About the book “Rent Recipients: Profits, Wages and Inequality (Top 20%)”
A study by Hungarian sociologist Ivan Szelenyi and his compatriot, economist Peter Mihalyi, provides an unusual perspective on the problem of social inequality. At the request of Gorky, Nikolai Protsenko sorted out their small but extremely rich book with ideas and facts.
Peter Mihalyi, Ivan Selenyi. Rent recipients: profits, earnings and inequality (top 20%). M.: Master, 2020. Translation from English. Content
When studying inequality, sociologist Ivan Szelenyi and economist Peter Mihalyi prefer not to focus, as they often do, on the gap between the income of the richest one percent of people and everyone else. Researchers believe that analysis of a larger group of wealthy citizens—the upper middle class, which accounts for about 20% of society—will tell a much more complete picture of the modern nature of inequality. Getting into this group, argue Szelenyi and Mihalyi, is increasingly difficult for those lower on the social ladder. In fact, its representatives are a modern aristocracy living on rental income. Hungarian authors illustrate their theory of rent with many examples, including Russian ones. However, as we will see, their book, unfortunately, does not provide confident answers to the question of how to reverse the situation with inequality.
Everywhere you look there are rents
Although the name of Ivan Selenyi, one of the main researchers of post-communist societies, is known in Russia - at least in academic circles - his work has been practically unpublished in Russian. The book “Building Capitalism Without Capitalists” (co-authored with Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley), several articles and a transcript of a Moscow lecture in 2006 - that’s probably all. “Rent Recipients” was originally released in 2019. This is the culmination of more than half a century of Szelenyi’s research work related to the countries of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space; Economist Petr Mihalyi's contribution to the book places it in a global context.
The work of Mihaly and Selenya (by the way, already the sixth in their joint account) fits into the trend of sociology and economic theory, which began to gain strength shortly before the global crisis of 2008. We are talking about a return to the classical political economy of the 18th–19th centuries, which, it would seem, was left in the past by the so-called marginalist revolution. Even in his lecture given in Moscow a decade and a half ago, Szelenyi, “to the surprise of some of those present,” named Adam Smith and Karl Marx among his main intellectual references. In The Rent Recipients another classic is added to this venerable company: David Ricardo.
What prompted Mihalyi and Szelenyi to return to Ricardo's theory of rent and write an intelligible but concise (only 140 pages) work? The trigger was the sensational, verbose bestseller by the Frenchman Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the 21st Century.” The authors rate it highly, but are extremely skeptical of the central thesis, according to which the principal source of inequality in society (especially in developed market economies) is excess growth in profits that outstrips wage growth. Here classical political economy comes to their aid, where in the structure of the economic product, in addition to profits and wages, another fundamental component was identified - rent, which in the further theoretical understanding of the economy was actually mixed with profit. Therefore, the main goal of their book is the return of rent as a category of economic analysis, without which an adequate explanation of inequality, in their opinion, is impossible.
For classical political economists, rent was associated primarily with land. Ricardo’s particular attention to this topic, as is known, was due to the fact that in the first third of the 19th century he was one of the main supporters of the repeal of the so-called Corn Laws in Great Britain, which created opportunities for the regular enrichment of landowners - unjustified enrichment, in the opinion of the industrialists of that time. Duties on the import of cheap grain into Britain allowed landlords to receive guaranteed income from inherited lands, while the industry initially had to exist “in the market” - in a situation of conditionally free competition. Therefore, the repeal of the Corn Laws, which took place in 1846, after Ricardo’s death, was perceived as the final victory of capitalism over outdated feudalism and became a classic “case” explaining the importance of competition in lowering prices.
History, as Mihalyi and Selenyi point out, has shown that Ricardo was not entirely right in classifying agricultural land as a scarce resource for the extraction of “scarcity rent.” The development of the vast expanses of the New World was just beginning two hundred years ago, and Ricardo may not have even guessed about the future progress of agricultural technologies that would increase the productivity of the land. But the very principle of extracting unjustified income from resources with limited access has not gone away - moreover, the scope of its action has only expanded. Suffice it to say that Mihalyi and Selenyi identify almost 13 types of rent in developed countries, defining rent as income arising from any source, access to which is closed to other economic entities.
