According to the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, by 2015, 61.20% of all precinct commissions will be equipped with ballot processing complexes (POIB). Voters will draw checkmarks on pieces of paper and stuff them into the electronic ballot box themselves. Computers will do the rest: they will count the votes and transmit the data via the network to the Territorial Commissions (TECs). In this case, the election results will depend on whether the COIBs work correctly. As practice shows on December 4, 2011, we have something to fear.
Gatchina residents, who have already suffered from KOIBs, are afraid of massive electronic falsifications
Sin of omission
On Monday, the Leningrad Regional Court rejected the claim of candidate to the regional Legislative Assembly Alexander Rastorguev and ex-deputy of this Legislative Assembly Vladimir Leonov. The plaintiffs demanded that the inaction of the Leningrad Region Election Commission (EC LO) be declared illegal and, on this basis, cancel the election results in Kommunarsky electoral district No. 17 (it was in this district that the testing of KOIBs was carried out - 49.7% of voters here threw ballots into electronic ballot boxes).
The fact is that on December 3, 2011, the EC LO received a letter from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation signed by Deputy Chairman Leonid Ivlev. This letter stated that a control count of votes of voters who voted through KOIBs should be carried out “only if the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation makes a decision on such a count.” The control count is a random check of whether the KOIBs counted the votes correctly: after the end of voting in the TEC, a draw is held, according to the results of which at 5% of the polling stations (but not less than three), the ballots are counted in the usual manual way, after which the results are compared with the KOIB data . If manual and electronic counting give the same results, then everything is in order; if there are differences, you will have to count manually in all areas.
Meanwhile, Ivlev, with his letter, actually abolished the need for a control count.
According to Rastorguev and Leonov, having received such a letter (from their point of view, illegal), the EC LO should have considered it at its meeting and either refused to execute or canceled its previously adopted instructions on the need for a control count. Meanwhile, the chairman of the EC LO, Vladimir Zhuravlev, simply forwarded Ivlev’s correspondence to all subordinate TECs, accompanied by his own letter, in which he clearly stated: “In the elections taking place on December 4, 2011, control (manual) counting of votes is not carried out for any type of election.” The EC LO is a collegial body, therefore, according to the plaintiffs, it should have met and made a decision on the letter - but instead it illegally failed to act.
A representative of the EC LO objected at the meeting that their “competence does not include discussing the orders of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.”
Let's try to figure out which side is right here.
Disorder in the matter of order
There are three levels of laws involved in this conflict. The first is No. 67-FZ “On the Basic Guarantees of the Electoral Rights of Citizens,” which very vaguely states: “The law, or in the absence of it, the decision of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation may provide that... at least 5% of polling stations are subject to control counting of votes."
“Unfortunately, the law is formulated poorly,” says Vladimir Leonov. “In my opinion, this was done intentionally to allow for the possibility of different interpretations.” Moreover, the phrase “may be provided for” itself, implying the possibility of not conducting a control count, contradicts the Constitution, which states that elections must be free. This means that citizens have the right to observe each stage of the elections. In the 17th Kommunarsky District we were unable to implement it. At the end of this process, we will certainly appeal this provision of federal law to the Constitutional Court.
The second law that interests us is about the elections of State Duma deputies, in which there is not a word about the control count. And the third is about the elections of deputies to the Legislative Assembly of the Leningrad Region, where the control count, on the contrary, is defined as mandatory.
The elections on December 4, let us remind you, were combined: the State Duma and the Legislative Assembly together. On this subject, Federal Law No. 67-FZ states even more vaguely: “When voting days are combined at elections of different levels, the procedure for conducting a control vote count is determined by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation or the corresponding election commission of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, depending on the level of the elections being held.”
The two above quotes from the 67th Federal Law contain the dog that, digging from different sides, the applicants and their defendants tried to bring to the light of day in court.
The opinion of the EC LO is as follows: since in the case of a combination, only the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation determines the order of the control count, and it has not determined such an order (which fact, according to their position, was stated in Ivlev’s letter), then neither the State Duma nor the Legislative Statutes should carry out such a count necessary.
The applicants believe that since the law of the Leningrad Region says (see the first quote from No. 67-FZ) that it is necessary to count, then it is necessary to count for elections to the Legislative Assembly; in the State Duma, no, which means Duma ballots cannot be recounted. As for the phrase about combining elections, the plaintiffs interpret it as follows: the Central Election Commission determines not whether a control count should be carried out, but only its order. And this procedure, by the way, was determined long ago - approved by special instructions of the Central Election Commission in advance.
The defendants argue that this is not an order at all, but a procedure - how to conduct a control count in the general case if a separate decision has established the order. And in general, how is it possible to open the ballot box and recount the Zaksovsky ballots, but not recount the State Duma ballots?
But this is how it is possible, as the applicants always believe, object. Put the State Duma's aside and count the Zaksov's!..
Of course, the plaintiffs and defendants did not find a consensus, and the court, as always in election litigation, sided with the latter.
However, if you ignore the bureaucratic fencing with commas in the laws and look at the situation more abstractly, it becomes obvious: a control calculation must be done. How else can you be sure whether the KOIBs counted the votes correctly? And if by 2015, already 60% of PECs will be “nominated” (by 2020, count all one hundred), and it will be impossible to check their work, then neither stuffing, nor carousels, nor falsification in TECs will be needed. Everything will be calculated as it should, and the mosquito will not undermine your nose. We can only hope that the Constitutional Court, following the complaint of Leonov and Rastorguev, will replace “may” with “should” in the federal law, otherwise the issue of some kind of election can be closed.
Direct speech
Alexander RASTORGUEV, candidate for the Legislative Assembly of the Leningrad Region:
— On the morning of December 4, a flash drive was issued for each KOIB. Flash drives were inserted into KOIBs. We asked what is on these flash drives and is it possible to check them? Naturally, they didn’t let us check, they said that it contained information about the polling stations: the total number of voters, etc. Okay, we downloaded the information - put away the flash drives! No, they say that data will be duplicated on them during the voting process, so that if the lights go out, nothing will be lost. Meanwhile, it is technically very simple to place a program on a flash drive that, for example, will send every third or fourth vote for A Just Russia or the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to the EdRa treasury.
Vladimir LEONOV, ex-deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Leningrad Region:
—Theoretically, whether there were falsifications using KOIBs could be found out by comparing the data with those areas where there was a manual count. But in practice this is impossible, since in almost all PECs where there were no COIBs, in our opinion, there were stuffings. This is easy to see from the distribution curve. If the elections are fair, then the percentages received by the parties will not depend on turnout or any other factors. If the elections are fair, then the percentages received by the parties will not depend on the turnout percentage and the size of the polling stations. However, at ten polling stations in the Kommunarsky district, where there was a manual count, there is a strict dependence: the smaller the polling station, the higher the turnout and, accordingly, the higher the percentage of votes for United Russia. This could only happen if approximately the same amount was thrown at each site.
What is especially alarming here is that in areas with COIBs we see just a normal distribution. This means that the voting could have been fair - or a program could have been used that gave some of the opposition votes in favor of United Russia. We have no way to check this, and the laws of mathematics do not help with such a cunning approach either. This means that the use of KOIBs without control manual counting will take falsification to a new level: they will be extremely difficult to detect.
Andrzej BELOWRANIN
Caricature cartoonbank.ru