The battlefield options, advantages, and disadvantages for Russia and Ukraine in the months ahead

Russia’s latest large-scale offensive in Ukraine has been underway for 10 months now. On the one hand, it has not led to the collapse of Ukrainian defenses, and the Kremlin’s territorial gains fall well short of the campaign’s desired aims. On the other hand, during all this time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have not even tried to seize the initiative, relying instead on passive defense and slow retreat. UAF Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi explained this strategy in late winter: Kyiv’s forces intend to exhaust the Russian army, inflicting as many losses as possible, before forming new units and then going on the offensive. This has been Ukraine’s playbook twice before: in 2022 (successfully) and in 2023 (unsuccessfully). Meduza reviews Kyiv’s odds in 2024 and analyzes the possibility of another Ukrainian offensive in the foreseeable future.

Will the Ukrainian Armed Forces even be able to stop this Russian offensive?

Russian troops have held the battlefield initiative in Ukraine for the past 10 months — longer than either side at any stage of the war. Such a sustained offensive became possible due to the Russian army’s advantage in forces and munitions. This advantage arose for several reasons:

• The UAF suffered heavy losses during its defense of Bakhmut (among its “old” brigades formed before the fall of 2022) and during its latest counteroffensive (this time, also among its “new” brigades formed in late 2022 and early 2023). Meanwhile, due to a series of defeats — and society’s growing “war fatigue” — the influx of volunteers to the front started falling by mid-2023. Moreover, Ukraine’s forced mobilization system was inefficient, leading the authorities to adopt various unpopular measures in May 2024 to draw more men into the military.
• For several months, from December 2023 to May 2024, political opposition in the U.S. Congress halted the flow of new weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. Also, U.S. funds allocated for weapons deliveries to Ukraine did not exceed the amount spent in 2023 (despite plans to supply more expensive types of ammunition, including ATACMS missiles and a higher number of interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system).
• At the same time, the Russian authorities managed to boost the recruitment of “volunteers” by raising regional governments’ payments to new soldiers. Additionally, the state suspended troops’ contract termination and demobilization, plugging a major drain on the army’s size. By the spring of 2024, the Russian Armed Forces likely had a one-and-a-half to twofold advantage in manpower and continued to be reinforced with new contract soldiers.
• Russia established a steady supply of artillery ammunition for its army by increasing production at home and buying supplies from North Korea. At the same time, the Russian military largely abandoned the reckless shell expenditure that characterized its tactics in the summer of 2022, creating relative stability for Russian troops (who faced a serious ammunition shortage in early 2023, too).
• Finally, Russia’s military has partially mitigated its technological lag behind the UAF in terms of intelligence, control, and unmanned strike capabilities. Crucially, Russia’s more effective aviation is now capable of massive strikes at static targets on the front line without entering the range of Ukrainian air defenses.

At the same time, in 10 months of slow advances, Russian troops have achieved only modest successes. A breakthrough with strategic consequences has proved impossible due to the two sides’ technological parity, and because Russia’s advantages fall short of overwhelming. At the offensive’s current pace (which has remained almost unchanged since its early days), it would take roughly 15 years for Russia to achieve President Putin’s declared goals: the capture of Ukraine’s entire Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. However, the Kremlin signals that it’s perfectly comfortable with the course of the war. Today, the Putin administration’s primary objective is to maintain the initiative on the battlefield and exhaust Ukraine and its Western allies until the coalition, for political reasons, is forced to enter negotiations on unfavorable terms.

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The war’s current trajectory is unacceptable to the Ukrainian authorities.

From Kyiv’s perspective, the army needs to seize the initiative, launch another counteroffensive, and possibly force the Kremlin into negotiations (if not from a position of strength, then under better conditions than are possible now). The only way to achieve this is to hold the line until the Russian military again exhausts its offensive potential. While doing this, Ukraine must simultaneously form a new strike group (including new brigades), strengthening it with unmanned and manned aerial assets and developing an operation that can change the situation at the front.

The UAF appears to be busy forming 15 or more brigades — in some places, at the expense of reinforcing units active at the front, which has led to criticism from some Western experts and support from others. At the same time, the troops in the field have been ordered to hold their positions at all costs (another decision that’s drawn significant criticism).

