October 1993. Chronicle of the coup. M. Meyer, O. Solodukhin, A. Yusupovsky. Intellectual centers of influence in the Russian political crisis.

INTELLECTUAL CENTERS OF INFLUENCE IN THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL CRISIS

Maxim Meyer ,
Oleg Solodukhin ,
Alexander Yusupovsky

ANALYTICAL CENTERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMP INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT OF SEPTEMBER 21 - OCTOBER 5, 1993.

The key role of the analytical services of the presidential camp in the emergence of Decree #1400 and the further development of the conflict between the president and parliament on September 21 - October 5, 1993 is not in doubt. It is the analysts and advisers to the president who are first of all pointed to as those “who made it all up.” However, despite a significant number of recent interviews with the analysts themselves, and guesses about their activities, not only the role, but also the very existence of many analytical units of the presidential team remains unknown not only to the general public, but also to many specialists.
To a large extent, this ignorance explains the search for some kind of unified headquarters, where “stage-by-stage constitutional reform” was being prepared in deep secrecy. They often try to pass off the chaotic movements of the presidential team during a crisis as the result of the activities of such a headquarters, as if everything had been calculated in advance. In principle, this idea is understandable - it is human nature to try to find meaning even in obvious nonsense. The logically unstructured chaos of history, where diametrically opposed intentions are sometimes intertwined, terrifies him.
In reality, so many people, think tanks and centers of influence participated in the design of the crisis, from the preparation of plans to the development of specific Decree #1400, that the question of a single author of the concept and even a specific decree can hardly arise. It is quite well known that such plans, including simultaneous elections, which the president spoke about at the IX Congress in March 1993, have been discussed within the presidential circle since at least February 1993. Materials and documentation of these discussions have appeared in print from time to time. So by the fall, a sufficient number of both conceptual and tactical “blanks” had accumulated, which, after being slightly linked to a specific situation, could be put into action. These “blanks” were developed in the system of the president’s analytical services, and as for the specific impetus that brought them into action on September 21, it hardly came from experts.
During the development of the crisis, from September 21 to October 5, 1993, a single headquarters that coordinated ALL policies of the presidential team in the conflict also most likely did not exist. Only partially suitable for this role is the group that spontaneously formed from advisers, members of the Presidential Council and allies of the president on September 22 (see below). However, the activities of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the government, which played an extremely important role in the development of the conflict, remained outside their competence. All these structures had their own headquarters and did not always coordinate their actions with the actions of the other part of the team. In addition, various centers of power, pressure groups and individuals, who often had greater influence than the analysts gathered on September 22, retained the possibility of influencing the president’s decisions.
However, the presidential team still had some semblance of a political headquarters, although it did not determine all decisions. It seems that this headquarters was not united organizationally and consisted of about a dozen leading experts, advisers, members of the Presidential Council, and the Presidential Administration. It is not possible to establish the role of each of them in making this or that decision, as well as to accurately name those who were part of this “headquarters”. This is a matter for a future parliamentary inquiry.
Therefore, returning to the question “who came up with this after all,” we consider it necessary to describe all the analytical services of the presidential camp as of September 21, 1993, since each of them in one way or another participated in decision-making during the conflict.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PRESIDENT

The influence of the Administration in the presidential camp constantly increased during 1992, and became especially obvious at the beginning of 1993, when, having left the “reactionary parliamentary corps,” former deputies of the RF Armed Forces joined the Administration: Sergei Filatov, Vyacheslav Volkov, Pyotr Filippov. Later they were joined by Sergei Krasavchenko, who, since July 1993, was entrusted with managing and coordinating the work of the Administration’s analytical structures.
In February 1993, the Administration was reorganized and a group of analytical units was created. From March to September 1993, the Administration's think tanks, along with the Presidential Council, played a key role in developing the strategy of action of the president and his team.
By September 21, 1993, there were 4 analytical units operating in the Presidential Administration: the Analytical Center for General Policy, the Analytical Center for Socio-Economic Policy with the Igor Nit Group of Experts included in it, the Analytical Center for Special Presidential Programs, and the Operational Information Center. They were entrusted with information and analytical support for the president and his staff, preparation and development of various problematic political and economic programs, and expert assessment of issued decrees and decisions of the executive branch.
On September 22, an operational analytical headquarters began working under the Presidential Administration, which, after the end of the crisis on October 11, was transformed into a Working Group for operational analytical support for constitutional reform measures.
Until September 21, 1993, two centers were engaged in actual analytical activities in the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation - the Analytical Center for General Policy (ACGP) and the Analytical Center for Socio-Economic Policy (ACSEP). The main provision of information to the presidential team was provided by the Operational Information Center.

