The other day, Alexander Morozov published an article at the “Russian magazine” to the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall . I will express three remarks, setting them in the order of growing “seriousness”.
About the "Soviet people, who removed from the anchor."
Morozov writes:
“In 1989, the people, previously called the“ Soviet ”, starred. The drift began a little earlier, around 1985, but it was a drift by unwinding an anchor chain. Until 1989, society itself could not affect the "agenda." His expectations poured into the forms created by the CPSU Central Committee. ”
As far as I can judge, the anchor chain understood in this way broke earlier. More precisely, there were several chains. In 1989, the political and ideological, so to speak, went through a mass movement to abandon socialism. But even earlier, another broke - a chain of simple loyalty, obedience to the authorities. This happened in connection with the economic reform of 1987-1988, when the lower links of the economic hierarchy to a large extent ceased to obey the instructions of the higher (reform and perceived as such a “freemen”). This process is well illustrated by numerous interviews with employees of economic ministries, collected at that time by Sergei Belanovsky and published in the third issue of the production of production interviews (part of them are posted on his personal website ). In other words, by the beginning of 1989, a complete “drift” was observed in a significant part of the Soviet state-public organism, and no Central Committee of the CPSU could create any “forms” there (and could not control anything at all).
About the White Guard
The author considers Yeltsin in fact the heir to the White Guards, and in a sense (including in the sense of the style of that time), this opinion coincides with my impression:
“Yeltsin is one of the most mysterious figures in Russian history. The mystery is that Yeltsin - being completely Soviet in life history - turned out to be “white”. That is, roughly speaking, he behaved as if he were a Russian nationalist, the White Guard and the extreme right of the Republican. ”
But what is amazing for me is the attribution to the “White Guard” also Putin:
“What is essential in the topic“ Putin and 1989 ”? The fact that Putin, like Yeltsin, is “white” . He is not a “Chekist”, not “Stirlitz”, as they loved to write at first. He is something like an officer of the Kolchakovskaya counterintelligence, who was destined to restore Russia destroyed by the revolution. So to speak, to lead the directory instead of the resigned of Kolchak after the final victory of the white movement. Putin’s so -called public ideology - “stop the breakdown”, “restore the vertical”, “getting up with the knees” is the rhetoric of the Kornilov rebellion, counter -revolution. ”
Well, this could be considered a matter of taste. Well, golden epaulettes in Putin are spinning the author - and let himself. But the fact is that in this Morozov contradicts his other thesis, namely, the assertion that by the end of the Putin’s term, our country returned ( Mutatis Mutandis ) by 1989 - both according to some political characteristics, and in the sense of the agenda facing it.
“Russia, leaving the historical zone of the“ zero ”, generally feels perfectly that the main tasks of the Putin directory are fulfilled. Figuratively speaking, that on-line-game, according to the levets of which Putin had to go through to get his bonus, had a certain route. He had to bring the player back to the “return point”. Approximately to the point at which Gorbachev could not cope with the putsch.
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In other words, a colossal personal, meaningful effort Putin returned Russia to the point at which 20 years ago it was necessary to start on the rails, make the right choice.
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In the "zero", in the conditions of the "long counter -revolution" Russia moved back, back - through all the points of the route unsuccessfully passed, and then Yeltsin. And at every point Putin managed to restore everything “about about back”.
Here somehow it does not add up. In 1989, they moved along the “White Guard” paths under the leadership of one, then the other “White Guard”, and as a result they described a full loop and returned to the “red” (well, “pink”) point of 1989. This cannot be. In fact, at some point the “White Guard” movement should have been replaced by the opposite. A sort of generalized version of the Roll theorem . Another thing is when exactly this turn occurred-the point of “changing the direction” can be identified in different ways. But in the symbolic sphere, it is obvious - this is the moment of return to the Red Banner in the army (well, to the Soviet state anthem).
Assessment of "nineties"
The author of the article does not express a direct assessment of the nineties. However, the idea of his assessment can be obtained from how he evaluates the Putin zero. Say, the country was faced with the task of "restoring Russia destroyed by the revolution", and the Putin Directory solved this problem. Therefore, "thanks to Putin for the zero."
"Russia, leaving the historical zone of" zero ", generally feels perfectly that the main tasks of the Putin directory are fulfilled."
And further:
In other words, a colossal personal, meaningful effort Putin returned Russia to the point at which 20 years ago it was necessary to start on the rails, make the right choice .
So, the choice of 1989 was "wrong." And the nineties are simply a period of chaos, decay, political anarchy, and irreparable losses. There was nothing positive in them. (Morozov does not write like that, but I know that he implies this. I see these intellectuals through.
Here I have to declare my categorical disagreement with the author, and with it - with 99% of the thinking Russians.