There’s no guaranteeing the UAF’s success in either holding its defenses or seizing the initiative in the war. Even if Kyiv’s forces manage the latter, there’s no certainty that the Ukrainian military will be able to

The UAF's success is not guaranteed, either in defense or in attempts to seize the initiative. And even if it manages to seize the initiative, there is no certainty that Ukraine will be able to capitalize on it effectively.

• Despite strict orders to hold the line at all costs, the UAF isn’t just losing territory: Russian forces are approaching critical logistical hubs that Ukraine can’t afford to lose.
• Attempts to redeploy brigades from one crisis area to another (some groups have changed locations three times since the beginning of the year) do not improve the situation. The front is expanding: in February, after the fall of Avdiivka, the frontline to the west of the city stretched for 25 kilometers (15.5 miles). Today, in the same area, it is more than 40 kilometers (almost 25 miles) long. Russia’s offensive north of Kharkiv has also added several dozen kilometers to the frontline. As a result, Ukraine’s active brigades must hold an increasingly longer front. Russia’s control of the war’s initiative means Moscow can choose the direction of its offensive, and expanding the front benefits Russia’s aims. Clearly, the Ukrainian army needs new units now to contain Russia’s advance.
• It’s not entirely clear who is currently recruiting more soldiers — Russia or Ukraine. Reports from Kyiv indicate that the country’s mobilization situation has improved since new laws came into effect, but how this translates into troop numbers remains a mystery. Meanwhile, Russia’s Defense Ministry says it recruited 190,000 new contract soldiers in the first half of the year, which is fewer than the previous year but should be enough to cover the military’s current losses (and might be sufficient even to form new units). But there’s no way to verify these claims independently and reliably. In any case, it’s doubtful that Ukraine would be able to gain a significant numerical advantage through expanded mobilization (as Russia did in 2023).
• Finally, the Ukrainian army’s offensive in 2023 and even Russian forces’ experience this year do not give UAF commanders cause for great optimism when planning future offensives in this war: attacking troops inevitably get bogged down in the enemy’s defenses, which are saturated with mines, trenches, drones, and artillery.

What are the aims of Russia’s ongoing offensive?

We can infer the Russian military’s goals and objectives from the directions of previous attacks and how Moscow positions its forces. The army is actively advancing in three theaters of operations: the main strike is directed at the center of the Donbas along a hundred-kilometer (62-mile) arc from Chasiv Yar to Krasnohorivka; with auxiliary strikes near Vuhledar in the southern Donbas and towards the Oskil River (in the eastern Kharkiv, northern Donetsk, and Luhansk regions). We’ve witnessed Russia’s greatest advances in the area to the west and east of Avdiivka, but any of these attacks could become a success for the army if Ukraine is forced to strengthen its defenses in the area by pulling men from another section of the front. For the past 10 months, by changing the direction of its attacks like this, Russia has managed a slow but gradual advance.

Future assaults could take multiple directions, each with its own advantages and disadvantages for the Russian Armed Forces.

Option 1: Central Donbas

Russian troops aim to encircle (or force out under the threat of encirclement) Ukrainian troops in the developed area between Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka (known as the Toretsk agglomeration).

A second direction is the road between Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar and the city of Pokrovsk itself — the most important logistical hub for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the central part of the Donbas.

It’s likely that the Russian military will continue its main offensive in this area.

The advantages for Russia:

A successful continuation of its offensive promises operational benefits for the Russian military: capturing or even starting battles in the Pokrovsk area will drastically degrade the supply situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces along the entire front from Krasnohorivka to Chasiv Yar.

After the Russian Armed Forces reach the Pokrovsk—Chasiv Yar highway (they’re already within less than five kilometers or about three miles), the Ukrainian front will be divided into two weakly connected parts, complicating Kyiv’s capacity to supply its troops and maneuver reserves.

From the Pokrovsk area, Russia would be well positioned for an offensive into the southern Donbas. From the Kostiantynivka area (west of Chasiv Yar), an offensive could be directed north toward the Kramatorsk—Sloviansk agglomeration.

Russian troops have a stable supply network in this area, anchored by the city of Donetsk and its suburbs, with numerous warehouses and developed infrastructure. This allows Moscow to concentrate a significant portion of all its forces in Ukraine on this front.

