Where are they?

George Bush: Syria should know that we expect complete cooperation from her. And that we urge them not to allow members of the Baas party, the Saddam family or a fugitive general to look for and find a shelter in this country. We expect that they will do everything possible to prevent the hiding of those who should appear before justice. And if they are already in this country, then we expect that the Syrian authorities will give them an interested side.

Irina Lagunina: This is a phrase from one of the recent speeches of the US President. The correspondent of the American newspaper New York Times in Baghdad John Burns gathered legends around the city. One of them says: last Wednesday, who came to the midday prayer to the ADAMI mosque in the north of the Iraqi capital, they saw on Saddam Hussein Square. He turned to them with the covenant, at least so they perceived it. He said that he was fighting with them, in the same trenches. And then disappeared like a shadow. Such legends can appear again and again, and will appear, no matter how further the events develop. They will become a second stream of mythology. The first surrounds the bin of Ladena. How the first legend originated and how now it affects the foreign policy of the United States and relations at the international and regional level. After the start of surgery in Afghanistan, our Washington correspondent Vladimir Abarinov tells the history of Osama Bin Laden.

Vladimir Abarinov: After the military defeat of the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden Laden disappeared without a trace. The large attacks comparable to the attacks of September 11, despite all the fears, did not happen - according to American intelligence, this means that al -Qaeda ceased to exist as a single transnational network with a centralized leadership and broke up into separate cells, whose members act independently, to the best of their means and forces. The fate of the charismatic head of Islamic terrorists, however, remains unknown. For assistance in his capture, the FBI appointed a reward of $ 27 million. There was a hope that Bin Laden was killed during the war in Afghanistan. However, then video recordings of his appeals to the Cremers began to appear, and recently - cassettes with a record of voice, which experts recognize as genuine. The mention of recent events does not allow you to doubt that the speaker is alive. The last such audio recording appeared in early April - Osama Bin Laden announces Jihad on it not only the United States, Great Britain and Israel, but also the Muslim countries that supported the invasion of the coalition to Iraq.

According to the director of the CIA George Tenet, the most serious success of the intelligence community was the arrest of on March 1 this year in the Pakistani city of Ravalpindi one of the closest associates of Bin Laden - Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Mohammed maintained a direct connection with Bin Laden both through couriers and e -mail via the Internet. Therefore, intelligence attached great importance to the computer, cell phones, notebooks and documents seized during arrest. In addition, Mohammed himself spoke. Part of the information that he informed the CIA employees managed to verify and confirm with the help of other arrested al-Qaida members who are cooperating with intelligence. This information, in particular, gave the American authorities the opportunity to strengthen security measures at facilities that were supposed to become new targets for terrorists, and also led to the arrests of al-Qaida members in the USA and other countries. New data appeared about the whereabouts of Bin Laden. In early March, units of Pakistani and American special forces headed to the west of Pakistan, to a remote area bordering Afghanistan. This operation has not yet been completed. People who personally know Bin Ladena exclude the possibility of his voluntary or forced surrender. If he finds himself in a hopeless situation, he is likely to commit suicide. In one of his messages, Bin Laden spoke of his intention to die and become a martyr of faith this year. In any case, in the USA there is a sample of the genetic code of bin Laden, with which you can identify the corpse.

Irina Lagunina: Our correspondent in Washington said Vladimir Abarinov. How can you explain the strange circumstance that Bin Laden has not released almost a single film from the beginning of the war in Iraq? Rather, he released one, but not very bright, with the announcement of jihad to everyone who helps the coalition troops, which could be expected from the head of Al-Qaida. We are talking with an expert at the International Strategic Research Institute in London Jonathan Stevenson. So, the last bright film of the bin Ladena Osama appeared shortly before the start of the war in Iraq. How can this be explained?

Jonathan Stevenson: I think that this must be evaluated in a wider context. He then tried to use the threat of war in Iraq in January this year to create the impression of a “common cause” between Al-Qaeda and the Iraqi people, although he bypassed the Iraq regime. Why didn't he speak after that? One possible explanation is that he physically for some reason could not do this. But, of course, this can be answered immediately: well, he could not, but one of his assistants could release the film instead. So the second possible explanation is that al-Qaeda simply did not see how to use the change in the regime in Iraq with political benefit for myself.

Irina Lagunina: Another strange moment. During all this time, there were very few terrorist acts, including against the coalition forces. Did many not believe that Al-Qaeda worked freely in Iraq before the war and enjoyed the support of the Saddam Hussein regime?

