We are very Eurocentric

I continue to read B.V. Makarova with curiosity. Here is such a thesis of "the main lesson of European history consists in the futility of fundamentalism, when even cultural policy was fueled by hegemonism." You know the conclusion is very unpleasant. Our rhetoric about self -identification and rejection of Euroorientation, alas, is based on Euroorientation. But it looks that way. We focus on what has long slipped off and gone, and we seemed to fall on the shadow of the passing one, and not even to the shadow, but to the place in which there was a shadow and now it slipped away.

Alas, alas, alas, we are Russians very much Eurocentric, it may be even more Eurocentric than Europe itself. Europe, as it were, is in the search, and in our efforts we somehow brake, or maybe through our efforts we brake. What yesterday was Eurocentrism, well, some 30 years ago, and we are right there. We look around today in search of great European politicians (de Gaulle, Churchill, etc.), and Europe in its search has long abandoned the principle of great politicians, and we are right there. We somehow slip back and the most interesting thing that Russia is in Russia who feel this feel that our fundamentalism is just a miserable delay. Listen into criticism of Russia flying into the modern authorities from all sides, behind a common political choir you can sometimes hear this awareness of delay. Not a search for identity, namely the replacement of this identity by the deepest habit of being late. And for many centuries we have forgotten how to walk on our own and present anything, but not ourselves as identity, we present what happened but slipped into the past.

And we continue to focus on this very, as Markov says "hegemonism". Watch who our allies in Europe are modern hegemonists, with the thinking of Europeans of the late 30s, with installations on "blood and soil". And here the war in Europe, again looks through the dirty curtain and it seems to me that everything will now depend on only two things: the ability of Russians to tighten the belts and the desire of the Russians to obey any idea. What idea? Doesn't matter! Will we have enough spirit?

It is important that this question about this is the spirit to manifest the hegemony through an adventure, for which people will pay with a long belt and another enthusiasm, or will we have the spirit of preventing war? And for this and the spiritual power to which he calls us, as it is not strange, is our habit of following Europe, alas, our habit of following Europe with a quarter -century lag. And this is not an economic lag, but a lag in understanding what is happening, in the perception of new challenges that not only the economy, but also geopolitics dictates to us, but also social psychology, etc. etc.

They already rushed somewhere, into the area without this, and we are still in the dust of the fight that everyone began to forget, but we consider this as the present. Will we have the spirit not to tighten the belt and not obey someone else's idea, but still give birth to something of our own? Against the background of this, it recently made a terrible conclusion: in the Orthodox churches there are no youth. There are Soviet old people and Soviet elderly people with children, but there are no youth. And if anyone leads youth to the Orthodox temple, then somehow deliberately, with an internal shoot. We seemed to learn something and are afraid to tell about it. And after all, these Soviet elderly people bring children to their Soviet Orthodox temple, as in the last hope of their lives, and not as an Orthodox temple, but children cannot understand this.

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