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Towards an irremovable autocracy
In memory of the constitutional process (1993–2020).
“In the seriously ill Russian state, the creation and adoption of a fair and humane constitutional document seems difficult, important, but still only the first stage of social recovery. Not only to adopt the Constitution, but to achieve the strengthening of the democratic constitutional system in the country, to turn public consciousness upside down and place it on a solid foundation of respect for the Constitution, law and law, friendliness and public solidarity - these are the components of the constitutional process that has begun in a renewing Russia...”
Thirty years ago, in July 1990, the Constitutional Commission of the RSFSR, created by the decision of the First Congress of People's Deputies, set itself such tasks.
The newsletter of this commission, published in October 1990, is still one of my reference books.
And every time you look at it, the question arises again and again: why is it possible today to talk about a “democratic constitutional system” and “respect for the Constitution, law and law” except as a mockery?
Monopolization and irremovability of power, the transformation of elections into a decorative procedure, the lack of independent justice, the transformation of television into a department of state propaganda, lack of freedom of speech, the adoption of key decisions in an unknown way and according to unknown criteria, equating opposition activities with hostile ones, the merger of the ruling party with the bureaucratic apparatus - the similarity with what they were going to decisively abandon 30 years ago is obvious.
Victor Sheinis, one of the “fathers” of the 1993 Constitution, sadly noted that “the most important driving forces of the authoritarian restoration arose as a result of the reformatting of the forces that buried the communist system.”
How could this happen?
Why, instead of forward movement, did everything go in a circle and almost return to the old, bad memory times?
My answer:
because in the fall of 1993, the model of a replaceable autocracy was chosen for Russia, which, naturally, subsequently wanted to become irremovable.
The main dispute in the Constitutional Commission, of course, revolved around the future form of government in Russia: presidential or semi-presidential republic?
Meeting in the Kremlin on the adoption of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation. Photo: Sputnik
On the one hand, it was said that a strong parliament was needed and the prevention of excessive strengthening of executive power, which could lead to a new dictatorship. On the other hand, that in the absence of strong parties and political traditions, a “North American type” presidential republic, where the president leads the executive branch, will be more effective.
The option, which was defended by a group of deputies led by Leonid Volkov, Revolt Pimenov and Viktor Sheinis, proposed a semi-presidential republic - with a government formed by a parliamentary majority. At the same time, the president would not be the “all-Russian manager”, and, while ensuring the balance of the branches of power, would not be able to command them.
Another option, proposed by a group of experts led by Valery Zorkin (future chairman of the Constitutional Court), provided for “strong presidential power”, in which the government “is not hostage to unstable coalitions in parliament.” They criticized the semi-presidential republic, believing that the prime minister, relying on the parliamentary majority, “turns from the president’s servant into his master.”
Let us note: Boris Yeltsin’s intentions to become from the speaker of parliament (that is, the coordinator of a collegial body) to a president ruling individually were clearly outlined already at the beginning of 1991. And on March 17, 1991, simultaneously with the referendum on preserving the USSR, a referendum was held on the introduction of the presidential post in Russia (then one of the union republics). After 70% of the referendum participants voted in favor, a corresponding law was adopted, and on June 12, 1991, Yeltsin was elected president.
Then the president and his supporters increasingly relied on a “strong executive branch” that “knows how to do it” and for which parliamentary discussions are an annoying obstacle in carrying out economic decisions desired (but not accepted by the majority of society).
Boris Yeltsin at the plenary session of the Constitutional Conference. Photo: Alexander Sentsov / TASS Photo Chronicle
After the famous referendum of April 25, 1993 on confidence in the president and the congress, Yeltsin created his own structure for preparing the draft Constitution - the Constitutional Conference, which began to prepare a purely “presidential” version.
The competition of projects continued until the dispersal of the congress and “Black October”, after which only the version of the Constitutional Conference remained on the stage. It was he (and even corrected personally by the president at the last moment) that was submitted to the referendum on December 12, 1993.
The fact that autocracy was programmed by this Constitution was clear to many (including the author) even then. But it was useless to explain to supporters of a “strong executive power” that the Constitution would read “president” and not “Boris Yeltsin” - they, intoxicated by the victory over the “enemy” in the person of parliament, sought to consolidate this victory in the Constitution.
The adoption of the Constitution took place in conditions that, to put it mildly, were not conducive to real discussion.
And somewhat similar to those in which the current constitutional amendments were adopted.
The draft was published on November 10, 1993, a month before the vote.
Television was completely placed under the control of the president and the government, there was no federal parliament, the vast majority of regional, as well as all city and district councils were dispersed - there were no platforms for discussion.
State propaganda worked exclusively “for” the new Constitution, and the draft could be criticized in the few newspapers that dared to do so, and even in election speeches - in parallel, there was a campaign for the elections of deputies to the State Duma and the Federation Council. At the same time, First Deputy Prime Minister (and future head of the Federation Council) Vladimir Shumeiko openly threatened the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (the future Yabloko) with removal from the elections for criticizing the draft Constitution.
As a result, the project was accepted, or rather, declared accepted.
December 12, 1993. Elections to the first State Duma of the Russian Federation, to the Federation Council and adoption of the draft new Constitution. Photo: Sputnik
It was stated that 58% of voters voted in favor, but there are serious doubts that more than 50% of voters participated (as was necessary) in the referendum. According to the well-known conclusions of Alexander Sobyanin’s expert group, large-scale falsifications took place (mainly attributed to turnout), but only 46% of voters actually participated. But it was not possible to verify this: by order of the head of the Central Election Commission Nikolai Ryabov, the ballot papers were destroyed, and all attempts to conduct a parliamentary investigation in the elected State Duma were blocked...
This is how a still-changeable autocracy was created.
But from the very beginning, the Constitution laid down all the conditions for it to gradually become irremovable.
An almost omnipotent president, endowed with the broadest (including personnel) powers, uncontrolled and bearing no responsibility either to citizens or to parliament.
An almost powerless parliament, unable to insist on the candidacy of the prime minister, not approving even some members of the government, unable to insist on the resignation of the prime minister, the entire government or individual ministers.
And only on paper is there an independent court, where all judges are appointed by the president.
Given such introductions, one can only be surprised that the “conflict between autocracy and elections” (the expression of the brilliant Liliya Shevtsova) led to institutional changes only 20 years after President Putin came to power, and not much earlier.
The way out of the situation is not simply to reject these changes (the adoption of which was also accompanied by monstrous falsifications).
The way out is to renounce autocracy.
Yes, almost everything has to start over.
And it is important not to repeat previous mistakes.