Translated material
Indian Ocean problems
Events in Mumbai could change the global agenda
President Dmitry Medvedev's upcoming visit to India this week has suddenly taken on added urgency. In fact, Mr Medvedev becomes the first world leader to visit this country, which has just suffered a major terrorist attack .If something similar to the Mumbai terrorist attacks happened in one of the Western countries, no one would doubt the fate of this event. By inertia, what is happening in Asia is perceived as something that has a regional rather than a global scale. But the current tragedy in India's financial capital has consequences that extend far beyond the region.
South Asia and the Middle East are steadily moving into the international spotlight. With the relative stabilization of Iraq, which American troops will apparently leave during the next presidential term, Afghanistan is turning into a major source of instability. Many diplomats and generals from NATO countries, which is fighting against the Taliban, openly make it clear that they do not believe in the prospect of a military victory for the alliance. The efforts of the Hamid Karzai government to establish a dialogue with the moderate part of the Taliban are seen as a search for political means of settlement.
As Henry Kissinger recently noted, in 2009 the reality of Afghanistan will become clear to everyone: "No outside force has ever managed to take control of this country by establishing a central authority - a lesson the British learned in the 19th century, and the Soviets in the 20th." According to the patriarch of American diplomacy, stabilization is possible only on the basis of decentralization of actions, which in turn requires coordination of efforts with neighboring countries. The key neighbor is Pakistan.
The sharp deterioration in Indian-Pakistani relations in recent days has already led to the exchange of hints about possible retaliation on the part of Delhi and, accordingly, a response from Islamabad. This is not the first time that the specter of a regional nuclear war has arisen - in 1999 and 2001, military-terrorist provocations led to severe crises (see reference). The nuclear issue is generally returning to the international agenda, and the conflict between India and Pakistan once again reminds us of how urgent the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is.
Pakistan has been in a fever for a long time. The resignation of Pervez Musharraf under US pressure this year and the rise to power of a “democratic government” has caused unrest within the Pakistani military establishment, which, in fact, runs the country. Washington has long been trying to force Islamabad to take effective action against the Afghan resistance operating freely on Pakistani soil. Actually, the complaints against Musharraf were connected not so much with the shortcomings of democracy, but with his endless maneuvering between obligations to the counter-terrorism coalition and the desire to avoid a clash with the Islamists. However, after Musharraf's departure, cooperation between Islamabad and Washington became even more difficult.
Now the pressure on Pakistan will obviously increase. The political landscape in India is likely to change - the nationalist opposition has gained serious bargaining chips against the government. And the change of power in the United States does not bode well for Islamabad. During the election campaign, Barack Obama promised to take the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan seriously.
A knot of different interests has sprung up around the Afghan-Pakistani problem. Pakistan's main ally is China. Beijing is linked to Islamabad by large-scale economic interests and extensive military-technical cooperation. Relations between China and India are believed to be improving in recent years, but mistrust and suspicion have not gone away. Events in Tibet earlier this year caused another surge of controversy.
Besides Pakistan, the second state without whose assistance it is difficult to count on pacifying Afghanistan is Iran. Tehran and al-Qaeda are openly at odds with each other, and the Iranians treat Pakistan with both jealousy and disdain. In conversations with Iranian representatives, one can often hear the argument: even if Islamabad is allowed to have nuclear weapons, how can Iran, a country of ancient culture and great-power political tradition, be prohibited from doing so?
If the new US president truly decides to make Afghanistan the center of his security strategy, he will have to deal with many problems at once.
Firstly, the intensification of hostilities, which will require both an increase in the American contingent and the involvement of Europeans, who are extremely difficult to persuade to war and sacrifice. Moreover, military victory in Afghanistan is unlikely with any number of foreign troops present there. But from the point of view of his political image, Barack Obama will need a clear victory.
Secondly, finding approaches to Tehran and Islamabad. Oddly enough, in the Afghan issue it is easier to count on the assistance of Iran than Pakistan: Tehran, at least, is completely disadvantaged by the success of the Taliban. Islamabad has the opportunity to “asymmetrically” respond to external pressure, reducing its activity to contain Islamists.
