Grigory of Nabershchikov

The host of the St. Petersburg hour of the Liberty Live program Tatyana Valovich: A lot of research has been written about the Great Patriotic War, but many documents are still unknown. A lot of myths and speculations appear that have nothing to do with real events. Today, Grigory Nabovshchikov, a St. Petersburg journalist, a historian who devoted half a century to the collection of archives related to the outbreak of war with Soviet intelligence will take part in our program. Personally met with many participants in the events.

Grigory Yuryevich, tomorrow the day of memory and sorrow, the anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The day before, as you heard in our report, (see the material: Harry Carolinsky’s book “Russian Key” in St. Petersburg ) - a new book about the Great Patriotic War was held. Do you think, in your opinion, the emergence of books that are not documented, but use other historical materials - benefit or harm, or contribute to the fact that more myths about the war appear?

Grigory of Nabershchikov: Both that and another and third. And more myths appear more, and fictions and truths, at the same time. I am a documentary. Therefore, I go the other way. But I think that this thesis that Stalin was going, for example, on July 6 to attack and occupy Europe - this, of course, is nonsense, because he did not have such strength then. The fact that he could call Dolores Ibarruri, and I know that George Dimitrov was interested in Bulgaria, I know that Clement Gottwald caused and was interested in how in Czechoslovakia it could be in case of our arrival - all this, but by 1941 by June 22, take such a fact, we kept in the first strategic echelon on the western border to 22 On June, only 56 divisions, and these 56 divisions were stretched about 50 kilometers deep into the east, and the Germans kept 103 divisions in the first echelon, made to a throw to the east - on us.

Tatyana Valovich: In your opinion, is it the truth of the Great Patriotic War?

Grigory of Nabershchikov: No. For a long time, our historians need to work in the archives of our country, foreign countries, in order to tell the whole truth, this is a very big serious question.

Tatyana Valovich: How the beginning of the war was covered - what the German authorities presented to their people, because Ribbentrop also performed on the radio before the German people, justifying the attack on the USSR. Was we widely known to the people about what the Germans said?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: You have touched on a good question - no. We had everything with the opposite sign. Take, say, such a thing. In the morning, Stalin was in such a position that he could not speak to the people. He entrusted this to Molotov. At 12 o’clock 05 minutes, the country heard Molotov’s voice, but regardless of the fact that we have different times with Germany, Ribbentrop, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, performed earlier. And in this statement, of course, he justified the attack, tried to explain to the Nard of Germany and the territories that Hitler had already captured by that time, where his performance was broadcast, in particular, the elderly in Czechoslovakia, who listened, Ribentrop collapsed into our leadership, they say that you were talking about friendship with Germany, and divorced a whole network of spies in the territory of the Reich, He said that our prominent diplomat Mokhov is engaged in espionage against Germany. Mokhov really was an employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, felt before the start of the war that he was calculated, and fled, so to speak, from Germany, returned to his homeland, leaving our scouts to the mercy of the fate of our scouts, they did not write about this now, but that was so.

Tatyana Valovich: What happened after Mokhov disappeared from Berlin. Who else was connected with him at this time?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: the famous Czechoslovatsky our intelligence officer Vladimir Ozhana and his wife Bozhenka Vernov managed to get into such sections of defensive facilities of Nazi Germany, in particular, to the Skoda factories in the Plznoye on the territory of the Czech Republic, her Nazis called the protectorate, and they were interested in new weapons, which has a place to be, fuel and lubricants, all this It was transmitted to Moscow through Stockholm. In Stockholm, the famous Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai, the People's Commissar of the First Government of Lenin, was sitting in Stockholm. She received at the end of the war the Order of Lenin for her, then wrote, diplomatic work, but in fact - intelligence. This enemy went to her and transmitted various data. The most interesting trip was May 31, 1941, three weeks before the start of Vaoyna. But I did not leave Veran. This act of Mokhov and the scatter in general began in our residency in Prague, sent a young man, the semi-Russian-half-time of Gennady Vitenla, here he is our contemporary, recently passed away, and Gennady Vitengl took two documents for transmission personally. On one document, the war should begin somewhere on June 11-12, and according to the second document-a list of Nazi agents in the USSR, which is waiting for the beginning of the war in order to start active actions.

Tatyana Valovich: But the fact that many Soviet intelligence officers reported the beginning of the war - this is a well -known historical fact, however, why was the Czech group so mistaken and where did this date come from?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: Yes, you are right, from different capitals, from everywhere Stalin there were very true reports. But they were of this kind - every Nazi step was traced, but the date of the attack was not called. By the way, the first date, already on June 22, called the famous Richard Sorge from Tokyo. June 13 was a short encryption from Tokyo. "I repeat, 9 armies consisting of 150 divisions will begin an offensive on a wide front at dawn on June 22, 1941. Ramzai" and here I specifically answer your question. Stalin had this data from Prague about June 11-12. On June 11-12, there was no war, no, Stalin was in terrible anger. Why is this group of Vladimir Ethana, there was such an Anichka Iraskov, a daughter-in-law of the famous Czech classic of literature, why they referred, our intelligence in Prague, on June 11-12. The thing is that Anichka Iraskova, who had great connections in the General Staff of the Nazi Army, the enemy, who had great connections in the leadership of the Office of the Skoda, at the Messerschmitt, and so on, learned about the encryption of April 27, the encryption forbade these enterprises to supply any products that the Germans were obliged to provide us, according to the agreements, according to the agreements, according to the agreements, according to the agreements Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, where trade was developed and so on, and pick up all the products that the USSR had to deliver for these and a half. They calculated - a month and a half - the beginning of the war.

