How Russo-Ukrainian War Changed Military Science

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Drones and other new technologies are important, but the basis for success is still economic mobilization, numerical superiority and artillery. Military expert summarizes three years of Russian invasion

Доступно на русскомDate23 Dec 2024

The third year of the full-scale war is coming to an end. Can it be considered a new type of war? What innovations has it brought to military art? Was the failure of the Russian offensive really due only to errors by the security services, and not strategic miscalculations by the military command?

To Kyiv and back

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was preceded by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent low-intensity conflict in eastern Ukraine. From April 2021, Russia, under the guise of exercises, deployed almost all of its ground forces along the perimeter of Ukraine’s borders. Despite the open preparations for the invasion, Russian forces, according to the opinion of experts at RUSI, succeeded in a disinformation operation against the Ukrainian military and political leadership.

According to the admission of the then-commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, the military command believed that the main blows would be delivered in the east and south of Ukraine in order to encircle the Joint Forces Operation grouping and break through a land corridor to Crimea. The reasons why Ukrainian strategists did not believe the US intelligence about an attack along the entire perimeter of the border are still unknown. The redeployment of Ukrainian units to reinforce the northern direction began seven hours before the invasion.

Russian units began advancing simultaneously in eleven directions. The plan of the operation was to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv in the first three days, paralyze the military and political leadership, and, with the support of Ukrainian collaborators, establish a new puppet state in Ukraine.

The rapid seizure of the capital was ensured by helicopter assaults on airports near the city and within its limits. Then, after creating a security zone around the runway, airborne units were to be landed by landing. Simultaneously, heavy mechanized units and punitive detachments were advancing towards the city to assist the airborne troops, for the subsequent stabilization of the situation and suppression of possible protests.

Russian forces had success in the southern operational zone, as they managed to advance from Crimea into the rear of the Ukrainian defense. The defending side considered such a scenario unlikely. We can judge this from the words of the former Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Viktor Muzhenko. The Ukrainian military anticipated a possible enemy breakthrough in the Volnovakha area and envisioned the construction of a fallback line along the Molochna River. The defense plan in the southern zone did not work. The subsequent blockade of Mariupol and the crossing of the Dnieper by the Russians in the first days of the campaign were the largest and most tragic failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this war.

Nevertheless, the overall strategic concept of the Kremlin’s operation was unsuccessful. By the end of March 2022, Russian armed forces had been pushed back from Kyiv and out of the Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, and Sumy Oblasts.

However, despite the defeat in the initial stage, the Russian state retained the potential for further military confrontation. Troops freed up from the northern zone were gradually redeployed to the south and east to reinforce combat formations.

Grandfathers fought the same way

Russia’s full-scale invasion began as an expeditionary operation designed for rapid success. Before the invasion, military observers, including those from the Russian side, noted the insufficiency of invasion forces from the perspective of classical approaches to planning combined arms operations. Just before the invasion, the former head of intelligence for the Russian Ground Forces, Rustem Klupov, stated: “I don’t believe in a war according to the Biden administration’s scenario — with the capture of Kyiv, Odessa, and half of Ukraine. The forces and resources that Russia would have to use according to this plan are absolutely insufficient. And in reality, we don’t have them either. In that case, we would have to stretch the operation out considerably, and from a military point of view, that’s pure suicide.”

Within the framework of the classical approach to military planning, the plan for the Russian blitzkrieg might seem excessively adventurous and devoid of military logic. Upon closer examination, one can conclude that Russia’s actions are quite organic for it. All the key elements of the plan were previously used in military-police operations of the USSR and Russia. A careless march in marching columns counting on an intimidating effect, airborne landings on capital airfields, neutralization of the enemy’s top leadership — all these components, both together and separately, can be found in the operation to suppress the Hungarian Uprising (1956), in the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), in the Afghan War (1979–1989), and in the two Chechen campaigns (1994–1996 and 1999–2009). The intoxicating effect on Russian planners was likely caused by the successes in the war in Georgia (2008) and the annexation of Crimea (2014).

The initial Russian plan failed largely due to a misunderstanding of the nature of Ukrainian society and an underestimation of its capacity for resistance. Since Russia lacks any high-quality academic school of Ukrainian studies, the Russian military-political elite relied mainly on their own great-power stereotypes and the illusion of cultural proximity.

