Summing up the last two months of the political struggle in Ukraine, which began by the Decree of President Yushchenko on the dissolution of the parliament and ended with an agreement on the conduct of early parliamentary elections on September 30, it is difficult to help the ephemeral of the consent. Indeed, despite the fact that the parliamentary coalition won a clear victory “on points”, the president and his “orange team” requested a truce, only because they feared complete defeat. In fact, the truce lasted only two days, after which the situation began to aggravate again. There is no complete unity regarding negotiations in the coalition camp. The agreements reached can not arrange “orange”, as they “program” their defeat in the upcoming elections.
Indeed, Yushchenko failed to insist on the main condition that Tymoshenko pushed him to: on the election in the summer, in the holiday season, when the activity of Russian -speaking voters is minimal. In addition, the electronic register of voters, the creation of which the parties of the parliamentary coalition and the cabinet of ministers managed to insist, will prevent numerous violations that regularly took place in the regions of Western Ukraine, when an absentee vote occurs on the passports of missing family members. As a result of this kind of fraud in the Western, Prushchenkovsky regions of the country, it was possible to "provide" a turnout up to 90% - at that time at least half of the adult population is constantly on earnings abroad. At the same time, in the eastern, Russian -speaking Ukraine, the "orange" administrations did everything to prevent the citizens of Ukraine working in Russia to vote. The so -called "unscrewing sheets" were simply not issued without any explanation. Now this will be put to an end.
However, a more reliable key to holding on honest elections is a significantly intensified control of the local and government during the crisis. During the crisis, the country was clearly demonstrated that the main power structures and structures of the legality are in the hands of the coalition. The power structures were considered to be Prushchenkovsky either effectively neutralized skillful agitation (army), or showed their inefficiency (security service) during the struggle for power.
The decisive role in the victorious for the coalition of the completion of the crisis played control of the Ministry of the Interior. The Minister Sushko by the Encharger Battalion "Golden Eagle" without hesitation threw an attempt to unconstitutional seizure of the prosecutor's office with Yushchenko’s supporters. In parallel, the last desperate attempt to seize Yushchenko’s power through a decree on the retraining of the internal troops and the last desperate attempt. This attempt was also unsuccessful due to skillful opposition: some of the internal troops remained faithful to the office and obeyed the orders of Minister Sushko. The other part, ready to transfer to Kyiv to protect Yushchenko, was discovered and actually blocked in places of their concentration forces of the deputy corps of local Soviets. These facts live on a number of Ukrainian television channels were reported by deputies of local councils and mayors of the cities of Eastern Ukraine. Be that as it may, after these events, Yushchenko surrendered to the mercy of the winners and the crisis was "settled" for a little more than a day.
Returning to the final agreement of Yushchenko-Yanukovych-Moroz, it should be noted that most of the requirements of the Orange coalition were forced to accept. Of the major requirements of the coalition in the agreement, there is no previous condition to hold the simultaneously parliamentary and presidential elections. However, reasoning soberly, it can be argued that the coalitions and Yanukovych personally are disadvantageous re -election, and this is why: for the coalition parties and their voter, it is more favorable if the president will remain unpopular, weak -willed, and now even more weakened during the crisis of Yushchenko. The strategic goal of all parties in the coalition is to further weaken the institution of the presidency to one degree or another (although the Party of Regions, Socialists and Communists set accents a little differently).
If the presidential elections were held in September, along with parliamentary, the president would most likely become not Yushchenko, but Yanukovych in the event of his nomination. This is evidenced by all polls of the popularity of politicians. But in this situation, the president and the office would have to directly control their residents to manage the Western, traditionally “orange” regions against the will of their inhabitants, which would not bring Russian -speaking Ukraine closer to a long -cherished goal - regionalization of the country and the development of local self -government.
The long -planned so -called second stage of constitutional reform in Ukraine just provides for the expansion of the responsibility of local councils and a decrease in the significance of regional administrations appointed from Kyiv. It was the regional administration that were the guides of the Ukrainization policy, so unpopular in the southeast of Ukraine. If the events develop smoothly, the coalition from the current three parties will hold the majority and then will be able to focus on the completion of the reform of the Constitution in the direction that was promised earlier. To increase the status of the Russian language to the second state voice of the coalition in Ukraine, in its current borders, it will not be enough in any case, but they will no longer be able to effectively resist the Russian language as a regional “orange”.
