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Author and presenter Vladimir Tolts
Leonid Brezhnev (phonogram 1977):
“Dear comrades! Dear foreign guests! These days, the Soviet people, communists of all countries, all progressive humanity solemnly celebrate the greatest holiday.” (Applause)
Vladimir Tolts:
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, in person. We talk about him and his reign in today’s episode of the “Time Difference” program.
Historian:
“There was a joke among historians when the entire history of the country was divided into periods - “Petrine”, “post-Petrine” and “Dnepropetrovsk”. The “Dnepropetrovsk period” is, of course, the most anecdotal time..."
Vladimir Tolts:
Today's episode of our program is dedicated to "Dnepropetrovsk Rus'" - the era of Brezhnev and the personality of this Soviet ruler. I based the program on my interviews taken 2 years ago from those who for many years wrote speeches and other documents, which were then published under their collective pseudonym - “Brezhnev”, and, as they now say, were voiced personally by Leonid Ilyich.
Historians often strongly contrast his reign with both the previous era of Khrushchev and the reigns of Gorbachev and Yeltsin that followed the brief Andropov-Chernenkov intermezzo. But the track records and creative biographies of those whom you will hear today (and some of them began writing “under Khrushchev” and ended up “under Gorbachev”), as well as their younger colleagues, such as Gorbachev’s recent confidant, and now Yeltsin’s Prime Minister Primakov, or Vitaly Ignatenko, a Tsekist who was awarded for film praise of Brezhnev, who later turned out to be the head of the press service Gorbachev, and now one of the most important figures in the information service of Yeltsin's rule - all this shows that such a contrast between the past and the present is no more thorough than the contrast between the youth of one person and his own maturity. People, of course, grow, age, change and can change a lot: their views, occupations, wives, sometimes even last names and pseudonyms, but in the main they are still the same. No matter how different the words and deeds of the rulers I mentioned, their speeches were written by the same people.
Of those who wrote at one time under the pseudonym "Brezhnev", you will hear today: Academician Georgy Arkadyevich Arbatov - in the 60s he was the head of the consulting group in the Central Committee, and then the director of the Institute of the USA and Canada created on his initiative (and with the support of Brezhnev); the last Soviet and first Russian ambassador to Israel, Alexander Evgenievich Bovin, at some point Brezhnev’s chief speechwriter, whom another participant in our program, Anatoly Chernyaev, called in his memoirs, along with Vadim Zagladin, “Leonid Ilyich’s favorite.” Former adviser to the President of the USSR, and even earlier first deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin (he still works with Gorbachev in his Foundation) is also a participant in our program. Mikhail Sergeevich’s long-term assistant, Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, a former employee of the International Department of the Central Committee, also works at the Gorbachev Foundation. In contrast, Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin, the former general director of TASS, head of the information department of the Central Committee and the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, who participated in our program, did not write any essays under the pseudonym “Leonid Brezhnev,” but he took part in organizing the creative process, and was one of the key figures in disseminating among us the ideas attributed to Leonid Ilyich.
Well, in the Moscow studio of Radio Liberty, historians talked to me about Brezhnev: leading employee of the Academic Institute of Russian History Yuri Nikolaevich Zhukov and professors of the New Humanitarian University: Evgeny Akimovich Knyazev and Vladimir Georgievich Alexandrov.
In his judgments about Brezhnev’s rule, the latter is very strict:
Vladimir Alexandrov:
The 70s, early 80s, it seems to me, this is a stage that completed a very long period of our history, an entire era that began in 1861, when we took the first step from a traditional medieval society to a modern, non-traditional, urban society and so on.
This time is still ours. And since this time is ours, we are very hurt, offended, and we really don’t want to see ourselves as complicit in this time. It’s very painful to realize that you were, well, if not the main cannibal, as all the former party nomenklatura were (I believe that everyone, starting with Lenin, are cannibals, only to a greater or lesser extent) and that you did nothing against this cannibalistic society.
Vladimir Tolts:
Professor Evgeny Knyazev evaluates the reign of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in a more colorful way:
Evgeny Knyazev:
There was a joke among historians when the entire history of the country was divided into the “Petrine”, “post-Petrine” and “Dnepropetrovsk” periods. The Dnepropetrovsk period is, of course, the most anecdotal time.
