Translated material
Lost flights
Zefirov M., Degtev D., Bazhenov N. Aircraft-ghosts of the Third Reich: secret operations of the Luftwaffe. - M.: AST; AST Moscow; Keeper; 2007. - 526 p.
We’ll make a reservation right away: behind the outwardly inherent samples of the Mass Poll, a completely serious study is hidden, dedicated to the actions of aviation intelligence and special -purpose squadrons.
This is not the first joint experience of researchers. Earlier, this group of scientists was published by the books "Swastika over the Volga. Luftwaffe against the Stalinist air defense" and "The goal - ships. The confrontation of the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Baltic Fleet."
The book tells about the genesis and evolution of aviation intelligence in Germany - from the airships of the Kaiser Air Fleet to its revival, though already in the form of aircraft. It came under Adolf Hitler, not least through the efforts of the talented colonel Theodore Rovel. And the planes were not simple. The reconnaissance squadrons of the Luftwaffe included aircraft that could take long distance flights, such as the FW-200 "Condor" and the Ju-290 "Sea Eagle" (4400 and 6050 km, respectively).
The activity of reconnaissance aircraft was characteristic of all three fronts of Nazi Germany: Western, Mediterranean and Eastern. True, in battles against the Allies, successes were more often interspersed with failures. So, in particular, there was a failure of the massive abandonment of Abwehr’s agents to England, an attempt to rebellion in Iraq against the British administration broke. However, some failures were due to technical problems. This happened using the world's largest BV-222 Viking seaplane. Initially, this six -month plane with a flight range of 7000 km was designed as a civilian. But the Viking flight range brought Hitler to the idea of a bombardment with their help New York. A raid on the Jewish quarter in the minds of the leader of the Great German Reich looked simultaneously a symbolic act and an act of retaliation. However, the task was impossible from a practical point of view: firstly, delivery for refueling aviation gasoline on the submarine was associated with a huge risk due to its fire hazard; Secondly, the landing of the seaplane to replenish fuel reserves could occur only with the excitement of the sea, not exceeding two points. As a result, the BV-222 were used on the Mediterranean to supply the army of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, and then as distant intelligence officers.
But on the eastern front there were more victories. So, through competently conducted aerial photography from reconnaissance aircraft in June 1943, the Gorky Automobile Plant was seriously damaged. For a more effective reconnaissance-sabotage activity in the tundra east of Arkhangelsk, a secret airfield was created. Similar bases also appeared off the coast of the White Sea, on the shores of the Gulf of Mezensky, as well as in the Vologda region. Thanks to such airfields, the paratroopers of the famous Brandenburg regiment managed several blows of the strategically important Murmansk Railway, on which the Soviet Union received vital supplies to Lend-Lease.
In general, in the case of the abandonment of saboteurs in the USSR, the result was better than with Great Britain. According to researchers, the most objective number of real saboteurs arrested by Soviet counterintelligence is 1854 people, including 631 radio operators (ratio of 1: 3). But at the same time, 389 radio stations were not neutralized, whose work was discovered by the radio interception service. Consequently, about 1170 scouts and saboteurs were not neutralized by the "heirs of Dzerzhinsky."
What caused these successes of the Luftwaffe against domestic Air Force? It seems that they were due to both the low professional level of training of our pilots and the quality of aircraft. The authors of the book give examples when the persecution of the enemy stopped due to the breakdowns of the equipment or due to the impossibility of reaching the height attack necessary for the angle of attack. As for the pilot class? Still, the level pilots, for example, Alexander Pokryshkin (the latest archival studies indicate that he really destroyed not 59, but 116 enemy aircraft) or Fedor Arkhipenko, who had 44 victories and knocked down, including the ACA pilot number 2 Gerhard Barchorn (301 victories), rather, exceptions confirming the gloomy rule.
The question also arises why, having aircraft for creating long -range aviation (ADD), the Nazis did not take advantage of the corresponding opportunity. In particular, after applying the tactics of “carpet bombing”, proposed by the British Marshal of Aviation Arthur, “bombing” Harris, who said about the capital of the Reich: “I want to incine this nightmare from the end to the end,” the intensive ramps of RAF and AIR FORSE on Germany began. The first took place on the night of July 24 to 25, 1943, when the 780 allies bombers struck Hamburg. Well, the first serious bombing of Berlin occurred on March 6, 1944 by the forces of 672 American bombers of the B-17 "flying fortresses". The Luftwaffe, as a countermeasure, took attacks on Britain in mostly rather limited forces. All the same two-engine bombers were used, however, new models: JU-188 and He-177 "Grif". The latter, however, was more consistent with the characteristics of the ADD, as he had double engines that could cover a distance of 5500 km, but it was not reliable. Due to the increased fire hazard, nicknamed the "Lighter", "The Griff" was soon withdrawn from the front.
The military resources of the Third Reich were rather modest. Industry could not cope simultaneously with all orders of the Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarin and Luftwaffe. In addition to the natural formation and observance of a certain balance of the interests of the parties (not to mention competition within each of these departments), it was also necessary to compensate for combat losses, and in different years they were unequal. So, for example, after the end of the Westernyubung operation (the occupation of Norway), one heavy cruiser, two lungs and four destroyers remained in the ranks of Kriegsmarin. The remaining ships were either destroyed or required repairs.
At the same time there were serious problems with fuel. The main place for oil production was a deposit in Ploseti (Romania). There were deposits in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria. However, the mass raids of the Allies limited the possibilities of their use. Albert Speer, the weapons Reichsinter in one of the interrogations showed that since June 1944 it became impossible to produce a sufficient amount of aviation fuel. For example, in September 1944, instead of the minimum monthly need of the Luftwaffe of 160,000 tons, pilots received only 30,000. True, there were plants for the production of synthetic fuel, mainly gasoline, in the Ruri region, Magdeburg and a number of other places (it was made, as a rule, from beets). But its production decreased from 927,000 (March 1944) to 472,000 (June) tons. By the way, the use of reactive aviation was not least due to a reduction in the production of natural gasoline. ME-262 "Swallow", the most successful jet fighter, had a rather unpretentious engine that consumed synthetic gasoline. While his piston brothers due to the use of similar fuel quickly failed. But during the system crisis of 1944-1945 it would be easier to create cheap ME-109 and FW-190 than labor-intensive reactive "swallows".
However, if the Hitler leadership would choose a different production strategy, then the limited resources would still not give the opportunity to produce various types of weapons in volumes exceeding those (or at least equal to them) that the allies could create. So, in addition to the successes that turned out to be the defeats on land, witty Field Marshal Erich Manstein, “lost victories,” we can say about similar lost flights. Including the reconnaissance of the Luftwaffe.