The legendary British intelligence agency MI6 is at a loss, the kind only experienced by a man who suddenly finds himself standing naked in the middle of a noisy street. And whoever stripped the respectable gentleman down to his underwear was former employee Richard Tomlinson, who published the book “The Big Breach: from Top Secret to Maximum Security” in Moscow. It would be nice if he could just run over to the Russians in order to tell the truth from a safe distance, which fits within the framework of tradition. No, he was published in Moscow (in English), and now he sits quietly somewhere in Italy, giving interviews left and right, and doesn’t blow his mind. What a bastard.
Where did he even come from?
Actually, the truth-telling memoirist is not British: Richard John Charles Tomlinson, 38 years old, was born in New Zealand, of which he is still a citizen. When you learn some details of his confused biography, a comparison with James Bond suggests itself. Outwardly, he looks like Agent 007: tall, energetic, dark-haired, handsome athlete, playboy in an expensive suit. Even his hobbies are akin to Bond's: a diploma in aeronautical engineering, a license to pilot an airplane, yachts, a luxurious Honda motorcycle, windsurfing and... gardening. And what a brilliant track record: Cambridge, service in the sabotage and intelligence unit of the SAS, joining MI6, work in Moscow, infiltration into a group of underground arms dealers who were going to supply a chemical weapons production plant to Iran, the Balkans. Speaks several foreign languages: Spanish, German, French and Italian. My British journalist acquaintances shared their personal impressions of Tomlinson: smart, well-educated, intelligent, certainly talented and an excellent intelligence officer... James Bond in kind!
From the far from complete list of Tomlinson’s advantages, it is easy to guess: intelligence simply had no right to pass by such a person. And in April 1991, he was made an offer that was difficult to refuse: interesting work abroad, the opportunity to see the world at public expense, a good salary. Apparently, the guys from the Circus (as MI6 is commonly referred to with the light hand of the writer John Le Carré) thought that it was stupid to bury such talents in the SAS.
Deaf and mute recruiter
And Tomlinson is sent to study at the “nursery” (also Le Carré’s slang) - at the MI6 training base in the ancient Portsmouth Fort Monkton. Tomlinson describes the everyday life of Fort Monkton, but, to be honest, there is nothing extraordinarily sinister: an ordinary intelligence school with all the usual troubles and belongings. In addition, before Tomlinson, Oleg Gordievsky wrote about Fort Monkton: “A naval fortress on the southern coast of England.” Built in the nineteenth century, it was used for teaching classes and seminars... The atmosphere there was spartan, but quite acceptable. How funny that the paths of Gordievsky and Tomlinson, two renegades, to say the least, crossed in such a symbolic way.
It is said that during his preparation at the nursery, Tomlinson received high grades and his prospects were regarded very highly. From March 1992 to September 1993, Tomlinson worked in MI6's East European Directorate, initially in the SOV/OPS (Former USSR Operations) department, receiving the personal code number UKA/7. “My job was to provide natural cover for operations (under the roof of a businessman, journalist, etc.) in Eastern Europe.” It is difficult to say how he worked in Moscow without knowing the Russian language: he writes that he was allegedly given the task of recruiting “Russian journalists with access to military secrets.” Smash the thunder, but Tomlinson is clearly not a recruiter - a militant operative for carrying out rather dirty, sensitive cases. How could he recruit someone in Russia? Using the alphabet of the deaf and dumb? Either he’s lying, or the cretinism of the secret service authorities is a fairly international phenomenon. Although in the Balkans the UKA/7 agent then works without knowledge of Serbo-Croatian...
According to legend, it was Tomlinson who took the infamous “Mitrokhin archive” out of Russia in 1992. Let me remind you that KGB Major Vasily Mitrokhin, who retired in 1984, as it turned out, spent ten years copying and accumulating secret intelligence dossiers, “collecting” materials on illegal immigrants and agents. In 1992, he decided: it’s time. And he contacted MI6. The British, naturally, did not refuse the gift and helped the defector and his family move to London. But the main archive from Mitrokhin’s dacha was allegedly taken out by Tomlinson.
