Elections—2000

Mikhail Sokolov:

Radio Liberty speaks.

The weekly program "Elections 2001" is on air. Mikhail Sokolov is at the microphone.

The activities of President Vladimir Putin, according to December polls by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, were approved by a total of 68 percent of respondents, their governor - 50, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov - 43, government - 38, plenipotentiary representative in the federal district - 25, the works of the Federation Council and the Duma were approved by 24 and 22 percent, respectively.

Putin is credited with raising pensions and wages, and his foreign policy is considered successful. But almost all the energetic government initiatives of the Kremlin in 2000 - the fight against oligarchs, federal reform - are assessed by the population definitely negatively, this is the conclusion made by the head of VTsIOM Yuri Levada.

The authorities in a bloc with the communists rely on the moods and expectations of the most conservative layers and mobilize them in their support. The most important result of the year was the disorientation and disorganization of that part of the population that considered itself to be supporters of democracy and reform, as well as the erosion of all oppositions and their transformation, as Professor Levada put it, into a power-hungry broth.

We will discuss the political results of 2000 with deputies of the State Duma of Russia Vladimir Ryzhkov, Sergei Mitrokhin, Viktor Pokhmelkin.

Mikhail Sokolov is at the microphone in Prague. Guests of the Moscow studio of Radio Liberty are deputies of the State Duma of Russia Sergei Mitrokhin, secretary of the Yabloko association for ideology, Viktor Pokhmelkin, deputy chairman of the Union of Right Forces faction, and Vladimir Ryzhkov, a former Duma deputy from the NDR and Unity, now an independent.

So, I would like to start with the elections to the Russian State Duma that took place a year ago. Do you think today, in a year, what would the election results be, the same as they were in 1999, or has something fundamentally changed? Well, let's get started, Viktor Pokhmelkin.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

I think the election results would be about the same as a year ago. In general, it must be said that neither society nor the state changed so seriously during that year to expect something different. This, by the way, is shown by the elections of governors, mayors, and elections of local government representatives, which are now taking place throughout the country. They, like a year ago, are dominated by two political forces - the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the party in power - well, with some gaps where, say, candidates from the Union of Right Forces, Yabloko and other political associations are breaking through.

This, in my opinion, shows that the country has not progressed much over the past year, and one can even state that, to some extent, the state as a whole, and the government, and perhaps the legislative power, have not realized those opportunities, on the one hand. But, on the other hand, there was no sharp rollback.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Sergei Mitrokhin.

Sergei Mitrokhin:

Well, I don't entirely agree. I think that if elections to the State Duma were held today, the results would be different. At least the Unity party would not have such a huge percentage. Now many voters have realized that this is a dummy party that is being puffed up by the Kremlin to achieve some of its own goals, that this party has neither an independent program, nor even independent voting in the State Duma, that is, its result would be less.

I think that Yabloko’s result would have been higher, since many voters would probably have appreciated the position that Yabloko took on Chechnya, saying that a political solution was needed in addition to just a military one, and accordingly, the result would have been different.

Well, and, besides, after a number of votes in the Duma that took place this year, such as voting for the anthem of the Soviet Union, or such votes as the import of radioactive waste, and so on... Suffice it to say that 90 percent of the population is against, and 90 percent of the Duma is for the import of radioactive waste, well, and on many other positions.

Most likely, the balance of political forces would look completely different a year after the elections.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Vladimir Ryzhkov.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

I agree with Victor. I think that the difference would not be great, and although Unity has indeed shown over this year that it is just an obedient instrument in the hands of the presidential administration, if Putin had again said that he calls for voting for this party, then everyone would have voted for it, those who voted a year ago. Because trust in the president is still very high, and people are ready to vote for even a white horse in the Senate if the president asks for it.

So, I think, there would be approximately the same results, which suggests that all the political storms of this year are occurring mainly in the elite, in the political class, without affecting the deep layers of society.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Fine. Now - to the Duma and the executive branch. Do you agree with the opinion that the Duma has become, in a sense, an appendage of the executive branch and is stamping out the initiatives of the government and the president, of which, however, there are not so many. Sergei Mitrokhin, "Apple".

