
Presenter Lev Roitman
Lev Roitman:
Most recently, in affluent Germany, the ruling coalition changed following the results of general parliamentary elections. The Germans are unhappy with their economic situation. I can imagine your reaction: we would like your, that is, German concerns. Not so long ago, the relatively prosperous Czech Republic also changed its government. And the Czechs were dissatisfied with the government of Vaclav Klaus, although it led the country to enter the European Union, where, by the way, the poor are not allowed. At the entrance to the European Union, in the leading six, along with the same Czechs, are Estonians, who are also dissatisfied with their position. All these dissatisfied people still achieve a lot. Let's add here Hungarians, Poles, as well as Lithuanians and Latvians. Other dissatisfied people get almost nothing or very little. Why? The following will reflect on this: Russian writer Georgy Vladimov; Ukrainian political scientist Vladimir Malinkovych and expert on the Czech Republic Efim Fistein.
In some countries, post-communist transformations are encouraging, in others they are disheartening, if we are talking about the general well-being of the population. Why does this happen or happened? Vladimir Dmitrievich Malenkovich, Kyiv, I ask you to think first.
Vladimir Malinkovich:
It seems to me that in our countries, post-Soviet countries, and above all in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the situation is significantly different from the situation in the countries of so-called Eastern (now they call themselves Central) Europe. I see here several very important reasons for our differences, and the first such reason, in my opinion, is the Byzantineism of our countries, that is, the lifestyle that we have associated with belonging to the Byzantine traditions, their orientation towards an essentially theocratic state, towards an autocratic theocratic state, where ideology and political power have always been in the same hands. This happened under the tsarist autocracy, and, in fact, it also happened under Soviet rule. While the countries of Eastern Europe have always belonged specifically to Europe, they belonged to a completely different system of values, where for a long time the division of powers into secular and spiritual prevailed. This is a very significant factor. And, in addition, this factor contributed to the formation of an empire in our country in the style of the Third Rome, this empire in the style of the Third Rome, it separated us from Europe and interfered with our European transformations. During, say, the 17th, 18th, 19th centuries, we, in fact, had neither a renaissance nor a reformation; all this cut us off from Europe and created very serious specifics - a specificity where there was and could not be a civil society, where every person considered himself and still considers himself a slave of power that has powers from above: either from God, or from some kind of total ideology. This is the first reason. The second reason is that the countries of Eastern Europe appeared in the communist camp, so to speak, by conquest much later, and they always had a regime easier than ours. For example, in Poland even private property in agriculture remained in fairly significant quantities, only 20% of all property in Poland was private property, and so on. The next thing is the autonomy of these markets. These were states very dependent on the Soviet Union, but still autonomous. But we have a single market, and this single market collapsed with the collapse of the USSR. Further, we had very radical reforms that did not take into account our specifics. This liberalization according to Gaidar, which led, in my opinion, to the collapse of the economy throughout the post-Soviet space. And finally, in my opinion, a very important factor is that we have an incredibly high level of development of the military-industrial complex.
Lev Roitman:
Thank you, Vladimir Dmitrievich, Kyiv. And now to the writer Georgy Vladimov, Georgy Nikolaevich, line for you.
Georgy Vladimov:
I think that in Russia we should also mention the incredible corruption, which has roots closer than, say, the history of Byzantium. The communist government, it was in contact even when there was no power, it was in contact with criminals even during the period when the Leninist party was preparing a revolution. Then these criminals, these thieves, penetrated into the authorities, primarily into repressive institutions such as the Cheka, where they were used to intensify terror, for mercilessness. Sometimes she, this government, took some measures against the thieves, but now this can be considered as a showdown: it’s just that some criminals got into the Cheka, others didn’t get through, and there was an armed struggle between them. Then we can say this: these thieves were used against political prisoners in the camps, against Article 58. And little by little the government itself became imbued with this criminal morality and criminal spirit. During Brezhnev’s reign, this was simply obvious: he himself was like that, and he allowed others to do so. At this time, our reformers, quick grabbers looked with envy, licking their lips at how unremarkable individuals grabbed from power everything that their hands could grab, and when it became possible, when shock therapy was announced, when it became a reality, and, moreover, a legitimate reality, that’s where the plunder of Russia began, the erosion of our lives, as stated in Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s book “Russia in Collapse.” So I see where the reason for this situation is that we are not succeeding. A long-standing European tradition, it somehow protected against such plunder, while others had all this within more stringent limits. In Russia, unfortunately, such a tradition has not been preserved, and it was not preserved initially and precisely because of the fault of the communist government itself.