I. Analytical Center for General Policy.
Headed by Anatoly Ilyich Rakitov, formerly Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation on issues of scientific and technological policy and informatization, then head of the first analytical structure of the Presidential Administration - the Information and Analytical Center, which operated from March 1992 to February 1993
The center consists of three divisions: strategic research, system automation, modeling and forecasting.
The Center has 18 full-time employees, including 10 experts. The center engages about 15 experts to work permanently on a contract basis.
The ACOP experts include qualified specialists - political scientists and economists: Alexander Lifshits, Sergei Selivestrov, Igor Yakovlev.
The main task of the Center is to provide the president and his “team” with information and analytical materials. ACOP is entrusted with ensuring the interaction of the President of the Russian Federation with political parties and social movements, as well as assessing the proposed draft decisions of the President of the Russian Federation.
The main activity of the Center: development of scenarios for current political processes. In particular, the Center prepared scenarios for the development of events at congresses of people's deputies and the possible reaction of the President's opponents to his actions. ACOP prepares materials on the “social well-being” of the population of the Russian Federation, the balance of power in political parties and movements, and migration problems.
ACOP is also engaged in the development of scenarios for current political processes, the study of demographic problems (migration and emigration), the problem of the development of commercial structures and new problematic technologies.

II. Analytical Center for Socio-Economic Policy.
ACSEP is headed by Pyotr Filippov, a member of the Coordination Council of the Democratic Russia movement, one of the founders of the Russia's Choice movement. Filippov is known as one of the most radical and active supporters of reforms.
The Center's staff consists of 30 people. ACSEP actively engages experts on a contract basis. ACSEP does not yet have fixed departments; employees are divided according to areas of activity.
The main task of the Center is the collection and analysis of socio-economic information for the presidential office.
Areas of activity of the Center: analysis of the current socio-economic situation in the Russian Federation, collection of information on the implementation of presidential and government decisions by ministries, preparation of relevant expert materials, examination of large socio-economic projects, as well as assessment of the possible consequences of the implementation of draft decisions of the president and government in the field of economics.
Within the ASCEP, the Group of Experts of the President of the Russian Federation on operational analysis and forecasting of the socio-economic situation in Russia (Group of Experts of the President), headed by the famous economist Igor Nit, operates quite autonomously.
The group of experts consists of 9 people working on a daily basis. The group prepares the economic part of all the president’s speeches, including trips around the country and abroad, and responds to the president’s targeted requests. Carries out an examination of draft presidential decrees and government orders from the point of view of economic security and their consequences for the economy. In addition, he prepares weekly notes and monthly reports on current political and economic issues.
The specifics of the group's work - operational mode and direct participation in the drafting of the texts of the president's speeches - determine its close connection with the president's assistants and the leadership of the Administration, which indicates a certain degree of influence.
The Group includes well-known economists: Mikhail Delyagin, Pavel Medvedev. The group actively attracts consultants from economic research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University.

III. Operational Information Center.
Headed by Andrey Remizov. The Center's staff consists of 50 people. Operating hours: 24/7, operational.
The center prepares daily morning express reviews of central, Moscow, city and regional newspapers, reviews of television and radio news releases, and news newspaper reports. The Center also publishes daily chronicles of the most important events in the Russian Federation, “Russia: Day by Day”; reviews of the opposition press, reports on the most important press conferences; daily reviews "In parties and movements". In addition to its main daily work, the Center carries out one-time assignments from the President and the head of the Presidential Administration.
The Center maintains daily contact with the head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Filatov, his assistant Igor Kharichev, who is responsible for the Administration’s relations with parties and movements.

