic countries, if our history is systematically not studied anywhere? And how can one effectively work on their information field, if we can learn their languages only in courses with appropriate embassies? Russia can imperceptibly lose all those numerous “battles for history” that neighbors lead with it. But the consequences of these lesions will already be very noticeable.
But the situation with the lack of Russian study of the history and culture of neighboring peoples is only part of a common problem with historical science in the country. All the 1990s were systematically destroyed, but with some changes in the early 2000s, many had hopes that the situation would improve. However, what is happening with historical science in Russia in recent years, otherwise it is difficult to name a defeat. Entire scientific schools are destroyed, the study of many countries and eras, scientific groups have been reduced by another third, or even more. It seems like a change in generations desired before that did not happen anyway, since in order for young personnel to come to the region, the level of their salaries should be at least slightly higher than the living wage. The persecution of historical science in the 1990-2000s are comparable to what was done in the 1920-30s-years of pogrom, when historical faculties throughout the country were closed. Yes, on the one hand, the current pogrom, of course, is more humane - they do not put anyone in prisons and camps. Yes, and more degree. But, on the other hand, in relation to science it is even tougher: then there was a task to rearrange science to new ideological rails, which in itself testified to the great meaning that the authorities attached to historical research. Now the task of simply the slow abolition of science as such: the country does not need historical research.
And instead of creating science, developing it (or at least stop its destruction), create a bureaucratic commission that is designed to explain to everyone what the past was . Of course, I really want to believe that she will do something useful, and at least in some ways it will improve the situation, somewhere the desired initiative. Unless it turns into something like a “ministry of truth” with repressive functions. However, behind this approach to business is a rather strange attitude to history not as a field of research, but as a monument, a kind of “bronze soldier”, guarding the ashes of ancestors. Moreover, as a monument to the already created - even he no longer needs new sculptors. We need securities and representatives of the authorities who will protect him from neighboring hooligans. And scientists - they, yes, are always interfered.