
Ukraine chooses the president. The development of the Ukrainian pre -election situation demonstrated a new stage in the formation of "Ukrainian Political".
In Russia, they are inclined to evaluate the neighbors condescendingly - whether in politics, whether in the economy. The Ukrainian situation also provokes condescending assessments - you can sneak about an excessive number of candidates, you can joke due to the fact that among the real applicants are two former premieres of Ukraine (and another among virtual applicants). But it turns out that in terms of economic growth, Ukraine overtakes not only Russia, but also many European neighbors today. By the way, it is not the only one that overtakes Russia - and not only at the Olympics in Athens. For example, hysteria around the monetization of benefits and other social reforms could have been avoided by simply asking Kazakhstan - there we are ahead of the structural reforms for five years.
And if we talk about Ukraine, then they are ahead of us not only at the rate of economic growth. Ukraine overtakes us in the pace of the formation of civil society.
Unlike Russia, the Ukrainian political class, so to speak, to some extent perpendicular to the vertical of power. Political entities acting on different flanks are quite viable. This turns the theme of political reform into one of the relevant topics of this presidential campaign.
The key intrigue of the Ukrainian presidential campaign consists, oddly enough, not who will win the elections. And in whether Leonid Kuchma will be able to implement his scenario of a political form, in which the change of first person will not lead to the destruction of the political system, to the “cleaning” of the elites, to the political and economic “black redistribution”. That is why the slogan "Ukraine without kuchma", which has become the only ideological base for combining the scattered forces around the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, is a slogan directed primarily not against Kuchma or, say, against the party of the party, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. This is a symbol of denunciation of the entire system of vowel and unspoken public agreements, which still ensured the fragile unity of Ukraine and gave hope for the gradual formation of a new, diverse and holistic, Ukrainian political nation.
The fact is that Ukraine is a unique test training ground in the history of recent decades, on which in real time an experiment is put in the center of which is the possibility of forming a new macro -level national -political subject corresponding to the scale of the 21st century policy.
The Ukrainian nation in its current version never existed in history. It arose in 1991 as a result of an amazing geopolitical process carried out as part of the USSR project. It was under the auspices of the USSR that the territories were collected together, on which eastern, cetral, Western, Carpathian and other Ukrainians lived in the first half of the 20th century. It was within the framework of the demonstration and demagogic national-cultural policy of the Bolsheviks that the Ukrainian language was proclaimed official language. It was for the implementation of Stalin’s ambitions that the Soviet foreign policy has achieved from the allies for Ukraine the status of a full -fledged UN member, which leads its own foreign policy. It was the division of labor in the framework of the Soviet centralized economy that turned Ukraine into an industrial, scientific, technical and raw material base of the Soviet Empire. Finally, it was the vicious practice of the Soviet party and state construction that increased the status of the Ukrainian political elite, turning it into one of two - along with the Russian - reserves of the formation of the personnel resource of the highest government. For decades, Ukrainian politicians entered the top leadership of the USSR, and two of the seven Soviet leaders - Khrushchev and Brezhnev - were immigrants from Ukraine, another - Chernenko - by a Ukrainian by origin, and the latter, Gorbachev, who was in vain tried to tie Ukraine to the USSR by the appointment of the Ukrainian party leader Ivashko to the post of deputy secretary, - Kuban, embodied the unrequitedness of the bonds Russians and Ukrainians.
It is no accident that the proclamation of state sovereignty in August 1991 was confirmed by a popular vote in a referendum in August 1991. And during this referendum for the independence of Ukraine, more than 94 percent of the votes of citizens of the former Ukrainian SSR voted - that is, all together, gathered in the 20th century on these lands together: Galicians and Kiev, residents of Lugansk and Kharkov, Ukrainians and Russians. Citizens of Ukraine voted for political and state independence - that, in conditions of multi -confessional, multi -cultural and multilingual Ukraine, only one thing could mean: we are talking about a new national association, about a new statehood in which a place for everyone would be found, this statehood who has chosen and proclaimed.
However, the remnants of the political culture of the Soviet period gave a paradoxical result. Having abandoned the political monopoly of communist ideology, the creators of an independent Ukrainian state could not abandon the political monopoly as a method. The militant ideological internationalism of the time of the authorities of the CPSU was replaced by nomenclature ideological nationalism, uncomfortable and not necessary for anyone, and most importantly - contrary to the interests of the new Ukrainian nation.
In an amazing way, during the first thirteen years of Ukrainian independence, the outcome of all elections - presidential, parliamentary - was determined by the so -called "eastern majority." And the national policy was controlled by the "Western minority", which artificially pushed the majority from the levers of power and influence, from the information-ideological channels.
The result was not slow: the new Ukrainian society, at the end of 1991. Almost more cohesive than the long -standing fronties - the Baltic countries - came by 2004 with a sense of disappointment and nostalgia. According to polls, in 2001, 51.3%of the total number of respondents would again vote for independence, in 2002 - 48.8%, and in 2003 - 46.5%.
