
USSR and the Russian Federation - highly centralized, monocentric spaces -states; Their cultural landscape bears the strongest imprint of universal, total centralization. The USSR and the Russian Federation are centralized, as it is supposed to empires, which, undoubtedly, they are (were) 1 . The USSR and the Russian Federation are extremely characteristic of the presence of a powerful single universal center - simultaneously super -polyfunctional and territorial. However, the role of this center in our facilities is completely different, the centralization of the USSR and the Russian Federation quantitatively and qualitatively, structurally and functionally different . With the undoubted similarity of the USSR and the Russian Federation, their centralization is seriously different, which is completely insufficiently paid to attention both when trying to identify the USSR and the Russian Federation, and when trying to waste their waste.
In the USSR, despite the obvious eccentricity (placement of the center, the nucleus of the country, in general, on the edge of the territory), the center actually occupies the median position in a real-mastered space (especially given the Satellite countries of the USSR along its western edge) -in the Russian Federation, the Moscow Center stands on the very edge of the territory and, given the very size of the Moscow region, is the border, the center-on-border (returning to the old Russian Russian The archetype of the capital: such were Kyiv and Novgorod, and later Petersburg).
The territory of the USSR, understanding both the USSR in the narrow sense and the USSR, in the sense of expansion -imperial, was extremely contrasting and polarized, contained polar , opposite to almost everything - especially in the cultural landscape - territories and regions , even countries. The USSR Center balances the various and even polar macro -regions of the state. In the USSR, the Center is a balancer and mediator of the various parts of the territory of the power , a kind of replacement regions. In the most general sense, the center of the USSR was a special intermediary region between a diverse province and an equally diverse periphery of the empire, the fate and status of which were obviously different. There are contrasting differences and functionally polar roles of the Baltic Republics, parts of Europe in the aspect of the cultural landscape, a full -fledged province of 2 - and Central Asia, the cultural -landscape and territorial part of the Middle East (dual status - the province of the East and the deep periphery of the USSR); Caucasus and the "Russian North"; densely populated Ukraine - the provinces of the USSR with a well -mastered territory and developed processing production - and low -blue resource Siberia, typical periphery, etc. Moreover, such developed, fully provincial parts of Central Europe as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, and the socialist developing countries of the Far East, the obvious part of the world periphery, were. In a certain sense, the Center of the USSR mediated the European territories of the powers (both inside and outside the USSR), the general resource periphery of Northern Eurasia (Siberia and Mongolia) and the relatively densely populated Asian territories of the Greater USSR.
The very presence of heterogeneous parts of the country , especially parts with different vectors of geocultural and geopolitical gravity, makes the role of the center functional and in this sense justified . The Center removes the contrasting poles of the country's contrast poles, ensures the coordination and interaction of these different poles, carries out the functions of general standardization and even standardization of space, correlation, coordination, and the interaction of various territories. Of course, this role is the more important and the more massive, the more and the more different regions enter the country. The more contrasting the centering territory, the more relatively more and functionally it should be the center - of course, only in the imperial centralized model. Centralization is functionally inevitable in spatial polarization, in this case the center is functionally justified and for it there is a very special real role. The design "Soviet space" 3 as the implementation of the imperial imperative of the arrangement of space was, if not excusable for the large diverse space of the USSR, then it is understandable. (However, the arrangement of a large heterogeneous space as an integrated one is possible by the implementation of not only the imperial project, but also the federal project; however, the Federation from excessively contrasting territories is unstable, an example of which the painful decay of Yugoslavia was revealed.)
But just in this regard , the USSR and the Russian Federation differ very significantly and even radically .
The Russian Federation is much smaller and much more homogeneous than the USSR, especially less than the USSR, along with possessions and satellites. In the Russian Federation - with one exception - there are no macro -regions and its power and its powerful centralization is not functionally motivated. In the Russian Federation - unlike the USSR - the territorial and functional value of the center does not have a structural basis (and justification, if we speak journalistic). The only exception is the polar opposite of the generally uniform and loyal center of the North of the European part of the Russian Federation (the Russian North), this former flowering province of Russia, which was reduced during the USSR to the humiliating status of the periphery, and the internally heterogeneous and culturally northern Caucasus with its famous geocultural separatism; It is also possible to strengthen the polarity of the south of the European part of the Russian Federation (a kind of "Russian Ukraine") and Siberia. There is a clear contradiction and even a paradox : the modern center of the Russian Federation seeks not only to normalize, but also to unify the subject space, while the functional meaning and political role of the center is more and more justified in a variety of space - a small weak center is sufficient to manage a standardized homogeneous space.
In the global geopolitical and geocultural horizon of the USSR - heterogeneous, and the Russian Federation in the same context is homogeneous. Considering that the complexity (differentiation and contrast is aspects and manifestations of complexity) increases the essential, substantial, intensive size, the USSR is a large complex heterogeneous space , and the Russian Federation - (relatively) a small simple homogeneous space . Then the centralization of the Russian Federation and the value and significance of the center of the Russian Federation are completely dysfunctional. The Center of the Russian Federation becomes disproportionately and non -functionally great, and the geopolitical temptation of its transformation into metropolis arises, but it is this transformation - and even only the tendency - immediately actualizes the enormous potential of fragmentation of the Russian Federation. We should not forget about the huge surge of separatism - and not only ethnic - during the revolution and the Civil War of 1917-1922. And now for separatism there are enough grounds, for example, conflicts for the right to dispose of natural resources - or powerful (albeit little to the surface) processes of rapid ethnogenesis in the vast spaces of Russia (or, if you like, latent unfolding projects of new ethnic identities, projects of new "imaginary communities").