Jonathan Stevenson: In my opinion, this testifies to a number of things. For example, that the ability of al -Qaeda how to organize its conditions - when and in what place the terrorist attack should be carried out was undermined during the operation in Afghanistan. And since then, Al-Qaida has been forced to rely on the initiative of local groups and local cells. They themselves choose when it is more convenient for them to carry out terrorist attacks. Another point is this. Despite the fact that the actions of the United States and Great Britain in Iraq could encourage actions under the banner of Jihad, they are concentrated precisely on Iraq, inside the country, and did not go beyond the borders to the neighboring region. That is, yes, anti -American and anti -Western sentiments in the region have increased - among a certain number of people, but those who spoke under the slogans of jihad went to fight in Iraq itself in order to directly resist the coalition forces. And in fact, they were called to this were called by radical Muslim leaders. What did not happen - and many expected this, I myself, including - did not increase terrorist activity in the world. One can only assume why so. But one of the explanations probably is that the change of regime in Iraq is what the Iraqi people themselves wanted.

Irina Lagunina: Two people, according to a strange coincidence, are listed on the wanted list - bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. What influence this fact has, on the one hand, on terrorist networks of the Al-Qaida type, and, on the other hand, on the mood in the region?

Jonathan Stevenson: The fact that Bin Laden is still on the wanted list of Al-Cide, not to say goodbye to mythology. In other words, they still have an influential and charismatic leader who can conduct a set to a terrorist network. And therefore, in this case, the difference is small - both before Iraq and after Iraq. It remains an icon for al-Qaida and a transnational radical Muslim terrorist movement. And until they find him alive or dead, he will remain such a leader. As for Saddam Hussein, despite the fact that it was largely a personal campaign, the operation against him from the United States, the purpose of this military operation was nevertheless reduced to not allowing this regime to create and use weapons of mass defeat. And from this point of view, the operation was successful. So it does not seem to me that the fact that Saddam Hussein was not caught or that there was no confirmation yet, that he is killed, will raise him to the level of the myth, icons in the Arab world. And on the other hand, if Saddam Hussein now decided to settle in a country and conduct terrorist operations against the United States from there, then the diplomatic consequences for this country would be so difficult that Saddam Hussein would be difficult to find a base for his activity.

Irina Lagunina: Let me remind you, we are talking with the expert of the London Institute for Strategic Research by Jonathan Stevenson. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Research, Leading Analyst of the Center and commentator of the ABC TV channel

Anthony Corddesman. Is it possible to draw a parallel between Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein in how the fact of their disappearance at a certain moment influenced regional relations, positions of countries and attitude to them from the United States?

Anthony Kordesman: There is one serious difference. Usama Bin Laden had ideology. And he was exactly the figure that could attract the attention and support of extremists in the Islamic world for a long time. Saddam Hussein, even from the point of view of those who opposed the war, was an unattractive figure, he practically did not receive support from the outside. Of course, this does not mean that Saddam and his sons cannot be a danger. If serious problems arise with the construction of a new Iraq, friction between Shiites and Kurds or some economic problems that can be caught, then it cannot be ruled out that sons and Saddam will have a political influence in the country, even being outside Iraq. And maybe even, over time, sons will try to make a baas party a viable political organization. Of course, it would be better for Iraq that the party’s elite would not return to the country and so that Saddam could not send them to Iraq to work among the population. But in general, these two people are two completely different phenomena. Bin Laden had not only ideology, but also an international terrorist network. Saddam may have money, but he has nowhere to run, he has no international ideological support.

Irina Lagunina: But, for example, cannot anti -Americanism be a single ideological basis?

Anthony Kordesman: there are a lot of ways to show anti -Americanism, without supporting Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein has no baggage behind his back. He is just a former dictator whose army broke up with amazing speed and whose support fell apart in an instant. People robbing his palaces, a falling statue - all these images will not be forgotten soon, unless the United States make irreparable mistakes in the process of national construction in Iraq. Yes, even sons. One of them, for example, is known, including in the Arab world itself as a thug. And this is the eldest son of Saddam of the Venti. Kusai is somewhat more competent, but all its competence is work in the Security and Intelligence Service. People are unlikely to support a person who has completely devoted himself to a secret police. It doesn’t matter which state in the Arab world is in question, the secret police in this region is everywhere unpopular.

Irina Lagunina: If we take into account the experience of relations with Pakistan, which the United States had immediately after the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, when it was necessary to unambiguously get the support of this country, what opportunities the United States has now in the Arab world, how can neighboring countries make cooperation?

