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CREEPING INDOCTRINATION OF THE PARADIGM OF FORMATION AND ITS ROLE IN THE FATE OF METAPHYSICS. IN THREE PARTS: PART ONE.
There is an opinion that we cannot comprehend the absolute because of our relative nature, but the true reason for this drama is that “the Greeks no longer made a distinction between being and becoming” (M. Mamardashvili). If nature follows the path of least resistance , then why do we impute to it such a labor-intensive mechanism as becoming as a fundamental principle, even ignoring the fact that its comprehension gives rise to essentialism and teleology?
Abstract : the notorious congenital defects for which metaphysics, starting with I. Kant, is subject to obstruction, are consequences of the fact that all its systems in one way or another proceed from the negentropic and anthropomorphic principle of formation, taken as the basic principle of being. Unlike its infernal antipode, negentropy , despite all its charm (or rather, thanks to it), is not a fundamental physical quantity , but a conceptual concept. Under its authority there are no laws, which, moreover, like the second principle of thermodynamics , would not be too human . Becoming does not correlate with the principles of Occam , Hamilton and simplicity - his routes are too dark and thorny. But if we place at the basis of our doctrine a principle that follows in line with the identified principles and definitions, then we will satisfy all the value-neutral arguments of anti-metaphysical criticism and preserve the methodological apparatus of classical philosophy, thereby recognizing its fertility. The implementation of this plan would lead to a revision of the heuristic potential of fundamentalism and to the lowering of the ontological status of becoming-evolution to the level of a by-product , which would relieve evolutionism of the need for the dubious services of teleology in filling gaps of a general order.
The treatise is addressed to everyone who is interested in how empirical metaphysics is possible.
Key words : truth, nothing, something, being, non-being, skepticism, empiricism, entropy, Parmenides, Aristotle, Copernicus, Hume, Kant, Peirce, Heidegger, Mamardashvili, Chanyshev.
There is a heuristic principle that truth is found
in an as yet ununderstood possibility that we can explore,
only by denying what is considered obvious. F. Ramsay.
Simplicity is what is most difficult (L. da Vinci); the simplest truths are comprehended later than others (L. Feuerbach); what alienates in the thinking of being is its simplicity (M. Heidegger); It’s not easy with beginnings - they are too simple to be easy with them (V. Bibikhin); The peculiarity of the ontological problem is its simplicity (W.V.O. Quine). Leaving reminiscences about the complexity of simplicity aside for now, perhaps we agree that the thesis about the simplicity of the beginnings has an etymological basis. From here we can conclude that the task of metaphysics is solvable: “the truth concerns everyone, and therefore must reach everyone according to the everyday criterion of intelligibility” [14, p. 338]. The opinion that it is impossible to know absolute truth, but that one can constantly approach it is pure casuistry: for absolute truth, relative truth is not part of it, but a special case of it. The scope of the law of universal gravitation goes far beyond the Newtonian apple, but does not offer anything qualitatively new.
With the growth of our knowledge, the truth moves further and further away from us - this incident, surprising for a dialectically inexperienced author, at the end of the last century led him to the seditious thought that philosophers actually move in the opposite direction from the place where the solution is located. Such a conclusion would be completely appropriate if we were talking not about metaphysics, but about an everyday situation. Of course, metaphysics is an unimportant tool for solving everyday problems, but did it not become so because thinkers from the very beginning were rigidly indoctrinated by a mysterious circumstance that was beyond the limits of intelligible criticism, which to this day acts on their mind and will with an irresistible and bewitching force?
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the return of metaphysics looks like a clear anachronism, but its last word, in all likelihood, has not yet been said. Before moving on to direct arguments, the author proposes to consider a number of indirect arguments - facts that are well known individually, but in their totality, apparently, have not yet been presented. This seems legitimate to the author: the return of metaphysics is, among other things, also “criticism... criticism of metaphysics” [11, p. 46].
