| The head of Gazprom Alexey Miller is not going to sell 10% of NOVATEK Chairman of the Board of Gazprom Alexey Miller, answering a question from journalists about the concern’s plans for NOVATEK shares, said: “We are not going to sell 10%.” Early last week, his deputy for foreign economic affairs, Alexander Medvedev, also assured investors that Gazprom does not plan to leave NOVATEK’s shareholders. This means that the management of the state-owned company retains the standard explanation for non-market transactions with assets aimed at increasing NOVATEK’s resource base, and the maximum favored nation treatment in the area of access to the Gazprom gas transportation system, which the company of Gennady Timchenko and Leonid Mikhelson has been experiencing over the course of this year.
Investors have long appreciated this behavior of the monopolist. Despite the good financial results that Gazprom has consistently demonstrated over the past year, the company's capitalization has decreased by 12% since November 12, 2009, although the market over the same period grew by 13%, and NOVATEK soared by 80%. As a result, the state concern “costs” only 4.5 times more than a company that does not have the right to export gas, produces 15 times less and sells 10 times less on the Russian market (there is no point in even talking about the availability of reserves).
As reported, the joint venture between NOVATEK and Gazprom Neft, created on a parity basis, will buy a controlling stake in Severenergia from Gazprom in November for $1.75 billion. The seller will only return its costs for acquiring the share from the Italian Eni and Enel. And Mr. Medvedev calls the deal not a sale of core assets, but a transfer of them on market terms to “subsidiaries” (Gazprom Neft) and “dependent” (NOVATEK) companies. In addition, by the end of the year, NOVATEK, instead of Gazprom, will buy a controlling stake in Sibneftegaz from Gazprombank. The parties have not yet disclosed the transaction amount.
The share in Sibneftegaz was one of the objects of Alexey Miller’s campaign to return assets withdrawn under the previous management of the concern. Itera had to sell 51% of the company's shares to Gazprombank, which was then still part of the Gazprom group and was completely controlled by it, for only $137 million. Already last year, Itera bought 21% of Sibneftegaz from the fertilizer manufacturer Acron. for the same 130 million dollars.
Nevertheless, Gazprombank offered Gazprom to acquire a controlling stake at a market valuation (about $2 billion for the entire company). The refusal of the monopolist was expected, especially since the future of Sibneftegez largely depends on the favor of Gazprom in the field of access. In addition, during their joint management, Gazprombank and Itera kept Sibneftegaz in a black body, withdrawing cash flows from the company. They bought the gas produced from the well for 680 rubles. per thousand cubic meters, which is below cost and half the wholesale price established by the Federal Tariff Service for the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. As a result, Sibneftegaz's net debt at the end of last year amounted to about $700 million.
Vremya Novostei sources familiar with the progress of negotiations between Gazprombank and NOVATEK say that the new buyer will receive more attractive conditions. The controlling stake will cost him $600-650 million, so $1.5 billion will be enough to pay for Severenergia and Sibneftegaz, which NOVATEK plans to raise in the next couple of weeks by placing 10-year Eurobonds.
The history of the Yamal LNG project, which is controlled by NOVATEK and Mr. Timchenko’s structures, clearly shows the scale of the company’s administrative resources. History has never seen such a swift and positive reaction from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to proposals for state support for a private company project. For example, LUKOIL has been seeking benefits for its Caspian projects for several years, having already fully invested in infrastructure, and in just a couple of months Yamal LNG received the corresponding resolution on fiscal benefits and instructions to ministries to work out issues of direct investments in the construction of port infrastructure and fleet for the project.
There is an opinion that Severenergia and Sibneftegaz are far from the last acquisition of NOVATEK. According to Vremya Novostey, negotiations are underway to buy out Farhad Akhmedov’s 49 percent stake in Northgas. Mr. Akhmedov himself, who recently hardly ever visits Russia and receives almost no dividends from the activities of Northgas, says that there have been proposals for sale, but he himself is not going to sell the stake. In 2008, he received about $1.5 million with a profit of $60 million (despite the fact that it was greatly limited by the agreement to sell gas to Gazprom, in fact, at transfer prices); at the end of 2009, no payment was planned at all.
As part of the campaign initiated by Alexey Miller, Gazprom also regained a controlling stake in Northgas. And although Mr. Akhmedov protected his rights as a minority shareholder, the financial return of the project is severely limited. And NOVATEK’s entry into the project can be justified by synergy in the development of condensate reserves available to Northgas (over 40 million tons proven according to SEC classification). The same NOVATEK has a similar figure of 63 million tons, less than about half is in development, and production is about 3 million tons per year (6 times more than Northgas). Several years ago, NOVATEK and Northgas even considered a joint project in the field of transportation and processing of condensate, but it did not take place due to Gazprom’s campaign. Alexey GRIVACHS | |