| Pyongyang is happy with Moscow and is waiting for Bush to leave
Yesterday, American-North Korean contacts unexpectedly resumed - US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Hill arrived in Pyongyang straight from the American military base in Osan, South Korea. In the North Korean capital, he held negotiations with his North Korean counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK Kim Kye Gwan.
As experience shows, other participants in the six-party negotiations on the Korean nuclear issue (except for the DPRK and the United States, which includes Russia, China, South Korea and Japan) learn about the content of these negotiations only after the fact. Neither the Americans nor the North Koreans talk prematurely about the essence of the agreements. This is unlikely to please other participants in the negotiations, who find themselves in the role of extras. But the reality is that significant decisions are made by the United States and North Korea.
Nevertheless, the prospect of convening a new round of six-party talks is realistic as early as July. Russia’s efforts to resolve the issue of returning to Pyongyang the DPRK funds frozen in a bank in Macau in 2005 were effective. By agreeing to accept funds from a Russian bank, thereby paving the way for the resumption of negotiations on the nuclear issue, Moscow increased its authority.
True, the funds themselves have not yet reached the North Korean accounts in Khabarovsk. But Pyongyang has already taken decisive steps towards its partners in the six-party talks. An invitation has been sent to inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to check the progress of work to close the nuclear reactor, as provided for in the agreements of the February round of the Six-Party Group. The IAEA delegation will arrive in Pyongyang next week; North Korea promises to shut down the reactor in the second half of July.
But it’s too early to rejoice. The return of $25 million from the Macau Bank is not an end in itself for the DPRK - it wants to regain access to the international financial services market and break the financial blockade. It remains to be seen whether other international financial institutions will follow the example of Russian banks. If they fail to do this, the issue of financial sanctions could re-emerge and stall the negotiation process.
The problem of the DPRK's production program for highly enriched uranium seems almost insoluble - the United States demands data, and the North Koreans deny its very existence. It is also possible that disagreements may arise regarding the amount of plutonium produced in the DPRK. According to some reports, in response to the requirement to measure the amount of plutonium, the North Koreans may demand a payment of up to $150 million. The DPRK will not limit itself to receiving one-time supplies of fuel oil as energy assistance. Pyongyang will certainly raise the issue of building a nuclear power plant, which the United States opposes.
North Korea is unlikely to be in a hurry to discuss these problems with the George W. Bush administration. Judging by the pace of negotiations, a complete cessation of North Korean nuclear development will take more than one year. Pyongyang is not even talking about nuclear devices yet. The North Koreans are in no hurry. First of all, they need long-term security guarantees. And the question of this can only be raised after the change of owner of the White House in Washington. Georgy BULYCHEV, Director of the Center for the Study of Modern Korea at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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