Sergei Mitrokhin:

Of course, this is obvious. For the first time in this State Duma, we are faced with the fact that factions have emerged that cannot vote independently by definition, but vote only as they are told. And these people make up a fairly significant part of the State Duma. This Kremlin drive belt in the State Duma makes it semi-independent, semi-dependent, allowing the executive branch to fashion from the State Duma almost whatever it wants.

This is a fundamentally new situation, it means a degradation of Russian parliamentarism, even compared to what it was before. And this fact will undoubtedly remain for the near future, until the next elections to the State Duma, unless, of course, it is possible to reverse this sad trend.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Vladimir Ryzhkov, your opinion.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

I want to return to the comparison of “Unity” and “Our Home - Russia”. Very often in the press it is compared that Unity has taken the place of the NDR. This is not entirely true. “Our home is Russia” was quite independent, especially in the last year and a half, when Chernomyrdin ceased to be prime minister. We never voted on command and maintained a certain independence from both the Kremlin and the White House.

Unity is completely subordinate to commands from the Kremlin. This year there was not a single case where this rule was violated. When I tried, being one of the members of the NDR who joined Unity, to state my position, I was immediately expelled. This, apparently, is precisely an illustration of what “Unity” represents.

If we talk about the State Duma in general, in 2000 there was not a single case when the president’s initiative was not voted on by the Duma. Not a single case. Moreover, as soon as the president makes a proposal, the Duma immediately forgets about the regulations, breaks all deadlines for consideration, as was the case with symbols, in particular, and votes with his pants up for everything that the president proposes.

In this sense, the current Third Duma is strikingly reminiscent of the third pre-revolutionary Duma. The first two Dumas were in opposition to the emperor and were dissolved. And the third Duma was elected after the so-called June coup of Stolypin, during which the main goal was achieved - the election of a loyal State Duma. This is exactly the same thing we are seeing now. The Duma has become an appendage.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Vladimir Alexandrovich, she still argued about the issue of the naval budget.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

Maybe this one will argue something in four years, we cannot rule it out. So far she doesn't argue. Maybe he’ll find some topic to argue about. But the most important thing is that the current parliament is an absolute appendage of the federal bureaucracy, serving its interests almost resignedly, and in this sense, I agree with Sergei and with those who talk about the degradation of Russian parliamentarism, this is the honest truth.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Victor Pokhmelkin. And, in fact, whose place in the Duma does the Union of Rightist Forces take?

Victor Pokhmelkin:

Well, the fact that a presidential and government majority has been formed in the State Duma is not scary in itself. If this was the result of the fact that pro-presidential parties won the elections with their program, with their ideology and then formed a government, this would be normal. But, alas, everything is different here.

The president, elected without any political influence from the Unity party and, there, the People's Deputy group, the main pro-presidential forces, simply dictates his positions through his officials to these two deputy associations. Of course, this does not correspond to the principles of parliamentarism. Here I completely and completely agree with my colleagues.

But there is one more feature of this Duma. This pro-presidential majority was formed with the participation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which has simply become an ally of the Unity party and votes synchronously on many positions.

And there is one more thing to note. If, for example, initiatives from the right, to which the president reacts normally, do not always pass through the Duma, then an initiative from the left almost always has a chance. That is, this Duma is turning to the left much more willingly. And I also mean pro-presidential parliamentary associations. This, unfortunately, can be stated.

There are practically only two factions in this Duma with their own independent position. These are the factions “Union of Right Forces” and “Yabloko”. And the story with the anthem and with a whole series of other issues shows that we are guided by our own value orientations, our own ideology, forming this or that position, regardless of whether it coincides with the presidential one or not. Or then it turns out that on some issues we support the president and the government, but on others we are sharply opposed.

But, unfortunately, this is a minority in this State Duma, we have to agree with this. And it must be stated that yes, this State Duma is an appendage of presidential power, with all the ensuing consequences.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Two out of three present in the Moscow studio supported Vladimir Putin in the elections, Yabloko had its own candidate.

Evaluate now your choice at that time, taking into account today's realities, that is, the continuation of the war in Chechnya, the war with NTV, a very unstable position on issues (I mean the authorities), on issues of economic reform.