In the category of limited rents, in addition to the classical “Ricardian” rent that provides income to the owners of agricultural lands and mines, they include, for example, various natural monopolies - including the extraction of rent from a status location in the case of housing, offices and hotels, innovative companies like Facebook, Google, etc. Also under the clear influence of the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, sources of rent associated with personal, social and cultural capital, such as talents in sports, fall into this category. and art, elite higher education. Rents of limitation also include various artificial restrictions on the entry of new players into markets - in addition to openly corrupt practices, cartels and lobbying, these are various types of licensing, monopolies created by states, and the protection of innovations through intellectual property rights.
In addition, Mihalyi and Szelenyi identify so-called solidarity rents as a separate group - from those created by nation states (trade protectionism, immigration controls, positive discrimination, for example, in the form of a guaranteed share of women in power) to collective bargaining, which is ensured by trade unions. This group also includes government social security systems and charitable organizations.
In short, rent as “unearned income” turns out to be an ontological feature of the modern economy; she did not remain at all in the world that Adam Smith and Ricardo described. The Hungarians' idea is by no means new - such "stars" of economic theory as Daron Acemoglu and Mariana Mazzucato insistently talk about the same thing - but Mihaly and Szelenyi formulate it with the proper degree of theoretical depth. The authors admit that in pre-capitalist economies rent was the main, and at times the only, source of income and wealth, but at the same time, they are fundamentally unaware of economies in which there was no rent:
“Even in developed societies, rent complements profit, often to ensure social stability. Recipients of free medical care, unemployment benefits, etc. also receive “rent” (income that they did not earn). In addition, to stimulate innovation, innovators who are exceptionally creative can also earn rents that protect them from constant and potentially destructive market competition. However, beyond a certain level (to be determined), the desire for rent in modern societies leads to the destruction of the state and/or socio-economic crisis.”
Actually, from here we can move on to the main topic of the book by Mihaly and Selenyi: what is social inequality and what are its true causes.
The 20/80 society instead of the “two-thirds” society
At first glance, such inequality is clear to everyone. The topic is not just widely heard, it is actively included in the global political agenda. At the beginning of the book, the authors recall the 2016 US presidential campaign, where all the main candidates - Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders - emotionally criticized global capitalism for its appalling levels of inequality, but ultimately agreed that on the issue of income distribution "the whole game is rigged." Mihaly and Selenyi’s book was written before Trump’s epic battle with Joe Biden (and, in fact, with the same Sanders), but over the past four years the problem of inequality has only worsened.
We usually judge the level of inequality by news headlines - “Russian billionaires' wealth doubles amid coronavirus,” etc. More savvy observers appeal to an indicator such as the Gini coefficient , which shows that the United States and Russia are indeed among the countries with the highest inequality. However, Mihalyi and Szelenyi insist, statistically derived indicators say little about real inequality - purely economic assessment tools do not work in this case, rather a sociological approach is required.
“Our central hypothesis,” argue Mihalyi and Szelenyi, “is that the most significant change in the system of social inequality is not the increasing accumulation of income and wealth in the top 1–0.1% of the population, but the declining relative mobility for the top 10–20%—that is, the ability to move in or out of that stratum. At the top of the social hierarchy a new trend is formed, this layer becomes the “new aristocracy”, the highest rank or state into which people are born. We indicate three mechanisms for the reproduction of this class: elite education, inheritance of fortunes, selective marriages. In this upper middle class, we believe, a growing share of income is “unearned,” a critical portion of wealth is inherited, and some of the high income is a recognition of status, prestigious degrees from elite universities, rather than a return on the real contribution of human capital.”
The emergence of such a structure of inequality seems to be one of the most important social changes of the last three or four decades, which are generally considered to be the reign of neoliberalism, a doctrine that highlighted free market ideals that seemed completely removed from the desire for rental income. But in practice, everything turned out exactly the opposite: if in the eighties of the last century the theory of a society of “two thirds” (the middle class in society) was popular, now the basic principle of stratification is completely different: 20% of the rich and super-rich and everyone else with very slim chances of breaking into the ranks of the “upper middle class”. Its reproduction as a privileged “class,” the authors state, is explained mainly not by the accumulation of capital (this applies to a greater extent to the top 1–5%), but, for example, by the inheritance of expensive real estate, works of art, etc. The top 10–20% of society are rich mainly due to rents, and not profits, as is commonly believed.
