Putin is forever

How much will the personalist regime live in Russia?

• The fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin began, which actually ruled the country of the nineteenth in a row.
• In Russia there are no political institutions necessary for any transformation of the current government.
• The Russian political system is built so that the absence of Vladimir Putin in everyday decision instantly paralyzes it.
• Putin’s high rating is not a guarantee of stability, but a very dangerous situation in which power cannot afford to reduce it a little.
• Hidden resources for the transformation of the system are enclosed in the ability of Russian society to develop and change the view of the world.

Sergey Medvedev: The future came on March 18, 2018, and it turned out to be surprisingly similar to the past. The presidential elections were held in Russia, but most likely it was a plebiscite to rejection of Vladimir Putin as the President of the Russian Federation. They did not have time to die out these elections, the Chechnya parliament made the initiative to hold a referendum on a change in the Constitution in order to allow Putin to rule the third term. Accordingly, the question arises: is it possible to imagine Russia without Putin? Details in the plot of our correspondent Evgeny Levkovich .

Evgeny Levkovich: Last week, the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin officially began. In fact, he ruled the country of the nineteenth in a row. Since the fall of the monarchy, only Joseph Stalin was at the head of state longer than him - 30 years. Putin has every chance to surpass the “father of the peoples”: for his 65 years he is in excellent physical shape, he has no chronic diseases, according to the latest VTsIOM poll, 82% of Russians unconditionally approve his activities, and the other day Ramzan Kadyrov said that he initiates the All -Russian referendum on the lifelong extension of his powers, since there is no Putin, according to the head of Chechnya, alternatives. According to the Levada Center , almost half of Russians may agree with him: 49% of respondents do not see a person who can replace the current president with his post. It turns out that Putin is forever?

Sergey Medvedev: Indeed, if not Putin, then who? We are discussing this topic with our guests: this is Konstantin Haaza , a political observer, a senior researcher at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences , and Nikolai Petrov , a professor of the Higher School of Economics.

From this Chechen initiative, you can brush off, as Dmitry Peskov did, you can smile, but maybe there is a passage of some very real political gesture?

Nikolai Petrov: I would not see the insidious plans of the Kremlin and a trial ball in this: rather, this is just the personal initiative of Kadyrov, for which, as he knows, they will not scold him and notes. It seems to me that the Duma is in many ways in accordance with the same motivation.

Sergey Medvedev: But the system goes to this? In September 2011, the numbers "2024" lit up in my head (that Putin will be until 2024), and now for some reason I have stubbornly burning in my head, the Voinovichi numbers "2042". Preparing for the air, I re -read Voinovich, and there is a lot of similar: there is controlled by the Communist Party of State Security - it seems to be such a humorous anti -utopia. But why isn't Putin really until 2042? He will be 90 years old, he is still in excellent physical shape.

Konstantin Gaaza: Putin himself does not know the answer to the question, why not until 2042. There is a well -known thesis that the attitude of President Putin to the right of the legist is a strict, formal, dry follow -up of the letter, although, of course, it cannot be said that he remained a strict executor of Russian laws for 19 years in power. But indeed, there are no obstacles between him and the third term, no forts and garrisons that need to be taken, no resistance. The only resistance is his inner aesthetic problem, associated with the fact that he does not think of a figure equal to Alexander Lukashenko or Nursultan Nazarbayev, does not think of himself a person standing on the same board with those who, according to formal signs, can be called dictators, that is, people, infinitely and diversely extending their authority. Of course, Putin would not want to stay so.

On the other hand, not only in Russia, but also in the world, the rules change quite quickly, and, unfortunately, not for the better. It seems to me that one of the leitmotifs of this period of 2018–24 will be about 2042, about a constant attempt to try on the image of yourself for this obstacle in the form of a formal ban on life -lifelong rule. The point is not that this is not

Not only in Russia, but also in the world, the rules change quite quickly, and, unfortunately, not for the better

Democratic, this does not scare anyone, but that aesthetically it very quickly moves Russia from even alternative Byzantine Europe towards Central Asia.

Sergey Medvedev: Is it possible now, from 2018, to present Russia without Putin, given this famous quote: there is Putin - there is Russia, there is no Putin - no Russia?

Nikolai Petrov: You can put a mental experiment: if the personalist leader evaporates today, what will we get tomorrow? We will get the lack of institutions that could provide at least some stability in this situation, we will get the struggle of everyone against all, in which it is not clear who wins. But this itself indicates that such a condition cannot last long. Today, the old rules do not work, but new ones are also absent, there are no institutions, and in such a situation it is difficult to talk about any way of transferring or transforming power, whether from Putin-President to Putin-the national leader, Dan Xiaopin, anyone or another. Despite the fact that we record the absence of any serious changes, the system should change due to internal reasons, and not because someone from outside will push it.