Victor Pokhmelkin.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

I would like to remind you that there was no single position in the Union of Right Forces. Yes, the majority supported presidential candidate Putin. At the same time, prominent figures in our movement had a different position on this issue.

Nevertheless, I believe that at that time the general approach of the SPS members to this problem was correct. The struggle for President Putin continues, and I believe that we are obliged to take part in it, since the president’s course has not yet been fully formed. Yes, there is Chechnya, yes, there is an attack on freedom of speech. Yes, there is a certain bias towards the security forces and flirting with the pro-Soviet, pro-socialist part of society.

But, at the same time, there is a certain movement towards liberal reforms in the economy. This suggests that the presidential course has not yet been formed. The President hesitates: a step to the left - a step to the right, a step forward - a step back.

And in this sense, it would be irresponsible, from our point of view, to move away from the fight for the presidential course, to move from the fight for the presidential course, to move completely into opposition to it. We believe that the possibilities of influencing the president have not yet been exhausted, and we will continue to strive, nevertheless, to influence the course to be more liberal.

So the critical point beyond which our party goes into the opposition has not yet arrived, but, in general, we must admit that this line is already quite close.

Mikhail Sokolov:

That is, you do not regret your choice.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

This choice was largely pragmatic and was dictated by the real conditions in which the country found itself. We understood that President Putin's rule would be controversial, and, in general, our forecast was largely justified.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Vladimir Ryzhkov, as far as I understand, you made your personal choice, since you left the Unity faction.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

I was expelled from the Unity faction for my position. Although, in general, I don’t regret it, because I can’t imagine what I could do there.

As for Vladimir Putin, I will not hide that I am quite disappointed with a number of his steps. It seems to me that his course towards partial dismantling - for now partial dismantling - of federalism and his course towards turning parliament into a puppet body, towards limiting freedom of speech in Russia, towards centralizing power in the hands of the president and his administration, his course towards further transforming the Russian government into a technical rather than a political one - in my opinion, this is the wrong strategy.

And for me, these points outweigh the individual successes that the Liberals have achieved in government. And this is where I disagree with the Union of Right Forces faction. I believe that democracy, civil society and the political institutions of democracy are much more important than the new Tax Code. And in this sense, the past year has shown that, of course, Putin is a capable president, of course, he is a capable president, of course, he can work effectively, but the question is - what strategy is this effective politician pursuing? And here a lot of things disappoint me.

Mikhail Sokolov:

That is, you personally consider yourself an oppositionist, Vladimir Alexandrovich?

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

Undoubtedly. Starting with his actions along the vertical of power, symbolism, and so on - I am in opposition to these actions, although, like Victor, I remain hopeful that, after all, next year will be a year of real reforms. And then I can change my position.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Sergei Mitrokhin, Yabloko faction. Please.

Sergei Mitrokhin:

Our position has not changed since the elections. Even then we saw Vladimir Putin’s weaknesses. The weakest side was expressed in his certain uncertainty and neutrality. The desire to please prevailed in him over the desire to pursue any specific political course. Well, during the elections, maybe it was justified - you have to win the elections, you have to please everyone, you have to stand above the fray, demonstrate your detachment from extremes. It is necessary to avoid any clear political positions so as not to alienate one or another part of society. All this can be justified by elections. We talked about it then.

It's hard to justify now. Look, Vladimir Putin is constantly engaged in simply sending certain signals. He sends signals to the right by taking liberals into the government, sends signals to the left by accepting Soviet state symbols. But this is all PR. Where are the real things, where is the real course to lead the country out of the crisis? We don't actually see anything.

We don’t see what exactly those liberals who were elected to the government achieved, and this is understandable. They themselves cannot do anything. Under the current system of power in the country, under the current constitution, some individual officials in the government, of course, cannot do anything.

We need the political will of the president, but we still don’t see this will. We don't know where Vladimir Putin is going to move. We'd really like to see him move in the right direction, and we're willing to work with him if he moves in that direction.

But so far he is only engaged in actions aimed at gaining public sympathy. However, the reserve of sympathy is gradually approaching exhaustion. If society does not see real movement forward, it will turn away from the president, and he must understand this.