Dangerous Witness
In the summer of 1992, Tomlinson learned something terrible from Nicholas Fishwick, who was responsible for planning operations in the Balkans: MI6 was preparing an assassination attempt on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic! Tomlinson laughed at Fishwick's revelation: idle chatter, MI6 cannot plan such a thing - this is a violation of the law.
It’s funny to even hear such super-naive words about some kind of law from the lips of an operative who already has some experience, at least in the same SAS, who was specially trained for operations of this kind. But our Dick does not give the impression of a naive person, which means he is disingenuous for the uninitiated public.
At a new meeting with Fishwick a few days later, the latter triumphantly presented Tomlinson with an official document: “To my amazement, it turned out to be a proposal to carry out an assassination attempt on Serbian President Milosevic.” The attached list of those who had the right to familiarize themselves with the document spoke of the seriousness of intentions. There were three options for eliminating the head of state, one more serious than the other, but Tomlinson knows nothing about the further fate of this development. Slobodan, at least for now, is alive.
But the operative would be involved in Yugoslavia proper from 1994, and his misadventures would begin a year later, almost immediately after the completion of the Balkan mission. They say that he then fell into severe depression. Something did not go according to plan in Bosnia - a friend and colleague was killed, returning to London, Richard learns that his fiancee has died of cancer. In general, Ostap got carried away, especially on his tongue; apparently, he was always unrestrained and treated his superiors without due reverence. As an operative, he showed excessive (in the opinion of the leadership) independence in Bosnia, completely getting out of control. And no intelligence service forgives such things.
Apostate
Tomlinson's troubles began on a rainy Monday, April 24, 1995. At the entrance to MI6 headquarters, he slipped the pass with an electronic pin code into the control machine, waiting for the usual blinking green light. But it flashed red. The personnel officer was brief: “Go home and don’t show up until we ourselves come into contact with you.” “What are your grounds for my dismissal?” I asked... “Why on earth do you want any other grounds?”
Despite a rather stormy explanation (without a fight), the personnel department flatly refuses to give Tomlinson any piece of paper about dismissal: “You know that we cannot give you anything on paper. This violates the Official Secret Act.
An interesting little detail: the comrade worked in the authorities for only about four years, but he behaves more capriciously than another honorary security officer with forty years of experience. And by the way, what did you have to do to end up on the street like this, without explanations, certificates of honor and parting speeches from your senior comrades? Here the ex-employer and the ex-agent are united: having filled their mouths with water, they babble in unison and pitifully a completely unintelligible nonsense, which is ridiculous to comment on. No, something happened between them, dear ones: I wish I knew what?
Still, let us give credit to the personnel officers of British intelligence: they quickly realized, in just four years, that they had made a major mistake by hiring a person completely unsuitable for the service. And they corrected their mistake. Rough? Well, as best they could, as was customary, they even offered me a quiet job in the City. They made a mistake, but they corrected it themselves and removed, as they say, a dangerous tumor. What happened next only brilliantly proves the rightness of the personnel officers who decided to get rid of the unstable personnel: should such people be allowed access to secret documents? The decision, although somewhat belated, is correct. After all, “theirs” Tomlinson, Philby, Blake, Ames, like “ours” Mitrokhin, Gordievsky, Litvinenko, Rezun-Suvorov, are pure defects, a fatal mistake of personnel officers: these people had nothing to do in the secret services, they could not be trusted with secrets.
They can say that they were horrified to see how terrible and bad the underside of the secret services is, how beautiful kid gloves serve to cover up the blood under the nails. One question: were these “truth seekers” forcibly dragged into the devil’s net? They themselves went with great desire to stand above everyone, to feel that they belonged to a closed club of the elite, to gain power over mere mortals and, to hide it, to improve their financial situation. For the most part, all our and their traitors, defectors, apostates were looking for ranks, awards and brilliant careers. It didn’t work out - they got offended, became sad and used a technique as old as the world: revenge. And in the world of secret services, no one has yet come up with a better way to take revenge than to rush into the arms of the enemy’s service.