The first Ukrainian offensive

In April 2022, having failed to achieve their objectives, the invading forces lost their offensive momentum and effectively transitioned to defensive positions. They were stretched across a front line exceeding one thousand kilometers and lacked sufficient troops to establish a coherent tactical formation. On the right bank of the Dnipro River, the attacking force, having failed to reach Odessa and the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, found itself in a vulnerable position. The group’s logistical lines ran across the Dnipro and were exposed to Ukrainian strikes. The Russian commanders compensated for the lack of manpower at this stage with total superiority in artillery. The opposing Ukrainian forces had almost completely depleted their artillery arsenals by the summer of 2022.

Lacking significant reserves, the Ukrainian leadership nevertheless began planning an offensive. The shortage of forces limited the choice of attack directions. An attack on the left bank in the direction of Tokmak — Melitopol seemed the most promising. However, priority was given to the liberation of the right-bank part of the Kherson Oblast. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian defense forces were preparing the Kharkiv operation to cut off the so-called Izium salient, from which the Russian armed forces could threaten to encircle the Ukrainian Donbas grouping.

At the end of August 2022, the operation to liberate the right-bank part of the Kherson Oblast began, and almost simultaneously, in early September, the Kharkiv operation was launched.

The Kherson direction was considered the main one, but the success of the Ukrainian defense forces in the Kharkiv Oblast exceeded initial expectations. The Russian troops, fleeing encirclement and complete destruction, quickly retreated, failing to organize defensive lines along the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers. The Kharkiv operation was characterized by a successful choice of timing for the offensive, when the enemy saw the concentration of forces for the attack but lacked reserves to counter it, as the main forces were engaged in the south.

At the same time, in the Kherson Oblast, Ukrainian units encountered a well-organized defense. The Russian command recognized the vulnerability of the Kherson group’s logistical lines and the need to withdraw it from the right bank of the Dnieper, but held the defense until November 2022. Despite the success of the Kherson operation, the Russians still managed to organize a retreat from the right bank.

The second Ukrainian offensive

After the defeat in the Kharkiv Oblast, mobilization was announced in the Russian Federation. However, mobilization could not immediately create an advantage at the front. Russia desperately needed time to train the mobilized personnel and replenish equipment losses. The gain in time was achieved by the tenacity of the right-bank grouping and two local operations: the offensive on the cities of Bakhmut and Vuhledar. Russia threw poorly trained personnel and recruited convicts from the Wagner PMC into battle, which led to disproportionate losses, but gave time to prepare mobilized reinforcements.

There are different views on the Ukrainian defensive operation in the Bakhmut area. According to one of them, Ukraine needlessly exhausted its most qualified brigades near Bakhmut, and the counteroffensive in the south in 2023 had to be carried out by newly created inexperienced brigades. The opposite point of view is that the defense of Bakhmut prevented the Russians from quickly capturing Chasiv Yar, then Kostyantynivka, and subsequently the entire Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

In any case, it should be recognized that the Russian General Staff managed to exchange untrained personnel and former prisoners for the time needed to build up troops and construct defensive fortifications in the southern operational zone.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian military and political leadership and Western allies, encouraged by successes in the Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts, decided to prepare a summer offensive operation for 2023.

According to the opinion of military analysts, when planning their summer offensive in 2023, the Ukrainian command could choose from five possible basic options: encircling Bakhmut, an amphibious operation across the Dnieper, an offensive along the left bank of the Dnieper to Vasylivka and further to Enerhodar, a strike in the direction of Velyka Novosilka — Berdiansk, a breakthrough from Orikhiv through Tokmak to Melitopol. In the end, the last option was chosen.

According to the initial plan, the offensive was to be carried out by 12 fresh brigades, trained abroad and equipped mainly with Western weapons and equipment. Three brigades were intended to reinforce the eastern front to prevent the transfer of Russian reserves. Three armored brigades were to breach the defenses along a 30 km section, then three mechanized infantry brigades, as a second echelon, would break through to Tokmak. Three more brigades were assigned the role of support forces.

The direction of the main attack could not be kept secret. Analysis of the situation, media activity on the Ukrainian side, and intelligence leaks in the US allowed the Russian command to concentrate a nearly 100,000-strong force in the direction of the breakthrough. The defensive formation, about 30 km deep, consisted of a well-equipped forward area and three defensive lines. The ground group was reinforced by 60 attack helicopters.