Mikhail Sokolov:

I would like to clarify with Sergei Mitrokhin how true are the conversations that Yabloko is preparing to move from such an uncertain position of carte blanche to Vladimir Putin into harsh opposition to the regime?

Sergei Mitrokhin:

We would not want to become hostage to some terms and words. We take a specific position. We condemn the adoption of a new anthem in the form of Alexandrov's music, we condemn the persecution of independent media (NTV). We condemn the import of radioactive waste, which is not supported by any control from parliament and society. And we condemn the president's policies on a number of other issues.

Whether it will be called opposition or something else - let the people decide. We will come to this decision over time. We have a certain approval for a number of actions, including those of the government, which is why the Yabloko faction voted for the budget. There is support for a number of the president’s steps, but all this, of course, does not mean that we are committed to unconditional support.

Now, if a critical mass of these positions of rejection of the president’s policies takes place, of course, we will have nowhere to go. We are still restraining ourselves from openly and unequivocally declaring ourselves the opposition, but I think (and here I agree with Viktor Pokhmelkin) that this line is inevitably approaching. If the president does not change his vague policy, if he does not speak out unambiguously on a number of key issues that the country faces today, then, of course, we will have no other choice but to go into opposition to the president.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Question to Vladimir Ryzhkov. Two representatives of the parties, SPS and Yabloko, spoke here. You are non-partisan. How do you assess the positions of these two forces, how close are they to the opposition? Or are they simply critics of the regime?

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

In my opinion, today they are not the opposition, because both Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces fully share responsibility for the defeat of the Federation Council (they voted for this reform). They fully share responsibility for the fact that now representatives of the presidential administration and business representatives are joining the Federation Council, and the nature of this chamber is changing radically. It will no longer be the Chamber of Regions, but will be... I don’t even know what to call it, what it will be. They fully share responsibility for the centralization of power in the country. They all supported it.

So I think it would be unfair to consider them the opposition. Another thing is that in their assessments there is concern about the situation with NTV, there is concern about some other problems, but they largely share the results of the first year of President Putin, because in many ways they themselves participated.

Mikhail Sokolov:

I would like to discuss further, after all, the situation with federal reform.

Liberals in the Duma supported the president’s idea, did not oppose the creation of districts, allowed the removal of governors and mayors, reorganized the Federation Council, and gave a third term to twenty-six governors. Here is the intermediate result.

What is your assessment of this “verticalization” of Russia?

Let's start with the Union of Right Forces. Victor Pokhmelkin.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

Yes, we really supported the fundamental directions of the federal reform, aimed at combating separatism, the feudal tendencies that have developed in many Russian regions, in order to form a truly unified legal economic space in the country.

We were well aware that this reform could have different motives, and that the party in power, quite possibly, and at least significantly... its representatives are guided by completely different motives than we are. They need centralization of power to recreate the empire, in order to ultimately turn Russia into a unitary state, into an extremely, maximally centralized one. If you like, into a kind of absolute monarchy in the new edition.

But at this historical stage, our interests coincided, because liberals were also objectively interested in ensuring the successful functioning of a market economy and democratic institutions in ensuring, after all, the integrity of the country and the fight against feudal tendencies. Those who advocated the “imperialization” of Russia were also interested in this.

I understand perfectly well (and everyone in the Union of Right Forces understands) that at the next stage, obviously, our interests will diverge, but this does not mean that we did not need to move in this direction. Another thing is that both we and Yabloko from the very beginning advocated the principle of election, direct elections of members of the Federation Council. This would solve the problem as much as possible, and we will eventually get there.

However, we have taken a step forward. We shared powers, after all. And I think we will fight for the next step to happen.

With all this, the professionalization of the Federation Council has occurred, with all the costs that are now taking place, and this, in my opinion, is still for the benefit of the upper house. Because the governors who sat in the upper house very often came from unprofessional and, I would say, such narrowly regional decisions. This is the very Chamber of Regions that Vladimir Ryzhkov dreams of; it was not the Federation Council of the previous convocation. This must, in general, be stated with open eyes.

