Face to face

Oleg Morozov

Karen Agamirov:

Our guest is Oleg Morozov, head of the deputy group “Regions of Russia”, member of the conciliation commission for finalizing the law on the formation of the upper house of parliament.

Oleg Viktorovich, it seems that at the beginning the conciliation commission worked harmoniously, everyone had hope that something would work out. Now everything is “zero”?

Oleg Morozov:

Yes, everything is “zero”. Everything, everything we did these days, turned into political dust. The output is zero.

Karen Agamirov:

Absolutely?

Oleg Morozov:

Absolutely.

Karen Agamirov:

Oleg Morozov's questions are asked by Jürgen Düschner(?), chief of the Moscow bureau of West German radio, and Moses Gelman, editor-in-chief of the Industrial Vedomosti newspaper. I am hosting the program, Karen Agamirov.

As always, at the beginning there is a short biography of our guest. Forty-six-year-old Oleg Morozov is from Kazan. He graduated from the local state university, then defended his dissertation in philosophy there and became an assistant professor. He worked as a journalist, political observer for the newspaper "Republic of Tatarstan", and later found himself in production - deputy general director of the capital's research and production association "Biotechnology".

Morozov became a deputy of the State Duma in 1993 and since then has not parted with the mandate of the people's representative. He has always represented the interests of the regional deputy group in the State Duma. It was called differently (today - “Regions of Russia”), and Morozov is the chairman of this parliamentary entity.

After the publication of presidential bills to strengthen the vertical structure of power, he actively participates in their discussion, remaining opposed to reforming the Federation Council in the form the president intended.

Oleg Morozov joined the conciliation commission to finalize the law on the formation of the upper house of parliament. Let us remind you once again that the work of this commission was in vain.

Oleg Viktorovich, what awaits us now on July 19 at the extraordinary meeting of the State Duma?

Oleg Morozov:

These are the options. When a law is rejected by the Federation Council, as you know, it rejected the law that was adopted by the State Duma, after which the chamber has two options for behavior. Or create a conciliation commission, which must propose to the Duma an already agreed upon option, and then this option is voted on as usual. The Duma must vote for him with at least 226 votes. If for some reason the Duma does not agree to the conciliation commission, or if the conciliation commission does not come to any result, then the Duma introduces this law to override the veto.

Well, theoretically there is a possibility when the Duma simply refuses to further consider the law due to the veto of the Federation Council, but this has nothing to do with this case, since the Duma has a completely different mood. Since the conciliation commission did not ultimately come to an agreement and did not fulfill its conciliatory mission, then with 100 percent probability on July 19, the relevant committee of the State Duma, headed by Mr. Lukyanov, will introduce a law to override the veto.

Karen Agamirov:

This is overcoming the veto, is it either once or several times? Or how many times can the procedure occur?

Oleg Morozov:

Good question. The fact is that until recently, literally until the last meeting of the State Duma last Friday, the chamber had a rule in the rules of procedure according to which it was impossible, let’s say, to endlessly put this or that issue up for re-vote. Well, there are times when the question is asked twice.

Well, let’s say, to override a veto you need 300 votes, but the monitor lights up 299. Then one of the deputies, one of the supporters of this decision, will definitely suggest that the chamber return to this issue again. If the House votes for this, then, in principle, the issue can be put to a second vote. But, as a rule, if the second vote does not give a result, then... common sense and Duma traditions suggest that this cannot be done for the third, fourth, fifth time.

But at the last meeting, an amendment to the regulations was voted on, which provides for a certain procedure that allows this question to actually be raised as many times as those who would like to overcome, in this case, override the veto, want.

In my opinion, this norm is completely unconstitutional, and I think that there will be deputies who will simply challenge it, because the legislative procedure itself becomes meaningless. That is, one can imagine a theoretical possibility when this or that law, which for some reason did not receive the required number of votes in the State Duma, will be put to a vote for years until it is voted for. But this deprives the legislative procedure itself of any meaning.

The procedure that exists today is much more correct. If, say, a law is rejected in the second... in the third reading, then it returns to the first. That is, this means: the chamber does not agree with him. Changes need to be made to it. And already introduce it in a modified form.