It is extremely different and the placement of geocultural-native regions in our countries. In the USSR, such zones, differing from the main territory, occupied the edges of state territory - in the Russian Federation a picture is much more complicated. In addition to the Caucasian Territory (the situation is obvious), in the very core of the country , in its Volga -Ural territorial and functional nucleus, there are specific specific - relatively much less than in the USSR, the basic level of differentiation - ethnic regions ; This is primarily Tataria and Bashkiria (Chuvashia and even almost completely assimilated Mordovia and Mari-El can be added to them). In the Russian Federation, a potentially foreign geocultural and geopolitically is located in the very center of the country, and a potential problem cannot be resolved by the separation of the relevant territories; The inside of the country cannot "separate" without the complete collapse of the state. The territorial and (partly) functional nucleus of the Russian Federation is occupied by the zone of non -Russian ethnic groups, foreign relative to the main territory. No matter how the regionalization occurs (although it is weakened now), during fragmentation of the Russian Federation, the model of “cutting along the edges” cannot be repeated, according to which, in general, the USSR collapsed and occurred; The continuation of this particular model is the separatism of a number of outskirts, revealed with different intensity - the republics of the Caucasus, Tuva, Buryatia ETS. Regardless of the probability of fragmentation of the Russian Federation (a number of authors consider it very relevant 4 ), such a model is impossible for it, which in many ways explains the current stability of the Russian Federation. The geopolitical Russian Federation is more stable than the USSR - but all the options for its fragmentation, if it is realized, will be much more radical. With a possible collapse of the Russian Federation - this will not be the collapse of the country, but the collapse of the state (the USSR was also not a country, but other education 5 ) - the preserved nucleus will be relatively much less than the RSFSR in the USSR; The problem is also that, unlike the RSFSR, that this nucleus is institutionalized in any way.
The role of the center of the USSR as a functional intermediary was also intensified by the fact that the space underlined this center was not limited to the borders of the USSR: the USSR actually was the core of the huge empire from Central America to Southeast Asia. Unlike the USSR, which was an integration core of a large heterogeneous totality of countries, states, territories, the Russian Federation does not have any noticeable external empire and is almost devoid of possessions and spheres of influence: external (outside the state territory) functions of the current center of the Russian Federation are completely insignificant; Of course, there is also the role of the Russian Federation in the CIS as its integration center-Jadra, but the role of the CIS weakens. And here the difference is so striking that there are doubts about the legitimacy of the comparison of the Russian Federation and the USSR itself, since the USSR was in a certain sense not a geopolitical whole, but only part of the (albeit special) macroregion -imperia - its nucleus; Should not compare the entire USSR empire with the Russian Federation? In this case, the differences in the Russian Federation and the "expanded USSR" will be much more significant. The USSR Empire is much larger than the USSR itself (and even more so the Russian Federation), it has even higher the contrast of territories, the polarity of different parts-by-owners, even more the share of the province and even more significant the dual province. If we find similarities between the USSR and the Russian Federation - and see them between the USSR itself and the USSR empire, then the similarity of the Empire of the USSR and the Russian Federation will already be noticeably less.
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No matter how the modern Russian Federation "actually" is correlated with the "true" (historical) Russia, there is no other Russia in the foreseeable future. The centralization of such Russia is non -functional, even dysfunctional, for the country it is excessive and burdened. Neither the country "Russia", nor the state "Russian Federation" of the Center-Stolita of such a physical and functional size is needed, they are harmful to them. With this level of centralization, something needs to be done. If you can’t even imagine an increase in the empire of such a size that the center becomes functional again, if we hardly submit the scenario of the “divorce” of Moscow and Russia according to the model (of the extremely successful) “divorce” of Singapore and Malaysia, then bringing the center to the required country of size can be achieved only by one path. It is necessary to rapidly reduce the functional size of the state simultaneously with rapid decentralization and even dismemberment of Moscow itself into those semi -settlements (or semi -sulfur settlements), of which it is actually “fifty”. The physical and functional size of Moscow is the function of centralization, and the latter is exclusively derived from the estimated space ... So, the intensity of space ...
1 See Kagansky V. National Model of the Cultural Landscape // Russian Journal, 06/18/04; Russian Federation as an empire // "Russian Journal", 12/13/04. And - later, but more details: Kagansky V. Russia - the USSR today? Comparative portrait of spaces. Article one. Similarities // Public Sciences and Modernity , 2005, # 2 Article second. Difference // Ibid., 2005, # 3. Article is third. The state of the Russian Federation and the Russian space // Ibid., 2005, # 4.
2 Kagansky V. Center - Province - periphery - border // "Russian Journal", 10/26/04. Read more - the cultural landscape and Soviet inhabited space. - M.: UFO, 2001.
3 Kagansky V.Soviet space - our inheritance // "Russian Journal", 08.20.04. Read more - the cultural landscape and Soviet inhabited space. - M.: UFO, 2001.
4 Yakovenko I.G. Russian state: national interests, borders, prospects. - Novosibirsk: Siberian chronograph, 1999.
5 In this essay cycle the text "Country and the state" is already planned.