In 1999, the question "Who is Mr. Putin?" Despite the fact that Putin worked for a long time in the administration of the President of Russia and the government of the country, Putin did not occupy the post of head of state, and it was not clear how he would behave as head of state. In addition, he, as most Russian leaders, came to power rather with a PR program than with a real plan of action designed for a long perspective. At the first stage, Putin was guided by political intuition and certain ideological ideas that formed both in the Soviet period and during his work in the public service after the collapse of the USSR . Based on these conditions, it would really be possible to wonder who he really is and what can do for the country? But the points over "I" were quickly placed by him. The decision -making speed was determined by the fact that he had a rational need to strengthen his own power.
Given his previous political career, Putin had to master Putin’s political art, so to speak, “on the go” and do it on his own, not relying on others . At the same time, for him, as a person from special services, the desire to own as much information obtained from various sources is characteristic, and it is likely that before making final decisions, he always demanded information about the problem, he found out the opinion of experts. It can hardly be said that someone led them or that someone imposed on him a decision. Rather, the state machine worked in the same mode as it. Putin and his administration realized one goal, trying to express the interests of the state machine and at the same time put it under their control. Since Putin was nevertheless president, and since officials understood which way the country was moving in, they gave advice and expert assessments corresponding to that logic, and did not try to contradict it.
In this way, the course that Putin spent in particular in regional politics began to take shape. The key here, perhaps, was the word “control”, that is, the concentration of power and the maximum possible control over power resources. This also implied control over the subjects of the federation, strengthening the power vertical. If we analyze how this course was implemented, it can be noted that in the very first period of the leadership of the Putin country, at the moment when he took the post of Prime Minister in 1999, if he had ideas about how to rule the state, then, in my opinion, not yet reconfigrated intuitive. Putin’s ideas about big politics and his political intentions began to crystallize after he received the status of the successor. This transition period ended by May 2000, by the time of the inauguration. It was then, I think that the intuitive ideas and sovereign instincts of Putin himself plus, of course, the position of his advisers, turned into a certain program for strengthening the federal center . The first step along the path, as you know, was the decree on the formation of the system of federal districts and the introduction of the position of plenipotentiary representatives of the president in federal districts. I must say that the centralization program of the Federation was developed very quickly, since the main legislative decisions that change the nature of the center with the regions were developed and adopted within a few months of 2000.
The entire Putin regional policy is permeated with the ideas of centralized control over a huge and complex Russian space. However, partly it was a reactive policy, that is, a policy of response to specific problems, periodically arising in this space. This is due to the fact that it was almost impossible to anticipate everything that can happen in the regions, but neither Putin nor his advisers with expert knowledge necessary for building long -term forecasts. However, with the adoption of new large decisions, no longer reactive, but logically arising from the previous ones, such as the transition to the appointment of governors, the search for the corridor of opportunities to expand control over the regions continued.
However, it should hardly think that the policy of strengthening the power vertical that Putin began to conduct, had some kind of clear alternative in post-Soviet Russia. The impulses to the centralization of the country were also noticeable under Yeltsin, but they did not acquire a systemic nature . Putin acted as an exponent of the collective will of state bureaucracy and the guide of a consistent policy, the deficiency of which was characteristic of the 1990s. In his place, any Russian president would have become approximately the same, unless he would be any notorious “pro-Western democrat”.
Thus, ten years after Putin came to power, it can be stated that the regional policy pursued by him was effective to the extent and to the extent that it can be effective in Russia. The achievement of the goals was, fortunately, Putin, even easier than it could be predicted at the moment when these decisions were made. The experiment that Putin put over Russia, over the Russian political system and on himself as the head of state, was a success. Regarding its results and methods, one can argue for a long time, but one thing is clear: Putin demonstrated determination and the ability to achieve the goals, became a politician with a capital letter.
However, the problem also is that these goals and this effectiveness have a small temporary horizon, which is limited by the medium -term historical perspective. They do not set the strategy for the development of relations between the center and the regions, the strategy for the regional development of the Russian state. However, it is necessary to make an amendment that the historical period experienced by us is still characterized by a high degree of historical and geopolitical uncertainty, and in this regard to expect something more over 10 years was not worth and not worth it. “Something more” would imply the introduction of some rigid ideological scheme, maybe a totalitarian nature, and Putin’s policy, despite the rigidity, was pragmatic and technological . And pragmatism in politics is still, to a greater extent, focus on solving situational problems that faces the politician here and now.
This is noticeable, for example, in the situation in the North Caucasus, the problems of which are currently and in the nearest historical perspective are not solved in principle. The North Caucasus can always provide reasons for intervention and, accordingly, Russian leaders always have the opportunity to prove themselves here with rigid people. At the same time, it should be noted that both Putin in Chechnya and Dagestan and Medvedev in South Ossetia made tactically correct decisions.
Nevertheless, Putin’s actions turned out to be effective from the point of view of the implementation of the decisions that he proposed. To date, I think it took place as one of the leaders of Russia, having removed all questions on this subject. Putin turned into one of the most experienced politicians of the country and at the same time into the most effective of all experienced ones: he mastered the skill of political tactics, hardware and political intrigue, proved himself as a person who knows how to set goals and achieve these goals.