IV. Working group on operational analytical support for constitutional reform measures.
The group began working on September 22, 1993 and exercised both operational control over the situation and the development of a behavioral strategy for the presidential team.
Initially, the Group included three members of the Presidential Council: Georgy Satarov, Emil Payne and Leonid Smirnyagin; Mikhail Fedotov, President of the independent Humanitarian and Political Science Center "Strategy" Gennady Burbulis, Advisor to the President Eduard Dneprov. Later, member of the Presidential Council Andronik Migranyan and Alexander Yakovlev joined the Group. The work of the group was led by the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Krasavchenko.
During the crisis from September 22 to October 5, the group worked daily. The results of the Group’s activities include decisions on the employment of former deputies of the RF Armed Forces, including a decree on benefits and social guarantees. The group developed recommendations for representatives of the presidential side at the negotiations in the St. Daniel Monastery, recommendations regarding “zero” options, for interaction with the constituent entities of the federation.
On October 11, 1993, the group was officially approved as a Working Group under the Presidential Administration. Its final composition included, in addition to the already mentioned participants, members of the Presidential Council: Yuri Karyakin, Otto Latsis, Sergei Kovalev, Dmitry Volkogonov. The Group also included the chief researcher of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Vorontsov, deputy head of the Analytical Center of the Presidential Administration for General Policy Alexander Lifshits, head of the Security Council apparatus Andrei Makarov, director of the Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Evgeniy Yasin. Sergey Krasavchenko was appointed Head of the Group.

ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT

By September 21, 1993, the presidential advisers were: Valery Burkov, Dmitry Volkogonov, Alexander Granberg, Eduard Dneprov, Ekaterina Lakhova, Nikolai Malyshev, Sergei Stankevich, Shamil Tarpishchev, Alexey Yablokov.
When the institute of presidential advisers was created in 1991, it was assumed that they would resolve issues of analytical and information support for the president, the Administration, and the entire system of executive power. Each adviser was allowed to recruit up to 15 people on his staff, thereby creating mobile analytical groups on a particular topic that directly carried out the tasks of the presidential administration.
However, by September 1993, the status of adviser ceased to be particularly significant. The work of advisers on information and analytical support for the president and the administration has been almost completely transferred to the Administration's analytical centers, and their staff has been significantly reduced. The activities of advisers became mainly representative. They represent the presidential administration at international political and public congresses, and are in contact with parties, social movements, and the press. The responsibilities of advisers also include working with mail, including that addressed personally to the president.
However, the advisers did not completely lose their positions and influence. They are also responsible for numerous analytical studies, which they prepare on orders from the president and the administration; many have personal important instructions from the president. Some advisers retained their influence through active work in other structures, in particular the Presidential Council. The fact that the advisers have at least not completely lost their influence on the president is evidenced by the fact that Dneprov and Volkogonov were included in the operational analytical group created on September 22. In general, the institution of advisers should be considered as a personnel reserve for the president, used if necessary.

PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL

As of September 21, 1993, the Presidential Council consisted of 29 people: Sergey Alekseev, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Vladimir Volkov, Dmitry Volkogonov, Yegor Gaidar, Mikhail Hefter, Daniil Granin, Alexey Emelyanov, Andrey Zhukov, Mark Zakharov, Vladimir Kadannikov, Alexey Kazannik, Sergey Karaganov. , Yuri Karyakin, Sergey Kovalev, Otto Latsis, Andranik Migranyan, Nikita Moiseev, Emil Pine, Gavriil Popov, Yuri Ryzhov, Georgiy Satarov, Leonid Smirnyagin, Anatoly Sobchak, Vladimir Tikhonov, Petr Filippov, Alexey Yablokov, Yuri Yaremenko, Alla Yaroshinskaya.
The activities of the Council as a whole were representative in nature. It was limited to rare, widely publicized meetings where no decisions were made, but only some assumptions and recommendations were made.
Information support for the activities of the Presidential Council was carried out, in addition to the analytical centers of the administration, by thematic groups created under the Council by a special annex to the presidential decree on the Council. In the summer of 1993, groups were created: national policy and regional problems (Pine and Smirnyagin), a group on economic policy (Tikhonov). The groups carried out information and analytical work aimed at supporting the Presidential Council and preparing thematic meetings of the Council.
Since the summer of 1993, the main work of the Council was carried out by a fairly narrow group that met regularly. It included Sergei Karaganov, Georgy Satarov, Emil Payne, Leonid Smirnyagin, Andranik Migranyan. Pyotr Filippov and Dmitry Volkogonov worked closely with the group. The group almost constantly worked together with a group of presidential assistants and the leadership of the presidential administration, mainly with Filatov and Sergei Krasavchenko. Coordination of the work of the Council was entrusted to Alexey Yablokov.
At meetings of this group, in the presence of the president, members of the government, representatives of the presidential administration and analytical centers of the administration, recommendations were developed on the tactics and strategy of the presidential team. In particular, at a group meeting in April 1993, the concept of a Constitutional Conference was proposed, and in August, a plan for phased constitutional reform with a program of tactical measures for the fall of 1993 was proposed. It should be noted that the developments of the group of members of the Presidential Council were, as a rule, conceptual in nature and sometimes underwent significant changes during implementation.
The high status of some of the most active members of the Presidential Council was reflected both on September 22, when they were part of the operational analytical group, and on October 11, when they were included in the Working Group on operational analytical support for constitutional reform measures under the presidential administration.