But, unfortunately, there is now a regulation in force that may allow this to be done for a long time.

Karen Agamirov:

Jürgen Düschner, chief of the Moscow bureau of West German radio.

Jurgen Duschner:

Please tell me, at first it was a dispute between Putin and the governors. He wanted to limit the power of governors. And now it looks like this is just a dispute between the Duma and the governors, and the Federation Council. And what role does Putin play now? He still hasn't said anything or what?

Oleg Morozov:

Formally, Putin is now, as it were, above the fray. Formally. He has a very strong argument that he is not a party to this conflict. And this argument is as follows: “I introduced another law.”

Well, for example, in the law that Putin introduced, there was a procedure for recalling members of the Federation Council, that is, the legislative and executive body of the federal subject was given the right to recall its representative, well, if this representative (theoretically, we can allow such a possibility) ceases to represent the interests of this body in the Federation Council.

The Duma, having received Putin’s draft for consideration, revised a number of its norms and made the law much stricter in relation to the Federation Council. Much tougher.

Well, here's another example. Let's say, in Putin's version, the appointment of a member of the Federation Council from a constituent entity of the federation was approved by regional law. It was his... it was his proposal. This meant that, if we imagine that the legislature does not pass a law on the candidacy of the governor, the governor automatically vetoes the law that the legislature passes regarding the representative of the legislature.

And there is a balance. That is, it turns out that they can actually each block each other. And, therefore, they are obliged to agree and let these two candidates pass.

In the version adopted by the State Duma and which remains today, the procedure is different. The legislature must agree to the governor's candidacy. And the candidacy of the legislative body is not discussed by the governor. It turns out that the legislative assembly, if it is in conflict with the governor, maybe, well... one can imagine such a situation (and we know a lot of such examples), simply will not allow a single candidate to pass.

Putin did not have this, but the State Duma accepted it. Therefore, formally, Putin can say today: “Generally speaking, the Federation Council is dealing not with my law, but with the law of the State Duma. The conflict today is not between me and the Federal Assembly, but between the two chambers of the Federal Assembly.”

But Putin can resolve this situation. If we assume that for him this is a matter of principle, that he values ​​his concept more than the version adopted by the State Duma, then if the Duma overrides the veto, he can impose a presidential veto on this law and demand that the Duma enter into conciliation procedures with it. Well, for example, by insisting on these two amendments.

Wait and see. I have a feeling that Putin will not veto this law if the Duma overrides the veto of the Federation Council. Because, again, in this case he wins, because the Duma, as it were, turned out to be holier than the Pope. She toughened the president's option. But he will say: “So be it. So be it. I agree with this,” and will turn the arrows on the State Duma.

Karen Agamirov:

Presidential veto override, right?

Oleg Morozov:

Yes, yes.

Karen Agamirov:

Moses Gelman, editor-in-chief of the Industrial Vedomosti newspaper.

Moses Gelman:

Oleg Viktorovich, today a fragmentary attempt is being made (and it is therefore doomed to failure) to change some element in the basis management system. That is, we are talking about an attempt, in the absence of some program for reforming the basis, to change one of the elements. Our state is federal, according to the constitution, so the basis is divided into separate regions. There is a part of the bases today that is largely destroyed. This is electric power, it is controlled by its own system, fuel, and so on, and so on.

That is why governors are at the head of regions. But most of the regions, one might say almost all of them, from an economic point of view, do not represent a complete whole. And historically, our regions were concentrated around significant mineral deposits, such as the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. Or around a transport artery, like, for example, the Volga region. Or due to some geographical and economic communities. For example, the North, the Far East.

And historically it turned out that in tsarist Russia there were governor-generals. These were macroregions. Now an attempt is being made (maybe even unconsciously, because this attempt so far concerns only the political level) to create federal regions.

So, several years ago, governors created a number of interregional economic associations. To be honest, it seemed to me then that this would be the first step towards reforming the government insofar as its management of society and management of the economy should intersect at the level of governors. Naturally, this does not mean holding every commodity producer and forcing him to do something. We are talking about developing some general rules of behavior.

