Collider Buddha

From the book of Anthony Agirre "Cosmological Coans"

The popularizer of science Anthony Agirre in the book “Cosmological Coans” decided to explain the structure of the universe, turning to Zen parables. We publish an excerpt from the chapter, which tells why many physicists consider themselves representatives of the only “real” science.

Anthony Agirre. Cosmological koans. Traveling to the very heart of physical reality. M.: Corpus, 2021. Translation from English Tatyana Lisovskaya and Inna Kaganova. Content

46. ​​At the base (Hirado, Japan, 1620)

The Dutch merchant graduated from the incredibly long and confusing enumeration of difficult rules acting in Nagasaki, and irritably remarked: "Only the Japanese could create a similar system."

You arrived only recently and now you are trying to understand how to behave here. The rules seem to you rather a joint Japanese-Gollander creation. "Is there something specifically Japanese in these complex rules?" You ask. In response, you have to listen to a long discussion about the basics of a Japanese nature, due to the Code of Samurai, as well as synthism and Buddhism. Finally, you manage to insert a word: “But, of course, Japanese society affects the nature of its citizens just as the nature of people affect how society works.”

The merchant, not paying attention to you, continues his long reasoning. Now he explains the role of Japanese Buddhist temples in politics. You are already distracted and return mentally to the basics. What is the basis of a person? And the personalities?

What lies at the foundation of the world?

Physicists like to think that their discipline is "the most fundamental." Physicists engaged in elementary particles and the theory of relativity, and cosmologists are even more sure of this. Ernest Rutherford proudly stated: "All scientists are either physicists or collectors of brands." This statement to some extent reflects an unusually contemptuous attitude towards other sciences-as more empirical, less effective and significant, which is based on not so reasonable fundamental laws. But it also reflects a much more common attitude to physics as a science underlying most other sciences. This means that if you approach the case quite reasonably, then by starting from physics, it is possible in principle (even if it is difficult or impossible) to derive chemistry, biology, astronomy, sociology, and so on. According to this point of view, all these sciences are a consequence of the “fundamental” laws of physics.

The adjective “fundamental” is constantly used: fundamental physics, fundamental representations, fundamental particles ... But what exactly does it mean? In particular, what does it mean that some theory, or a set of rules, or description of the world are more fundamental than others?

If we are talking about theories, then (at least physicists) usually refers to the presence of special, dual relations between them. Suppose there are two theories: f (“fundamental”) and D (the one that can be “deduced”). Both theories somehow describe the same system. Suppose further that by choosing theory f, we set and determine the theory D: if you have accurately determined theory f, another theory D cannot be. Then suppose that the number of components, structures, relationships, etc. In theory F, is much less than in D: Theory F is easier and more elegant . If all this is done, theory F is called “more fundamental” than the theory of D.

The often used example is the quantum theory of electrons, protons and neutrons (theory F) and the periodic system of elements (theory D). After these three types of particles and the nature of the interaction between them are selected, the elements are set. For example, there is an element with 2 protons and 2 neutrons (helium), but there is no element with 56 protons and 2 neutrons: quantum mechanics predicts the absolute instability of such an element. At the same time, several properties of these three particles and a small number of equations describing their behavior are much simpler than a large complex table of elements, each of which has a large number of properties.

On the other hand, one can promise hoarsely (for example, with a Dutch merchant), whether the most fundamental “laws” of human nature, the nature of the people or the laws (literally) of society are the most fundamental. It is clear that there are two types of relations between the social, aesthetic and other minds of a group of people and the laws and social institutions created by them. And those and others significantly affect each other. Society greatly affects the nature of man, and not only while he is alive, but also at the genetic level. Creating a language as a means of communication greatly influenced our biological device. The language contributed to the development of agriculture, hunting, migration processes, the emergence of cities, technological development, and so on.

So, it may seem that there are really some more fundamental levels of description (for example, a description in the language of atoms)-but at some point (perhaps when it comes to biology), the level hierarchy becomes less obvious. Although if you delve deeper, then everything is not so clear even in cases that seem obvious.

For example, if the properties of atoms are set, then they determine the device of the periodic table. But is it possible to really change the basics of chemistry without changing the properties of atoms? No! If we will be provided with irrefutable evidence of the difference between chemical reactions from those that should occur according to modern theory, we cannot simply shrug and say: “Quantum theory and properties of particles (theory F) determine chemistry (theory D), but chemistry does not determine the quantum theory.” Since if theory f defines D, it also determines what D is not ! Therefore, we will be forced to make some changes to F in order to create a new theory that includes our new knowledge about theory D. In fact, this is exactly what we do, testing “fundamental” theories. But if this is so, it should be recognized that, although the advantage of theory F is its great simplicity, it is no more determined than the theory of D.