Anthony Kordesman: I must immediately notice that Pakistan has come to cooperation, despite serious internal problems in this country. And the elections, especially in the northwest provinces, showed that the Islamists are leading in the political spectrum. And there really was a fight of ideas, and not the fight against terrorists. The problem was to form a new, alternative ideology in the Islamic world. The United States has not yet been able to do this, partly due to the fact that the image of how America relates to the Muslim world after September 11, the image that the press folded was very hostile. The problem with Iraq is that if Saddam Hussein is really hiding in Syria, then the United States will have to put pressure on Syria so that he is sent somewhere from there - it is still unclear where. It may be that he can appear before the international court, maybe back to Iraq, is difficult to say at the moment.

Irina Lagunina: Anthony Corddesman, Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies.

We started this program with a quote from a statement by George Bush about Syria. An equally tough position in relation to this country is also manifested in public speeches by the US Minister of Defense Donald Ramsfeld. The Minister of Defense says that the coalition troops detained several buses who brought volunteers from Syria to fight Iraq. Some of these people were simply returned to Syrian territory, some fell into prisoners of war camps. In the personal things of these people, letters were found announcing a reward for the murder of American troops. However, immediately after this information, the US Secretary of State Paulin Powell said that the United States has no plans to deploy a military operation against Syria. The British colleague Powell Jack Str made a statement: “There are questions that Syria should answer. But as for whether Syria is next on the list? We have already stated, there is no list,” said the British Foreign Minister. What kind of pressure levers on Syria do the coalition have? What does international law offer at the disposal? The Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Corddesman.

Anthony Kordesman: I think that for this it is not necessary to introduce troops and start a new war. You can exert economic and diplomatic pressure, threaten that the country will lose US support. There are a huge number of areas in which the United States can exert such quiet pressure on Syria. The same applies to Iran and any other country of the region that will decide to shelter former Iraqi leaders. The problem is that, of course, this pressure will not be decisive. And if the state is ready to pay any price for the shelter Saddam Hussein, then no pressure will force him to abandon this thought. Another thing is what kind of shelter it is. This can be an ideal political link, for example. How did you manage to get rid of the President of Uganda, go Amina? He practically buried himself in Saudi Arabia, where he could not threaten anyone else. And the Saudis brilliantly kept him in a bottle for so many years. So there are a lot of options on how to put pressure on states and how to solve the problem with Saddam.

Irina Lagunina: Go Amin, who was mentioned by Anthony Corddesman,-the President of Uganda from the 71st to the 79th was overthrown by the National Front of the Liberation of the country and fled abroad. During his reign, the country was one of the 25. The poorest states in the world. The total number of repressed and executed in these years is still not published. But back to Saddam Hussein and bin Laden. Psychiatrist, professor of political psychology at the University of George Washington Jerrold post 21, worked as the director of the Center for Analysis of Personality and Political behavior in the CIA, developed a political portrait of the CAMP David participants for President Carter, and the portrait of Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion in 1991.

Jerrold Post: I have recently been interested in the general features and differences of the three main opponents of the United States - Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Ira. All three are unique in their own way, and each of them should be considered from the point of view of his historical, political and cultural context. But they have some interesting common points, common features. All of them see themselves at the head of the struggle for their own business and proclaim themselves by people who are devoted to this matter to the core, but at the same time everyone is preoccupied with their own reputation. I was struck by the fact that in October last year, when Usama Bin Laden seemed to have fallen from the focus of the international community, and all the attention of the United States was concentrated on Saddam Hussein, on the threat that came from his regime, and that it was necessary to immediately solve this problem, it was at this moment that a new wave of attacks organized by al-Qaida flashed. This time in East Asia and in the Middle East.

Irina Lagunina: “The struggle should be waged only in the name of God, and not in the name of national ideologies, and not in order to achieve the victory of ignorant governments that rule all Arab states, including Iraq,” Bin Laden spoke in the middle of February this year. What are the films of bin Ladena show?