So today, philosophers are once again wondering how metaphysics is possible? Apparently, the answer is quite obvious: if the revival of metaphysics is possible, then only taking into account the fair criticism to which it was subjected at one time . While not coinciding with science as the subject of its research, metaphysics must remain within the framework of its requirements, which can be reduced to empirical verification without any particular complaints. Otherwise, the revival of metaphysics is a figure of speech, since what can an abstract method of refutation offer instead of what is being refuted [11]? In other words, the author intends to limit himself to the problem of verification, because there is no point in talking about anything else without solving this main problem. At the same time, the author has a strong feeling that all other problems, according to the principle of complementarity, will be resolved on their own, if only on the indisputable basis that they all manifest themselves in metaphysics to an equally (extreme!) negative degree.
To please anti-metaphysical criticism, it would seem that it is enough to simply limit ambitions, which is what it actually calls for. But this would mean abandoning metaphysics—turning it into a museum exhibit or merging it with science to the point of complete indistinguishability. And besides, the object of metaphysics (consistent, unhidden , truth), in contrast to the object of science (the world of changeable things), apparently can best provide its verification if it is true that the scale of truth of thinking is set by things (Aristotle), and the mind is capable of transforming knowledge, but not generating it (Pierce). From here, as a spoiler, the conclusion follows that absolute truth not only does not interfere with its own verification, but, on the contrary, brings it to the absolute level... and if this is not the case with your truth, then you have reason to think about it.
The main crimes of metaphysics are essentialism, dogmatism and the claim to possess truth. Criticism extrapolates to metaphysics the costs of its doctrines, but besides them, metaphysics still has its noble task, the reason for the profanation of which lies not in it, but in the way philosophers solved it. Imagine that Copernicus, having lost faith in the Ptolemaic picture of the starry sky, did not offer his own solution in return, but banned astronomy - this is exactly what Kant did with metaphysics and, in good faith, called the Copernican revolution .
Is it not a consequence of popular induction to believe that essentialism is an innate feature of metaphysics? Can we seriously say that all options have been exhausted? Are we mistaking fatigue of form for a refutation of substance? Perhaps, within the framework of classical philosophy, there is a place for theories confirmed by experience, and not only “through metaphysical self-understanding” [5, p. 23]? In many ways, we have not yet reached the level of the thinkers of the past (after all, much knowledge does not teach intelligence), but we are already burdened by their presumptions, as an annoying hindrance. And what, having so bravely abolished metaphysics, did we get in return, except for poorly concealed agnosticism?
The rejection of dogmatism is so firmly rooted in science that in turn it has become a dogma that ignores any differences in the nature of the objects of scientific research and the metaphysical. If absolute truth is synchronous and not diachronic, then the science that studies it is not temporal, but dogmatic: scientific thinking immediately loses its fallibilism as soon as it comes to the absolute, but turns a blind eye to negative dogmatism, like a mother to the tricks of her child . There is subjective dogmatism and objective dogmatism - no alternative should come not from the observer, but from a fact about which we have experimental-apodictic knowledge (empirico-deductivist version of fundamentalism), although, according to the well-known interpretation of Nietzsche, there are no facts, but only interpretations . As in the case of essentialism, the problem of dogmatism is associated with verification: the interpretation of metaphysical positions as initially unverifiable can also be dogmatic..., and it was unproven before.
Scientific thinking denies the existence of absolute truth or denies a person the possibility of knowing it, falling into the liar's paradox - this opinion claims to be absolute in the least labor-intensive form. It is difficult to accept as an argument the fact that the truth has not yet been discovered, since “nothing except history tells us that [any – P.M.] problem, up to the problem of bastards, cannot be solved” [11, p. 180]. If science adheres to such a position regarding itself, then what kind of its development could we talk about? You need to pay attention not to the level of claims ( importance should not be confused with difficulty [Kant]), but to the degree of their validity, and historical or moral engagement is unacceptable. You cannot know everything (total truth), but you can know everything about the principle underlying everything (total truth), and this is knowledge of the fundamental principle of being.
