Translated material
After Tskhinvali
The political confrontation with Russia will be more difficult to win than the military one
The Russian-Georgian war is an ominous milestone in post-Soviet history. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is waging full-scale military operations against a country with which it is linked by the closest historical, cultural and human ties. Whatever caused these events, they represent a failure of policy on all sides involved in the conflict.What is happening in the Caucasus is a huge human tragedy, and while blood is being shed, discussions about big politics, interests and calculations seem blasphemous. But wars do not end without a political solution. And it is impossible to draw the right conclusions without a sober analysis of the causes and consequences of the armed conflict.
Moscow's decision to use military force to stop the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia had no alternative. After the support that Russia has provided to the authorities of the unrecognized republics for many years, it would be simply immoral to withdraw at a critical moment. This would completely undermine confidence in the Kremlin’s policy (not only in the Caucasus) and demonstrate its inability to consistently pursue and defend its course. Not to mention the fact that the methods used by Tbilisi to “restore constitutional order” also fall under the grounds for “humanitarian intervention,” an idea introduced into political circulation by Western countries in the 1990s.
However, the legality of the steps taken last Friday does not negate the need to answer a number of questions.
Russia has a long and close presence in South Ossetia. Russian security forces oversee the unrecognized territories. Georgia, as an unfriendly country, should be the focus of Moscow’s attention, including intelligence attention. Moreover, since Tbilisi began to accelerate rapprochement with NATO, this has become one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy.
In this context, it is unclear how a large-scale military operation, for which Tbilisi, without a doubt, had been preparing for a long time, could take the Russian leadership by surprise?
Since the status quo, which had been maintained in conflict zones for about ten years, was unfrozen, Russian policy has become increasingly contradictory. The desire to simultaneously play the role of a neutral mediator-peacemaker and patron - guarantor of the security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was to the detriment of both statuses. At some point, Moscow actually stopped trying to promote a political settlement, relying on expanding cooperation with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi and stopping current aggravations. At the same time, Russia tried to formally remain within the existing legal framework, and the further it went, the more it came into conflict with reality.
Now, of course, is not the time to question Russia’s relationship with the authorities of unrecognized states. Moscow's duty is to protect them and guarantee the inviolability of the territories. But when the war is over, it is necessary to calmly figure out to what extent the interests of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz leadership coincide with the interests of Russia. And how often does official Tskhinvali or Sukhumi play an independent game of aggravation to achieve their goals. If Moscow has to go to war over this, it should be sure that actions “on the ground” are under effective control.
As for Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili’s actions have their own logic.
The maximum program is to seize the region with lightning speed and announce the restoration of territorial integrity. Had this plan succeeded, Russian intervention would have been even more difficult. After all, Moscow has never formally challenged the ownership of South Ossetia by Georgia, and the victors, as Russia itself knows from the Chechen experience, are not judged, and the West would not seek the withdrawal of Georgian troops.
The blitzkrieg did not work, but another goal was achieved - Moscow is involved in the war and is no longer considered a mediator. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, said: “Russia is a party to the conflict, and this should be reflected when the ceasefire ceases fire and peace negotiations begin. It is clear that there is no return to the previous status quo.”
Tbilisi has long sought to send peacekeepers from the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU or any other international organization where Russia does not have control. Until now, it was impossible to change the format without Moscow's consent. Now the situation is different.
Tbilisi will use every new day of the war and every subsequent Russian air strike on targets outside South Ossetia to attract international support. The world's screens are showing images of the bombing of Gori, not the destruction of Tskhinvali. Mikheil Saakashvili is actively speculating on the image of the “young Georgian democracy”; he has already called Russian actions “an attack on America and its values.” His determination is explained by the confidence that in the confrontation with Russia, the Western community, primarily Washington, will be forced to support Georgia, no matter what it does. Saakashvili's task is to draw the United States into an active confrontation with Russia in the Caucasus.
It is unlikely that Mikheil Saakashvili's South Ossetian campaign would be sanctioned by the United States. Judging by a number of signs, Washington was not ready for what happened. But American authorities bear responsibility for what happened.
Throughout Saakashvili's reign, the United States contributed to the rearmament of the Georgian army, provided political support to the Georgian president, and turned a blind eye to his adventurous behavior. Even the crackdown on the opposition last year, which greatly tarnished the image of the Georgian president as a “great democrat,” did not affect Washington’s favorable attitude.