The drawbacks for Russia:

• This is the most obvious plan with the worst potential consequences for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which is why Kyiv will do everything it can to prevent a breakthrough here. The Ukrainian authorities understand that this area needs to be reinforced, likely at the expense of troops from other sections of the front.
• Throughout this war, obvious main attack paths have drawn enemy reserves until a battle turns into a “meat grinder,” as was the case near Bakhmut (the Wagner mercenary offensive) and in the Zaporizhzhia region (the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive).

Option 2: A northern route

As part of Moscow’s “multiple strikes” strategy, which aims to divert the attention of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from central Donbas, the Russian military periodically intensifies its offensive in the north — from the city of Siversk in the Donetsk region to Kupiansk in the Kharkiv region. In May, to maintain pressure on this operational front, the Russian Armed Forces began an offensive across the border of the Belgorod and Kharkiv regions. The likely overall plan was quite ambitious: in the event of success, Russian troops could have advanced from the north along both banks of the Oskil (a sizeable river) in the general direction of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk (as well as from the east, from the direction of Siversk and Bakhmut). But the offensive didn’t pan out: near Kharkiv and Vovchansk, Ukrainian defenses halted Russian troops, and Moscow’s advance near Kupiansk and Siversk remains too slow.

However, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces transfer troops from this front to the Pokrovsk and Toretsk area (and such transfers have already begun), the Russian army could reactivate its northern plan.

The advantages for Russia:

• If Ukraine’s defenses collapse along this front, Russian forces will once again be able to threaten the UAF’s most important fortified areas in Kramatorsk and Sloviansk from the north — as they already tried in 2022. Back then, the offensive quickly fizzled out due to a lack of Russian manpower.
• Without this offensive or one like it, Russian troops will be unable to capture the northern parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which President Putin has declared to be the war’s official political goal.

The drawbacks for Russia:

• Moscow hasn’t committed enough men to its forces in the north to execute an operation of such scale.
• All previous attempts (since the winter of 2022-2023) to break through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ front near Kupiansk or Siversk (or between them in the valley of the Siverskyi Donets River) have failed. Much of the territory in this area is covered by forests and divided by large rivers. Furthermore, the local infrastructure — namely, a handful of roads from Russia’s Belgorod region and from Starobilsk and Svatove in Ukraine’s Luhansk region — cannot support the supply of a large number of troops.

Option 3: Southern Donbas

Russian troops have already approached the main supply route of Vuhledar — the main fortified point in Ukraine’s southern Donbas defenses. Additionally, they have captured the area of the city of Marinka and almost completely the city of Krasnohorivka to the north of Marinka. In the long term, this opens the door to attacks on Kurakhove, an important logistical hub for the entire southern Donbas.

The advantages for Russia:

• The capture of Vuhledar would radically enhance the security level for the Russian Armed Forces’ supply lines in southern Ukraine. Russian engineers have completed the construction of a railway from the Rostov region to Ukraine’s occupied southern regions to reduce the army’s dependence on supplies delivered over the Crimean Bridge. The farther the front advances from this railway, the more reliable it will be as a supply line.
• From the Kurakhove area, Russia could mount an offensive toward Pokrovsk from the south, meeting its forces advancing from the Avdiivka front.

The drawbacks for Russia:

• Such an offensive wouldn’t get the Kremlin any closer to its main goal: the capture of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Moreover, breaking through to Pokrovsk from the south would be challenging. At the end of the day, it’s unlikely that losing Vuhledar would force Kyiv to make significant concessions.

How might the Ukrainian Armed Forces advance if they seize the initiative?

If Ukraine’s military overcomes the challenges laid out above, exhausting Russia’s advancing troops while simultaneously forming a new strike group, it will have few counteroffensive options. Kyiv faces military and political limitations: on the one hand, the Ukrainian Armed Forces likely won’t get a chance at another attempt if a new offensive is unsuccessful or merely fails to achieve sufficient gains. On the other hand, it’s impossible to imagine that the Ukrainian military will be able to achieve an overwhelming advantage in forces over Russia in the coming months. Therefore, any Ukrainian offensive must be concentrated in one direction, where success can bring the greatest political benefit.

There are a few different ways Kyiv could go if it gets the opportunity, and each offensive has its own advantages and disadvantages.

Option 1: A counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region

This is the safest option, requiring the least force exertion. Russian troops invaded across the border of the Belgorod and Kharkiv regions on two fronts with relatively weak groups and failed to break through Ukraine’s defense to a significant depth. All Kyiv would need to do here is push Russia’s troops back across the border.