The nineties gave Russia an exceptionally important experience - a reflection of a possible real exit from the repeating cycle "Tyrania - Troubles". Despite the collapse of one central government and a strong weakening of another, it was not a period of bloody chaos and anarchy - it is enough to compare with what came after the collapse of the centralized control system in 1917. There was a fairly long experience of peaceful life in conditions of significant diffusion (decentralization) of public power.
(I will immediately make a reservation about the “peaceful life.” Yes, there were outbreaks of organized violence on the outskirts, even war. Yes, there was an armed skirmish in Moscow in October 1993. Yes, the number of private violence not authorized by the public and other central regions of the country was sharply increased, but this was not a civil war. And in general, the objection is an objection consisting of “crime. I propose to mentally compare the situation in 1995, say, in the Kursk region or even in the “Gangster Petersburg” with Chechnya of the same time or Tajikistan three years earlier.
This is exactly what the doctor prescribed. It is on the path of decentralization and crushing of public power in as much as possible (within the framework of a reasonable) number of institutions and levels that Russia has a chance to break out of the cycle “tyranny-anarchy”, which has become so characteristic of it in modern times.
Yes, the situation of the nineties with this aspect of the diffusion of power resembled the situation in medieval Europe - hence the constant (then) screams about "feudalism". And what? If something is good and useful, I personally do not care that it is “something” to some intellectuals or boresic artists resembles something “archaic” and “reactionary”. Moreover, in modern Europe and America, fortunately for these countries, some “relics of the Middle Ages” remain in the form of decentralization, separation of powers and self -government.
Yes, people did not always know how to dispose of new institutions for their benefits, especially since all this was VNOVA. There were failures. But there were good luck, when it really managed to change the bad bosses, and to confront the wrong decisions of some institutions, based on others, and achieve the presentation of their interests, and organize something necessary and useful. This experience of life in the conditions of diffuse power also requires a separate description and explanation.
Why was this experience interrupted? More precisely: why Russian society abandoned the diffusion and decentralization of power in favor of concentration and centralization (and, accordingly, supported the Putin project). In addition to obvious psychological reasons and the following circumstances, I note the reason that seems to me key. This is the complete lack of study of the corresponding political ideology and philosophy of intellectuals in Russian. Moreover, this applies to all directions - to liberals/democrats, and to patriots, and to socialists. With the exception of a small number of marginal authors, who, moreover, are more likely to express images, emotions and engage in journalism, which present systematic philosophy and ideology (including criticism of dominant principles).
Yes, there was a movement for local self -government, including the intellectual movement, but the agenda itself and the ideology of this movement as a whole was “local” in nature and practically did not question the postulates on which the entire system of public power is based. In other words, it was “defensive” - to protect local self -government from centralist creeps, and not to undermine the centralism as a principle. This movement undoubtedly had achievements, including a strategic nature. In particular, the Constitutional Department of the MSU from the system of state power allows us to still maintain an elected beginning at least at the local level. But this is a defensive success that cannot give victory in this confrontation.
Why are Russian intellectuals so alien to the idea of diffusion/crushing public power? One of the reasons, as it seems to me, is that the Russians with their characteristic religious fervor were completely devoted to the confession of one of the main myths of Art Nouveau - the myth of rational control over reality (about the fundamental controllability of all things). This is evidenced, for example, the fact that “uncontrollability” (and variations of this concept) is one of the main curses in the Russian intellectual discourse. And the diffuse/fractional/decentralized public power is very poorly “controlled” (and ideally - generally uncontrollable). In order to trust such a system of power, one must have a completely different idea of reality in the head, which is not that reality is just a “game of strength”, and to achieve the good you need to control as much “forces” as possible and have as much power as possible (using a special force - “mind”), and that this reality has a transcendental moral basis, which ultimately excludes chaos and loss of meaning. Such a worldview is alien to the secularized, crypto-oxult consciousness of the intellectual modern. The Russian intellectual will still try to come up with how to scatter so much to catch steam and graze the wind.
Due to some strange historical circumstances, Russia turned out to be a good landfill for the introduction of the worldview of Art Nouveau into the brains and the corresponding social experimentation (engineering). Probably because we do not have medieval remnants.
Returning to the theme of the nineties, at that time we climbed into the water, not knowing Broda. And they jumped out of the water, not because there is no ford (it is), but because they were frightened of their ignorance.
Conclusion
Well, finally about hopes. I want to tell the author: your hopes are in vain. There will be no “right choice” in “New 1989”. There will be the same cycle - an attempt to “control” reality with the help of strength, catch smoke with your hands, and then the smoke will eliminate, and the “controllers” will again begin to persecute the vision of the chaos.
The way out, if he is, is not in “management with the help of a restored vertical”, and not in “chaos”, but in the new “residence of the nineties”. But already with open eyes and with an understanding of what and for what is being done.