Jerrold Post: We seemed to witness the change of composition. С выпуском первой пленки, бин Ладен словно пытался сказать, что это - операция не против Ирака, это операция против мусульман, и он бин Ладен, истинный лидер радикального ислама на самом деле и должен возглавить эту борьбу. Я могу только так интерпретировать эту пленку. Складывается впечатление, что он словно был уже назначен противником номер один Соединенных Штатов, и когда Саддам Хусейн всплыл в центре международного внимания, бин Ладен решил выйти из тени и потребовать назад свое первенство. Затем уже накануне конфликта бин Ладен выпустил еще одну пленку, в которой как бы подтвердил ранее сказанное и на самом деле даже попытался умалить значение Ирака в целом и Саддама Хусейна, в частности, для мусульманского мира. Он даже не упомянул Саддама Хусейна по имени. Он назвал иракцев еретиками, неверными, но, тем не менее, поскольку в борьбе за них, помогая им, встав на их сторону, могли погибнуть столько мусульман, он, бин Ладен, поведет эту борьбу. Затем буквально дней десять назад появилась еще одна пленка, в которой он призывал развернуть мировую войну против Америки за то, что она напала на исламскую нацию. Эта пленка по языку напоминает его призывы поддержать арабов-мусульман в Афганистане, которых он набрал для борьбы с безбожным нападением Советского Союза на мусульманских афганских братьев. Иными словами, в мире есть только одно первое место, один лидер. И меня поразило, насколько яростно бин Ладен борется за то, чтобы удержаться на этом месте, сохранить его за собой и быть в центре внимания.

Ирина Лагунина: Но давайте поговорим о Саддаме Хусейне. Он не террорист, который вынужден скрываться и для которого это - нормальное состояние. Он все-таки был главой государства. Может ли быть доля правды в той шутке, которая появилась в последнее время: Саддам Хусейн сидит в роскошном отеле на берегу Персидского залива, смотрит на закат и говорит: "Как хорошо, завтра не надо идти на работу". Если взять его психологический портрет, он мог бежать, такой поступок был бы в его природе?

Джеррольд Пост: Вопрос здесь в другом. После всего того террора, которым он запугал свою нацию, что, какой шаг, какой факт заставит эту нацию поверить, что Саддама Хусейна на самом деле больше нет? Ведь для будущего страны его политическая смерть важнее, чем физическая. Сейчас люди помнят 1991 год. Те, кто слишком рано тогда возликовали по поводу того, что Саддам свергнут, были уничтожены этим режимом, и сами оппозиционные лидеры, и их семьи. Так что сейчас, до того момента, как его останки не будут идентифицированы или он сам не будет обнаружен, некоторое беспокойство в обществе останется.

Ирина Лагунина: Вы в начале разговора упомянули о различиях в психологических портретах этих людей. Давайте поговорим о различиях.

Джеррольд Пост: Саддам Хусейн - лидер, доминировавший в своем обществе. Он - тот клей, который держал этот режим. Конечно, за ним идут его сыновья, но это не такая существенная опора. Если бы сейчас кто-то хотел заменить его в рамках того режима, который он создал, то все равно не смог бы это сделать. Режим был создан им и для себя самого. Так что если он в бегах или физически недееспособен, то это - конец режима, конец той вертикали власти, которую он построил. Это - отличие от бин Ладена. Бин Ладен, может быть, воспользовавшись теми знаниями, которые он приобрел в школе менеджмента в университете в Джадде, создал горизонтальную, плоскую организацию. И в отличие от других харизматичных террористических лидеров, таких, как лидер курдских сепаратистов Оджалан, глава ПКК, у бин Ладена есть последователи, которые в крайнем случае могут занять его место. Его организация полностью построена на принципе взаимозаменяемости. Когда командующий операциями Атаф был убит в первые дни войны в Афганистане, его заменил Зубайда, когда Зубайду схватили, его заменил Халид Шейх Мохаммед, которого, впрочем, сейчас тоже допрашивают.

Ирина Лагунина: А какое влияние на американское общество оказывает тот факт, что оба основных противника - в розыске?

Джеррольд Пост: Есть один аспект, который постоянно подвергается критике в этих конфликтах - излишняя персонификация, личностная сторона. Словно США выступают против лично бин Ладена или лично Саддама Хусейна. А когда Соединенные Штаты в целом и президент Джордж Буш в частности выступает лично против Саддама Хусейна, это возвышает иракского лидера в глазах его последователей. Аналогичным образом именно Соединенные Штаты возвели бин Ладена на престол террориста номер один в мире. И делая это мы сами создали ситуацию, при которой пока существует лидер, проблема остается нерешенной. А ведь проблемы очень разные. С одной стороны государство и иракских народ с его структурой, с очерченными границами и проблемами. С другой стороны запутанная и разнообразная террористическая сеть "Аль-Кайда". И не надо было бы смешивать эти две проблемы. Но в любом случае из-за персонификации у американцев не будет ощущения исполненного дела, пока эти два человека существуют.

Ирина Лагунина: Мы беседовали с профессором психиатрии и политической психологии в университет Джорджа Вашингтона Джеррольдом Постом.

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  Irina Lagunina

  Head of Special Projects of Russian Service Radio Liberty

  Laguninai@rferl.org