GROUP OF PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS

By September 1993, the group of presidential assistants consisted of seven people. The group was headed by First Assistant to the President Viktor Ilyushin. The assistant on economic issues was Anatoly Korabelshchikov, on legal issues - Yuri Baturin, on international affairs - Dmitry Rurikov, on work with political parties and the public - Lev Sukhanov. Two referents were also included in the group of assistants: Lyudmila Pikhoya and Alexander Ilyin.
Assistants were considered the highest status group. Their ability to influence decisions made by the president was significant. However, the specifics of the work - round-the-clock operation, the need to compile texts of the president's speeches, prepare materials for meetings of the Presidential Council, etc. - deprived the group of the opportunity to be a real analytical center. The assistants actively worked with members of the Presidential Council, administration think tanks, administration leadership and, based on the information and analytical materials they provided, compiled materials for the president. However, at a time of crisis, a group of assistants, as the closest to the president and enjoying his unconditional trust, could influence immediate decisions, including the decision to use force.

ANALYTICAL SERVICES OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT OF SEPTEMBER 21 - OCTOBER 5, 1993.

By the beginning of the crisis, the analytical services of the Supreme Council were completely decentralized. Analytical activity in the Armed Forces throughout its existence was strictly connected with groups and individual factions. There has never been a single analytical center for the Armed Forces. Despite the speaker’s attempts from the fall of 1991 to the spring of 1993. to directly subjugate all analytical centers and groups, he succeeded only partially.
By September 1993, each of the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court - Ispravnikov, Agafonov, Voronin - had its own analytical units. A powerful analytical structure of the Chairman of the Federation Council Veniamin Sokolov under the Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces, headed by Ramazan Abdulatipov, was in the process of formation; since 1991, the analysis and forecasting sector of Edward Ozhiganov has been working. Analytical groups also existed under strong factions of the Armed Forces. Khasbulatov, Rutskoi, Voronin, Sokolov, Abdulatipov, Ispravnikov, Zorkin brought to the situation their own vision of goals, ways out of the current situation, and priority actions.
As in the case of presidential analytical structures, we provide information on their status as of September 1993 to understand who and how in the analytical services of the Armed Forces could and did resist the actions of the presidential team. In the certificate we present only those of the numerous analytical and information centers of the parliament that could actually be related to the events of September 21 - October 4, 1993. Therefore, the Supreme Economic Council under the Presidium of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Parliamentary Center of the Armed Forces do not appear in the certificate. It is possible that some of the experts from these structures came to the White House and were directly involved in attempts to resolve the crisis, but the authors do not have such information. But even if this happened, the structures themselves, remaining behind the White House blockade, could not receive instructions from its leadership and conduct productive analytical work.

ANALYTICAL SUPPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SC.

