
The deployment of situations similar to what happened in Chelyabinsk has long been passing through the same scenario. The public reaction of indignation is combined with the open recognition that “it has always been and, probably will be”, the desire to eliminate the crime always appeals to its immediate results, guided by the principles of criminal law: so far nothing happens, we will do nothing.
In this case, everything is as always, and it is this rituality that causes a sense of collapse. All actions that seem to imitate a “healthy reaction to atrocities”, in fact, resemble an attempt to once again press the same button that has not been connected with anything for a long time.
This ritual of a “healthy reaction”, in particular, includes a desire to compensate for social offense, the hardships of the victim as quickly as possible. Justice should be performed instantly, because, it seems, its main principle is Lex Talioni (tooth for tooth). That is why, with any catastrophe of one or another scale, the question of the “speed of reaction” of official officials immediately arises. The authorities should be extremely fast not because it will actually solve something in reaction instantly, but because it turns out to be the instance of the execution of this Lex Talioni, an inexhaustible resource of the “return of the teeth”. In reality, such an idea of the legality logically ends in the very “grandfather”, which they say so much: it is in hand -to -hand combat to the tooth returns in exchange for another tooth with maximum speed. Power in such conditions is only a symptomatic expansion of the rules of this battle "for the weak."
Another ritual point, along with the imperative of speed, is the desire to exclude their own disaster from the social organism by expelling the one who "is responsible for it". Even if you agree that ministers and the president personally are responsible for everything, it is interesting to note that in such cases they require not so much answer and responsibility as renunciation of it. The only way for the authorities to answer and do something is to go into the misery of private life. That is, in other words, the power is a priori is guilty, but it is not always possible to prove it with such evidence as in exclusive cases of terrorist attacks, atrocities and disasters. As soon as the proof is evident, the authorities only need to make an act of public self -removal. Society lives on the principle of "not caught - not a thief", and if it is caught, then I will please you to obey in full.
It is difficult to say that it is the source of such a situation: the traditions of determining the evil and "pitch" Russian authorities or some atavistic features of citizens who relate to the authorities as a leader who, with a lack of countryt, should be put on a stake. Moreover, it is advisable to do this regularly, even if there is no inexpensive (you can find it in one form or another almost always).
The third, and perhaps the most modern point of this protective ritual is a discussion of publicity of the policy and a hypertrophied indication of the need for a “change in the system as a whole”. On the one hand, public gestures of politics, serving as a pretext for its desired elimination, are interpreted as some magic passes, which, if they were more correct, could fix it all overnight. It's just that our politicians "do not behave like that." But since they always behave incorrectly and a priori, "you need to change the whole system." The grandeur of the last task is here, however, not an invitation to at least think about it, but rather means the completion of the ritual: we already realized that it is necessary to change “everything”, however, since this is impossible, nothing will change. We are waiting for total changes.
All this ritual hides several ideological structures that obscure the whole situation as a whole, not even allowing to get closer to the posing of questions.
The ritual of "rejection of evil" requires that what happened each time seem to be a consequence of certain external reasons, in the place of which the power of one or another level usually interviews. In other words, ideologically, the question is always posed in the form of "who is to blame?" This form, associated with fairly strengthened liability structures (who is responsible for the lack of light in the house, who is responsible for the cat, which climbed into the tree and does not allow this house to sleep?), Currently does not work. It’s not a matter of “circular bail”, which the military prosecutor’s office is trying to break, but that, even tearing it to shreds, it is difficult to solve something.
Since such responsibility is always external, it always arises in a situation of failure, it is always post factum. And she gives rise to a deceptive impression that it was just that someone had made something or did not look. For example, she creates the appearance that, in cases of grandfathers, responsible officers indulge the raging “grandfathers” or even provoke them, that is, she hides the fact that “grandfathers” are not some external invaders of the army or alien, but the same soldiers who correctly playing army games (therefore, “grandfather” who does not beat anyone, causes real bewilderment and hatred). In other words, a sporadically arising “external and extraordinary responsibility” does not allow us to understand what is being done in the army, why some structures and forms of behavior are extremely stable.
As for the "grandfather", all this is manifested especially brightly, since the last event put the very concept of "hazing" on the brink of survival. Actually, in addition to the transfer of responsibility "in a circle", there is no longer any organizational and research mechanism. However, the "grandfather" previously seemed to be something "apophatic" - after all, it was determined negatively, as "tireless relations." That is, it was such an informal residue that it seems to be no, but sometimes it is very necessary.
Now, the reaction at the description level is different - the hazardous relations cease to be a relationship when one of the participants in the relationship is sent to the grave or wheelchair. This is either the former grandsonism (something suspicious, but inevitable and potentially useful), or a crime against human rights and the personality that needs to be disassembled in Strasbourg. Of course, the latter option assumes that this is simply the case of atrocities, manifested on the universal surface of a person’s relationship to a person, but in this case the very issue of the army, that is, the "place of crime", is taken out of brackets.
If violence in the army is simply violence, it does not have any specificity (then, apparently, the military prosecutor’s office is not needed). However, such a simple and as if a deideological solution has its own pitfalls.
The problem is that the "informality" of the hazardous relations (their fixation as that which is not fixed) has not yet allowed them to influence them differently than in the orderly order, that is, relatively speaking, in the order of the charter . The idea of the universality of the victim and the fact that the welfare of the state can be perplexed by no tears of the child, hides the fact that the army remains an institution, extremely heterogeneous in relation to those forms and rules of modern society, which most members are felt as a certain certain. Hierarchy, exclusion from "civilian life", own laws, lands, its own, although not autonomous economy - all this makes the army a fragment of an ancient institution, which in modern society is often perceived as a bone in the throat. Especially in those conditions when its functionality remains in question.
The distribution of civilian logic and ways of decisions is possible, as it may seem, only with the ultimate dissolution of the army in society, when the army does not exist as an organism in the body, but is sprayed in the form of separate duties of each citizen (which, if occasion, can reach the machine from the cabinet), although it is clear that such decisions are extremely local.
The problem of "hazing" and its management is not rested with existential allegations about its presence or absence. Violence in the army is not a purely Russian or Soviet invention (it is enough to recall, for example, such a classic as the "all -metal shell" of the village of Kubrika). Rather, the question is precisely in preserving - complete or incomplete - archaic of the army itself, its impenetrable historical and social border. We can put forward the assumption that the rationalization and “scentification” of the army applied for a long time only to the “army in action”, namely the theory of wars and military operations. Military science is a special science that is engaged in how the army should do its work and fight. However, its development (embodied in the structure of the "General Staff"), apparently, is adjacent to the fact that the social existence of the army continues to be a business not by military scientists, but by civilian "humanitarian specialists" who are obviously refused the right to be any adequate description and effective decision. The army as an institute is a blind spot of the army in action.
Undoubtedly, at the same time that a huge part of the "army problems" does not apply to the department of its own "military doctrine", therefore, preserving the army as a granted and further analyzed education, you can only aggravate such problems. Ultimately, one of the points that allow the issues similar to the "grandfather" should be an immersion, an injection in the "military science" of the actual "civilian" sciences, primarily the managerial and sociological series. Another thing is that such an immersion cannot pass without friction and cannot but destroy the impression of the self -evidence of the current structure of the army and its functioning.