Sergey Medvedev: Is Putin himself an institute itself, generally the only institution? I represent the work of Kontorovic “two bodies of the king”: the investigature of the political body of the nation into the body of the sovereign, a leader, who is not by chance, is shown to us so often in order to prove his masculinity.

Konstantin Haaze: Putin is not an institution. In the report of one of the good, smart loyalists there was an interesting phrase: "Putin is a transcendental category." Putin is a tool of cognition, this is a way by which we specify in a certain way the political situation, Russia, and the nation. At the moment when this instrument and this optics disappears, of course, great things await us. In order to imagine Russia without Putin, other cognitive tools are needed. Now we imagine Putin and immediately imagine Russia.

We now have a war of all against all, it is another matter that it has some restriction in the form that somewhere there is a living physical body. Gorbachev was amazingly said: he purr. The degree of person’s involvement in communication is that he purr, intentionally makes him not to be understood. The national leader will evaporate tomorrow-Medvedev, a large Politburo, the yard will gather, and they will somehow sit down.

Konstantin Haaza

Putin’s problem is not that Russia is unprotected without him, but that in the case of any disappearance, we will have to re -claim Russia, and everyone understands this. Therefore, we may not do this in an emergency mode, when you, like Prokhanov’s, turned into a rainbow, disappeared over the turntable, and all: we go into the office, and there is no one there, and the window is open. Still, let's try to do this before he evaporates. This is the second leitmotif 2018–24.

The first leitmotif is Putin’s attempt to stretch himself as a statesman going beyond the Constitution, and the second leitmotif is an attempt to come up with this country in some way, in which Putin will have a slightly smaller role, and there they can get some other guarantees. And what are these guarantees when the president purr? This is an occasion to argue that he had meowed.

Sergey Medvedev: Maybe he no longer needs to say anything? The famous Weberian triad-it seems to me that Putin now has all three legitimities: rationally-bureaucratic, with which he came in the early 2000s, and traditional, like the mandate of the sky, which is given in the Russian political structure, and charismatic: the same T-shirts, smartphones with Putin, Putin on horseback and so on. At the same time, he does not need to do anything, he stands as a kind of deity, is simply present in the creation of Russian politics.

Nikolai Petrov: Unfortunately, the system is built so that the absence of Putin in everyday decision -making instantly paralyzes it. We saw how this happened when Putin for unknown reasons disappeared for a while. And this is just a very dangerous thing, which is so centralized and brought to Putin’s level of all decision -making, not even the most important, that in his absence no one has the right to accept them. This can be a paralysis system: absolutely no one can, does not want, and as a result of the selection that has been underway for many years, and is not able to make responsible decisions without the president itself.

Konstantin Haazaz: And if we stop producing this legitimacy? There are three workshops, in one of them rationally-bureaucratic legitimacy is produced. There are complex mechanisms, equipment, technologies, administration, government apparatus. There is a charisma workshop, there was the head of the Surkov, now Kiriyenko, Volodin, it doesn’t matter. They make banners, embroider socks to the leader ... There is a traditional dispute: relatively speaking, in half the council and the Russian Orthodox Church - they sit and find out what is more traditional. Let's imagine that in some of these workshops the work will simply be interrupted-for example, in the charisma production workshop. He also has a very technological charisma, which depends on half -naked photos, trips on the KAMAZ, and so on. Let's imagine a story when he purr and purr, does not say anything.

Putin is a tool of cognition, this is a way by which we marry a political situation in a certain way

Can Putin be eliminated, arrange a shabel for himself? The story of a 19-year government shows that no. An example is the appointment of a new office. People whose names were named by Medvedev, with whom he had already talked a week ago, they say: show the decrees where Vladimir Vladimirovich signed. And if Vladimir Vladimirovich did not sign, then everything. The situation of semi-paralych is exactly what is happening now, when half of the deputy prime ministers have already cleaned the cabinets, although they continue to formally be listed at work and receive a salary, and the other half did not enter there because they did not see the decrees from Putin.

This is a system, infinitely vulnerable technically. It is vulnerable at the moment when the charisma workshop begins to conflict with the workshop for the production of traditional legitimacy. This, by the way, is the normal plot of the second term of Putin when Surkov fought with the Russian Orthodox Church. Or when, for example, he does not stir, the system enters the state of the semi -paralych.

Sergey Medvedev: And this is an unstable balance, this semi -paralych can last the entire fourth term?

Nikolai Petrov: I hope not. But at the beginning of the last period I thought that for so long it could not continue. Oil prices went up again, and it seems like there is no need to carry out any serious reforms, you can only do to maintain the system in the state of the coma in which it is located. And how long it can happen is a big question. I would not have any special optimism today not so much for the configuration of the government that is outlined, but according to the program that we see.

