| Kim Jong Il torments American hawks with atomic mysteries Sensational statements by Americans that the DPRK has “admitted” to violating “every conceivable agreement” on nuclear non-proliferation continue to shake the Asian region. However, in fact, the American emissary Kelly on October 4 in Pyongyang was only told that the DPRK would be able to produce not only nuclear weapons based on the uranium process, but also more powerful weapons if the United States did not abandon the threats. And nothing more than that. According to Pyongyang, Washington can get a solution to the problem if it recognizes the DPRK and concludes a “non-aggression pact.”
But what else could the DPRK authorities do? On the first day of negotiations with Kelly, the North Koreans categorically rejected accusations of a “secret uranium program.” However, in the United States this reaction was a priori regarded as “lame excuses.” It seems that the original purpose of Kelly's mission was to demonstrate the intractability and deceit of the country's "axis of evil." This would help create a pretext for the United States to withdraw from the 1994 framework agreement, according to which a nuclear power plant was to be built in the DPRK by 2003, and at the same time “hold back” its allies in Tokyo and Seoul, who were distributing advances to Pyongyang.
However, Kim Jong Il deftly responded to American accusations with the formula “neither confirm nor deny.” It is impossible to objectively prove the existence of the North Korean nuclear program. It seems that the Americans only have information about Pakistan’s supplies to the DPRK of some components of the relevant equipment. Islamabad denies this, there is no independent confirmation. President Bush is not in the mood to talk to Kim Jong Il, but then concerns about North Korean weapons of mass destruction will remain.
Now Washington is trying to scare the world community. He has already twisted the arms of his allies in Japan and South Korea, forcing them to accept a trilateral statement during the APEC summit in Los Cabos, which speaks of the DPRK’s nuclear program as a proven and real matter. But Chinese leader Jiang Zemin did not succumb to blackmail during his visit to the United States, emphasizing only the importance of a peaceful resolution of the problem.
From a moral point of view, Pyongyang has reason to believe that the United States has not fulfilled its obligations under the first framework agreement, and therefore it is seeking a new pact. But then Pyongyang may well allow international inspectors to visit the sites of interest, who will make sure that no uranium enrichment facility exists.
The Americans say that North Korea began a uranium enrichment program several years ago. The Pentagon chief said the United States already knew that North Korea had enough plutonium to produce one or two atomic bombs. The information that Pyongyang could allegedly create two or three more nuclear warheads based on enriched uranium in the foreseeable future and increase its nuclear arsenal to three or four units could not, in the eyes of Washington, qualitatively change the assessment of the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula.
However, only now has a large-scale scandal emerged around North Korea's nuclear program. It is obvious that the Washington administration held this card in order to ensure American dominance in Korean affairs at the right time - including by undermining Pyongyang's trusting relations with Beijing and Moscow.
What should Russia do? With all the Kremlin’s commitment to non-proliferation and the awareness that the “nuclear crisis” violates Russian plans in Korea, including economic ones, blind support for the US position is not a solution. It should be taken into account that the United States can implement several different scenarios in Korea.
The first is to increase pressure on North Korea, even to the point of using force. However, it is unlikely that it will be possible to put together an international coalition for this purpose, since even Washington’s closest allies, not to mention the PRC and Russia, doubt the validity of the US arguments. In addition, the North Koreans in their statement vowed to die rather than submit. So, to fully clarify the truth, the United States will have to go to a large-scale war; for Russia this is beyond the realm of possibility.
Second, the United States will ignore Pyongyang’s approaches, trying to tie the hands of its allies in developing dialogue with the DPRK and providing assistance to it. The breakdown of Japanese-North Korean negotiations on normalizing relations fits into this scenario. Washington will argue that the DPRK's nuclear program is a proven matter, and therefore international isolation of the Kim Jong Il regime and increased pressure on it are necessary. Then Russia will find itself in a difficult position - based on its own interests, it will have to support the DPRK, while trying not to spoil relations with the United States. The situation is dangerous, since it is possible that sooner or later the North Koreans will have to escalate the situation.
The third is a logical, but not desired by Washington hawks, scenario, which involves resolving the problem through direct dialogue between the United States and the DPRK. China, the EU, Japan and the Republic of Korea would like the same thing - even taking into account the change of administration in Seoul, it will be interested in cooperation with the North. For Russia, taking into account the trusting relationship between the Russian leader and Kim Jong Il, a fertile diplomatic field opens up here.
We can only count on the unpredictability of the Pyongyang “great commander.” Why doesn’t he declare at the right moment that he was “joking” and that the DPRK does not have any nuclear program? Then the Americans would have to “eat their hat” and sit down at the negotiating table, unless they again impose conditions like “total checks and inspections.” But here Russia, China, and even the US allies will have much more arguments to convince them to resolve the matter peacefully. Georgy BULYCHEV, IMEMO RAS |
|