Mikhail Sokolov:

The floor goes to the opponent of this reform, Vladimir Ryzhkov. Indeed, there has been a change in the procedure for forming the Federation Council, and soon instead of the Chamber of Regions there will be party factions, and then, probably, they will get to the constitution.

So, Vladimir Alexandrovich?

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

Well, this is the case when I fundamentally disagree with Victor on not a single point.

First. The Federation Council was the chamber of regions. They actually communicated the real situation on the ground through the Federation Council and had a real opportunity to influence the actions of the federal government, the Central Bank and the president.

Now the regions will not have such an opportunity. The feedback will be cut off, because the State Council is an exclusively ceremonial body, and both the federal center, which has lost its sense of reality, and the regions, which have lost their channels of influence, will suffer from this.

Fight against feudal lords. This is the favorite topic of our liberals and the Kremlin. "We must fight the feudal lords." These people either do not know or forget that feudalism and regional independence are the basis of civil society in the West. And one of the main... one of the main sources of civil society, because the regions balanced the absolutist power.

And the third thing I want to say. Indeed, this reform of the Federation Council undermined the foundations of our constitution. Indeed, the constitution is now struck to the very heart, the constitution is democratic, the constitution is federal. And indeed, the liberals, by supporting these proposals, actually opened the way to changing the Basic Law, which, under current conditions, could lead to the complete dismantling of federalism, local self-government, parliamentarism and the basic rights and freedoms of citizens.

So I still consider this a very serious mistake by both the president and our liberals, and I’m afraid that they will still be able to convince themselves of this.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Sergei Mitrokhin. Didn't Yabloko make a mistake, for the sake of fighting authoritarian regimes in several khanates (in Bashkiria, there, Kalmykia), which you have talked about more than once? Did you support Putin’s plan, but ended up getting a third term for Shaimiev and company?

Sergei Mitrokhin:

I would first like to disagree with the term that “we supported Putin.” It was Putin who supported us. The program for reforming the Federation was proposed by Yabloko, and, of course, Yabloko could not stay away from this.

Yes, we believe that the Federation Council - in the form in which it was created under Yeltsin - led to the degradation of the country. It was only in England in the 12th century that feudal barons sat in parliament. This was not the case anywhere else. It is barbaric when the person who heads the executive branch is also a legislator. This is a brake on the path to civilization.

We know a huge number of cases when criminal elements were concentrated under the roof of governors, and the governors themselves, or presidents... I can directly name people like President Ilyumzhinov, well, and a number of others who were simply criminal elements in power. And it was absolutely impossible to do anything about it.

Therefore, changing the structure of the Federation Council was an imperative. The institution of federal intervention, which allows governors to be removed for committing criminal offenses and for violations of federal law, is an imperative. No one can convince me that some mistake was made here.

Another thing is that Vladimir Putin failed to complete the federal reform. In fact, today we are faced with the fact that this reform is stuck and is virtually doomed to failure.

This is the story with the third term. By the way, you are mistaken that the Yabloko and SPS factions supported a third term. On the contrary, we actually voted “against”. But why did the idea of ​​a third term arise? Because personalities like Shaimiev, Rakhimov and a number of others said: “Whatever you accept, we will still go for a third term. And do with it what you want.” And, in essence, the Kremlin administration submitted to this pressure. She was precisely unable to complete the work of federal reform and put the presumptuous regional princelings in their place. She lost this round.

We see that the presidential administration cannot do anything about the chaos that is happening in Primorye, when people are simply frozen. It is absolutely clear that the governor bears full responsibility, but they cannot do anything with him. They are afraid. We see the same situation in other regions.

The notorious harmonization of regional legislation with federal legislation failed. We see that in the regions there are thousands of violations of federal legislation, but only dozens of such violations are corrected.

Thus, the Kremlin obviously simply failed to cope with the task that it declared at the beginning, and this is very sad.

Mikhail Sokolov:

I would like to check with Viktor Pokhmelkin. As far as I understand, Yabloko was really against a third term, but it was the Union of Right Forces that made it possible to carry out the decision to elect a third term under the Kremlin’s promise to resolve, apparently, the land issue. And you were deceived again?

