Hafez Assad

Presenter Vitaly Portnikov

Vitaly Portnikov: My interlocutors: in Moscow, the editor-in-chief of the Internet publication "Middle East.Ru" Alexander Shumilin, in Tel Aviv, Radio Liberty correspondent Victoria Moonblit. The hero of our today's program is Syrian President Hafez Assad.

Assad was born in 1928 into a poor family. He underwent military training in the USSR. He served in the Syrian air force, and in 1963 he was among the conspirators who overthrew the then leadership of the country. In the new government, Assad received the portfolio of Minister of Defense, a post he held until 1970, when he himself carried out a palace coup and first took the post of prime minister, and a year later the presidency.

Assad established himself as an excellent strategist, who was able to cope simultaneously with both the internal struggle in the country and the regional conflicts of the Cold War. As a result of his rule, Syria became one of the most influential states in the Middle East. Using patronage from the former USSR, Assad brought his country to second place in the region in military capabilities, in this matter it was second only to Israel. Thanks to him, Damascus skillfully chose its position in the US-led alliance's fight against Iraq. Instead of facing his external adversaries in open combat, Assad preferred to act more subtly, giving his enemies territory to base on and fueling their activities with weapons and money. For decades, a fundamental point in the Syrian-Israeli conflict over the Dutch Heights has been Damascus' support for Hezbollah militants to establish bases in southern Lebanon. At the same time, Syria’s contradictions with Turkey over the distribution of water resources became the impetus for Damascus’ decision to support Abdullah Ocalan’s Kurdish separatists in Southern Lebanon.

The fight to recapture the Dutch Heights, lost to Syria in the 1967 war, has been the main driving force of Assad's presidency. Having failed to achieve this goal during the 1973 war and the battles for Lebanon, the Syrian leader found the strength to enter into a negotiation process. Assad thus sought to solve the problem himself, not wanting to leave it to his successor, who would be under much greater pressure in this matter. However, negotiations mediated by the United States were unsuccessful. Even if they were effective, it is unknown how much time would pass before the new head of the Syrian state would achieve such untouchable authority that he could implement the decisions signed by his father.

The President of Syria was the absolute master of his country, and as in many states with undeveloped democratic institutions, his presidency began to acquire the features of a hereditary monarchy. No sooner had Assad passed away than the Baath Party on the same day announced his son Bashar al-Assad as a candidate to succeed him.

Vitaly Portnikov: Even after his death, Hafez al-Assad remains one of the most curious and complex personalities in the history of the Middle East. Firstly, he is the leader of the very party against which the entire power of the military machine of the United States and allied countries was used - the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party. Only in Iraq did this party, led by Saddam Hussein, lose power, and in Syria, this party, led by Hafez Assad’s son Bashar, continues to hold power. Secondly, Assad is a member of the Alawite minority. That is, a person who managed to impose the rule of a small, and also nationally distinct, clan on a fairly large country that continues to glorify the Assad family and at the same time in Syria itself remains a fairly calm, seemingly stable situation. Thirdly, despite the confrontation with Israel, it is necessary to recall that Israel still controls part of the territory of Syria, the Dutch Heights, Assad, however, without concluding peace with Israel, continuing to support many radical groups, nevertheless, managed to avoid open confrontation with Tel Aviv. And this is also a very important point in his political biography. But maybe all this happened unwillingly? To what extent can we say that Assad was a sophisticated diplomat and a person who really strived for stability?

Alexander Shumilin: It is quite possible to say that he was a sophisticated diplomat, but rather a person who strived for stability. Actually, he was never involved in diplomacy, he grew up and was formed as a military man, tough, and, as you rightly noted, he comes from the Alawite community, which makes up only 8% of the population of Syria. This says a lot. At least the main thing is that the Alawites were subjected to repression and persecution for many centuries, right up to Assad’s rise to power, and they were accustomed to resisting external threats. These are closed, rather tough, purposeful people, like, in fact, the majority of persecuted minorities in various communities of different countries, especially countries with dictatorial regimes and totalitarian traditions. So he was formed not as a diplomat, but rather as a tough person, striving for order, to establish this order.