According to I. Kant, there is an innate defect in metaphysics that cannot be achieved, much less eliminated, unless one gets to the place of its birth . In the light of this completely sound assumption, the ban on metaphysics further inspired by Kant himself is extremely incomprehensible. A tragicomic situation has arisen: the ban on metaphysics follows from certain metaphysical premises, which cannot be revised on the basis of the ban on metaphysics [11]. By swapping the major and minor premises, Kant, as it has now become fashionable to say, pulled the owl of speculative metaphysics onto the globe of metaphysics as such.
But the main reason for the abandonment of the search for final answers lies not in Kant and not in anti-metaphysical criticism, but in the reorientation of the interests of modern thinking, and therefore academic philosophy has found itself completely at the mercy of “a new type of rationality, the main feature of which is the abandonment of the search for truth.” [10]. Absolute truth and the problem of being (two sides of the same coin - epistemological and ontological) have long been no longer marginal goods and are of interest today only to ardent, but not very discriminating marginals, for whom the diseases of metaphysics are an empty phrase.
Thus, in the course of preliminary investigation, we came to the conclusion that the anti-metaphysical criticism is based on various variations of two equally dubious arguments - popular induction and the paradox of the liar, richly seasoned with negative dogmatism, which is based on the mistake of the deceased . The author is not going to speculate on this circumstance and draw far-reaching conclusions from it, although, according to Hollywood wisdom, if something can go wrong, it will definitely go wrong . The listed shortcomings do not mean that metaphysics should be immediately restored to its rights, but they increase the chances of its final rehabilitation, which still need to be managed wisely.
INVERSION AS A METHOD OF SOLVING A METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM
Inversion, as a way to solve one or another scientific problem, is often and willingly used in research. The most famous example of effective inversion, without any doubt, is the Copernican revolution in astronomy: with the reversal of the Earth and the Sun, the need for epicycles, equants and eccentrics, through which Ptolemaic astronomy had previously tried to bring its picture of the starry sky into conformity with visibility, completely disappeared. However, if we are talking about inversions within objective reality (the world of changeable things), then their effectiveness is not final, but only relative - over time, their results are adjusted, and sometimes even canceled.
The most striking example of ineffective inversions is the endless shuffling of monism and dualism, transcendentalism and immanentism, formal logic and dialectics, materialism and idealism, etc. This truly Chinese encyclopedia of Borges for two and a half millennia has not led to a solution to the main problem of first philosophy, since none of the pictures of the world known to us has yet been subsumed with any empirically verifiable base.
The next inversion, in all likelihood, should be carried out between the PS and another principle equal to it in scope (or greater, since not every occurrence is evolutionarily colored, but that is not the point of the matter) that would correspond to the maximalism of the stated goal. If N. Copernicus came to value-neutral astronomy by clearing it of anthropomorphism in the form of geocentrism (it doesn’t matter how he positioned it), then the author intends to come to an equally value-neutral metaphysics by clearing it of anthropomorphism in the form of evolutionism. The successful completion of this operation, apparently, would be a real analogue of the Copernican revolution in metaphysics, in contrast to the heavy stone that I. Kant hung around its neck.
ETIOLOGY OF THINKING FORMATION
Like any conscientious researcher, a metaphysician, before moving on to the actual metaphysical understanding of the received material, begins by carefully identifying the patterns of the surrounding world or turning to scientific sources, for what else does the principle of division of labor exist for? And the natural thought that he comes to at this stage is no different from the conclusion of any modern scientist: formation lies at the foundation of the world. What the author, almost without sinning against the truth, identified with evolution
All metaphysical doctrines are attempts to comprehend existence evolutionarily. This also applies to religious pictures of the world, which in words shy away from evolutionism, but in fact are connected with it both by the unity of anthropomorphic origin and by the need to provide meaning to the evolutionary process, putting a head on it (see theistic evolution ). Evolution is so complementarily and clearly presented in the surrounding world that the thinker simply has no choice. Scientific evolutionism explicated the vices of metaphysics, the implicit cause of which was everyday evolutionism. Having abandoned the secondary and frankly fantastic that mythology included, the philosophy that separated from it retained from mythology the most important thing for itself - PS , placing it at the center of its own discourse.