Third, building mutual understanding with China and India. Paradoxically, it was in the latter area that George Bush, who has little to boast of in foreign policy, achieved success - Washington's relations with Beijing and Delhi by the end of his term were much better than at the beginning. Democrats in both capitals are viewed with suspicion. Both Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton made statements during the campaign that could be regarded as trade protectionist, and this is of great concern to China and India.
After September 11, 2001, the United States administration made an attempt to turn the fight against international terrorism into the core of all world politics. Nothing came of it. There was no consolidation against the common enemy. In addition, it has become increasingly clear that terrorism is not an independent problem, but one of the consequences of the general imbalance of the international system.
It seemed that with George Bush, this approach was becoming a thing of history, especially since the global financial crisis dictates different priorities and forces us to move to coordinated actions to repair the international system. However, events in India and their possible consequences are capable of mixing up the cards and filling the emerging multipolar world order with content that is not what everyone expected.
First Indo-Pakistani War. 1947--1948 . The first armed conflict between India and Pakistan that arose after the partition of British India. The cause of the conflict was a dispute over the ownership of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; The state had a predominantly Muslim population (therefore it had to go to Pakistan), but the Maharaja of Kashmir decided to join India. The fighting lasted from October 1947 to December 31, 1948. About 3,000 people died during the war. Approximately 60% of Kashmir came under Indian control, 40% came under Pakistani control.
Second Indo-Pakistani War. 1965 In early August 1965, Pakistani intelligence services began sending trained saboteurs into Indian Kashmir, who were supposed to raise an uprising there and launch a guerrilla war against the Indians. The Indians became aware that infiltrators were coming from the Pakistani part of the state, and on August 15 the Indian army invaded there to destroy militant training camps. The 12th Pakistani Division defending the area could not hold back the advance of the Indian Corps. Very soon, the threat of capture loomed over Muzaffarabad, the “capital” of Pakistani Kashmir. India did not hesitate to escalate hostilities, taking them beyond Kashmir for the first time on September 6, when the Indian army invaded Pakistani territory. The troops reached almost Lahore, after which they were driven back by a Pakistani counterattack. Subsequently, both sides carried out offensives and counter-offensives several times, trying to achieve any major success. On September 23, the war ended. Through the mediation of the USSR, in January 1966, Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Shastri signed the Tashkent Declaration, which drew a line under the war.
Third Indo-Pakistani War. 1971 On December 3, 1971, the Pakistan Air Force carried out a surprise bombing of a number of Indian air bases, but the damage from the raids was minimal. Almost simultaneously, Indian aircraft began carrying out retaliatory strikes on air bases in Pakistan. The Pakistani command tried to impose a two-front war on India and launched offensive operations in the west. However, the superiority was on the side of the Indian army. The Indian army not only repulsed the Pakistani attacks, but also went on the offensive, capturing some border areas early in the war. On December 16, the commander of Pakistani troops in Bangladesh, General Niazi, signed the act of surrender of his group. This ended the war.
Kargil conflict. 1999 All efforts to defuse the situation in early 1999 were a complete fiasco when up to a thousand militants infiltrated from Pakistan crossed the Line of Control in five sectors in May. Having easily thrown back the small garrisons of the border posts, they strengthened themselves on the Indian side, taking control of a number of tactically important heights. The militants were covered by Pakistani artillery firing across the Line of Control. India, gradually throwing more and more units into battle, by the end of May increased the number of troops to ten brigades of ground forces. The main battles took place in the Kargil, Dras, Batalik and Turtok sectors and the Mushkoh valley at a front of 46 km. These events were called the “Kargil Conflict,” although many observers preferred the word “war” at the time. By mid-June, the Indians finally managed to recapture most of the heights, but the gangs finally left Indian territory only after Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif admitted on July 12 that they were controlled from Pakistan and authorized their withdrawal.
Kashmir conflict. 2001--2002. After the attack on the Indian Parliament building in Delhi on December 13, 2001 by a group of militants, India, which accused Pakistan of aiding terrorists, began hastily transferring troops to the border. Throughout December 2001 and January 2002, both states teetered on the brink of war. Almost all ground forces of India and Pakistan were brought to the border. The situation was defused thanks to the active position of the international community, primarily Russia and the United States.