What did he manage to do in Syria? He came to power at the end of the 60s. Actually, in 71 he officially became the country's president, and before that he was an influential figure in the ruling triumvirate of the Syrian Arab Socialist Revival Party. He completed military practice in Egypt during the “six-day war”, on the eve of the “six-day war”. He became acquainted with the way of thinking of the Soviet generals while in Russia, undergoing an internship here. So, of course, this is a general, but a general who has become a politician, and a sophisticated politician. So I conclude my monologue with this conclusion: he is not a diplomat, but he is a politician with military, strategic thinking, but a sophisticated politician.

Vitaly Portnikov: Victoria, was Hafez Assad an enemy for Israel or was he still perceived as a partner at some point in Syrian-Israeli relations?

Victoria Moonblit: Hafez Assad was never perceived as a partner. But I would say that the attitude towards him was as follows - a respected enemy. He was indeed a respected enemy for a number of reasons. And for the same reason, as a professional pilot and, moreover, a very good pilot. I would like to remind you that he once received the title of “the best pilot in Syria.” Assad made a big bet on the development of the Air Force. Indeed, I think that no army, including the Egyptian one, has caused Israel as much trouble as Syria and, in particular, the Syrian Air Force. By the way, I think to this day in the Arab world, perhaps, the best aviation in terms of training pilots in Syria and this, of course, is the merit of Assad himself.

Assad was a man who managed to use defeat to his advantage with incredible somersaults. The defeat in the “six-day war”, and after all Assad at that time was the commander of the Air Force, in fact, the minister of defense, Assad took advantage of the national shock that was in Syria after this defeat. And the fact that the masses needed a strong personality, and he, the Minister of Defense, in a war that was lost, became president, as if in response to the demand of the masses for a strong personality.

Assad proved himself to be a very tough politician in the fight against Palestinian militants and Yasser Arafat in the second half of the 70s. And finally, Assad was a man whose word could be trusted. So, I will remind you that at one time the Prime Minister, during his first term in office in the late 70s, when he indicated that the crossing of the Litani River by the Syrian army, which was then pursuing Palestinian militants, would be considered as the beginning of a war, from that moment Israel could know that the river would not be crossed. That is, I would say that he took open and tough measures, rather than showing some kind of sophisticated deceit. And this earned him respect.

Vitaly Portnikov: And for the Soviet Union, Alexander, was Hafez Assad a partner or a person who used Moscow to achieve his own political goals?

Alexander Shumilin: Absolutely the right question. For all, I would say, without exception, the leaders of the Arab states were both partners and people who used the influence, the political influence of the Soviet Union, who aligned themselves with this line. And mainly those who sought to replenish their arsenals of weapons first of all, in order to implement one or another political line. As a rule, we are talking about the category of radical leaders, and their political line is quite definite - opposition to Israel. For a long time it was defined by the words “throw Israel into the sea” until the mid-70s. So for Russia it was a partner, of course, because this is essentially the policy, the policy of pleasing radical regimes in the Arab world, that Moscow pursued all these decades, the pre-perestroika decades.

Actually, the Middle East was the scene of open confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is known how the roles of political leaders were distributed there, and radical leaders were, frankly speaking, clients of Moscow in every sense of the word - political clients, military clients, clients-recipients, Soviet weapons, the debt for which had been accumulating all these decades, which is now being talked about a lot. In particular, Syria's debt to the Soviet Union for weapons is now a much larger figure than what is rumored in relation to Iraq and Saddam Hussein, namely $11 billion. So, through Hafez Assad, through Damascus, Moscow pursued its line in the Middle East. This line was tactically anti-Israeli, and strategically anti-American. Hafez al-Assad served Moscow quite faithfully for most of his presidential term, just as Moscow served him. It was a partnership with clear calculations, strategic calculations and tactical benefits.

Vitaly Portnikov: Victoria, Hafez Assad had to transfer power to his son Bashar. In many cases, the transfer of power to a son is regarded precisely as the strength of a person who managed to create a regime capable of reproducing family members, the emergence of an heir to the throne, and not just a successor. But other observers say that Bashar al-Assad is just an indicator that Hafez al-Assad did not trust anyone in the ruling party, and that just with the emergence of the president’s son as head of state, the Syrian regime has weakened significantly, and now one cannot expect the former stability from it. Can we say that Hafez al-Assad managed to continue this Syrian stability for a time after his departure?