For some it was an era of stagnation and something gloomy, something terrible, for me it was an era of reading, a constant era of reading, because then, when you didn’t buy books, but they were given to you and given to you for several hours, sometimes days, you had to read, otherwise you would not see it again, as they said then.
Therefore, I am grateful to the “ native Communist Party ” for pursuing good literature so diligently. She was so popular among students that we, in general, received our education then.
On the other hand, this is, of course, a misfortune, because this is the end of the empire. The end of the empire was then, of course. The empire ended then, and it ended in agony and in misfortune, and in jokes, and in these absurdities that happened. But it, of course, did not end with the war.
Leonid Brezhnev (phonogram 1977):
60 years ago, the workers and peasants of Russia, led by Lenin's party, overthrew the power of the capitalists and landowners. The first victorious socialist revolution in world history took place.
Vladimir Tolts:
In November 1977, when Leonid Ilyich delivered this festive speech, he was already a seriously ill man. He warned his speech writers in advance: “The report will not exceed 50 minutes.”
Some biographers of Brezhnev claim that the year 76 turned out to be a fatal milestone here.
From Dmitry Volkogonov’s essay “Seven Leaders”:
“When Brezhnev began to fall apart before the eyes of the entire country, and the world, the Politburo took a number of additional measures to protect the precious health of the General Secretary: he was accompanied everywhere by an intensive care vehicle with medical personnel, appropriate health rooms were equipped in his places of work, and, in fact, from 1978, only the General Secretary’s summer vacation was increased to two and a half months.”
And there was also winter leave and progressive malaise, and an illness that did not allow him to regularly perform his position as sovereign...
Leonid Zamyatin:
He suffered two strokes, he did not spare himself from the point of view of medical recommendations, because this is a man who could drink well, could take a good walk and always had a penchant for the female sex, and much more, which of course accelerated his illness. Although these are human factors, if we are talking about a statesman, then it is impossible not to mention this, because they led to his early decrepitude, aging and to the consequences that you are talking about.
Vladimir Tolts:
But those who worked with Leonid Ilyich from the mid-60s remember a different Brezhnev: energetic, businesslike, albeit not very educated, but knowledgeable...
Leonid Brezhnev (phonogram 1977):
A developed socialist society has been created, exists and is being improved - the result of the historical creativity of the masses. (Applause) Honor and glory to the Soviet people - the victorious people!
Leonid Zamyatin:
It was quite difficult for Brezhnev - when he came after Khrushchev's coup - as a statesman, because Leonid Ilyich was a compromise figure at the Plenum of the Central Committee, when the question of who would be Khrushchev's successor was being decided. I've heard this many times. And, in fact, when Brezhnev came to power, he was a compromise figure due to the fact that, on the one hand, Podgorny was applying for this position, for this post - a limited man, but with great ambitions, on the other hand, this was the former head of the KGB and the entire security service Shelepin, who, practically, loomed before the healthy Brezhnev, who had been in power for a long time, as a contender for this power. When we study the history of the first period, we should not discount these two points. This made Brezhnev’s position much more difficult and influenced his decisions.
Vladimir Tolts:
And here is what Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, a long-time employee of the CPSU Central Committee, says.
Anatoly Chernyaev:
Brezhnev initially did not intend to assign autocratic rights. And initially, he seriously counted on collegial leadership (with the help of this principle, Khrushchev was overthrown).
I would draw attention to the fact that, despite very strong attempts from the environment, and not only from the close circle of Moscow, but also from the regional committee circle of the country, pressure to resuscitate Stalinism, Brezhnev still did not agree to this at the 23rd Congress. True, he turned himself into General Secretary, so to speak, inherited the title, but he did not go for a general, total resuscitation of Stalinism. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia caused a breakdown in his, in my opinion, psychology and concept of political government.
Vladimir Tolts:
Nowadays, many memoirists and historians (Chernyaev is an exception), when talking about Brezhnev, talk about two different people: one - in the first decade of his reign - an energetic, calculating, party progressive; the other - after '74 - is a political puppet with progressive insanity. This scheme, even if we omit the political crudeness of its definitions, is just a scheme. Life, as always, is more complex and colorful.
I ask you to tell about Leonid Ilyich, as a person and politician, Alexander Evgenievich Bovin, who knew him closely.