Please tell me why the formation of interregional economic associations, which, in general, could become the center of the subsequent formation of administrations of federal districts, where the power of the federal, presidential, and gubernatorial authorities would be balanced... And at the head of such an association or administration of the macro-region there could be a representative of the president, and then we could talk about a balance of interests and we could talk about strengthening presidential power and subordination, and the removal from significant tutelage of law enforcement agencies and other federal bodies.

Tell me why this didn't happen?

Oleg Morozov:

In a sense, I see in Putin’s idea of ​​creating these seven federal districts and appointing his representatives there as some kind of quasi-idea, similar to what you are talking about. It is, in a sense, tied to former associations of economic interaction.

But I understood your question a little differently. You are talking more about a certain... a certain fragmentation in the understanding of the entire system... of reforming the entire system of power in Russia. That is, why today we are dealing specifically with three laws, without seeing behind them the entire strategy that is possible both at the macroeconomic level and in terms of the strategy for reforming the state.

I have this question too... it sits inside me. Because I agree with you that it is very difficult to make any decision on this specific, private issue (well, for example, reforming the Federation Council) without really understanding what lies behind it, from the point of view of the economy, federalism in Russia, the balance of interests between the regions and the federal center, and so on, and so on. I also have this question.

After all, look what is happening today, if you continue your thought. The Federation Council will be formed in a new way. Well, let's say. Let's say it's not so bad. Let it be formed in a new way. Let's say. Let's say Putin's idea is good. But behind this idea we immediately see the following: the Federation Council in its new form will not have the political weight that it has today. He will not be an equal player in the triangle President-Duma-Federation Council. He will be a weak player.

Let's say I agree with this. Let there be a weak player. Let there be a weak Federation Council. But then I must answer the question: why do we need a weak Federation Council? If we are talking only about the need to “move” (as they say now) the regional barons, take away some of their powers and transfer them to the federal level, then this task does not necessarily need to be solved the way it is solved in this case. In this, our case.

If we are talking about the fact that we are taking a step towards eliminating the Federation Council, then go ahead and say so: “We will transform Russia from a federal state into a unitary one. In a unitary state, Russia does not need a Federation Council. We are taking the first step to prove to the whole country and the entire world community that the kind of Federation Council that it will be in six months is not needed by Russia.”

But these are different strategies. This is a different path of development for Russia.

So I want to understand and I still can’t fully understand, what are we doing? Are we taking the first step towards transforming Russia from a federal state into a unitary one, or are we taking a completely different step? But today it is not clear to me yet.

Karen Agamirov:

On July 12, you, Oleg Viktorovich, met with the President, Vladimir Putin. Now you are saying that you really cannot understand what the developers, the authors of this bill, want.

Haven’t you felt that the president himself, now he realizes what he wants?

Oleg Morozov:

Just so, if the distance at which we are considering this problem is measured there... in months, and not in years and decades, then I understand the president’s strategy. He doesn't hide it. He says that... and he directly told me about this during the conversation, that he is not satisfied with the Federation Council, which brings together governors endowed with parliamentary immunity, governors who completely control the economy of their regions, and governors who, in their current form, are practically not accountable in their work to the federal center. Nothing can be done with them.

That’s why he introduced a law on the formation of the Federation Council in tandem with another law that creates the institution of federal intervention. Well, I’m talking to journalists from Germany, and there is an institution of federal intervention there. There is a “right of the first night,” when the federation declares that “this is my authority,” and then the land can no longer claim this authority if, according to the declarative principle, the federation declares this.

So, Putin links these two structures, he removes governors from the political scene and at the same time, as if, his presidential hand hovers over them, which tells the governor: “Now you are also under my control. I can remove you from office if you violate federal law and federal legislation.”

Is this a bad design? No. In principle, I am ready to consider it. But here's the comma...

I must understand what is behind this... what follows this construction, what is the president’s next step, what does he want next. Here he is talking about the State Council. We discussed this topic with him. That is, he wants the regions to be represented not by the current or future Federation Council, but by the State Council, which includes the heads of the constituent entities of the Federation. Not necessarily all, but, for example, some of them represent republics, some of them represent territories, some of them represent regions, some of them represent federal capitals or two cities of federal significance - St. Petersburg, Moscow - some, for example, autonomous okrugs. Well, this is still a diagram that is drawn on one’s fingers.