Konstantin Haaza: which we do not see.

Nikolai Petrov: But at least it is somehow present in the form of decrees. This resembles 2005: preparation for tandems with national projects, when everyone will be good, light and rich. We see some constantly continuing election campaign and the production of the very legitimacy that seems to be after the election, but it seems like it must be constantly confirmed by monthly polls and not lower below 86%.

Sergey Medvedev: As the political scientist Alexander Morozov figuratively expressed on Facebook: oil under a hundred, Scythians and Sarmatians are displaying horses and sitting down to drink wine from their rivals framed by gold. Victor Pelevin, a prophetic Russian writer, has long said that Russia has found its national idea - this is Putin.

Let's try to present possible scenarios of Putin's transformation. We do not allow the script that it turns into a rainbow, evaporates. But he can transform - say, turn into an old man, into Ayatolla, Elbasy, like Nazarbayev. There would be a person, and there would be a position. Putin continues his earthly bodily existence, but a new supervisory function is being formed under it. Do you represent such an option that the current term will be devoted to the formation of the function of the father of the nation?

Nikolai Petrov

Nikolai Petrov: This option is certainly preparing, another thing is how much it is realized. After all, we do not have a transit of this kind, the necessary institutions. If we have all the fullness of power and control over property and the courts in one hand, then it is impossible to agree among themselves and somehow divide this power and not be afraid that the next day the one who receives the president’s post will say that now we have other rules, now property does not play, and so on. Any transformation involves the creation of new institutions, and this is not necessarily democratic institutions. I believe that just with the idea of how to transform the system, the leader should come up quickly enough, otherwise a situation of complete uncertainty arises, when the elites, no matter how disunited today, still begin to look and watch, and what's next, who is next. This is a very dangerous condition.

Sergey Medvedev: Konstantin, a Mexican scenario is possible when the outgoing president points a finger at his successor, and so is repeated from generation to generation?

Konstantin Haazaz: No. In order to decide on the scenarios of any succession, we need to answer a very simple question: we continue to plan that the President of the Russian Federation is a screen that separates citizens from the ruling class? Putin is a screen. On the one hand, there is a ruling class, and it is disgusting, it is cannibal ethics, these people eat each other. On the other hand, there is an audience. Transit, carried out in 2005-2008, was based on the idea that the president is still a screen, a separator between the ruling class and Russian citizens, this is such a gearbox, some should not see others, these cannot be allowed to the people, and people cannot be watched as they live. Putin cannot leave in this format, because this story immediately throws the successor beyond the boundaries of the political system, where three workshops for the production of legitimacy begin to work.

The characteristic feature of the Russian political system is that our ruling class does not rule, and the president is an obstacle to this public rule. If this is preserved, then Putin should jump onto the floor above, and then the president will be the next prime minister, and Putin will sit as chairman of the Security Council, chairman of the State Council.

Sergey Medvedev: Why not monarchy? This absolutely fits into the monarchical scheme.

Nikolai Petrov: Even under Yeltsin they said that we have an elected monarch. Putin today is much larger than the king than ever in the post -Soviet history, or maybe in the Russian one. The question is in the throne. The monarchy is very clear, strict rules of how it is all transmitted.

Konstantin Haaza: this must be poured into a form, and they have problems with any form.

Nikolai Petrov: On the one hand, we saw during the time of Yeltsin that the best institutions cannot completely transform the country overnight. And on the other hand, we saw how these institutions work, we have a very serious positive experience of the 90s. The way out, obviously, is that hand in hand should gradually and for a very long time improve, change, complicate both institutions, and the corresponding political culture. If we immediately take advanced democratic institutions, we will surprise why they do not give the result that they give in other countries, and vice versa, if we always say that let them learn to choose first, and then we will pour water into the pool, we also do not get the result.

Sergey Medvedev: That his imperial office, that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU or the same Old Square as the Presidential Administration, in Russia, is ruled by an unconstitutional body such as the Presidential Administration and a certain monosubject allocated from the government system.

The President of the Russian Federation is a screen that separates citizens from the ruling class

Konstantin Haaze: The events of the late twentieth century, starting with the collapse of the Berlin wall, are comparable in its scale with a 30-year war, with the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the German nation. У Фуко есть очень интересная ремарка в конце курса лекций 76-77 года: он говорит, что маленькие германские княжества после заключения вестфальского мира стали лабораториями, в которых совершенно по-разному экспериментировали с новым пониманием государственной власти. Постсоветское пространство в широком смысле, начиная от Германии и заканчивая Китаем, превратилось в гигантскую лабораторию, где каждое княжество каким-то образом пыталось прикрутить себя к новому пониманию государственной власти и суверенитета, возникшему после 1989 года. Все, что мы сейчас имеем, – это достаточно новые уникальные штуки. Власть, которая возникла, осуществляет себя в экспериментальном режиме, ей не нужно тысячелетнего эффекта колеи, она эту колею каждые выходные воспроизводит телевизором. А если выключить телевизор, то мы еще не знаем, какой окажется колея.