However, if the development of Ukrainian society were unequivocal, if the real filling of Ukrainian politics were exhausted by ideological distortions, today we would not have the opportunity to talk about the economic breakthrough of Ukraine, its new role in the geopolitical space, about its successful political development. In fact, Ukraine today combines two lines, two possibilities.
It is no coincidence that the types of two main election coalitions that are forming today systematically differ from each other. The coalition developing around Viktor Yanukovych is a prototype of the polyvariant, but unified political Ukraine. The atmosphere of pragmatism is hovering over this coalition, if you like, trading, its participants appeal to the mind of voters, refer to the numbers of achievements, promise specific solutions. Viktor Yanukovych is reasonably accused of using an administrative resource - because the current head of government, the resource of real power, makes it possible to agitate with a business, result, the opportunity to attract the attention of the voter to specific actions of the authorities.
A completely different coalition develops around Viktor Yushchenko. This is the prototype of the rally, "sicheva" Ukraine. Its participants appeal to emotions, to the discontent of people, promise them to "change the right wrong." It is no coincidence that Viktor Yushchenko put forward a huge rally (unlike Yanukovych, nominated by a block of parties and organizations). The emotional -milled element equalizes everyone - intelligent liberal economists, and special vetech with American citizenship, and terry fascist xenophobes - and accumulates their energy for destruction.
Today, both coalitions are gaining strength and hoping for victory. And it is unlikely that today it is safe to predict who will win. But the consequences of the victory of each of them are quite obvious.
Analogies with Georgia and Serbia in relation to Ukraine have been given more than once. However, Ukraine is not Serbia and not Georgia. Manipulated mass hysteria can be effective in a homogeneous society that can - at least temporarily - to impose the illusion of unity. But all the same, as a result, the "areas of heterogeneity" do not remain in the previous state - they are either absorbed (like Ajara) or finally rejected (like Kosovo or South Ossetia). For Ukraine, an attempt to hysterical unification cannot end in anything other than the crash of the very idea of the new Ukrainian statehood.
The prospects of the presidential campaign in Ukraine are quite understandable, although even now not a single conscientious sociologist will be decided to give an accurate forecast. This is due to the specifics of the prevailing election confrontation, the specifics of two political lines associated with undeniable campaign leaders.
These two lines are combined with each other very peculiarly. What is Yanukovych's Line? This is a typical "version of Putin": a bet on specific achievements as the current head of government, consolidation rhetoric, social orientation. This version of the change of power was brilliantly implemented in Russia and allowed to ensure stability, continuity of power and at the same time give people a sense of a new start, hope for serious changes. What is Yushchenko's Line? This is a “option of Saakashvili”: a bet on the fatigue of the population from the previous government, on the injection of dissatisfaction, on the “effect of the crowd”, for the non -critical perception of “revolutionary slogans”. This option allowed in Georgia to carry out the usual "elite cleaning" under the cover of the "people's revolution" and clearly implement the program for the change of power developed outside the CIS.
What is the peculiarity of the current Ukrainian election situation? The fact that for the first time in the post -Soviet space "Putin's Option" and "Saakashvili option" came together on the forehead, and both options are represented by strong players. And we are not talking about which of the candidates is stronger or better, but about who will be able to impose on the country his agenda of elections. If we are talking primarily about pragmatics, about the results, about economic growth, about the prospects for the country's development, about rational arguments - then the Yushchenko team will look weak, if not marginally. If voters manage to plunge into mass hysteria, then Yanukovych with all his “specific achievements” may simply not hear against the backdrop of the loud pre -election PR of the Yushchenkovites. Until now, no one has been able to "pull the blanket." Therefore, the elections are so scandalous and like a loud dialogue ... Say, deaf with blind. And it all depends on what the voter will do - he will plug the ears or click.
As for Russia, its interests now, obviously, coincide with the interests of "Big Ukraine". Russia needs strong, reliable and stable Ukraine - and independent and sovereign. For Russia, difficult and partly conflict relations with such a “big Ukraine” are preferred than dubious acquisitions that could follow after the collapse of the current Ukrainian state and its section between Russia and the West into unstable puppet formations. And to the "Big Ukraine" the line of Putin-Yanukovych gravitates. And not the Saakashvili-Yushchenko line.
That is why the choice for Russia is not so simple, but quite obvious. Ukraine, which chose pragmatism and reforms, strong, diverse and independent - this is not a gift for Russia, just say. Long experience in interaction with Ukraine Leonid Kuchma gave us many sad examples of mutual misunderstanding - and that is why today some experts are trying to warn the Russian authorities from a single choice: they say, you will support such and such a candidate, and he will become president and will “throw you”. Yes, of course, he will "throw"! As the head of the independent fifty millionth power, which has its own interests, not always coinciding with Russian, it will be a difficult and not always convenient partner. But the alternative to this is not a “more convenient” partner, but the absence of a partner. Moreover, not only the partner-heads of the state, but also the partner-state, a partner, in the place of which we will have to get out of the “porridge” of dangerous conflicts and other people's intrigues brewed with unfriendly hands.