Victor Pokhmelkin:

That's not entirely true here. 239 votes were cast for the law in the first reading, 13 votes from the Union of Right Forces. That is, without us this decision would still take place.

In the Union of Right Forces, the 13 people who voted are divided into two parts. Half voted because their leader is a representative of the “New Force” in our organization... their leader Sergei Kiriyenko heads the Primorsky Federal District and is the plenipotentiary representative of the president. The other half actually had some kind of agreement with the presidential administration, and this concerned the promotion of liberal reforms in the country, including land reform.

We will judge how deceived we are or not in January, after all, because while consultations are still ongoing, not everything is lost in this regard.

And I don’t look at the issue of the third term so clearly, because the issue has been resolved in principle: two terms for each head of a subject of the Federation. And this position remains unchanged. Here all members of the Union of Right Forces were unanimous.

Now we are talking about the form of implementation of this provision in relation to individual Russian regions. Here, in principle, in order to maintain some stability, I fully allow certain exceptions. Of course, there must be serious restrictions, and the federal center is certainly losing the fight to the regional barons. Of course, it is standing still or even retreating in a number of directions, since the demonstration of force that took place at the beginning, today, in general, really turns out to be a demonstration in many ways.

And the institution of plenipotentiary representatives, it seems to me, is now drifting completely in the wrong direction. Instead of fighting to establish legal order in the respective territories, the president’s representatives are increasingly drawn into economic processes, engaged in economic activities, trying to strengthen their own influence, their own authority, and are drawn into completely fruitless conflicts with governors in the wrong places. And it seems to me that it is precisely in this part, in terms of introducing the institution of plenipotentiary representatives, that Putin’s reform is indeed wrong.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Vladimir Ryzhkov. You should probably be pleased that the regions have demonstrated their strength and some governors have achieved exceptional conditions for re-election.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

Well, that would be too simple an explanation of my views. In fact, I am a categorical opponent of a third term. Both Victor and Sergei know about this. Moreover, I reported this issue to the committee, to the Committee on Federation Affairs. And our committee split. And I will oppose the third term to the end, because I think it’s completely disgraceful that in a year or two some leaders of the republics will celebrate their twenty-year anniversary in power. And when Viktor Pokhmelkin says that six people agreed on liberal reforms, it seems to me that this is a cannibalistic price for liberal reforms, when millions of people are under the heel of authoritarian regimes, against which so many philippines have now been issued. And some liberals from the Union of Right Forces say that “for the sake of the Land Code, we will leave these people in the same condition for another five years.” This is very interesting logic for liberals.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

I'm sorry. But they vote for them.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

Everything is arranged there in such a way that people vote for them. Who else will they vote for? Everything is arranged there in such a way that they will be voted for six more times, if God grants them health.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

They will vote for the same cannibal.

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

As for the general situation with the regions, it seems to me that we should not perceive the victory of Shaimiev or Rakhimov as a victory of federalism. Unfortunately, this is far from the case.

And so, when my friends say that they would like Putin to restore order, correct the laws, restore human rights, it seems to me that they act like people who were asked to dig a hole. People dug a hole... and while digging it, they hoped that there would be a fountain there. And then the bosses said that they were, in fact, digging not a fountain, but a grave. And those who were digging say: “Lord, how wrong we were! Damn! And we thought there would be a fountain.”

So it is here. It seems to me that the authorities did not set the task of protecting human rights and establishing order. The only task that the authorities set for themselves was the loyalty of regional leaders. And this problem is solved. And so now a third term can be allowed, and a lot more can be allowed, having a hook in the form of federal intervention, the right to remove governors, and so on.

So the idealism of many of our liberals has led to the fact that now, indeed, regional leaders, on the one hand, are defenseless in the face of the center, and in order to protect themselves, they make deals with it, as was the case before.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Let's move on to the results of the autumn regional elections. Do you agree that at this stage they have turned into such an unprincipled dispute between the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Unity, and all the elected “red” or “gray” governors are, in fact, just now the same “faithful Putinists”?

Sergei Mitrokhin?

