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What to exchange Russian tactical nuclear weapons for?
Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) have become an important political factor in the process of ratification of the new Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty currently underway in the United States and Russia. The Barack Obama administration is convincing Congress that it is necessary to approve the treaty, otherwise the chances of starting negotiations with Moscow on the reduction of almost 4 thousand nuclear weapons (this is how they estimate the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons) are zero. By the way, the Pentagon keeps 400 B61 atomic bombs at eight NATO bases - in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Great Britain.Leading researcher at the Center for the Study of Disarmament, Energy and Ecology at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Evgeniy Myasnikov, believes that Russia could try to achieve significant advantages in solving the problems of missile defense and strategic non-nuclear weapons by making concessions in solving the problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons, that is TNW. At the same time, Mr. Myasnikov himself admits that most likely the United States will consider dialogue on joint missile defense programs as a replacement for discussing missile defense issues in the context of nuclear arms reduction, that is, for propaganda purposes.
Whether this is true or not, time will tell. At the NATO summit in Lisbon this fall, the question will be decided whether it is necessary to create a missile defense system and whether this work “should become a mission of the alliance.” By this time, NATO is expecting Russia’s response to its proposal of readiness to cooperate on the creation of a joint missile defense system.
The head of the Center for International Security of the IMEMO RAS, corresponding member of the RAS Alexey Arbatov and the head of the sector of the IMEMO RAS, professor at the MGIMO Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Oznobishchev recently wrote that a “technical compromise” on the path to implementing the agreements on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) may be found in the context of a broader “package solution”, for example in connection with agreements on tactical nuclear weapons.
Thus, an exchange of tactical nuclear weapons is proposed to solve all the military security problems facing Russia.
The United States is extremely interested in mutual reduction of nuclear weapons to a greater extent than required by the New START Treaty. On the eve of the signing of this treaty in Prague, the American television channel Fox News noted, citing its own sources, that “the White House... hopes to defeat Russia’s previously expressed reluctance to go beyond the limits of the START Treaty, especially in the part that concerns tactical weapons, weapons with small range of action." “The United States and Russia, even after the entry into force of the New START agreement, will control the majority of the nuclear warheads on the planet, and we consider it appropriate to take the following steps (to reduce arsenals),” the assistant undersecretary of defense for political affairs noted at the time James Miller. “We intend, together with Russia, to begin, after the ratification of the START agreement, a discussion of issues covering the entire spectrum of nuclear weapons - strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed,” he added.
Is it in Russia's interests to exchange tactical nuclear weapons for participation in missile defense, for the modernization of the CFE Treaty and for solving the problems of non-nuclear strategic weapons?
The official condition for Russia's participation in missile defense is joint work on the project from the very beginning. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, we are not ready to be “fastened” to a project that was initially created without taking our opinion into account. On the other hand, Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin believes that the construction of a European missile defense system for Washington is a purely political project that has nothing to do with military “threats.” An acute conceptual crisis in NATO could lead to America's complete loss of control over Europe. There is clearly no need for us to participate in a political project to tie Europe to America. Russia's permanent representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, believes that, despite the common threats that the Russian Federation and NATO have, they do not need a unified missile defense system. According to Mr. Rogozin, these threats “must be resolved diplomatically before talking about building a unified missile defense system.”
This refers to President Dmitry Medvedev's initiative for a global treaty on European security. It was assumed that if this treaty was signed, common military bases would emerge in Europe and thus the second problem would be solved - conventional weapons on the continent, that is, the discussion of the CFE Treaty would move forward. Now NATO countries are three times superior to Russia in heavy weapons. This advantage is offset by Russia's possession of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the exchange of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to solve these problems is not without alternative.
Finally, the third question is non-nuclear strategic weapons. In the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 and in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2009 and 2010, respectively, the deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems is classified as the main external military danger for the Russian Federation, along with the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense and the militarization of outer space. In a speech at the UN General Assembly in the fall of 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev said: “Without solving problems such as missile defense and the creation of a non-nuclear strategic offensive capability, it is impossible to achieve real progress in nuclear disarmament.” The New START Treaty limits strategic non-nuclear weapons to a much lesser extent than the “old” one.
Non-nuclear strategic weapons are being developed in the United States within the framework of the Prompt Global Strike (GSU) concept. “This concept, combined with global missile defense, becomes a tool for gaining political and strategic dominance in the world. This is a rather serious factor, undermining the principles of mutual deterrence and mutual security, eroding the architecture of strategic stability,” says Anatoly Antonov, director of the department for security and disarmament at the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The START Treaty, signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague by the presidents of Russia and the United States, does not limit such non-nuclear strategic weapons (NSW) as air-to-ground ballistic missiles, as well as long-range air-launched cruise missiles that can be deployed in within the framework of the BSU concept.
“The problem of strategic non-nuclear weapons can lead to a dead end in Russian-American negotiations on the next stage of reductions,” says Yevgeny Myasnikov. The United States, following the model of working with the missile defense problem, can try to involve Russia in discussing joint work on creating a new nuclear force. Several years ago, during a meeting between Robert Gates and Sergei Ivanov, the US Secretary of Defense asked his colleague’s opinion about the creation of a NSV on a mutual basis. However, using the missile defense model in negotiations with Russia on non-nuclear strategic weapons is unlikely to yield positive results. After all, missile defense is a defensive system, and NSV is an offensive system.
Any attempt to determine the source of the threat, even when creating a missile defense system, will entail significant political costs for Russia, which does not classify any countries as “rogues.” Hypothetical cooperation with the United States in the field of offensive weapons would have even more far-reaching political consequences for Russia. In addition, if Russia has something to offer the West in the field of missile defense, then in the field of precision weapons the United States is clearly ahead of it.
At present, it is non-nuclear strategic weapons that are the most destabilizing, and Russian tactical nuclear weapons can play a large role in solving this problem. It is also important that tactical nuclear weapons are much more economically profitable than non-nuclear weapons. One tactical nuclear warhead is several times cheaper than a cruise missile, much less a ballistic one.