| Georgia decided to get rid of Russian peacekeepers Yesterday, Georgia warned that it was going to reconsider its approach to the activities of Russian peacekeepers on its territory. For the first time, dates for the end of their presence were outlined in an openly ultimatum form. If Moscow does not urgently ensure progress in resolving conflicts between Tbilisi and the two rebel republics, the Russian peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia will be interrupted on February 10, 2006, in Abkhazia on July 1, 2006.
The ultimatum was voiced by the Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Nino Burjanadze. At the same time, she instructed the government to develop a “road map” for a detailed settlement process in Abkhazia and South Ossetia by December 1, 2005. Parliament will approve the corresponding resolution at the next session in early October.
The current form of activity of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was determined by an agreement signed by the presidents of Russia and Georgia on June 24, 1992 in Dagomys. Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Georgiy Khaindrava said at a press conference in Moscow that its revision will happen “not today, but perhaps tomorrow.” “Russian peacekeepers have actually refused to fulfill their mandate,” Mr. Khaindrava declared.
This statement was preceded by a ten-day wave of accusations from Tbilisi. On September 20, South Ossetia celebrated the 15th anniversary of the declaration of independence and held a military parade. Similar events were held there in previous years. But this time Georgia decided not to turn a blind eye to the fact that the parade of military equipment in Tskhinvali violates the Dagomys agreements.
During the parade in Tskhinvali, the commander of the Blue Helmets, Major General Marat Kulakhmetov, remained defiantly aloof and admitted in conversations with journalists that what was happening was illegal. OSCE peacekeepers and observers ensured that the armored vehicles moving through the center of Tskhinvali immediately left their area of responsibility. Tbilisi's irritation with the passivity of the peacekeepers (it was assumed that they would block the way to Tskhinvali for equipment and confiscate it from the South Ossetian side) increased many times after the Georgian side was accused of mortar shelling of the capital of South Ossetia on the evening of the holiday on September 20. Then ten people were injured, including children.
The area of responsibility of the JPKF, outlined by the Dagomys Agreement, covers a piece of land measuring approximately 100 by 50 km. As part of a unique peacekeeping operation, launched on July 14, 1992, former opponents are participating in restoring order: the JPKF includes Georgian and South Ossetian battalions. The core of the force is the Russian battalion; overall command of the peacekeepers is exercised by Russia. Every Thursday at the peacekeepers' headquarters in Tskhinvali, operational issues are resolved at meetings, including everyday disputes between Georgians and Ossetians. In the conflict zone, Georgian and Ossetian villages are mixed mosaically, and any neighborly quarrel can lead to armed confrontation.
Each battalion can have up to 500 troops. There are now half as many Georgians: after all, in addition to the mission in South Ossetia, Georgia bears the heavy burden of peacekeeping in Iraq and Kosovo. The Ossetian battalion should be staffed by North Ossetia. But in fact, South Ossetians with Russian citizenship have been serving in it for a long time. Tbilisi claims that South Ossetia, through a peacekeeping battalion, is actually training its own regular armed forces.
Now the peacekeepers are deployed at 23 outposts: the Georgians at five, the Russians and Ossetians at nine outposts for each battalion. Weapons should not be brought into the conflict zone, and the creation of militant groups is not allowed. The South Ossetian military conducts exercises in the Java region at the Ugardanta training ground, located outside the conflict zone. But Tbilisi considers the very existence of the South Ossetian Ministry of Defense illegal, since the republic is unrecognized and, by definition, cannot have its own defense department.
Co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission from South Ossetia Boris Chochiev explained to Vremya Novostei that according to the Dagomys and subsequent agreements, peacekeepers must remain in the conflict zone until a full-scale political settlement is reached. However, the mechanism for their removal or replacement in conditions of chronic unsettlement has not been prescribed.
What can supporters of Georgia's territorial integrity do if Tbilisi offers South Ossetia maximum rights in a single state, and Tskhinvali stubbornly insists on independence? “I believe that Shevardnadze was initially mistaken by signing an agreement in Dagomys that was unfavorable and short-sighted for us. Now we have to disentangle ourselves and look for ways out,” Tengiz Sigua, the head of the Georgian government in the early 1990s, told Vremya Novostei in the early 1990s. - Shevardnadze did a lot then, without consulting anyone, without asking anything. The conflict has been frozen, but how to move on? Years go by, there is no progress.”
In form, the current harsh political offensive by official Tbilisi against the peacekeepers repeats the recent experience of squeezing Russian military bases out of Georgia. The current Georgian authorities like to achieve results in a short time. Tbilisi is very encouraged that in a matter of months it was possible to move from threats to outlaw Russian military bases to an agreement reached in May on a complete withdrawal of Russian troops in 2008. Now a similar attack has been launched against peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Tbilisi believes that in the shadow of the “blue helmets” the unrecognized republics are strengthening their statehood with a condescending or favorable attitude from Moscow.
The analogies with the scenario of expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgia are obvious. What is striking is the determination of Nino Burjanadze, who at the beginning of the year put a lot of effort into mobilizing the Georgian parliament to fight the Russian military presence. The other day, Mikheil Saakashvili told the European Union: “There are all signs that Russia has annexed (Abkhazia and South Ossetia. - Ed. ).” At the same time, the President of Georgia proposed to Moscow to recall from South Ossetia the key leaders of the unrecognized republic who had recently arrived there from various regions of Russia - the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chairman of the KGB.
State Minister Georgy Khaindrava believes that “Russia openly supports and arms separatist regimes.” Consequently, “neutral, friendly countries must be involved in the process of resolving the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict.” The issue of US participation in the negotiations on South Ossetia, as they say in Tbilisi, has practically been resolved. Mikhail VIGNANSKY, Tbilisi |
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