Lev Roitman:
Thank you, Georgy Nikolaevich. Efim Fishtein, the same questions for you.
Efim Fishtein:
When assessing the socio-political situation of countries, I would not take as the main or even one of the most important indicators such a phenomenon as a change of government, say, or even a change in public sentiment in one direction or another. Because we know that in highly developed countries, public sentiment is quite critical, and governments change with depressing regularity. Why? Because, let’s say, in the Czech Republic there was a change of government, however, if we look at the mandates that this or that party receives, then it paradoxically turns out that the right-wing parties, which previously constituted the government of Vaclav Klaus, won the last elections, however, the government is social democratic, it is true that it is a minority government. And the current autumn Senate elections have shown that public sentiment has moved even more to the right, and the government is still the same Social Democratic. That is, these are not yet central indicators. I think that we should still turn to more ontological, that is, deep-lying indicators, such as the tradition of the country, mentality, the presence or absence of the Byzantine tradition, which Vladimir Malinkovich pointed out. I think that this will still be more accurate than focusing on some small shifts back and forth. And even the economic situation, say, I would not evaluate by one indicator such as the gross national product, if it is correlated with the level of, say, 1989, when economic development in post-communist countries is generally measured. Recently, just the other day, the European Bank published a report on the state of the post-communist world, and in this report we read an interesting statement: “Countries that have carried out balanced privatization and liberalization in parallel with deep institutional reform are more resilient and show greater resistance to the global pressures of the world crisis.” It turns out that if we judge by the fact that the world crisis affected Russia, its economic condition, especially painfully, then, apparently, privatization and liberalization there were more superficial than deep. After all, Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary almost did not experience the consequences of the global crisis.
Vladimir Malinkovich:
I want to say that, indeed, theft and all-corroding corruption are one of the main reasons for our failures, but I associate this precisely with this Byzantine tradition, where arbitrariness ruled, not right, not law. We didn’t have such a tradition that there was a law. After the reforms of Alexander II, there were some hopes that we would become a legal state, but they very quickly disappeared. And they always stole from us, remember, even from Karamzin: “What are they doing in Russia? They are stealing.” And this theft is connected with the lack of such a phenomenon as legal consciousness among our people; it does not exist today. This is a very important point associated with the Byzantine tradition of our country, with autocracy and the arbitrariness of any person in power. But I would still like to draw attention to the military-industrial complex, which is, in my opinion, a very important element of why reforms are not progressing in our country. Our military-industrial complex is very large; there was no such military-industrial complex in the countries of Eastern Europe - neither in Poland, nor in the Czech Republic, nor in Hungary. Although there is shipbuilding and mechanical engineering - all this really exists, they still worked to a large extent for the civilian sector. But in our country all this went to war and now no one needs it, no one needs the Nikolaev Shipyard, which builds cruisers and very expensive ones, no one needs tank factories, and all this is very energy-intensive, today it is all extremely unprofitable. And what is also important: it was at these enterprises that the most qualified part of our population worked - both Ukrainian and Russian, especially Ukrainian. Nobody knows what to do with them, and since this is a very large percentage of the population, the purchasing power of the entire population is low, and therefore, in fact, we have no prospects for the development of light industry oriented towards our market. This, it seems to me, is one of the most important points why, firstly, the radical reforms that were in the Czech Republic and other European countries are impossible in our country, along with the fact that there is a civil society there, but we do not have it. And, secondly, we have a shift towards left-wing parties, since these qualified specialists, who, in theory, should vote for reforms, today and tomorrow in the elections will vote for the communists: they have been living very poorly for many years.
Lev Roitman:
Thank you, Vladimir Dmitrievich. I would group what you are talking about as objective factors. But there are also factors that are somewhat common to Russia, and to Ukraine, and to the former territory of, say, the Soviet Union, and to Eastern European countries - this is the same corruption that you are talking about. After all, the talk of the town is the corruption that existed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Corruption in the Czech Republic is depressing for everyone, but it terrifies people with faint hearts. Only a person who has no idea about this country can say that there is no corruption in Poland. Baltic states? There is more than enough corruption in the Baltics. The Baltic states were, just like the Eastern European countries, under Soviet pressure, in the Soviet economic and psychological sphere, for approximately the same number of decades. Nevertheless, in all these countries things have somehow moved forward. I put forward this thesis and will now pass on the line to Georgy Vladimov: perhaps the problem is that in all those countries that we are talking about as countries where something happens, their troubles and their shortcomings are correlated with their own shortcomings, but in Russia, in Ukraine, in the same Belarus, which Vladimir Malinkovich mentioned at the beginning of the program, all these troubles are attributed to evil intent, some kind of demonic manifestations of others, third parties. strength?
