Singapore Hope

The interests of Pyongyang and Washington temporarily coincided

Last week, an extraordinary event occurred at negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue. On July 23, in Singapore, for the first time in the history of the six-party dialogue involving North and South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and Japan, which began in 2003, an informal meeting of all six participants took place at the level of foreign ministers. It appears that the event was intended to symbolically demonstrate to the world the progress made in eliminating Pyongyang's nuclear program.

The apotheosis of the meeting was a handshake and a brief conversation between US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Eui Chun - this was the first contact at such a high level between the two warring states. Although the two ministers managed to exchange only a few insignificant remarks, many world media were quick to regard this event as evidence of a “thaw” in US-North Korean relations, allowing hope for the acceleration of nuclear disarmament in North Korea.

For a short period of time, the interests of the two antagonists coincided to a certain extent. On the eve of the November presidential elections, the US administration urgently needs visible foreign policy successes. At the same time, the DPRK leadership is seeking to receive from Washington as many political and economic bonuses as possible for “exemplary behavior,” or at least the appearance of such.

The meeting in Singapore showed that the six-party talks still have chances to move forward, but there are many pitfalls along this path that could slow down the negotiation process or even throw it back. Initially, it was assumed that at the ministerial meeting a line would be drawn under the second stage of denuclearization of North Korea. Let us recall that the first stage included the suspension of North Korea's nuclear development, the second - the decommissioning of nuclear facilities under international control, the third provides for a complete, verifiable and irreversible cessation of all nuclear activities of Pyongyang.

The foreign ministers of six countries were going to determine ways and timing for completing this process, as well as create the foundations of a multilateral mechanism for ensuring peace and security in Northeast Asia. The last of these tasks clearly turned out to be an unbearable burden for the partners. It seems that they have not yet been able to agree even on the general principles on which this structure could be based.

The completion of the second phase of dismantling the Korean nuclear program also poses difficulties. Pyongyang never tires of accusing its partners of delaying the provision of promised economic and energy assistance to North Korea. Let us recall that the five remaining participants in the negotiations, in response to the DPRK’s steps towards curtailing its nuclear program, pledged to provide it with assistance in an amount equivalent to the cost of 1 million tons of fuel oil. Russia, China, South Korea and the United States are gradually moving forward on these issues, but Japan has flatly refused to participate in these efforts. Tokyo refers to unresolved bilateral problems with the DPRK, primarily on the issue of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s and 1980s with the participation of North Korean intelligence services. Pyongyang says that if by the end of this fall the promised assistance is not received in full, then work to disable the nuclear facilities will be suspended - moreover, the process may be reversed.

Another knot of contradictions is forming between the DPRK and the United States. Having provided the Six countries with a declaration on their nuclear programs at the end of May, Pyongyang considered its obligations fulfilled. Now the DPRK is seeking from Washington a previously agreed upon reward: the earliest possible removal from the American list of states sponsoring international terrorism. The White House has formally launched the “delisting” process, which takes 45 days. At the same time, Washington insists on conducting the most intrusive inspections (such inspections require physical access to the controlled facility, its disassembly or even destruction) to verify the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by North Korea.

The Americans view Pyongyang's consent to conduct such checks as a necessary condition for removing North Korea from the blacklist. But the North Koreans strongly object to these US demands. They insist that appropriate controls should apply to the entire Korean Peninsula, not just the northern part.

Alexander VORONTSOV, head of the department of Korea and Mongolia at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Petr AGALTSOV, political scientist