Alexander Bovin:
There were, in fact, two Brezhnevs: one healthy, one sick. And therefore two completely different stories.
While he was healthy, everything was very normal, you could argue, swear, shout, wave your hands about different theses. He listened to everything attentively and it was possible to object to him. In general, it was a completely normal working environment. This is if we talk about business. And if we talk about the person: he was also a completely acceptable person, not evil, not cruel, in my opinion, the war, of course, had a huge influence on him. Of course, his education was a bit difficult; he didn’t like to read books. Instead of books, he had a different method: he talked with people, the sources of his information were people. Instead of reading some thick book dedicated, for example, to Poland, he talked with people and learned something. This is also one of its features. You know, he had such a general’s humor, a general secretary’s kind of humor, so to speak, after all. Here we are arguing about some issue, a speech, for example, he listens, listens, and then says: “Okay, so you argue, argue, and I will go to the podium, and this will become a quote.”
Leonid Brezhnev (phonogram 1977):
A new historical era has begun - the era of revolutionary renewal of the world, the era of transition to socialism and communism. The path that hundreds of millions of people are walking today, and which all of humanity is destined to follow, has begun. (Applause)
Vladimir Tolts:
Like all other speeches of Leonid Ilyich, this one was written by the participants of our today’s program and their colleagues. Several teams of intellectuals, professionals, selected by Brezhnev personally, or inherited by him from the overthrown Khrushchev.
Here is one of them - Georgy Arkadyevich Arbatov, he was involved in drafting Brezhnev's speeches from 1964, when Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as head of the CPSU, and until Leonid Ilyich was able to publicly read the speeches written to him.
Georgy Arbatov:
It was a common practice - they wrote to everyone. I think they even wrote to those who could have written it themselves. But either this has already become a custom, and this is always easier, and now, in my opinion, they continue to write.
Vladimir Tolts:
From Dmitry Volkogonov's book "Seven Leaders":
“In fact, the General Secretary turned into the main court master of ceremonies, a decorative leader, whose decisions are born not in his head, but behind his back: in an experienced, well-trained apparatus, where, indeed, there were many smart workers. But even the efforts of such people could not hide the wretchedness of the General Secretary’s thinking, his primitive reasoning.”
Vladimir Tolts:
-Who were these smart workers? - I ask Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin.
Vadim Zagladin:
Among those who worked with him during this period, say, speechwriters, the majority were energetic people, with independent thinking and ideas that often diverged or, in any case, went much further than the official course. I mean Nikolai Nikolaevich Inozemtsev, Georgy Arkadyevich Arbatov - they played a very important role during this period, and they continued to exist subsequently. This also speaks about some of the character traits or thinking of Leonid Ilyich - he selected just such people.
Another question: what could they do, and what would it ultimately give? Because it is known that the texts that were written and which he approved, to which he made his contribution, especially at the first stage, in the second this was less so, they then passed through a very fine sieve, and many things simply fell out of those that even he approved. On the other hand, even those questions that were introduced and that were of an innovative nature, I would especially highlight the 24th Party Congress, this is the 71st year, they simply were not implemented later. They were recorded, decisions were made, the congress supported these recommendations and proposals that came from his lips, but then, practically, they came to naught.
Vladimir Tolts:
I continue to ask one of his speech writers , Vladimir Zagladin, about Leonid Brezhnev.
- Vadim Valentinovich, some of your colleagues now recall that at that time they were extremely depressed by their service mediocrity, but how did you perceive your work?
Vadim Zagladin:
- Tell me, what choice did we have then? There was no choice, there was a man who was the head of the party and, in fact, the state, who instructed us to do certain developments, and we had to do them, trying to do something better, something closer to the true needs of the country, offering our ideas. We had no other choice.
Refuse? It would be possible, of course, to refuse, but what would be in return? This is completely unknown, because there were other teams, and other people who were close to him, who had completely different positions, much less positive, let’s say, than those that we proposed.
Vladimir Tolts:
We also talked with Georgy Arkadyevich Arbatov about the political, creative and personal goals of Brezhnev’s speech writers.
Georgy Arbatov:
At first, for some it seemed like a great honor, then more like a necessary burden, and for very mature people, as, in fact, the only opportunity to try some ideas after all (I don’t like the word “ voice ” - it has entered our vocabulary in the same way as “ written ”, when it’s written you have to speak), but in general, someone else will say it. And when he says it, it’s not like you wrote an article - it will already have some influence on politics, one might say.