Sergei Mitrokhin:

In these elections, the Kremlin’s position was very clearly defined. The Kremlin simply does not want to change anything in particular; it does not have any specific policy towards the regions. His only goal is to achieve the loyalty of the newly elected governor or president.

If the Kremlin sees that a given candidate has such a chance - and this is, as a rule, the current governor or president - then it will support him. If he sees that there are no such chances, then he will support his competitor. The Kremlin's main goal is to secure loyalty, because the loyalty of the governor is the main resource. Including for the subsequent re-election of the president himself.

The Kremlin's most basic strategy is the absence of any risk. But there is a certain contradiction in this. The fact is that the people who voted for Vladimir Putin, in a sense, they expected change, they expected novelty. And suddenly, when they see that this president supports the same old regional chief under whom the region collapsed... as was the case, for example, in the case of Udmurtia as a result of the rule of Alexander Volkov... And suddenly they see that on the eve of the elections, right there, exactly two days before the elections, the representative of the president supports him, and he meets with the president himself, and it is clear that the president is simply burning with the desire to see this person as a newly elected regional chief, of course, many give up. They suddenly see that the president, it turns out, is not going to change anything, strictly speaking.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Sergei, but you, too, Yabloko, supported the communist Nikolai Vinogradov in Vladimir.

Sergei Mitrokhin:

The situation with Vladimir is special. There was a very difficult situation when one of the Yabloko representatives supported Vinogradov, while others did not support Vinogradov. Unfortunately, sometimes we - including our regional organizations - do not have a common position on this or that governor.

Mikhail Sokolov:

This probably happens with presidents too.

Sergei Mitrokhin:

Well, this is a trend with the president. Here in Vladimir, this was one of the few situations in the country; there, it was one of dozens. And with the president and his administration, this is a trend across the country, which is quite obvious, that the most important thing is not to take risks, the most important thing is to make safe bets. And these bets were made, and, as a rule, those candidates with whom the Kremlin linked its forecasts for their passage to this post passed everywhere.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Victor Pokhmelkin. But you also bet on the “faithful” candidates, on Guzhvin, for example, in Astrakhan, and on other candidates...

Victor Pokhmelkin:

You know, Mikhail, I do not agree with the fundamental formulation of your question, that Unity and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation fought. Nothing of the kind. The whole struggle took place within one big party in power, which today includes the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Unity, and a number of other political organizations.

The fact is that today a representative of the party in power cannot win the gubernatorial elections. This is just how elections are structured, this is how society is structured today, this is the importance of technology today, resources that only representatives of the party in power fully possess. By the way, she herself is not alone. And even within the presidential administration, different parts of it supported different candidates in a number of regions.

In the elections that are taking place today, the gubernatorial elections, I mean, neither the Union of Right Forces, nor Yabloko, nor even we together, so to speak, where we united, simply had no chance. Therefore, we had to choose according to the principle of the least evil and support those candidates of the party in power who are more sane, more oriented towards some meaningful policy in the interests of their region, who promoted reforms in one way or another.

We are realists and understood perfectly well that a “pure” candidate from the Union of Right Forces in today’s conditions has practically no chance in the gubernatorial elections. And this, unfortunately, is a sad feature of that stage, the period that we are experiencing today.

If we look at elections to representative bodies of power, then, after all, there is a different picture. There we already notice that candidates from the Union of Right Forces and candidates from other political organizations with ideological overtones nevertheless achieved victory, and in some regions they even simply, one might say, had a resounding success with the Union of Right Forces in elections to representative bodies of government. I would like to remind you that in the Kaliningrad region, for example, both the chairman of the regional Duma is a member of the Union of Right Forces, and a member of the Federation Council was also elected from the legislative body - a member of the Union of Right Forces.

This means that today the priority of our party in regional elections is precisely the elections to legislative bodies, and this is explained by many reasons.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Vladimir Ryzhkov, do you agree that the current results of these regional elections are also predetermined by the fact that Russia, as it were, is drifting from a monarchical oligarchy to an almost absolute monarchy, when the policy of the center is predetermined, well, literally, by a very narrow group (relatively speaking, one is Abramovich-Mamut, and the other is the St. Petersburg security officers)?