The main locomotive of the constitutional reform was still the speaker of the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Rada) Alexander Moroz, however, overcoming it by the party of the electoral threshold, based on the results of polls, is still under some issue. However, being extremely interested in the passage of his associate, Yanukovych has already offered the socialists an association.
If further consolidation is planned on the coalition flank, the party situation on the "orange" flank has only become more complicated. The electorate is crushed: to two "orange" parties (Tymoshenkovskaya BYUT and Yushchenkovskaya "Our Ukraine"), another was added. From the Group of the Lutsenko group, the “People’s Self -Defense” movement arose from the Socialists, which was blocked with the “orange” camp. This movement, according to polls, delayed part of the "orange" electorate from the party of Yulia Tymoshenko But. If earlier the Party of Socialists to a large extent contained nationalists that were, which were, which were, which were rising under the European Social Democracy, then after the fall of Lutsenko, the socialists finally entrenched in the “blue and white” camp, which now, together with the Communists, could be said into a full-fledged tricolor.
The Communists of Ukraine in all surveys will also be held in the next composition of the Armed Forces. Their leader Simonenko speaks very decisively in favor of the abolition of the presidency institution in general and for the transition of Ukraine to the parliamentary system. Among part of the voters, this proposal is very popular, especially in the Russian-speaking southeast of the country, where Yushchenko uses a special antipathy. However, its practical implementation may turn out to be unprofitable basic forces for reasons that have already been affected above. In today's Ukraine, the weakened President of Yushchenko represents the Western regions of the country, being a symbol of the supreme power for the West-Ukrainian nation forming there. If the institution of the presidency did not exist, the question would arise about how to manage these regions. In other words, the point is not in the president, but in the fact that in the conditions of the split of the Ukrainian people into two nations, dual power can be eliminated either by force or the constitutional division of sovereign power within the framework of, for example, the Confederation. However, none of the parties to concessions on the issue of the authorities is yet ready.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that in Ukraine the question of the authorities is closely related to the question of property: it is simply impossible to acquire significant property and keep it without power. The initial problem is not that business intervenes in politics, but that business in Ukraine cannot exist without interfering in politics. Not all Ukrainian politicians are oligarchs, but all Ukrainian oligarchs are politicians. In particular, the President’s “Orange” is supported by the West Ukrainian, the so-called Mukachev group of Ukrainian oligarchs, whose representatives Yushchenko appointed the bodies of the national security of Ukraine and other bodies controlled by him.
Given all this, not one of the political forces, like the electoral and financial resources standing behind them, can afford to lose. But since the weakest side in this case is “orange”, it is from them that provocations and attempts should be to change the inevitable as the election deadline approaches.
Another obstacle to the implementation of extraordinary elections within the agreed period may be numerous disagreements regarding the specific content of the corrections to the law on parliamentary elections, which should adopt the Armed Forces of Ukraine to ensure their implementation. Here, the number of opinions approximately coincides with the number of parties, and as a result, the discussion may delay, leading to a breakdown of the agreements - which is already beginning to happen in fact.
Another obstacle to the elections in the designated deadlines may be a delay in the preparation of the electronic register of voters. The chairman of the Ukrainian CEC has already stated that for this he might need a whole year. Also, the question of expanding the representative office of parties in the CEC may require time for Utryaski. The status of party representatives is not clear, and what the CEC should be: a purely “professional” or “political” structure, including representatives of parliamentary parties as having a voice of members. Many are sure that in modern Ukraine no formally “professional” CEC can be guaranteed to remain independent of the interests of one or another political camp.
Given all the difficulties, we can confidently say that the political crisis in Ukraine has not been overcome, as evidenced by the complications of the very last days. The agreement of Yushchenko-Yanukovych-Moroz can only be considered the end of its next stage. It will not be overcome on September 30, even if the elections take place within this period. After all, the reason for the permanent crisis in Ukraine is the intransigence of the goals of two warring camps. At the same time, any “victory”, constitutional or power, is also impossible for any of the parties: this would mean the need for the “winner” to manage half of the population of Ukraine against her will. An extraordinary situation requires extraordinary solutions. Perhaps, to shift the situation from a dead point, we should wait for the Ukrainian political Olympus new politicians with new ideas ...