The attitude was different: some wanted to please, others, on the contrary, wanted to introduce something new, to some extent dissident, oppositional, and thereby legitimize this point of view. So it happened differently...
Vladimir Tolts:
- What goals did you personally set for yourself when you wrote speeches for Brezhnev? - I asked Alexander Evgenievich Bovin.
Alexander Bovin:
- It was my job, I worked, I tried to work well. But, since my colleagues and I belonged to the category of the now mercilessly reviled sixties, then, of course, we had such a kind of liberal mood, we tried, as far as possible, to introduce all kinds of such motives into the tests that we wrote and composed. Sometimes it was successful, sometimes it was less successful, but we tried to do something like that.
Leonid Brezhnev (phonogram 1977):
And now, summing up the main, decisive result of six decades of struggle and labor, we can proudly say - we survived! (Applause) We survived! (Applause) We won! (Applause)
Vladimir Tolts:
From the memoirs of Anatoly Chernyaev about one of Leonid Ilyich’s speeches:
" The floor is given to the General Secretary. A stormy ovation, everyone stands up. A session of insanity ensues. Bovin's oratorical techniques sound completely ridiculous in the tongue-tied speaker - the further, the worse. The more (with every minute the speaker got tired), the more obvious it became that he hardly grasped the connection between phrases. Suddenly he stopped, was silent for a long time, turned the page back and, as if to himself (but the microphone was on, that is, audible on the whole hall) said: “Did I read it correctly?” Then again he confused the order of the words, read them incorrectly, the speech sounded meaningless.
Vladimir Tolts:
I ask Academician Arbatov:
- Georgy Arkadyevich, but after 1976, what part did the already ill Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev take in composing his “epoch-making speeches”?
Georgy Arbatov:
- He just listened - they read to him, everything that was written, sometimes he asked some questions, sometimes he asked to remove something, to correct something, but in general, he was much more passive. He had a short period of time during which he could maintain attention, so in general the requirement was to write shorter, simpler, he began to have difficulties with speech, he apparently had some damage to the nerves that controlled the vocal cords. So it was a rather sad picture.
Vladimir Tolts:
- Georgy Arkadyevich, it was at this time that those people who wrote his speeches for the sick Leonid Ilyich, his epoch-making speeches, were precisely those people who tried to defend their political position in these speeches and received a rather biting, I don’t know how fair, name - “puppeteers.” How fair is it, do you think?
Georgy Arbatov:
- You know, these people have never had much influence on politics and in this regard it is wrong.
But there were several people to whom he listened: some on foreign policy issues, and not because they participated in speeches, but because he invited them and consulted, and I had several such conversations with him. But they could somehow give him some idea or something. But for someone to guide him like that - this did not happen. In general, he preserved in an amazing way, even while he was sick: members of the Politburo were afraid of him and obeyed him unquestioningly.
Vladimir Tolts:
And here is what Leonid Zamyatin answered my question about puppeteers .
Leonid Zamyatin:
-Who were his puppeteers? You see, at a certain period, when he realized his weakness, he brought three people closer to him, and in essence, there was a triumvirate of power .
I would arrange the people in this triumvirate like this: the first is Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov , the Minister of Defense, this is a man who came to power from the time of Stalin, the former Minister of Arms under Stalin, a very energetic, capable, sharp man, and he was, in fact, one of those few people who claimed the position of a future successor if something happened to Brezhnev. (What was unexpected for me, for example, was that Ustinov suddenly passed away some time later, and in a rather unusual way. I myself talked to him the day before that he went to the hospital and was treated for one thing, but it turned out to be something else, and death occurred when Gorbachev was elevated to the rank of one of the members of the Politburo.) The second person in this triumvirate at that time was Andropov Yuri Vladimirovich . And the third was Andrei Andreevich Gromyko .
You know, we always jokingly called it the “walnut Politburo.” Why? Because they always gathered to resolve issues on the eve of the big Politburo, that is, the elected Politburo, they gathered in the “Nut Room” in the Kremlin, not far from Brezhnev’s office, and first, sometimes it took several hours, they worked out a decision among themselves, which they believed that it was the one that should be adopted, the one with which it was possible to reach a decision in the Politburo, but there must be agreement between these three. This concerned primarily issues of defense, strategy, foreign policy, and major internal issues. This group was, in essence, the triumvirate that ruled power during the Brezhnev period.