Such a State Council is also possible. And this is also clear to me. Here I understand Putin.

But, you see, I need the whole picture. The whole picture. How will the system of federal relations work after these reforms? How will taxes be divided between the federal center and the regions? I don't know the answers to so many questions.

Why, in fact, do I have doubts, why didn’t I vote for the law on the Federation Council? Maybe partly because I don't fully understand the president's entire strategy.

Once again I return to the thesis. If behind this strategy is the liquidation of Russia as a federal state, I am categorically against this strategy. If behind this is a change in the mechanisms of governing a federal state, then perhaps I am in favor, but I must understand the whole picture, the whole palette of possible relations.

And here, of course, I have certain doubts. But, to answer your question directly, whether Putin knows what he is doing or not, well, he himself knows for sure. I am not inclined to think about the president that he is taking any steps in some kind of airless political space for himself. He may not say everything, but at least I think he knows.

Karen Agamirov:

Oleg Viktorovich, don’t you have the same impression as Tuleyev, for example, that the president simply has one goal - to deal with the governors, the old guard?

That is, the president wants, like Stalin in his time, to change the leadership of the country, right? these, as you said, “barons”, regional ones. That is, just get rid of some - others will come. Rejuvenate, I don’t know... Just... well, how Stalin carried out a personnel revolution in his time.

Oleg Morozov:

Well, from what the president says both publicly and, say, during meetings with me (this is not the first time I have met one-on-one with the president), I did not get such an impression.

Moreover, from the laws that are being considered today, this does not follow legally, because the election of governors remains. To imagine that after the adoption of such laws there will be widespread arrests of governors after they lose their immunity, or widespread dissolution of legislative assemblies... well, this is simply madness.

Can you imagine what will happen in Russia when legislative assemblies there will be dissolved in batches, and then elected again, and in a scenario that may be much worse than the current one?

Karen Agamirov:

Do you remember how the governor of the Tyumen region, Roketsky, once said at the Federation Council: “We, like sheep, can be led one after another.” Remember this statement?

Oleg Morozov:

Yes, there were different statements. There were even worse statements.

Karen Agamirov:

That is, they are still afraid?

Oleg Morozov:

They are probably afraid. Well, I repeat once again that this is too scary to be true. I would say so.

Therefore, I don’t have such a feeling, and the legal basis for this kind of action simply does not exist yet. By the way, in the law that the Duma adopted on the institution of federal intervention, the procedure for removing the governor and the procedure for dissolving the legislative assembly are framed quite harshly. That is, this double violation must be a violation of the law. This should happen twice in the procedure... of a court decision. And only after this the president can decide to dissolve the legislative assembly or remove the governor.

Moreover, this law gives the constituent entities of the Federation six months to bring their legislative acts into compliance if there is a court decision that a particular act does not comply with federal law. An act or constitution, or charter of a subject of the Federation.

That is, procedurally it is simply not yet possible to do what you are talking about.

Politically, if we abstract from the legal side of this issue, politically it is completely clear that the real opportunities of governors to influence federal policy after the adoption of these laws become qualitatively different. Just qualitatively different. And in this new capacity, governors cease to represent (well, using that word) a political danger for the president, as, for example, today, when they are consolidated in the Federation Council. When they have parliamentary immunity, when they all meet together in Moscow once a month, when they may disagree with the president, as was the case with Skuratov.

The president is knocking all these supports out from under them. And what kind of reprisals can we talk about then? It simply becomes unnecessary. The governor, as it were... is expelled from Moscow, they put him in their fiefdom and say: “Now, face to face with your population and deal with it like an economic leader. We have taken away all your federal political functions from you.”

The president can achieve this goal without resorting to Stalinist repressions at all, especially since the president constantly says that he does not intend to build a police state in Russia. Moreover, he is so enthusiastically supported by the State Duma in this endeavor.

Kareg Agamirov: Jürgen Düschner, chief of the Moscow bureau of West German radio.

