Crisis in "Interevropier"

There was something like a “inter-European” that extends from the Baltic Sea to the space between the Black and Caspian seas and even affects the parts of Central Asia (Kazakhstan) between the European community and Russia. This is the intrauropier is politically too heterogeneous, but economically and military terms too weak to perform the functions of regional organizing force on its own. Therefore, the countries of the Inter -Europea rush between the two geopolitical poles of power, the European Union and Russia. In the background, the United States acts, pursuing its own interests, which are not so much in the peacefulness of the region as in attempts to prevent the revival of Russia as a great power or at least prevent such a revival.

Due to its political weakness, which is the result of the weakness of the economic, the state of the "Inter-European" became pawns in the game of rival geopolitical centers: the USA, Russia and the European Union. Moreover, the third stage of NATO expansion to the east has long been going on. Its purpose is to include the countries of this region in the NATO-centric system of European security, to dilute them with Russia for a long time or completely provoke their confrontation with Moscow. The Russians are interested in minimizing the influence of competing forces in this region. Nevertheless, the goal of Moscow to change the Western orientation of several countries could not be achieved by timid attempts to use the strategy of “discarding” through the “change of regime”, nor a demonstration of the confrontation course with NATO and the EU.

With the beginning of the Caucasian conflict, the EU began to play the role of geopolitical power and fulfill the intermediary mission. Until now, the EU, under the French chairmanship, masterfully resolved insurmountable conflicts of the interests of the EU and the USA.

The way Russia acted in relation to Georgia clearly illustrates that Western strategies may fail in the construction of democratic institutions in the region between the Black and Caspian seas, since it is impossible to use the advantages of the proximity of the European Union or NATO. And, despite the plans of democratic transformations, the EU projects to ensure the safety of energy supply from the Caspian and Central Asian regions must be built bypassing Russia, and it is also possible to use the possibilities of Iran, which are under threat. Moscow is quite capable of complicating the logistics supply of NATO troops in Afghanistan and abandon cooperation in solving international problems.

The no indicative, but helpless gesture of Mikhail Saakashvili, by the conclusion of Georgia from the CIS, weakened the CIS. The principle of a single treatment of the CIS President Putin was revised primarily in favor of cooperation with the states of Central Asia.

These strategic changes did not affect the countries of the interior, in particular, Ukraine and Georgia. The purpose of Russian politics was to neutralize their Western orientation by supporting pro -Russian or at least not definitely pro -Western forces. "Frozen conflicts" were an instrument of influence and actually insured Moscow from the possibility that Georgia in the foreseeable future will join NATO or EU. Having recognized both rebellious provinces at the state level, Moscow has lost this insurance and probably reached the result of the opposite to the desired.

The extremely strict military operations of Russia against Georgia and the subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that the Kremlin is not considered the legal capacity of the EU or the possible reaction of the West, in any case, with regard to the symbolic threats of the introduction of sanctions. So far, the score of the game in the interurop in favor of Moscow, since the EU on an extraordinary summit on September 1, 2008 introduced only a symbolic sanction: regarding the extension of a friendship and cooperation agreement between the European Union and Russia. Even if the West wins in this matter, in any case, nothing will affect the vital issues of European-Russian trade relations or investment policy.