Georgy Vladimov:
Here, Vladimir Dmitrievich had the idea that in some way the conquest of the country somehow contributed to the softening of the harsh regime. If we take Germany, Germany was probably greatly helped by the fact that there was an external force that took upon itself, among other things, such a function as the eradication of Hitlerism. After all, the Nuremberg trials and then the trials that followed, they came from the initiative of the allies, our allies, because the whistleblowers, they were among the Germans themselves, but they were somehow not allowed to do this, because they themselves were in the dust. These processes, which were carried out on the initiative of the allies, they served as the seed for those 86 thousand processes that then went on, as they say, like an avalanche. You can imagine what these 86,000 are - it has penetrated into the people's consciousness. Then came assistance under the Marshall Plan, the allies considered themselves obligated to help the country they occupied and conquered. All this contributed to the fact that the country, Germany, was given a powerful impetus: on the one hand, the eradication of the previous regime, on the other hand, the establishment of a new one. None of this happened in Russia; power fell into the hands of the very people from the same party that led the country to collapse. You have to, like in the fairy tale about Baron Munchausen, pull yourself out of the swamp by your hair. So I see this as the reason why we don’t succeed in many things.
Efim Fishtein:
You know, corruption is a social phenomenon that is very difficult to measure, so they usually use the corruption perception index. Since there is no indicator, a pure indicator of corruption itself, businessmen are asked questions: how do you perceive corruption in a particular country? And here is the paradox: on the scale of perception of corruption, say, Italy is 2-3 places below the Czech Republic, behind Hungary, behind Poland - a paradox. However, no one will accuse Italy of being a country that has failed to cope with the task of transformation; it is a country that is one of the leaders in the economic world. Therefore, not only this. It seems to me that what is more important is the absence of division of society along fundamental political guidelines. In Italy, despite minor party differences in the way, say, the country develops, there is still agreement regarding the general political orientation. This is a country of the Western family. It seems to me that the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic states feel the same way about their political orientation. That is, regardless of whether a social-democratic or a conservative government comes to power, it changes some details, it may round off some corners, and, on the contrary, it sharpens some, nevertheless, in general, the orientation remains the same. While in Russia, as Vladimir Malinkovich said, the question is cardinal: either the votes will be given to the liberal parties, or the votes will be given to the communists. That is, the phenomenon that many experts at one time called the discreteness of Russian history, the severance of its internal ties, or, I would say, a policy of wall-to-wall scrambling, will resume; one experiment is replaced by another social experiment, which is fraught with tragic consequences. After all, you need to understand right away that if Germany after the war was involved in the world market, then Russia, today’s Russia, if it fell again under the rule of communists, would, on the contrary, be removed from the world market, isolated from it, and I don’t see any paths of development here.
Vladimir Malinkovich:
I would like to note that, in my opinion, both our liberals are Bolsheviks and our communists are Bolsheviks - we have little choice. Our liberals threw bombs in Chechnya, our liberals shot up parliament, our liberals dominate among corrupt officials. So, in my opinion, this is not an important question, but the important thing is that there is no civil society and therefore we have the same government - both anti-communist and communist - the same thing. And one more thing: there is a feeling in the West that our country is not ready for reforms. But the West treats the countries of Eastern Europe and us very differently. I would like to give an example that the West invested a thousand dollars per capita in Hungary, 400 in Estonia, and only 15 in Ukraine. Not without reason - they do not trust us. But instead of supporting democratic tendencies, we support any government that will restrain Russia, which is dangerous for Europe, and, in general, will turn Ukraine into a counterweight to Russia. They turn a blind eye to the fact that we do not have freedom of the press, to the fact that parliamentarism is suppressed in our country, and so on, and so on. It seems to me that the West should also reconsider its attitude towards the processes in the East, taking into account the specifics of these countries.
Lev Roitman:
Thank you, Vladimir Dmitrievich. In conclusion, I want to note that it is not for the West to live in Russia, and it is not for the West to live in Ukraine. The West is a completely vague concept. It is not the West that is investing, it is Western investors who are investing. And you made a reservation that there are reasons not to invest in unstable economies. And from my point of view, what you said sounded exactly what I was talking about, blaming others for their own sins, instead of, first of all, talking about themselves. The West is abroad, but you need to do things at home yourself.