Vladimir Tolts:
So, if we turn to the official political vocabulary of those years, noticeably equipped for some reason with an ornithological dictionary, unlike the trinity of “ hawks ” from the Politburo, Brezhnev’s speech writers were liberal “ doves ”. So what liberal goals did they achieve with their work?
Georgy Arbatov:
- This is what succeeded (although I don’t want to attribute this to those who wrote the speeches, especially to myself) he had this idea from the very beginning, but detente - it succeeded. At first, we managed to make some progress with the reform. But then, using the jealousy that existed between Kosygin and Brezhnev, some bureaucrats managed to inflame his distrust of this, and the reform died out altogether.
Vladimir Tolts:
- But these are all global problems, but for people, individual people, what have you, liberals, managed to do? Brezhnev’s position, reflected in a number of his speeches, his position on human rights, on the implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the humanitarian sphere, his attitude to the problem of freedom to leave and enter the country, his attitude towards dissidents - to what extent was this position shaped by those who wrote Leonid Ilyich’s speeches, what did you achieve here and what did you achieve?
Georgy Arbatov:
- But some conversations, not just what they wrote, but conversations, when sometimes for a week or two, work is going on on some large document, and conversations are going on, and they are distracted, and all this to some extent could influence. I don’t think that they had a decisive influence, because he had the most serious conversations, of course, with members of the Politburo, with people in higher positions, and these issues were resolved there.
But, nevertheless, it was still somewhat possible to somehow persuade him, to somehow warn him against certain things. Because they really pushed him, because they wanted him, there was terrible pressure, to cancel the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Congress at the 23rd Congress. We managed to fight this off, we managed to fight it off through the efforts of many people, including those who helped him write his speeches.
As for departures or absences, but, you know, some individual questions may have been raised about someone or something, but in a way that this issue was seriously discussed - no. Moreover, we had different opinions on this issue. Some thought that if we singled out one nationality and allowed only them to travel, this would only cause a rise in some bad feelings in the country, which would decide that these people of this nationality (I’m talking about Jews) are second-class people, second-class citizens. They are not only citizens of the Soviet Union, but they also have citizenship and loyalty in another country. If you allow it, then everyone, but there is no need to single out one nationality.
Vladimir Tolts:
- But Jews were “second-class” citizens at that time?
Georgy Arbatov:
- But to approve this by the state... It was still a great hypocrisy, but the psychology was internationalist , no one admitted that anti-Semitism exists in our country, supported by the state.
Vladimir Tolts:
From a top secret memo by KGB chief Andropov on the hostile activities of the so-called group for promoting the implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR, sent to Brezhnev on November 15, 1976: a list of the Helsinki group indicating the non-random and false nationality of each:
" -Ginsburg Alexander Ilyich, born in 1936, Jew.
- Grigorenko Petr Grigorievich, born in 1907, Ukrainian
- Professional criminal Anatoly Tikhonovich Marchenko, born in 1938, Jew.
- Sharansky Anatoly, born in 1948, Jew;
- Slepak Vladimir, born in 1927, Jew;
- Sakharov’s wife Bonner Elena Georgievna, born in 1922, Jewish;
- Mikhail Bershtam, born in 1949, Jewish... "
Well, and so on.
The document aimed to create the impression that the movement for compliance with the Helsinki Accords was inspired by international Zionism. Actually, Andropov was to some extent banging on an open door. Brezhnev, like many other members of the party's Areopagus, was inclined to consider Zionism to be the source of many of his problems, but he had no idea what it really was.
However, if we compare his attitude towards the phantom of the Jewish threat with Andropov’s, one cannot help but note that Brezhnev’s approach was more sober and pragmatic.