Jurgen Duschner:

Oleg Viktorovich, I think, and I have the impression, and many people in Germany, that the discussion here in Russia centers on the question of how much power the president has and how much power governors and regions have. And I think, and maybe you agree, that this is not a good question.

We... you already talked about this, we also have such a federal system in Germany, and it has been working well for a long time. And the regions have a lot of power. Well, for example, right now we will have a discussion about tax reform, and the biggest difference is that the regions in Germany have power that exists on a democratic basis.

And I think that the discussion here in Russia should be more focused on the question of how power in the regions can be reformed so that it is... democratic. Because now there are a lot of problems that we now... we have here in Russia, they exist because of this, because the regions there have many governors who have undemocratic power.

Do you agree?

Oleg Morozov:

Yes, I partly agree that this whole reform should, of course, include the component you are talking about. That is, not only the problem of how much power the president has or, more broadly, the federal center and the regions, but also the problem of democratizing the life of both the regions and, I add, also the federal center.

Because if this is divorced from one another, if we, as it were... do not consider the problem of forming a civil society in this coordinate system at all, but only talk about how much power someone has, then there is a unique example. I talk about this all the time, reminding us all.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev possessed gigantic powers for, there... a few weeks before his political death. Gigantic powers. That is, it would seem that the concentration of power in his hands was maximum. He was also the leader of the... only party at that time that controlled almost everything. He was the president of the Soviet Union. He was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That is, well... what powers did he lack in the federal center?

And the country collapsed like a house of cards. Like a house of cards. It collapsed for two reasons. The first reason is that political reform was not accompanied by real, thoughtful, effective economic reform. One cannot be separated from the other. Reform the political system of society and not successfully bring the economy into line with this.

And the second reason is that civil society institutions were not created. All problems were based on the system of "power, more - less." It doesn't happen that way.

Therefore, I completely agree with you that, probably, if today we, as it were... consider on one side of the scale the problem of how power is distributed, then on the other side of the scale there should be the problem of democracy, the problem of forming a civil society.

After all, look what else is happening today. After all, when today they talk about making all regions equal in rights, the principle of the constitution is not being respected, right? Regions have different rights. Tatarstan has more rights because it has a special agreement with the federal center. And unfortunate Chukotka has fewer rights. It is 101 percent dependent on the federal center. As much as they give, that's how much... we'll live on.

But this is one side of the problem. One side of the problem. No two regions are the same. One region will always be more economically developed, another less, one more rich in natural resources, another less rich. One has created one industrial potential (and there is no escape), and the other has a different one.

The problem is different. Today in Moscow we have one level of income for citizens and, accordingly, the same economic rights, but in another region the level of income, wages, pensions, the entire social sphere is completely different. They are not actually equal. This is already a violation of civil rights. The rights of a citizen have already been violated, because it turns out that his rights differ depending on the region in which he lives. This cannot happen in a normal society. This is also a problem of democracy.

If we are talking about governors as the absolute masters of the region, then this is also a question of the need for legislative procedures that would strictly place them in the legal field.

Karen Agamirov:

Moses Gelman, editor-in-chief of the Industrial Vedomosti newspaper.

Moses Gelman:

Oleg Viktorovich, the Duma passes many laws, and it seems that they are also fragmentary in nature insofar as the legislation must serve the reforms at this stage.

If we talk about economics, then without a program, and a program is an algorithm written in the language of the performer, it is also a system. And the system, its design, begins with selection... a reasonable choice of model. And the model is commodity-money circulation.

Analysis of this model shows that commodity-money circulation is unbalanced, and therefore the first step should be to lead the economy out of the financial crisis and ensure that this circulation is balanced. And creating conditions for its further development in the interests of society.

Why is the Duma not raising the question of the need to develop a program in legislation? And around this program, legislative documents should be created that should contribute to this program.

Because today the randomness of these laws, in my opinion, is largely due to the absence of what is called the law on legislation or the law on laws.

Does anyone in the Duma think about these things or not?