The advantages for Ukraine:

• A victory near Kharkiv could yield significant political benefits: Putin publicly ordered Russian troops to push the Ukrainian military back from the Belgorod region’s border (though the Kremlin later downgraded the offensive to a “tactical” operation after the breakthrough failed).
• Pushing Russia’s army back across the border would free up forces for other fronts. The defense of Kharkiv and Vovchansk has required Kyiv to concentrate large forces — about eight and a half brigades (30,000–40,000 men). In the event of success, a weaker covering force can be left at the border.
• Russian troops have advanced only 5-7 kilometers (less than 5 miles) into the areas around Kharkiv and Vovchansk, which puts the new bridgehead within range of almost all the weapons in Ukraine’s arsenal. If Moscow decides to reinforce its defenses outside Kharkiv with reserves, it will reduce the pressure it can exert on other sections of the front.

The drawbacks for Ukraine:

• Even a defeat in the Kharkiv region is unlikely to force the Kremlin into any compromises — it would still be too insignificant to change Russia’s war aims.
• In another Kharkiv counteroffensive, Ukrainian troops would risk getting bogged down again (as they did in June and early July). If this were to happen, Ukraine’s forces on the war’s main battlefield, in the Donbas, would be left without any hope of reinforcements.

Option 2: A counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region

As was the case a year ago, the most promising front for Ukraine in both political and military terms remains the country’s south. Reaching Russian troops’ supply lines near Tokmak, Melitopol, and Volnovakha could lead to a major collapse of Russian defenses. But Kyiv’s main challenge in the south is the same as last summer: it faces a large group of Russian troops that can rely on a sophisticated, highly engineered defense system. And Moscow can send reserves at any moment.

The advantages for Ukraine:

• The Ukrainian military has long wanted to replicate its most successful offensive: the deep breakthrough it achieved in the Kharkiv region in the fall of 2022, which immediately brought significant operational, strategic, and political gains.
• A decisive success in the Zaporizhzhia region could immediately and radically improve Kyiv’s position in future negotiations (it could even jumpstart Ukraine’s efforts to renew talks from a position of strength).

The drawbacks for Ukraine:

• A renewed southern counteroffensive comes with great risks for Ukraine, whatever its potential gains. In a best-case scenario, the Ukrainian military has learned from its previous mistakes and this time relies on more than newly formed, inexperienced brigades, devotes all available forces to the operation, creates a group capable of achieving local air superiority (at least during the breakthrough phase, using F-16 fighters and Western air defense systems), and finally achieves the element of surprise. However, even if Kyiv manages all this, a breakthrough on the battlefield and a victory over Russia’s reserves seem less likely now than in the summer of 2023.
• Another unsuccessful large-scale counteroffensive would threaten the Ukrainian military with a crisis even worse than the predicament it’s been in since last summer’s failure.

Option 3: A winter counteroffensive in central Donbas

The Ukrainian military’s primary task in the months ahead is to counter the threat of a Russian breakthrough in central Donbas, which could destabilize Ukraine’s defenses and supply lines in the region. In the fall of 2022, Ukrainian forces exploited weaknesses in Russian troops’ stretched flanks near Balakliya, and the UAF could do this again with the Russian group now advancing on Pokrovsk. A successful operation here could nullify all of Russia’s gains in recent months.

The advantages for Ukraine:

• Kyiv must end Russia’s capacity to threaten both Pokrovsk and the road between Pokrovsk and Chasov Yar. Otherwise, Ukrainian troops in the Donbas could face a severe logistical and operational crisis.
• Defeating Russian forces near Pokrovsk could influence the Kremlin’s willingness to continue the war.

The drawbacks for Ukraine:

• Ukraine will probably find it impossible to build on any success here because what lies beyond Russian forward positions is the city of Donetsk and its suburbs. (The battle for this territory will require a completely different concentration of forces.)
• The window for a counterattack is nearly shut: if Russian troops reach Pokrovsk, it will make it impossible to supply and stage a large Ukrainian strike group. Kyiv needs an interim success: the Ukrainian army must stop Russia’s current offensive. This, in turn, may require the immediate use of reserves that Kyiv has been building up for a future counteroffensive.

Translation by Kevin Rothrock