The body is without an idea

So, over the past months and weeks in Ukraine, the removal of the vertical of power near Yanukovych, which gradually began to pushing from the power of former and existing allies, has almost completed. Such actions of the head of state may well lead to further reformatting of the Verkhovna Rada. And if the destruction of the unity of the BYUT faction will be continued, then the pro -presidential Party of Regions will have more the necessary 300 votes in the country's parliament.

What is the weakness of Yanukovych

It was then that a natural need will arise to translate real changes in the management of the country into a legal direction-that is, again redistribute the powers between the president, government and parliament. This means that in a year, Yanukovych can try to regain the powers of A la “early Kuchma”. However, this, no doubt, will lead to a number of difficulties. Firstly, you will have to suppress the resistance of large owners. There are too many subjects in Ukrainian politics, and there is no unified decision-making center de facto. At the same time, there is a great influence of the financial elite, who is used to considering politicians as instruments of protecting their interests or playing several efforts at the same time. Accordingly, it is unprofitable for her to deal with only one owner. The smoldering split between different political forces is only for a while covered in fear of the crisis.

Secondly, the “anti-tobacco campaign”, which unfolded against the Minister of Education of the Tabachnik, demonstrated the inability of the regionals to successfully celebrate with Galician nationalism. The policy of “affairs instead of words”, of course, is very effective. But if the authorities do not play on the field of history and culture or tries to abstract from these problems, journalists, opposition and other representatives of the “third sector” who have not yet forgotten how to make “color revolutions” are intercepted.

The technocratic vertical (without the ideological component) will stumble to the same place in which the Kuchma power system collapsed. She will have to make gradual concessions to large owners, which in recent years have turned into the most important decision -making centers in intra -Ukrainian politics, as well as trying to maneuver between different ideological groups, the requirements of which in principle cannot be satisfied.

The best time for reform

At a recent meeting in the United States, the President of the United States Obama told Viktor Yanukovych that this time is the best for reforms. This applies not only to the economy, but also to ideology in Ukraine. It's time not to close from it, but to try to develop something intelligible and integral for the whole society, not leading to the provocations of the marginals from both shores of the Dnieper. Yanukovych has a unique chance to create a polyarchy in Ukraine - the multi -speed of different decision -making centers - which will become a model for overcoming schisms for other unstable states . But he can do this only by contacting the opposition. The opposition is now split as never before. Many of her representatives do not tolerate each other, while some of them have agreements with the authorities to work against each other's image.

The growing internal split among the opposition, which is provoked by power, is burdened by the lack of systemic and “fresh” vision by opposition politicians to solve the problems of the Ukrainian economy and politics. There was no ideological competition between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko as it was. They continue to compete at the level of image and solutions to momentary problems (by the way, Tymoshenko showed themselves better on this field). In this case, the opposition (in the person of Tymoshenko) is difficult to count on the mobilization of at least most of the protest electorate. To this it is worth adding that Tymoshenko is perceived by many strong players as a too impulsive person with whom it is difficult to deal with. Therefore, the Ukrainian large business was considered before the election of Yanukovych to a more acceptable candidate.

As for the “windows of opportunities for the opposition”, then they are quite significant.

Firstly, the authorities are mired in economic problems. In Ukraine, the country's budget has not yet been adopted. And in Russia there is confidence that Yanukovych will not provide the Russian campaigns with the preferences that they could receive under Tymoshenko.

Secondly, Tymoshenko is the strongest inner pressure lever on Yanukovych. Especially in the public sphere. The main opposition, which Viktor Fedorovich was until March this year, did not even go to open debate with Tymoshenko Prime Minister. It must be understood that the positions of Julia Vladimirovna as a “truth -making” were only strengthened.

Thirdly, European integration under Yanukovych will come across the same obstacles as with his predecessors-the inability to adjust the legislation, the acute nature of the internal struggle, which prevents the fulfillment of all European conditions, the unwillingness of unilateral concessions, and finally. Tymoshenko has a chance to appeal again to the European elite with his model of relations of European-Russia.

Fourth, Tymoshenko has about 15% -18% of the electorate, which are its fans, that is, they will not stop voting for Tymoshenko, most likely, in no case.

Presidential competition

The Lakmusov piece of paper for the authorities - checking the strength of its administrative and ideological components - will be local elections in March 2011 and especially the elections of the mayor of Kyiv, which (taking into account the weak positions of the current mayor) can give a powerful platform for PR. But even if Butus won, the unambiguous revenge of the “orange” forces should not be expected. Behind external stability hides the same large fragmentation of the political field of Ukraine.

In the east of the country, Yanukovych had a strong competitor in the person of Deputy Prime Minister in economics Sergei Tigipko . Things are even more confusing in the West and in the center of the country. Political passions, and as a result, the mobilization of the electorate, weakened. There is no universally recognized leader yet. Some opposition, it seems, cannot say for sure who they are more than the opposition - Yanukovych or Tymoshenko. As a result, if the parliamentary elections took place now, then on the one hand the National Democratic Camp would have suffered greatly due to the collapse of the Union of “our Ukraine” and “People’s Self-Defense”. On the other hand, the Party of Regions also has a ceiling, above which they usually do not “jump” - 30%-35%. And at the same time, part of the electorate can go to Tigipko. As a result, you get an even more unstable parliament than the current one.

However, the will of Yanukovych to stability and the decision of the Constitutional Court on the legality of the existence of the current coalition in parliament, most likely, will not give soils for re -elections for a year or even several years. During this time, layouts can change several times. True, now it is clear that if the authorities do not undertake to solve the problem of ideological mosaic and conflict between different Ukrainian identities, then the split will remain, which will be the repetition of the 2004 scenario.