The catalyst for the current aggravation was Condoleezza Rice's visit to Tbilisi a month ago. The US Secretary of State resolutely sided with Georgia in regional conflicts and also supported rapprochement with NATO. The increased activity of American diplomacy in the region is due to the fact that the outgoing administration of George W. Bush needs at least some international success, otherwise his legacy on the world stage will be a continuous series of failures. The approval of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia (or at least one of them) at the alliance's ministerial meeting in December is practically the last chance to achieve a visible achievement.
It is unlikely that the White House and the State Department intended to give Tbilisi permission to go to war to restore territorial integrity. But Saakashvili interpreted this position unambiguously: America will not abandon us.
The upcoming change of administration in Washington is important for another reason. George Bush has certain obligations to Mikheil Saakashvili, whom the Republican administration promoted from the very beginning. If Barack Obama becomes the next US president, the attitude towards Tbilisi may change. Support, of course, will not stop, but it is unlikely to remain as unconditional. If McCain wins, the Tbilisi authorities are counting on favor, but even then some adjustments are not excluded. The senator's circle includes representatives of the realist school who will not want to jeopardize the more fundamental interests of the United States for the sake of Saakashvili. That's why Tbilisi is rushing to act under Bush.
In general, the events in South Ossetia demonstrate the trap into which American policy has fallen in the post-Soviet space. Washington actively intervened in the events here, relying on loyal regimes. But the United States does not have the ability to either keep them on a “short leash” or fully come out in their defense in the event of an aggravation. The United States cannot even withdraw - too many advances have been handed out. All this makes the American presence a destabilizing factor.
The European Union, as usual, is unable to formulate a common position, and its voice has been almost inaudible in recent days. Individual European states are taking the initiative. The political instruments that the European Union has at its disposal are not working. And Europe's ostentatious activity in the region only stimulates Tbilisi to take action, giving hope for support, which in reality will not come. It is clear that the anti-Russian lobby in the EU will try to squeeze the maximum possible out of events - the Baltic countries and Poland have already called for a radical review of relations with Moscow.
This war will end, but the problems will only get worse.
After everything that happened, it is impossible to imagine a return to the settlement mechanisms that existed before the beginning of August. This poses a serious question for Moscow about what it wants in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and how to achieve it. The political model must be deeply calculated and proposed proactively, otherwise Russia will have to react to formats that will be imposed by Western countries. At the same time, it is obvious: no matter what Mikheil Saakashvili does, the West will insist on the inviolability of Georgia’s territorial integrity.
In general, the events in South Ossetia once again highlighted Moscow's huge problem - the lack of allies on which it could rely. Even countries with which Russia has special relations, such as Belarus or Kazakhstan, will not support Russian actions, because they project any encroachment by Moscow on the sovereignty of their neighbors onto themselves. (The exception is Yerevan - because of Karabakh, but Armenia is already squeezed into very harsh conditions and is unlikely to take drastic steps.) That is why Russia’s possible recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not be supported by anyone.
A fierce information war awaits us in the near future; in fact, it is already underway. Mikheil Saakashvili went all-in, and now he has no way back: he must convince the world at all costs that Georgia is a victim of aggression from Russia. Any provocation is possible - both military and political. Most likely, the revival of organizations like GUAM and the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice cannot be avoided. In recent years, they have been in a state of withering, but now there will certainly be proposals to give them collective security functions, since Georgia and Ukraine have not yet been accepted into NATO. An extremely dangerous situation has already emerged around the Black Sea Fleet - Kyiv is threatening not to allow ships heading to the Georgian coast area back to Sevastopol. I don’t even want to think about the consequences of carrying out this threat and Moscow’s response.
By the way, the issue of Tbilisi's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance has not been removed from the agenda. Of course, it is difficult to imagine that in the current situation the European countries that objected to the Membership Action Plan in April will withdraw their objections. But the campaign by supporters of Georgia's admission will be very noisy, focused on justifying the Russian threat to Europe. The atmosphere promises to be tense.
Moscow will have to show maximum restraint and prudence in order to minimize Saakashvili’s propaganda capabilities. The statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense that Russian armed forces will not cross the border into South Ossetia is encouraging. And in general, Moscow is acting in a measured manner, thinking through each next step.
And of course, we cannot allow a disgusting anti-Georgian campaign like the one that broke out in Russia two years ago in connection with the arrest of GRU officers in Georgia. Otherwise, the information war will be lost immediately and forever, which will aggravate the already serious political problems.