Oleg Morozov:

Let me first quote myself, my beloved. When we approved Kasyanov, the State Duma, after Putin proposed this candidacy, I, speaking on behalf of our faction, said... I quoted a famous saying from Ilf and Petrov, from the novel “12 Chairs.” When, do you remember, they discussed what should come first, money or chairs? And the hero said: “You can get the chairs earlier, but the money is still in advance.”

So, it also happened to us that when... We always act according to the formula of Ilf and Petrov. We approve prime ministers, we pass laws (I’m just moving on to your question), but we never actually ask ourselves the question: in general, in what system are we accepting all this? That is, why do we accept?

That is, the prime minister comes, he never brings us a program. Because. According to the constitution, within a week after, say, the president is elected, he is obliged to submit a candidacy to us. But Kasyanov, quite logically, comes and says: “Well, guys, where did I get the program? What are you talking about? I... it’s been a week since I was appointed. You wait. I’ll come later and bring you the program. But first, approve me.”

So, today in Russia we have a vicious system of relationships between the legislative body of power and the executive body of power. By the way, to the question, is anyone talking about this? Your humble servant has been talking about this for more than a year now, and for more than one year. And in publications, and at press conferences, and in conversations like today.

For example, in West Germany... in Germany, approximately ninety percent of laws in the Bundestag are introduced by the government. This is the correct scheme, because the government comes with a certain program and, accordingly, introduces to parliament the law that it needs in order to implement this program, achieve this goal, this strategy. And since the parliament exists... is formed according to the principle of the majority that wins the elections, then, accordingly, it turns out that the parliament, the Bundestag, supports the government in its legislative initiatives. And these initiatives are carried out under a specific program.

But, unfortunately, our entire system of power is structured topsy-turvy. Our government is approved without a program. Our government is not a government of a parliamentary majority. It can also be a government of a parliamentary minority, as was the case, for example, under President Yeltsin. There, either the LDPR or the communists dominated there all the time, and the government was reformist, there, starting from Gaidar and ending with, say... the last government, there, Putin before he became president.

And I also absolutely agree with you that we make laws on our own. Then it turns out that they begin to contradict one another. It turns out that they begin to contradict the regional ones... or the regional ones begin to contradict the federal ones. Not because all of them are villains, but because they pass laws very often, based on their specific tasks that they solve. Including economic ones.

It turns out that we pass laws or do not accept laws that the government proposes to us based on some part of its ideas. We don't see the whole picture. We don't know this economic strategy.

And I just recently told Putin about this, that we must move to a completely different scheme. Even in terms of timing, to a different scheme. First of all, a message from the president. The President addresses and proposes a strategy for socio-economic development to the country. As part of this strategy, the government proposes a socio-economic program. Moreover, part of this program should be, for example, twenty-five laws that the government is developing.

But only today it can develop normal laws; it has all the tools. There are twelve people in the Duma committee. How can a high-quality law be made? The government has money, institutions for this, experts. Bring us these laws for your program.

Next stage. The Duma approves or does not approve this program legislatively. Does not approve - crisis of power. New elections. The State Duma must be dissolved; it does not support this president and this government. Approves - she takes responsibility for the program.

And from above is the fourth stage. Budget. In the fall or whenever... by December - the budget.

Then logic appears both in lawmaking and in the program. And then everything works according to your scheme.

Today this is not the case. This is also a problem of reforming our government system. Well, for example, we must move to a government of a parliamentary majority.

Karen Agamirov:

Well, then the communists will be in power.

Oleg Morozov:

Well, today's Duma shows that it is not. Today the communists with all their allies have 130 out of 450. This is also absurd. In what normal country have you seen a coalition of right and left, a parliamentary coalition? Or, as happened here, fraternization between Unity and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, right? At the beginning of this Duma. Remember when they divided up positions, committees, and formed an alliance?

Well, let's say, even if this alliance arose. Then form a government, answer. Propose your right-left program, and let them vote among themselves for it.

Karen Agamirov:

You're saying logical things, right? This is how it should be, how it should be. Well, everything is somehow the other way around. According to Nietzsche, this is... incomprehensibility, unknown, lack of understanding. Maybe this is how we should live...