Under these initial conditions, the chances of success for the Ukrainian offensive seemed very slim. The reasons for the subsequent failure of the 2023 summer offensive are undisputed. The timing of the offensive was poorly chosen — the enemy had time to build fortifications in the defense zone; there was no secrecy of the plan and no surprise; the offensive was carried out with insufficient forces; the attacking group was formed from new, inexperienced brigades; the defending enemy had air superiority.

Russian offensive

By the fall of 2023, the line of contact had stabilized, with the sides mainly engaged in positional fighting for more advantageous tactical positions. In early 2024, Russian forces managed to break through in the area of the Avdiivka fortified area. Unsuccessful attempts to capture Avdiivka had been made since the beginning of the invasion. But at the end of 2023, the Russian command managed to create a significant preponderance of forces and resources in the Avdiivka direction. The subsequent capture of Avdiivka allowed the Russian Armed Forces to slowly advance deep into the Ukrainian defenses. By the end of 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were still unable to overcome the operational crisis in the east of the country, which arose as a result of the loss of the Avdiivka fortified area. The occupying forces approached the belt of small towns in western Donbas, beyond which lies open steppe terrain all the way to the Dnieper River.

In turn, the Ukrainian military-political leadership also attempted to break out of the positional stalemate and authorized an operation to invade the Kursk Oblast.

After successful advancement in the initial phase of the operation, the invading force reached the maximum extent of its capabilities in controlling enemy territory. Without the support of the next echelon, it was forced to switch to positional defense, which put it in a vulnerable position.

By the end of the third year of the war, the initiative on the battlefield belongs to the Russian forces, however, both sides are showing signs of resource depletion. Ukraine is experiencing an acute shortage of manpower, while Russia is forced to replenish its arsenals with supplies from North Korea.

Conclusions

New technologies, primarily unmanned aerial vehicles, have significantly changed the battlefield, tactics, techniques, and methods of employing military equipment. But they have not shaken the doctrinal approaches to warfare. Success still requires mobilizing a significant part of the population and the entire spectrum of national resources.

Drones are likely to displace attack helicopters, assault and reconnaissance aircraft. But, despite their widespread use, artillery remains the primary means of destruction, and success or failure is determined by control over the terrain by infantry units.

Former US Army Lieutenant Colonel and military expert Alex Vershinin, analyzing the Ukrainian combat experience, demonstrates how much more complex attacking actions by small infantry groups have become. From elementary tactical techniques, they are evolving into a complex operation where the actions of a single platoon require the use of three types of electronic warfare, support from reconnaissance and attack drones, and the presence of counter-battery radars. The tactics of the warring parties and the combat formation of troops are pushing experts to conclude that traditional strongpoints and defense areas will likely be transformed into a new combat order consisting of “safe bubbles,” representing a zone remote from the enemy, covered by military air defense and electronic warfare. From such a relatively safe position, troops will conduct reconnaissance and engage the enemy without coming into direct contact with them.

At the strategic level, the Russo-Ukrainian war is returning the military to the paradigm of a war of attrition as a priority strategy in a clash between two large states. According to military experts, a war between states with comparable military-industrial and economic potential will inevitably flow into a protracted phase, where the more resilient side will gain the advantage. The development of long-range weapons and technical reconnaissance means will lead to the preferred use of maneuver by fire over maneuver by forces. The increased effectiveness of fire, in turn, will force troops to defend more than attack.

The current war has shown that even successful offensive operations appear unreasonably costly in the long strategic perspective. According to this approach, major offensive operations should be avoided in the first eighteen months to two years of a conflict.

The experience of the Russo-Ukrainian war has exposed the unconvincing nature of the doctrine of a small, professional, high-tech army designed for a short-lived regional war. Military strategists are returning to the model of a permanent professional core, supplemented by a mobilization reserve during periods of threat.

Views on nuclear weapons are likely to be revised. Strategic nuclear weapons are more like a terrorist’s belt packed with explosives. Their main characteristic is that, unlike conventional weapons, they are not suitable for selective engagement of the enemy and cannot lead to victory in a strategic sense. As for tactical nuclear weapons, their destructive properties are comparable to those of conventional weapons. At the same time, the possible tactical advantages of using tactical nuclear weapons are incommensurate with the harmful consequences for their possessor.

Russia has lost its status as a superpower. The war exposed the weakness of the Russian armed forces in comparison with the modern armed forces of the Western coalition countries. It has become obvious that NATO forces are capable of paralyzing all of Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure with several days of missile salvos.

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