Tatyana Valovich: Grigory Yuryevich, one of the myths is related to how Stalin perceived the beginning of the war, that he was not able to take any actions at that moment and even gave the radio to Molotov that you know about these documents?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: Look, this combat group of our scouts in Prague - Vladimir Verana, Bozhenka Vernov, Gennady Vitengl, Anichka Iraskov - they did a big job, tracked all this, but when there was no war on June 11-12, there was no war, Stalin became furious. Marshal Zhukov says in his memoirs that on the eve, along with the People's Commissar of Tymoshenko, they came to Stalin to sign a ready -made directive to bring the border military districts to a combat position - to raise it as alarm. And Stalin had an incorrect on them: “There was only one ours here,” the owner used an obscene word here, “who has already acquired in Japan by tags and public houses, and deigned to even report the date of the German attack - June 22. Order and believe him?!” Naturally, Stalin asked the military leaders from the office, did not sign anything, and the country was not ready for almost the first Nazi strike on June 22. An interesting moment, now they write a lot about this, one writer from the other rewrites that Stalin, having heard from Zhukov, is the famous: “You hear me, Comrade Stalin, the Germans are bombing our cities,” Stalin as lay down, his hands on the table and head on the table, and so a few days sat in this state - this is, of course, an anecdote. I still remember, about 40 years ago, General Poskrebyshev, an adjutant of Stalin told me, he worked with him for 18 years, the secretary in peacetime, the adjutant during the war, that there was a diary of Stalin on June 22 - several dozen political figures, and defense industry specialists he accepted, that is, he worked very hard. But, as they say, there is no smoke without fire. Stalin did not fall into a shock state on June 22, but on the 28th, when he was informed that the Germans had taken Minsk, and Hitler flew out, from time to time, our television twisted the tapes, as Hitler jumps from the ramp and loudly shouts to the warriors surrounded by: "Russia lost the war, the war ends," and so on. Hitler had some reason for this. Now the numbers give different ones, how many millions we allegedly surrendered or how many hundred thousand, I will not touch, I will give my facts interesting. 170 of our divisions of the first strategic echelon in the first weeks of the war, 28 were completely defeated of them, and 72 divisions lost up to 50 percent of personnel and military equipment, this is what we say-that we, in general, have vanished the beginning of the war. In the first three weeks of the war, in our Leningrad direction, the enemy advanced 450 kilometers. This just says that we did not have good military personnel. They were repressed, that's how it happened.

Tatyana Valovich: Having realized that the country was in this state, Stalin decided to conclude the second Brest world - this is also said little about - how did you learn that Stalin wanted to conclude the world in order to give Hitler any territories?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: It was a big, first of all, the political mistake of Stalin, and in many communist parties, when they learned about this, Stalin’s disappointment was about this. And this is under a big secret, it already became known in post -Soviet Russia ... It was so. When on June 28, Stalin, in general, saw that it was bad, he called Beria and says that “according to your sources, you need to find a person who will be an intermediary between me and Hitler. We need to urgently offer Hitler the world. We are ready to give him all of Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic states, Bessarabia, and then, when we grow up, as after the first Brest world, we will take all the way ... He proposed the figure of the Bulgarian diplomat Ivan Stamenov, who at that time was in Moscow. But Ivan Stamenov, having heard what he was called on, was not afraid of the Kremlin leadership - after all, Stalin and foreigners in the Gulag sat in the Gulag, and put them a fool: "I am a Slav and I won’t go for such a shame. I need to fight."

Tatyana Valovich: Grigory Yuryevich, how did you know the name of Ivan Stamenov?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: Studying in the archives of our country and abroad various moments from the history of the twentieth century, in particular, I was interested in the anti-Partyan of our group Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich, who were defeated by Khrushchev in the summer of 1957. And I stumbled upon the materials of the meeting of the Catraition of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which discussed the materials of the anti-Party group, the defeat of them at the Plenum, they gathered in Moscow on July 2, 1957, and the report was made by Zhukov, he then performed the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Konev, Malinovsky, Kuznetsov, Nedelin, Bagramyan, Vershinin, Golikov, Meretsk, Meretsk, were performed in the debate. Next. Our commanders, participants in the Great Patriotic War, cited various information known to them about members of the anti -party group. My attention was attracted by Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, during the process of Beria in 1953, he was the commandant of the special judicial presence that Beria judged, and he began to give excerpts from Beria’s performances, about how they went to this connection with Ivan Stamenov, how they called him to the Kremlin, and how all this happened. In sufficient detail. I emphasize once again, Ivan Stamenov behaved very courageously and noble.

Tatyana Valovich: The very thought of the emergence of fascism in Russia was unacceptable 20 years ago. However, now an increasing number of young people are involved in extremist organizations, why do you think this is happening?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: Probably someone needs it. There was such a Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet, he said that if the stars are lit in the sky, then someone needs it. I understand that.

Tatyana Valovich: What do you think, the law that was adopted yesterday, about extremist activity - will help to somehow curb these groups of young people who sometimes uncertainly on the streets of the cities of Russia?

Grigory Nabemshchikov: First of all, I do not agree with you that the law is adopted, it is only in the second reading, the third reading can make changes, then the Federation Council, then the president will sign or not, so now it is difficult to say which law will be released after the president’s signature. But one thing is clear to me: I saw many laws over my long century of life. I am afraid that any law that will be adopted will not be implemented. I am very afraid of this.