Vladimir Ryzhkov:

I will return, after all... I want to say two words about the regions.

It seems to me that their back was broken in the summer, and now regional elections do not make as much sense as they did a year or a year and a half ago. They were deprived of the upper house, the money was redistributed 60 to 40 in favor of the federal center, the vast majority of regions are now completely dependent on subsidies from the federal budget, plus any governor can now be imprisoned and removed from work. And in this situation, no matter who wins the regional elections, a Kremlin protege or, by chance, an opponent of the Kremlin, as they believe, he will still crawl on his belly in a month and swear allegiance to the president. He will have nowhere to go if he wants to work, and so that in his region at least something can be paid, heated, traveled, loaded, and so on.

In this sense, now, indeed, the Kremlin is a decisive player on the stage of regional elections. This is his technology. He looks at which of the local candidates has a chance, chooses the most loyal one and directs all the main resources to him. Nine times out of ten, this candidate wins. If the Kremlin sees that its candidate is not winning, then it removes the opponent from the race, as was the case with Rutskoi. And as a result, we will get an absolutely loyal corps of governors, no matter what they are called - communists, SPS, Unity... This is a matter of taste, as it were.

The only amendment I would make is regarding the communists. Nowadays there is a somewhat simplified idea of ​​​​communists, that they are loyal, that they are safe, harmless, like such a fluffy bunny. I still think that with the inevitable fall in the president’s rating, which will happen sooner or later anyway (this is the nature of politics as such), the communists will turn out to be the real serious force that can challenge the authorities.

As for the drift from monarchical-oligarchic to absolute monarchy, this is a matter of, as it were, a verbal balancing act. I don’t see that this year the government has seriously freed itself from the influence of big capital, and this influence is quite strong. But the fact that the autocracy, unity of command and power of the Kremlin is strengthening is obvious.

Mikhail Sokolov:

Perhaps, in conclusion, I would like Sergei Mitrokhin to answer this question.

Sergei Mitrokhin:

I also don’t see any reason to say that the oligarchic regime has changed in Russia. The fact that the president is fighting the oligarchs does not mean that he has defeated the oligarchy. If we count Gusinsky and Berezovsky, then this means falling into a very big mistake. These people have already been removed from power and have no access to it. Therefore, they cannot be oligarchs.

At the same time, a new wave of oligarchs is rising in the country, completely gray, invisible people who derive income from their proximity to power. The oligarchy, on the contrary, has stabilized; it has become a system. Previously, it was not such a system; before, there was a struggle for power between oligarchs. And now this struggle is over, and, indeed, we have received an almost classic type of oligarchic regime in the country. And this, of course, is very sad. It is all the more sad that this oligarchy is also an element of such a corporate police state, the course towards which Vladimir Putin has taken today.

Mikhail Sokolov:

And Viktor Pokhmelkin. Your final word on the oligarchy in Russia.

Victor Pokhmelkin:

The problem in Russia is not only and not so much the oligarchy and oligarchs. The problem in Russia is that a class called the bureaucracy traditionally rules the roost here. In our nation-building, in public administration, there is still a priority of the interests of the state body, a priority of the interests of the department, a priority of the interests of the corporation, but by no means a priority of the interests of the individual.

And, unfortunately, perhaps the main problem with Vladimir Putin is that he is now the most important official in the country. And he feels, first of all, a spokesman for the interests of this particular class - the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy.

And it is natural that the bureaucracy always gravitates towards big capital. This is an objective trend that is present in many other countries. And this is also due to the fact that, unfortunately, society has largely come to terms with the power of the bureaucracy. There is no strong protest against this. If society applauds the persecution of Gusinsky and Berezovsky, then we see very, very few protests against the dominance of bureaucrats. Even those free people, entrepreneurs who, in general, strive to expand their business, have already come to terms with the fact that they are dependent on the authorities.

And this, perhaps, is the main fault of Vladimir Putin, who had an excellent opportunity, after all, to go beyond the interests of his class, which promoted him to power, relying on the support of society. He hasn’t taken such a serious step this year. And this means that there is a huge danger that in a year he will simply become a complete hostage of this class of his and will no longer be capable of such decisive impulses.