This is what Hegel writes: we can reduce what is really important for us here to the concept of development - when the latter becomes clear, then everything else will follow by itself . Whitehead echoes him almost word for word: “if we return to original experience, then the becoming of things will become the original generalization around which we must build our system.” [13, p. 293]. Previous thinkers may not have been able to explicate their thoughts so clearly, but they implicitly proceeded from the same considerations: “ for the Greeks, the problem of becoming and being different from each other no longer existed .” [7, p. 100]. Современные разработчики онтологической проблематики могут совсем не использовать малоупотребительный нынче термин становление , а также слова, однокоренные ему, но это еще не означает, что они говорят не прозой.
ПРОЦЕДУРА МЕТАФИЗИЧЕСКОГО ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ. PART ONE
Остановись метафизика на этом здравом заключении, никаких претензий к ней не возникло бы, но тогда это была бы не метафизика. Мыслителю недостаточно зафиксировать вездесущность становления и на этом основании объявить его основополагающим принципом бытия, как это принято в науке, для которой истина — это избыточная вещь, а главное, чтобы техника работала (К.Ф. фон Вайцзеккер), по причине того, что наука и есть техника (Х.-Г. Гадамер). Науке для ее целей достаточно относительно истинного знания [10, с. 34], а потому она способна успешно функционировать, базируясь на ошибочных предпосылках (напр. флогистон ) или на обмане, если он способствует увеличению чувства жизни (Ницше).
Довольствуясь данными дак-тестов, наука затыкает рты Юму в его критике каузальности, скептицизму, солипсизму и прочим философским сомнениям. Хотя современные философы дадут в этом фору ученым: врожденная способность пользоваться устройством мира делает совершенно неважным незнание этого устройства . Да, знание устройства мира не имеет практического применения (что, кстати, не факт), но философия тем и отличается от науки, что ее целью является не это, а роскошь жить в осмысленном мире .
Но повторимся, что мыслитель в отличие от ученого не может доверить судьбу эволюции видимости, ибо неверно было бы предоставить такое дело простому стечению обстоятельств (Аристотель). Притязания ПС на истинность и на фундаментальность в глазах классического философа должны получить куда более веское (в том числе трансцендентное) обоснование.
Мало кто из нас способен оставаться равнодушным к величественной драме, имя которой — становление. Она всегда вдохновляла и будет вдохновлять человечество на создание наиболее выдающихся произведений в различных областях творчества. Перед ее глобальностью меркнут мелкие нестыковки, одной из которых является то, что и определяет величие становления — его бесконечность. Она (вкупе с пищевой цепочкой и цикличностью) указывает на отсутствие смысла, а потому в классической философии бесконечность было принято называть дурной .
В отличие от большинства из нас Ницше всем нутром чувствовал ущербность такого рода вещей: путем становления ничего не достигается, его реальность, которая признана единственной, невыносима . Уровень исторического развития никак не коррелирует с жизнью и смертью, горем и счастьем, любовью и ненавистью — с тем, что нас более всего интересует. Кентавр истинная бесконечность был специально придуман для легитимизации ПС , но как бесконечность может быть истинной, если это именно она препятствует познанию истины: «Вывод о непознаваемости мира опирается… на онтологию непрерывного становления» [11, с. 51]?