Moreover: obvious determinism often ignores very important elements. Consider the biological laws of heredity , which are formulated in the language of genes, chromosomes, reproduction, and so on. It is clear that chemistry is most important here. But these laws of genetics can almost certainly be incorporated , taking as a basis the laws of chemistry (or atomic physics). The use of DNA, coding schemes of amino acids (left -handed, not right -handed ones), mating chromosomes and sexual, these and similar processes and properties are to a very large extent historically determined. Yes, they “work” well, but almost certainly there are other “solutions” in which the laws of genetics and heredity would be completely different. Thus, in order to move from the seemingly “fundamental” chemistry to “less fundamental” genetics, a large number of auxiliary historical information are required. How does this information fit into our scheme? If you add it to the “fundamental” description using chemistry, the result no longer seems simple. In addition, under the existing laws of genetics, it may turn out that it is quite difficult to choose another set of chemical laws or the laws of atomic physics, which leads to the same laws of genetics, regardless of evolutionary history. So, apparently, here determinism rather indicates another path from the allegedly “less fundamental” to allegedly “more fundamental”!

But, of course, we will be able to avoid such annoying misunderstandings and defend the honor of physics of elementary particles if we limit ourselves only to physics and chemistry? Not a fact! Remember: contemplating the drawing in the cave, we found that it seemed unchanged (for example, the laws of atomic physics) in different universes “can change fabulously”. This is so, since the “one dharma”, which “fills them all,” manifests itself in the form of other laws applicable in smaller energies. Thus, perhaps there is a one-many-digit ratio between the comprehensive theory and different sets of “fundamental laws”-like those who study atomic physicists in collider experiments. With such a scenario, the laws that we have are due to our specific cosmic history or, possibly, where exactly we are in a certain multi -sized cosmos containing all possible forms.

Other aspects of fundamental physics can also be more conditional than we are used to counting. Suppose we will ever face an extraterrestrial life and understand it-or create a rather powerful artificial intelligence. Will the laws of physicists formulated on the basis of a huge array of new data that we have, like those that we know? We can assume that they will be equally effective. It seems likely that from the point of view of mathematics, their level will be to some extent equivalent to ours. However, conceptually, this physics may not be at all like that, and completely different elements can be its basis. For example, in textbooks, talking about quantum mechanics, they usually use the wave mechanics of the Schrödinger and its formulation through the integrals on Feynman's trajectories (we discussed both of these approaches here). However, there is also equivalent matrix mechanics of Heisenberg, the theory of hidden boma variables, as well as the formulation of quantum mechanics (to varying degrees successful and complete), based on the theories of categories, information theory, designer theory, modeling with cell automatic machines, etc. Even if they can be displayed in the other in mathematics, these displays are often incompletely incompletely, and every of these ones The formulations can lead to completely different ideas about the world, indicating new areas that require further study. Why does the mechanics of Schrödinger dominate - at least in textbooks and university courses? Probably, to a large extent, only because it was the first and carry out calculations with its help easily.

So, when describing many physical systems, we are dealing with a combination of a set of relatively simple rules and their rather difficult details due to the initial conditions, the background, clarifying our place in the universe (either the Universe, or the multi -senior, or our quantum state), a social history that affects which concepts is most natural for us to use in this case, and so on. Laws that determine the behavior of the system are not allowing a combination of two components that do not allow simplification - the rules and their details. But if both of these components are significant, the ability to derive what we consider “less” fundamental, from the “more” fundamental is not so obvious and quite ambiguous, and the conclusions about what should be from is almost the opposite.

Despite this, we still have the impression that atoms, precisely because of their small size, is inherent in something fundamental - conceptual simplicity that distinguishes them from the disordered, complex world of biochemical reactions, economics or the Code of Samurai Busido. However, in this case, you can give examples that will make you think. Sometimes laws regulating the behavior of a system from a large number of particles can be beautiful and simple. Consider how machine calculations and atoms correlate. The theory of calculation is a simple, well -developed theory formulated in the language of Turing machines, logical valves and other approaches. These ideas can be used in the calculations of transistors, lego toys, a black hole, paired DNA or Ginnium bases. The same applies to the laws of statistical mechanics, such as the second law of thermodynamics: it is equally easy to apply both to the monastery kitchen utensils and to atoms.

These are extremely strict laws. If you begin to argue that you have created a device that violates the laws of the theory of computing, not to mention the second law of thermodynamics, no one will want and will not perceive you seriously. Formal evidence and theorems on the basis of which calculations are performed, as well as mathematical physics, are quite objective. But still there is something in them, which is not constructing a person (or at least on an observer). Without such systems created by a person as transistors and microchips, laws that control the work of logical valves and Turing machines, and the rules that determine computational complexity do not matter. In the same way, the second law of thermodynamics, according to which the mess is growing, is perceived as an important, one of the fundamental laws of nature, although we determine what the order is, using both our definition of macrosa and our definition of what we initially consider the “system”. So, where did we find ourselves? We have the conviction that the physical world has “fundamental laws”. This is what physicists study. And this is fair. But this statement is not as categorical as it seems initially. We, physicists, sometimes say that this and that is just the totality of this and this, obeying this and that. This should be taken seriously. Like the Dutch merchant, physicists learned and explained a lot about the structure of the world, studying the “basics”. But do not be likened to the Dutch merchant and do not perceive it too seriously.