Here are excerpts from the working recording of the Politburo meeting on March 20, 1973, at which Brezhnev demanded from Andropov and Shchelokov (he was then the Minister of Internal Affairs) to urgently suspend the execution of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on the obligation of those leaving for permanent residence abroad to reimburse the costs of their education, since American legislators linked the granting of “most favored nation status” to the Soviet Union with the abolition of these restrictions on human rights. This is what Leonid Ilyich said then:
“ Zionism makes us stupid, and we take money from an old woman who has received an education. Since she has a higher education, pay money to Shchelokov, he will give you a piece of paper when you go to Israel. I am not raising the question of repealing the law, but if you want, this question could be raised. Either we will earn money from this matter or carry out the intended policy towards the United States.
Jackson managed to introduce the amendment even before Nixon introduced the bill to give us most favored nation treatment.
What is our work worth then if things turn out this way? Or do we have a law that persecutes Jews? Why not give them a small theater with 500 seats, which operates under our censorship and the repertoire under our supervision. Let Aunt Sonya sing Jewish wedding songs there. I'm not suggesting this, I'm just saying it. What if we open a school? - The program is the same as in other schools, but the national language is taught in it, Jewish. What will change from this? I asked myself this daring thought. But since I am always full of revelation, I don’t think anyone has ever suggested: what if we allowed a Jewish weekly newspaper? Not everyone will read it in Hebrew, it will be read by a Jew - old Abramovich, and that’s what TASS reports.”
It would be a mistake to imagine Leonid Ilyich as a kind of political good-natured person, narrow-minded and tongue-tied. At all stages of his reign, he perfectly understood the ruthless secret mechanics of his power and carefully monitored the reliability of its punitive action.
“ Brezhnev ,” one of the biographers of the General Secretary wrote long after his death, “ was not a stupid reactionary and, as a pragmatist, was able to turn the steering wheel a little to the right or left, walking along the fairway of his power .”
But, I will note on my own behalf, the “Titanic” of Soviet state communism, during the reign of Leonid Ilyich, already inevitably began to sink, although other first-class passengers tried not to notice it.
For some, the stability proclaimed by Brezhnev to this day seems to be a real achievement of his rule.
Leonid Zamyatin:
I believe that globally, if you look at Brezhnev’s direction over the course of 20 years as a great country, which he maintained due to the strength of both his environment and the activity of many people who were members of the Politburo at that time, he maintained the greatness of the state. He maintained the unity of this state.
And now, when we are studying why the country collapsed, the roots must be sought partially, of course, in the Brezhnev period. But to a large extent, the fact that Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev decided to trample all Brezhnev’s policies, or rather the policies of the great country of that period, was his big mistake. It had to be rebuilt, it had to be added.
Vladimir Tolts:
And here’s what Gorbachev’s current employee, Vadim Zagladin, tells me:
Vadim Zagladin:
People still felt confident, in any case, they believed that tomorrow it wouldn’t be worse, it would be maybe the same, maybe it would be better, but it wouldn’t be worse. And this confidence that people had, despite the fact that they lived unimportantly, and many simply poorly, despite the fact that the country gradually slowed down the pace of development and reached the zero point, this confidence is the feeling that people lost, and which, it seems to me, was not an acquisition of that time, but in any case, the fact that it was preserved this feeling then was a definite achievement.
Vladimir Tolts:
Of course, for those who survived Gorbachev's perestroika and the storm of post-communist reforms, it is obvious that not only changes, but also the stability of life have independent value. But today, it seems, it is already obvious to everyone: it was during the reign of Brezhnev that this stability of life turned into a fading fiction.
Let us, however, give the floor to historians.
Yuri Zhukov:
I would not say that the era, the time of Brezhnev, completed the stage begun by the abolition of serfdom; I would still connect only two eras - Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Khrushchev's time is a time of some kind of fermentation: back and forth, back and forth, left and right, the country rushes along with him. Under Brezhnev, it clearly emerges: in one place, the whole world floats forward, the USSR remains further and further and further, no matter how we analyze it: economically, politically, culturally. And despite the vibrant life in individual kitchens, the country as a whole is turning into something similar to a stagnant swamp.
Vladimir Alexandrov:
This is a terrible time, perhaps the most terrible time. As the Japanese say, we fell behind forever - precisely during this time.
Evgeny Knyazev:
Now there are people who say that it was a wonderful era, that everything was there then: then everything was good, it was stable, well, there wasn’t this, there wasn’t that, but, in general, you know , he lived and let others live - that’s what they say about Leonid Ilyich. This is a delusion that is not worthy of mere criticism; it is funny to hear for those who lived at that time!