Oleg Morozov:

Everything is much simpler. You know, you're complicating this problem. Sometimes (I love this saying) the devil is in the details. Where did this system, the current system of government, come from? It appeared as a result of the political shock that arose after the shooting of parliament in 1993.

The current electoral system, all the powers of the president, government, Duma and Federation Council were invented under one. Yeltsin issued a decree on the elections of the State Duma with the firm expectation that this mixed system (half by lists, half by districts) would lead to the unconditional victory of the “Democratic Choice of Russia” (it was given up to 70 percent), and then an obedient parliament would appear, which supports the government, supports the president, votes as it should. Well, governors were always Yeltsin’s support at that time. He had no conflict with them then. And he was sure: “Well, the governors will definitely support me.”

They wrote a constitution for a specific political task, set up this system of power, and it failed at the very first elections. The LDPR won the elections. “Democratic Choice of Russia” did not receive a resounding victory, but actually suffered a defeat.

A completely helpless parliament emerged. where there is no majority, and the situation arose with which we are still dealing.

Karen Agamirov:

I don’t know what the president is silent about, but you met with him, right? Why haven’t we started talking about bills, about holistic reform, to reform not only the upper house, but also, first of all, perhaps, our administration, which is not clear what it is doing now? Or, on the contrary, it is too clear what he is doing. The State Duma, the government... And in general, why do we need a new Federation Council? They sent the governors to places somewhere, and let them sit there. Why is a new army of officials needed in Moscow? Why do we need a new State Council? You didn’t try to ask him this, what is all this for, strictly speaking? People don't understand this.

Oleg Morozov:

The President clearly says that the steps he is taking are strengthening the power vertical. That this is being done to bring the decisions that are developed by the federal center, as it were, to their implementation.

I don’t share the president’s opinion on everything here. I don’t share that part that I don’t quite understand why this should really strengthen power? I am for strengthening the power vertical. For God's sake. But I don’t really see why these decisions that we are making today should really strengthen the power vertical.

Except that there is one, well, obviously strong point in which, by the way, I support the president. This is the emergence of the institution of federal intervention, when it is possible, through the law, to restore order in the region to some extent.

But this is not at all what you are talking about. Because this does not make it possible to bring a management decision to completion. After all, we are talking about only one thing - if the head of a subject of the Federation or the legislative assembly violates the constitution, then the institution of federal intervention appears. And if some economic scheme does not work, there is no possibility of applying the federal intervention procedure.

Therefore, I can comment on the president only to the extent that he directly states his position. He says that this is a strengthening of the power vertical. This is the removal of a number of barriers that prevent him from bringing his decisions to completion.

Karen Agamirov:

By tradition, at the end of our program, journalists express their opinion about the participant and the conversation.

Chief of the Moscow bureau of West German radio.

Jurgen Duschner:

It's not just people in Germany who don't understand this debate. I am sure that even thirty kilometers from the center of Moscow they are not even interested and do not understand what we are talking about. This dispute means not only the strengthening of the vertical of power, but, finally, it must be the strengthening of the power of Putin alone.

Because people here in Russia see and know that the old dispute between the Duma and the governors continues. And Putin is good at keeping silent. And finally, perhaps he is the last person, if the Duma argues with the governors about who will have more power, he may say: “I will do everything myself.”

Karen Agamirov:

Moses Gelman, editor-in-chief of the Industrial Vedomosti newspaper.

Moses Gelman:

I hope that I will not be suspected of being a sycophant (you are not my boss), but I am deeply convinced that if such deputies and senators had been the majority in both chambers, then, probably, today we would not be witnessing that performance, which, in my opinion, most people simply do not understand.

Karen Agamirov:

And I would like to wish that Oleg Dmitrievich Morozov... yes, but his speeches, indeed, are always distinguished by specificity, everything is clear... that he, as a deputy, the head of the deputy group "Regions of Russia", well, you will sit there on the nineteenth... And so the summer is hot. So that it doesn't work out at all, so that...

Oleg Morozov:

Hot, right?

Karen Agamirov:

Yes. For it to get so hot that people, I don’t know... well, it’s August after all. Have pity on them. Agree. So many adults. Maybe we can come to an agreement?