Victoria Moonblit: You formulated it very correctly, Vitaly: Hafez Assed had to, you said, transfer power to Bashad Assad. Indeed, it was necessary. The fact is that, apparently, in his dreams, Hafez Assad saw his other son, the eldest son, on the presidential throne, but because of the tragedy that occurred, the youngest son, whom Assad himself had not prepared for power, became the heir to the throne, it happened, there was no one else. As for whether this is a strengthening or weakening of the power of the Assad clan, I will say that it is both. On the one hand, the Assads remained in power. On the other hand, Bashar al-Assad has apparently become what Hafez al-Assad never could have become. Bashar al-Assad has become, to a certain extent, an obedient executor of the will of a certain part of the Syrian generals. Under the father, the generals were subordinate to the president, but under the son, the son is still subordinate to the generals. Which is not surprising: Bashar al-Assad is not a professional military man, he is an ophthalmologist, he does not have the skill and tough military bearing that his father had.

Vitaly Portnikov: Alexander, just now Victoria said that Bashar al-Assad was the uncontested successor to the deceased president Hafez al-Assad. But perhaps this lack of alternative was the result of a serious crisis of power, the fact that Assad himself, despite his magnitude as a leader, was very afraid of strong competitors. By the time of his death, there were simply no serious figures capable of leading Syria.

Alexander Shumilin: This is both true and not true. On the one hand, there were such figures; it was these figures that Hafez Assad was very afraid of. The Minister of Defense, his Vice President Haddad, by the way, his own brother Rifaat Assad, with whom they have entered into open confrontation in recent years. Before that, it had been quite hidden for the last ten years. Hafez sent Rifaat to Geneva for four years, then he returned and was sent to another place. And already from abroad in 99, that is, a year before the death of his elder brother, Rifaat provoked an uprising and a conspiracy against him. This was an attempt to seize power. That is, contradictions and rivalries intensified towards the end of Hafez al-Assad’s reign, both in his family clan and in his immediate circle, in the leadership of the Baath Party and in the leadership of the country as a whole. So here we can only say that he was afraid of stronger figures and figures dangerous to his family and from among his inner circle.

Vitaly Portnikov: From the family, it turns out, in the narrow sense of the word, if we are talking about the unwanted brother Rifaat?

Alexander Shumilin: Quite narrowly, because, in essence, these were different families, of course. I have already said that these were warring brothers and family clans. So the choice was made in favor of Bashar under the influence of these circumstances and taking into account the prospect of modernization, which Hafez Assad himself outlined in the last years of his reign. After all, he outlined some policy lines, essentially aimed towards the liberalization of the political system and economic system. But even then, at the first stage, this line was sharply opposed by those closest circle of generals. And Hafez Assad began, in fact, a purge in these two areas - his family clan in a broad sense, getting rid of rivals. By the way, he neutralized his younger brothers. Bashar, let me clarify, had two more brothers besides the eldest, the deceased Basel, he also had two younger brothers who also expressed some claims, say, if not for supreme power, then at least for closeness to the supreme power, and, frankly speaking, muddied the waters. Hafez Assad has been clearing this field for the last few months. He brought Bashar closer to him, summoning him from London, and entrusted him with several functions, made him his political adviser, forced him to take courses at the military academy, awarded him the rank of colonel and entrusted him with several important missions, such as the fight against corruption, in fact, he headed the structure that oversaw the fight against corruption - and this is a huge problem for Syria. And the fight against drug trafficking is the second colossal problem for Syria, which probably deserves special attention. But it was Bashar who was in these sensitive positions, thereby he had to gain authority, which, in general, happened.

Vitaly Portnikov: Hafez al-Assad was one of the representatives of that galaxy of Arab leaders who largely changed the face of the Middle East. But it is quite remarkable that the people who were next to him, Anwar Sadat in Egypt, King Hussein in Jordan, King Hassan in Morocco, they in many ways sought to normalize relations with Israel. Openly or secretly, but, nevertheless, this normalization occurred. Hafez al-Assad did not strive for such normalization. Why, Victoria, what do you think?

