The fate of Iran's nuclear program is being decided in Vienna
Today in Vienna, 35 members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will complete their consideration of the Iranian issue, which began behind closed doors yesterday. Russia is represented by the Russian Ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, Grigory Berdennikov. Yesterday, Finnish Deputy Director General of the IAEA Olli Heinonen spoke at the meeting. Based on the results of his report and debate, the council will adopt a resolution, the draft of which was agreed upon earlier this week in London by the foreign ministers of the countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.
This document instructs the Director General of the IAEA, the Egyptian Muhammad ElBaradei, to inform the UN Security Council about the steps that Tehran must take to remove suspicions of creating atomic weapons. To do this, it must “reinstate the moratorium” on “any activity” related to uranium enrichment processes or research in this area (the moratorium was introduced by Iran in November 2004).
The Iranians may be required to “provide the IAEA with the opportunity to clarify all aspects of past nuclear activities.” Including “by interviewing competent persons, providing access to all documentation and dual-use equipment, as well as to military facilities where nuclear activities may be carried out.” ElBaradei's final report, which considers the situation “critical, but not a crisis,” will be presented by the IAEA Investigative Committee on March 6.
The Egyptian calls Russia’s initiative to create a joint venture on its territory to enrich uranium for Iran “a bridge to a fair settlement.” So the Iranians have both time and reasons to think about it. In the meantime, they have only slightly moderated their ardor, continuing to make tough statements. Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanii, warned that if the Iranian problem is transferred to the UN Security Council, Tehran "will move on to enriching uranium in a significant amount." Soltanii acknowledged, however, that his country is “confident in the support of its Russian and Chinese friends.”
On Wednesday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak visited Tehran and convinced Iranian Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani that “Iran must fully follow the decisions of the IAEA.” It now depends on Tehran how events will develop. If the Iranians establish fruitful cooperation with the agency, then, as Russian Ambassador in Vienna Grigory Berdennikov noted yesterday, the IAEA's March report will not have to be submitted to the UN Security Council. The head of the US intelligence community, John Negroponte, unexpectedly added cautious optimism when he told the Senate Intelligence Committee yesterday that Tehran “may not yet possess nuclear weapons and fissile materials.”
Moscow is in favor of Tehran returning to the moratorium on research work on uranium enrichment, which was resumed last August at the Isfahan Nuclear Center. Hours before the Vienna meeting, Ali Larijani warned that Iran would begin industrial uranium enrichment if the UN Security Council was informed about its nuclear dossier. By the way, on January 10, the Iranians, in the presence of IAEA inspectors, removed the seals from the underground nuclear plant in Natanz, which until 2003 was disguised as a fertilizer production plant, and announced that “limited research and development work (R&D)” would be carried out there.
In recent days, IAEA inspectors have claimed that they have seen documents in Iran indicating that the country has individual components of atomic weapons. The Iranians respond that “such documents can be taken from the Internet.”
As one of the Russian specialists on this issue, who wished to remain anonymous, explained to Vremya Novostei, in November 2004 the Iranians actually “introduced a single moratorium on all work on uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing,” but then they “began to slowly chip away at it.” At the same time, they claim that they are pursuing exclusively peaceful goals. “But R&D is the development of technology,” our interlocutor noted. “And there are strong suspicions that Tehran can use these technologies in any way it wants.” There is no certainty that there are no hidden facilities in Iran where material production can be developed.” Formally, of course, “Iran is not violating anything, but the problem is not the resumption of R&D, but the fact that there is no trust in Tehran.”