Мы не знаем российского общества, оно намного более "прогрессивно", чем то, как устроена российская власть. Вся моя лично надежда связана с тем, что в какой-то момент это опережающее развитие российского общества, этот отрыв станет настолько большим, что будет уже не очень важно, кто сидит в Кремле, остался там кто-то или не остался.

Сергей Медведев: Как давно звучали алармистские прогнозы коллег: это не может продлиться, еще несколько месяцев – и все. И еще год, еще пять, десять лет… Есть какой-то предел насыщения этого "всегда"? Или действительно эта ресурсная подушка, количество природных ресурсов и ресурс страха, которым Россия может торговать на международной арене, обеспечивает эти страховочные сетки?

Константин Гаазе: Страховочными сетками являются три цеха по производству легитимности. До тех пор, пока существует всеми понимаемая, но не проговариваемая договоренность между тем, что мы называем российским обществом, и тем, что мы называем Путиным, эта система может эволюционировать сколь угодно долго. За последние 20 лет если мы что-то и поняли про эту гадость, то только то, что она бесконечно адаптивна.

Сергей Медведев: А что может нарушить этот нерушимый контракт между обществом и Путиным? В Китае был мандат неба, потом случалось великое наводнение, голод и мор, и император терял мандат неба. Случалось народное восстание, приходила новая династия… В России может что-то произойти, из-за чего Путин потеряет мандат неба?

Константин Гаазе: Слава богу, нет, хотя некоторые коллеги-социологи говорят: у народа глаза кровью умоются от чего-то – от теракта, от большой войны, и он прозреет. Я не верю в возможность прозрения, а верю в возможность смены познавательной оптики. Когда я говорю, что общество выросло, я имею в виду, что обществу говорят эти слова в телевизоре, а общество отвечает: слушайте, ребята, это какой-то вчерашний день. Не то что они против Путина, просто они больше не могут слушать Соловьева. Через какое-то время может что-то появиться.

Николай Петров: Оптика может резко меняться. Как платье голого короля: еще вчера все видели, какое оно замечательное, а тут что-то произошло, и вдруг все видят совершенно иначе. В этом смысле надо понимать, что 86% – это не гарантия стабильности, это очень опасная ситуация, когда власть не может себе позволить ни на копеечку это снизить, ведь когда оно пойдет вниз, никто не может сказать, как это будет развиваться дальше: рухнет или будет постепенно ползти вниз.

Константин Гаазе: Нельзя поставить на профилактику цех по производству легитимности.

Николай Петров: Мы видим, что все ресурсы системы идут не потому, что кто-то хочет сделать жизнь особенно хорошей, а потому, что иначе невозможно сохранять эту самую штуку. Что касается элитного пакта, проблема в другом – у нас нет элиты. Элита – это люди, которые обладают какой-то самостоятельной властью в силу контролируемого ресурса, денег или власти. Мы имеем систему чиновной элиты, в том числе и в виде олигархов, которых назначают, а если они будут плохо себя вести, то их поменяют. Как они могут о чем-то договариваться, кто они такие? Пока нет никаких институтов: ни частной собственности, ни политических институтов, – не может быть и элиты, способной достигать какого-то компромисса.

Сергей Медведев: Даже у таких, как Кадыров и Сечин, нет субъектности?

Константин Гаазе: У них есть способность совершать действия внутри системы. У Сечина огромная агентность, у Кадырова она намного меньше. Есть другие фигуры с довольно большой агентностью, о которых мы не говорим каждый день. Или Ротенберг – простой еврейский парень в тенниске, но его агентность такая, пол-Кремля отдохнет, глядя на то, как он построил мост за 250 миллиардов рублей. Они способны к действию. Вопрос в том, в какой момент они проснутся и скажут: он голый, а мы бароны.

Сергей Медведев: Все сводится к тому, что Путин – это не институт, не политическое тело нации, а способ познания, оптика, те очки, при помощи которых мы смотрим на мир и говорим: есть Путин – есть Россия, нет Путина – нет России. Но все равно рано или поздно в один момент мы снимаем очки, и оптика поменяется.

*В видеоверсии программы высказано мнение, что А.Н. Илларионов делал алармистские прогнозы по поводу скорого краха режима, которое не соответствует действительности.