Victoria Moonblit: I’m not sure, Vitaly, that I didn’t strive that much. It’s another matter that Hafez Assad was not ready to normalize relations, let’s say, on the terms that were then worked out. But more than that, I would say that after signing the peace treaty with Jordan, Assad felt that the train was leaving, the train of the Middle East peace process, and he needed to jump on it. And that’s when Assad began sending messages to the Israeli leadership through various individuals, UN representatives, and representatives of other states to start negotiations. So he was ready to negotiate and, in general, was ready to come to a peace agreement. Another thing is that he was cruel and unyielding in his demands. By the way, Vitaly, I want to draw your attention to one point. When proposals to start negotiations came from Assad the father, an incredible revival began in Israel, and they took this very, very seriously. When such proposals come from Assad the son, they are disdainfully rejected without discussion.

Vitaly Portnikov: President-fighter - that’s how Hafez Assad was officially called. How important was it for Assad, Alexander, to transform Syria from a small Arab country into a geopolitical factor, or did he simply ensure security for his own regime, for example, when he sent troops into Lebanon and essentially subjected this country to Syrian jurisdiction, when he fought the Palestine Liberation Organization? Were there such large-scale geopolitical objectives or was it simply about maintaining power in a particular country?

Alexander Shumilin: This was their tool for maintaining power and, most importantly, unlike all the other leading players in the Arab world, say, the oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf or Egypt, which was quite militarily strong and powerful in size, Syria did not have such trump cards. And Hafez Assad initially made a bet, a geopolitical bet, on strengthening, on maintaining tension with Israel, in order to thereby come to the forefront of the confrontation between the Arabs and Israel and from this position have everything that he had - political respect, very powerful financial flows from the Persian Gulf countries and the image of the main Arab unbending leader with regard to confrontation with Israel. And this problem of Arab-Israeli confrontation has been and remains the main political, geopolitical, as we now see, problem not only for the region, but for the whole world. Consequently, with his toughness he scored points and strengthened his geopolitical weight. And he always followed this line. His heir, Bashar al-Assad, is also trying to follow it. It is here that a certain duality of his policy is manifested, that is, he cannot give up that rigidity on the surface, that verbal rigidity that his father has always recorded and always demonstrated. But at the same time, he shows, in essence, flexibility. This is not easy for him to do, because many clans of the old guard are still active, still powerful, and they are now putting a lot of spokes in his wheels. Hence the duality of his behavior and, in many respects, inconsistency. But I will return again to this main thesis that his father, and at the same time Syria in the Arab world, and at the same time in a broader sense, in the world gained its main authority due to its tough attitude towards Israel. And this factor was and remains important for Bashar as well.

Vitaly Portnikov: Victoria, Hafez Assad died on June 10, 2000, several years have passed. Do you think Syria remains the country of Hafez al-Assad?

Victoria Moonblit: I think not. By the way, while I agree with Alexander Shumilin that tough opposition to Israel gave Assad political points, I want to say that the world was changing. And the fact that during many years of Assad’s rule actually gave him a very powerful position, in the last years of Assad’s rule rather pushed him to the political periphery. On the same political periphery today, from my point of view, is the current post-Hafezasad Syria. And it truly looks like Bashar is not the figure who can bring her out of this periphery.

Vitaly Portnikov: And do you, Alexander, think that Syria remains the country of Hafez Assad today, or is it another, as Victoria thinks, a post-Hafez Assad country?

Alexander Shumilin: Yes, this is already a post-Hafezasad country. And I think this is for the better. For completely different conditions are developing in the region, and Bashar’s actions in recent months after the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime, his attempts to improve relations with the United States, to meet previously rejected plans for a Middle East settlement, including the Saudi alternative, and even the idea of ​​​​carrying out democratic reforms in the Middle East, which is now being developed by Mubarak, all this suggests that the new leadership, Bashar’s entourage, he himself is in a certain confusion. And he personally continues to demonstrate toughness, rejecting plans that are too compromising. But he demonstrates this in words; in reality, he takes steps towards it. And this is the call of the times, the situation is truly qualitatively different. Especially, I emphasize, the most important factor is the occupation of Iraq, which neighbors Syria. Of course, Syria is no longer the country of Hafez al-Assad. Now we need to see how things will be under the new president. I believe that he is a man of realistic views. Now a certain dialogue is being established, and he is able to do this, with the main world players, with the United States, and with Russia. Let's see, everything is probably moving towards a political settlement. But militant rhetoric will always sound from Damascus as a reminder of the lion father, the unbending lion and sphinx Hafez Assad.