Становление также нуждается в некоторой силе, которая заставила бы частности единым фронтом сплотиться вокруг него, чтобы неуклонно следовать в указанном направлении, потому что самостоятельно, по собственной воле, они этого делать, видимо, не желают. В этом состоит основная задача эйдосов Платона, плотиновского Единого , бергсоновского жизненного потока , уайтхедовского бога-корректировщика и т. д. А. Бергсон был предельно откровенен и циничен: «Жизнь есть сама подвижность, частные же ее проявления приобретают подвижность только поневоле» [2, с. 145]. О недостатках же доктрин имманентного становления, попросту сводящих дело к идее саморазвития материи (хотя эволюционизм и пытается завести роман с телеологией), хорошо сказал Кант, причислив закоренелых атеистов к самым непоследовательным теологам .
В ходе осмысления бытия в рамках становления «понятие единого вместе со всеми своими функциями и свойствами перешло в понятие Бога». [6, p. 260]. Бог бесконечен, но Он известным образом опредмечивает, а значит, ограничивает бесконечность. Недаром же религиозная картина мира de facto признана наиболее удовлетворительной доктриной становления: вероятно, должен быть Бог, потому что многое труднее объяснить без Него (Д. фон Нейман). Бог — это эквант, позволяющий онтологизировать идею становления. Именно этой идее метафизика обязана своей онтотеологической конфигурацией и возникновением соответствующего же гештальта: вопрос о бытии последовательно ведет к вопросу о Боге (Э. Корет). Пирс подменяет причину следствием, когда объясняет плачевное состояние метафизики тем, что ею в основном занимались теологи — рассматривая проблему бытия сквозь призму становления, любой последовательный мыслитель поневоле становится теологом. А потому отказ от парадигмы становления представляется автору главным условием преодоления онтотеологического проекта философии (Т.Х. Керимов).
Но куда исчезает вся наглядность ПС , когда мыслитель переходит к его метафизической обработке? Откуда берутся те причудливые теории, за которые метафизику справедливо нарекли формой интеллектуального мошенничества ? Аппарат метафизики — это не волшебная палочка: сколько овец ни складывай, шоколадки не получится (Ф. Коплстон). Еще Лейбниц предупреждал об опасности неуместного пользования схоластикой . Аберрация находится не в метафизике, а проникает в нее вместе с ПС : можно построить пекарню по последнему слову техники, но если вместо муки использовать благородную мраморную крошку из карьеров классической Греции, то произведенный продукт, несомненно, будет прекрасным, но при этом едва ли съедобным.
Исходя из ПС , метафизика утрачивает способность к верификации и, погружаясь в область темных интуиций, становится учением о сверхчувственных основаниях бытия и особой формой познания , где размыта грань между метафизическим и метафорическим. Одаренные мыслители усматривают в этом немалую пользу для себя: еще бы, спекулятивное познание возвышается над опытом, спекуляция есть креативное мышление, абстрагирующееся от чувственного опыта, что интеллектуально возвышает человека [15]. Эмпирическая метафизика для них «оксюморон, смешивающий эмпирический и спекулятивный подходы наподобие воды и масла» [11, p. 8]. (О. Столярова рассматривает кантовский запрет на метафизику с точки зрения спекулятивного ее сегмента, что живо напоминает змею, заглатывающую собственный хвост — ведь это именно спекулятивная складка метафизики принудила Канта пойти на столь крайние меры).
Итак, проблема метафизики не в ее методологии, а в применении последней по отношению к ПС : если принцип, выбранный нами в качестве фундаментального, таков на самом деле, то мы получаем подтверждение этому путем возможности предельной фиксации и верификации того предмета, на который указывает интенция этого принципа. В противном случае дело будет обстоять так, как это мы наблюдаем на примере абсолютов ПС (бог, абсолютная идея, материя и прочий легендариум). Как легко убедиться, здесь нет ничего доступного пониманию лишь кучки посвященных иллюминатов — просто надо хоть немного разбираться в архитектонической кухне метафизики, а не судить о ней по блюдам, вкус которых зависит не от кухонной утвари и даже не от уровня квалификации повара (настолько тщательно технология этой кухни была разработана ее создателями!), а исключительно от используемых при их изготовлении продуктов.