Just a scoundrel?
Resentment is the key to understanding Tomlinson. A British journalist I know treats the ex-agent with some sympathy and is not inclined to call him a traitor, but emphasizes: “He had brilliant prospects, but everything went to waste. Richard was offended, and now everything is covered with resentment and hatred for him.”
Tomlinson had a lot to be offended by, but he broke the rules of the game - he rolled a barrel towards the Circus, threatening to reveal secrets. He began writing drafts of a book about his work in MI6 and even contacted an Australian publisher. My former colleagues could no longer tolerate this. And by something like MI6's internal disciplinary tribunal, he was sentenced to a year in a secret prison. He served six months and was released, angry, as you understand, to the point of lawlessness and with the only desire for revenge.
The ex-spy leaves inhospitable Albion and travels around the world - the USA, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, trying to get his articles into newspapers. But since 1996, in relation to all his opuses in the UK, the so-called. instruction ╚D╩ ≈ not to publish anything.
Even outside Britain, at the request of MI6, Tomlinson was arrested, detained, searched, interrogated 11 times, all his records and computers were confiscated several times, he was forced to hide floppy disks in the gas tank of his car or the body of his TV. He is expelled several times from his chosen country. Spain, France, Switzerland, Germany, Italy - wherever there is a persecuted spy, there is no rest for him anywhere. French and German intelligence are trying to recruit him to learn about British operations in these countries, but he is holding out. The Swiss secret service makes an approach and agrees to cooperate...
In May 1999, Tomlinson dealt his service the strongest and, as any service officer would say, the most despicable blow: on his website he published the names of 117 active British intelligence agents. One can imagine the intensity of passions in Whitehall and at MI6 headquarters. But, even despite this, neither special capture groups nor liquidators are sent to him, no poisoned umbrellas. Marvelous!
Now answer the rhetorical question: could the Russian special services calmly pass by such a person?
Mysterious publisher
It is quite natural that a publisher from Russia contacts Tomlinson. This man, apparently, is very serious and therefore mysterious. He is stated as Sergei Korovin, but who will bet that his first and last name are genuine? His publishing house CJSC “Narodny Variant”, supposedly located in an office on the street. Sentry, the enterprise is just as mysterious: there is not a single book to its name, and until mid-January of this year nothing was heard about it at all.
Although what is incomprehensible here is that such tricks are commonplace in the world of intelligence services. Maybe the publishing house is not one-time at all, but this is unlikely, since the Tomlinsons, Philbys, Gordievskys and other Suvorovs do not run back and forth in packs.
Actually, nothing is known about Korovin. Official representatives of MI6 claim that the connection between the Russian “publisher” and one of the Russian intelligence services (SVR, FSB or GRU) is undeniable. If only because during his trips to the USA and Switzerland he behaved like a well-trained operative, trained to detect surveillance and break away from it - yeah, they were watching!
British intelligence officers complained to the press: Korovin traveled abroad to meet with Tomlinson according to documents where he was listed under the name Kirill Vladislavovich Chashchin. It's hard to prove, but for some reason it's believable. According to one version, Korovin-Chashin and Tomlinson met in European countries five times. The ex-agent himself told The Sunday Times that he met with the publisher in Italy and Germany “more than twice, but less than ten times.”
So the question of whether the Russian special services are behind the publication of “The Big Breach” can a priori be considered rhetorical. No matter what they tell us, it is obvious to anyone: you can only decide on such a stubborn and tough confrontation with one of the most powerful and influential intelligence services in the world in one case - if there is another, no less influential one behind you.
