| The Ministry of Finance proposes to bring the debts of the USSR to the Paris Club countries to the market Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin announced yesterday that Russia is ready to exchange its debt to the Paris Club for marketable securities. He did not disclose the details of this initiative, but referred to the experience of Germany, which had already taken a similar step to cover its budget deficit (in June-July Berlin issued papers against payments to Russia on the Soviet debt). The Russian authorities were unhappy with the deal carried out by the German Ministry of Finance. They believed that it would cause damage to the reputation of both Russia and Germany and that Russia should distance itself as much as possible from this deal and do everything possible to prevent similar transactions by other Paris Club creditors. Yesterday, Mr. Kudrin noted that Russia’s absence as a borrower on foreign markets is not the reason that other states can issue their securities on its debt. Meanwhile, the German lender has planned another placement of such securities for this year.
The debt to the Paris Club, which Russia inherited from the USSR, amounts to about 40% of its total external debt. As of January 1, 2004, the country owed 18 club member countries about $46 billion, including Germany - 20.3 billion, Italy - 5.7 billion, Japan - 3.7 billion, and the USA - 3.5 billion, France - 3.4 billion dollars.
On June 24, the German Ministry of Finance announced the placement of credit notes among private investors linked to payments to Russia on Germany's debt. The German authorities were forced to take such a step due to budget problems: its deficit exceeded 3% of GDP for the third year in a row, which violated the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Union. “For Germany, the purpose of the operation is to immediately generate income instead of receiving semi-annual interest payments and debt repayment over a long period from the Russian side,” the German Finance Ministry said in a statement. At the beginning of July, dollar-denominated credit notes with a ten-year maturity in the amount of $2.4 billion and a yield of 9.6% per annum were placed. The volume of applications for their purchase amounted to $24 billion. A few days later, the cost of bonds on the secondary market increased sharply: their yield decreased by 1% compared to the yield of the primary placement and amounted to 8.6% per annum.
The success of the initial placement of credit notes on the debt of the USSR, as well as the subsequent rise in their prices, showed that investors were ready to work with these securities. At the same time, the initiative of the German financial authority demonstrated that creditors from the Paris Club are ready to immediately repay at least part of the debt with a significant discount. Thus, the deal carried out by Germany turned out to be expensive for it: this country usually borrows at a rate below LIBOR, and the new securities were sold at a yield of LIBOR plus 460 basis points. However, Germany's example could be followed by other European countries experiencing similar budgetary difficulties, most notably France and Italy.
Russia could offer cash-strapped creditors to repay part of their debt early at a discount or, following Germany's example, issue commercial paper on its debt. In the latter case, the primary purchasers of these securities would not be investors, but creditor countries, which could then sell them on the open market. Judging by Mr. Kudrin's statements, this is the path chosen. Despite the dissatisfaction expressed against its largest creditor, Russia could not influence Berlin's actions in any way and would not be able to influence similar actions in the future.
According to the rules of the Paris Club, commercial paper can only be issued in an amount not exceeding 20% of the total debt. This restriction helps prevent harm to the debtor whose payments are used as collateral for the issue of securities. The harm may consist, for example, in undermining an already established market for its securities or in worsening the conditions for the debtor to issue new euroloans. Most likely, even if the members of the Paris Club agree with the proposals of the Russian Ministry of Finance, they will still prefer not to go beyond this limit. A larger volume of emissions could collapse the Russian borrowing market. In this case, the financial departments of creditor countries may find themselves the owners of securities that will be valued at a discount that is too large for them. This, obviously, is the main issue of the negotiations, if they take place. Since we are talking about issuing debt securities, lenders must additionally take into account the factor of market fluctuations.
This factor obviously does not concern the Russian authorities. Since 1998, Russia has not placed its Eurobonds on foreign markets. The government several times planned a new entry into the markets, planning to place Eurobonds in the amount of 2.5 billion in 2005. But when considering the budget for the next year, it was decided to replace this issue with funds from the stabilization fund. In addition, if the market swings down, the government will be able to restructure the debt by purchasing cheap securities.
However, the situation that may arise in the international market for Russian borrowings when an agreement is reached between Russia and the Paris Club on the scheme proposed by the Ministry of Finance should excite corporate borrowers. On June 24, when information about Germany's plans was made public, Russian 2030 bonds lost 2.5 percentage points in price. And after the placement of credit notes, JPMorgan Bank lowered its assessment of Russia's government debt to "below average" from "above average." Then the situation was restored. However, with significantly larger emission volumes, the trend may become stable. This will become a problem not only for creditors who agreed to “paper” debt repayment, but also for non-state issuers from Russia. Their entry into the international market will be in doubt due to the general low market valuation of Russian debt obligations caused by the increased supply of government securities.
The cost of new Russian securities, if they are put into circulation as a result of negotiations, can be predicted based on the price of the initial placement of notes from the German Ministry of Finance. German bonds were issued by a company specially created for this purpose. The German bank KfW acted as an intermediary between the German authorities and this company, directing the money received to pay off interest and debt to Russia to pay off the notes. According to the terms of the placement, in the event of Russia's default on its obligations to Germany, the German authorities, after 60 days, must publicly declare Russia's default and become free from their obligations to the company issuing the notes. In this case, KfW must pay investors a fixed compensation of 20% of the nominal amount of the notes. Thus, investors had to assess, first of all, the risks associated with Russia. If the Russian Ministry of Finance becomes the issuer of new credit notes, then investors' assessment of the risks associated with these securities is unlikely to change significantly in comparison with German notes. Igor POLISCHUK |
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