Other top sociologists have recently written about this “20/80 society” - for example, Harvard professor Theda Skocpol, a researcher of social revolutions, who believes that the advent of the coronavirus will only consolidate this ratio of shares. But Mihalyi and Szelenyi, by making rent the focus of their research, sharpen the problem to the utmost. Does capitalism in the classical free market sense have a future? - this is essentially the main question of the book. The immediate answer—which was voiced even before the coronavirus era—is not very optimistic:
“If Piketty is right – and he seems very close to it, especially in the case of post-socialist countries, but perhaps the whole world – and we are experiencing a transition to inherited capitalism, where the pursuit of profit is replaced by the pursuit of rent, then this is likely to destroy the economic dynamism and the relatively open, socially mobile and to some extent rewarding society that modern capitalism has offered the world.”
The reservation about post-socialist countries in the last quote looks like an interesting remark to the well-known theory of the Russian sociologist Simon Kordonsky and his followers that an exemplary class society has recently been built in Russia. It is difficult to argue with this statement, but, alas - or fortunately - there seems to be no Russian exceptionalism or the notorious “special path” here either. Mihaly and Selenyi, of course, have no illusions about modern Russian realities (as well as the realities of Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban), but they see signs of class society and “refeudalization” in many other countries - and, in fact, everywhere.
Next time everything will happen again
Among representatives of the “ordinary” middle class, which undoubtedly includes the authors of “Rent Recipients,” this situation cannot but cause discontent. The problem is not only that in the current era of slow growth of the world economy, the recipes for combating inequality that were recommended in the middle of the last century, for example, by Nobel laureate in economics Simon Kuznets, who believed that strong economic growth itself can make the distribution of income more equitable, no longer work. In fact, inequality around the world is becoming a major cause of social discontent, which, as Mihalyi and Szelenyi note, is caused not by the fact of the gap in wealth and opportunity itself, but by people's knowledge or perception that the “successful” are greedy, dishonest and corrupt.
The authors propose a solution to the problem of inequality, again, in the spirit of Ricardo, who advocated taxation of rental income. “A tax on rent,” Ricardo pointed out, “will affect only rent: it will fall only on landowners and cannot be transferred to any consumer.”
Therefore, Mihalyi and Selenyi consider the fairest solution to be to tax inheritances (which, by the way, was also proposed by Piketty) and, in general, to pursue a policy of shifting the tax burden from profits and wages to rent. The biggest tax problem from a social and economic point of view, in their opinion, is the value added tax (VAT) - if its rate is high, it falls on the poorest of the poor (a significant example is the increase in VAT in Russia from 18% to 20% in 2018). The lowest possible VAT and moderate taxation of profits and earnings, offset by high rates of taxes on inheritance and capital income, are practically feasible and serve social justice and dynamic economic development, Mihalyi and Szelenyi believe.
As for the occasional initiatives to tax the richest 1 percent, Hungarian authors call them populist demagoguery: in their opinion, due to this, it is impossible to obtain a sufficient amount of public income. A similar assessment suggests itself with regard to the measures announced by various states (including Russia) to “fight poverty.” In light of the above, such efforts, in the absence of real measures to combat inequality, will probably be crowned with the only result: poverty will decrease only in the reports of officials, and inequality will increase in reality. One cannot count on anything else also because people belonging to that very upper middle class show such touching attention to the problem of poverty.
However, the mechanisms for the practical implementation of these initiatives are not described in the book of Mihaly and Selenyi - presumably, they by default see them in standard democratic procedures with the help of which they can influence the tax policy of the state. In addition, the authors admit that their proposed reconfiguration of the tax sphere may not bring the desired effect. It is extremely difficult to impose excessively high taxes on inheritance (as well as any others, be it taxation of profits or earnings); owners of fortunes, as usual, will find legal ways to avoid taxation, and the state will have to “turn on the back.” Relevant examples in the book include Denmark, which had one of the world's highest wealth tax rates but then had to abolish it, and Japan, which had an inheritance tax rate of 55%. To avoid taxation, some of the richest citizens of this country changed their place of residence (according to documents), after which the government, in turn, expanded taxation on their assets around the world, and this caused the problem of attracting foreign investors to Japan, since all their assets could be subject to taxation, no matter where they were located.
Но как быть, если само государство и сфера политического в целом находятся под контролем того самого высшего среднего класса, который вряд ли станет играть в игру «пчелы против меда»? Описанные в книге множественные способы поглощения государства частными интересами не оставляют никаких сомнений в том, что общество «20/80» — это надолго. Если, конечно, не сработает естественная закономерность: наследники, как правило, склонны проматывать полученное наследство (в качестве примера Михайи и Селеньи ссылаются на роман Томаса Манна «Будденброки»). Но понимание того, что история в конечном итоге расставит всех по своим местам, выглядит слабым утешением в мире, стремительно возвращающемся в Средние века.