Of course, Tomlinson's book is far from being the truth in its pure form, but a mixture of true facts and fiction. In any case, there are plenty of blunders there. One can applaud the professionalism of our fellows in civilian clothes: they did not miss their chance to interject with their eternal opponent, they did their job accurately. Did you give us the “Mitrokhin archive” from the day before yesterday, Gordievsky and even the fugitive Litvinenko? So get it! Although “The Big Breach” will not make a big hole in the ancient British fortress: Britain will survive.
As for the memoirist himself, by all standards he is a complete loser. Although he has already taken his place on the shelf of official history. But not honorable: unlike Bond, Tomlinson is clearly not a gentleman, because gentlemen, even from the secret services, do not give up their own.
Vladimir VORONOV.
Yuri Kobaladze:
Gordievsky has already screwed up, this one will be next
For a short comment, we turned to the General of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Yuri Kobaladze, who is currently the managing director of one of the Western companies. During his work at the Foreign Intelligence Service, Kobaladze spent 7 years in London, leaving this hospitable city only at the request of the indignant authorities.
≈ The book is written in good, lively language and is certainly interesting for a professional: this is the first attempt to tell a story about British intelligence from the inside; this has never happened before, except in fiction.
In terms of genre, “The Big Breach” is a copy of what our traitor-defectors, the same Gordievsky, did and published. But there is nothing particularly new - any working methods unknown to us - there. For the first time in literature, the operations of British intelligence officers in Russia are described, this is interesting in itself. But which professional would be surprised by the description, for example, of the working methods of our “outdoor signage”?
But from the point of view of a professional, there can be only one assessment of his action: it is called betrayal. He violated the rules accepted in intelligence as such. After all, when entering the service of this organization, a person voluntarily and quite consciously takes on certain obligations, accepts restrictions, and agrees with the rules of the game.
I don’t know why he was fired, maybe he really suffered unfairly, but does this give him - or any other professional, no matter what service - the right to make public the most confidential names of people?! From my point of view, a professional intelligence officer can and has the right to speak out, the right to criticize. But anyone, even a retired operative, must still agree on the mention of certain names with intelligence leadership. He didn’t ask them: “Do you want to be mentioned?” Just like our traitor-defectors. Gordievsky, by the way, has already screwed up on this: several of the people he mentioned filed a lawsuit. I do not rule out that something similar could happen here.
Do you also know what is interesting in this book epic of intelligence? According to the general rating, both our and British intelligence services are still among the most advanced, best and respected intelligence services in the world. And it's nice.
Obvious mistakes in Richard Tomlinson's book
Tomlinson writes that Oleg Gordievsky was recruited by British intelligence while working in the London KGB station. But even the defector himself admits that he began working for MI6 almost ten years earlier: in 1973, when he made contact with the British in Copenhagen. Some sources in the SVR are confident that Gordievsky’s recruitment occurred during the Copenhagen mission of 1966–1970.
Tomlinson provides details of how MI6 carried out a recruitment approach to Russian Foreign Ministry employee Platon Obukhov. But during this period, Tomlinson no longer worked in Russia and, due to his position, could not have had access to Russian intelligence sources and developments. The scandal with Obukhov was widely covered by the British press, and it can be assumed that the author, based on known details, was able to partially restore the picture of what happened.
A rather frivolous picture is described of how in the summer of 1992, the head of the Balkan operations planning department, a professional and highly experienced intelligence officer, Nicholas Fishwick, shared plans to assassinate Milosevic, showing the most secret papers not just to a fledgling greenhorn newcomer (Tomlinson had barely served in MI6 for a year by that time), but to an employee of a completely different department. Even making allowances for sloppiness, such a degree of familiarity and openness between a boss of such a high level and a 29-year-old ordinary operator, taking into account British traditions, is hard to believe. Most likely, Tomlinson could have seen the document much later, when he himself began working in the Balkan direction.
The most compelling argument against Tomlinson's revelations is: if everything he writes about is really true and British intelligence is truly a monster, then why is he still alive?