1. Group of economic consultants to the Chairman of the Supreme Council
Formally, the status of the group of economic consultants of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, as part of the Secretariat of the Chairman of the Supreme Court, was approved by the Regulations on the Secretariat of the Chairman of the Supreme Court of May 22, 1992. However, as a group of experts, the group was formed in the fall of 1991. Since then, the composition of the group has undergone virtually no changes, and it itself has become the most influential analytical center in the system of expert services of the Supreme Council.
Its members consider the professional start of their group to be the preparation of the analytical material “On the further development of economic reform in Russia,” which formed the basis for the famous speech of the Chairman of the Supreme Council at a joint meeting of the Council of the Republic and the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Council on April 2, 1992.
The speech and the material itself laid the first foundations for the independent course of the Armed Forces, its criticism of the methodology of reforms carried out by the government, and at the same time concretized the ideology of the experts themselves.
By September 21, 1993, the group of economic consultants to the Chairman of the RF Supreme Court was the most authoritative and influential in the system of analytical centers of the Supreme Court. It consists of six experts: A.I. Milyukov, Yu.I. Kashin, V.G. Bakhovkin, V.V. Serebryannikov, E.A. Buchelnikov, V.V. Sirotin.
The group advised the chairman of the Supreme Council on all economic and political issues - from the financial and banking sphere to the balance of power in the regions.
In addition to the current analytical work, the speaker’s consultants were busy preparing his reports and speeches, organizing interaction between the chairman and lower-level structures of the Supreme Court, and supervising the Scientific Council that existed under Khasbulatov.
Khasbulatov gave the most important instructions to Miliukov’s group, as his closest and most trusted employees. Thus, starting in March 1993, A. Milyukov personally, on behalf of the Chairman of the Supreme Council, supervised the work of the “round table”, which ended with the development of a Declaration signed by the Supreme Council, the government and the Central Bank.
The group, together with the leadership of the WES and the Economic Reform Commission, prepared the July economic meeting. It is obvious that the group also took part in the development of economic and political decisions at the last X Congress of People's Deputies.

2. Personal advisers to the Chairman of the Supreme Council
The status of Khasbulatov’s personal adviser has always been one of the biggest mysteries in the system of analytical structures of the Armed Forces. The number and personal composition of advisers was quite skillfully hidden by the leadership of the Armed Forces; information about them was practically not leaked to the press. Their rights and responsibilities remained vague.
By September 1993, the existence of five advisers was known, among them people with very different status and degrees of influence. These are Yuri Senkevich, Artur Chilingarov, Vasily Lipitsky, Sergei Semenov. From March to September 30, 1993, before Barkashov was forcibly deprived of his ID and expelled from the White House by militants, the famous political scientist Sergei Kurginyan was Khasbulatov’s adviser.
The speaker's advisers were clearly divided into two groups: those who took office in the fall of 1991, the “first set,” and those who came much later, at the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993. The first group included Yuri Senkevich, Artur Chilingarov and Sergei Semenov - no longer just officials, but personal friends of Khasbulatov, the second - Vasily Lipitsky, Sergei Kurginyan.
Yuri Senkevich and Arthur Chilingarov came to this position in the fall of 1991. Both were familiar with Ruslan Khasbulatov during his teaching career. Senkevich and Chilingarov are not on the staff, do not have offices in the White House, and continue to work in their own professional areas.
Yuri Aleksandrovich Senkevich is an adviser on medicine and international humanitarian assistance.
Artur Nikolaevich Chilingarov - advisor on environmental issues, the Arctic and Antarctic, the North and northern peoples in general, Hero of the Soviet Union. He came to Khasbulatov from the position of deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology. Now he is the president of the Russian Association of Polar Explorers. Chilingarov took an active part in the development of laws relating to the problems of the Arctic. Supervised the work of the State Committee for the North.
In the spring of 1993, the chairman of the executive committee of the Civil Union, Vasily Semenovich Lipitsky, became an adviser to the Chairman of the Supreme Council on a voluntary basis. His competence included working with political parties and movements. However, by September 1993 it had not yet turned around. The crisis prevented the planned creation of a number of public councils under the Supreme Council from representatives of parties and public organizations.
Sergei Mikhailovich Semenov deals with problems of the global economy and advises Khasbulatov in this area.
The advisors' contacts with the chairman were fairly informal. They occurred approximately once a week in the form of unrecorded conversations. Advisors often took part in Khasbulatov’s business trips. The scope of their activities also included work at congresses. The events of September 21 - October 4, 1993 confirmed the high status of advisers and their primary influence on decision-making by the chairman of the Supreme Council. It is known that it was the advisors, primarily Sergei Kurginyan, who, right up to the last days of the Supreme Court, directly participated in the development of decisions by the Supreme Court and the X Congress of People's Deputies.

3. Scientific Council under the Chairman of the Supreme Council
The Council was established by order of the Chairman of the RF Armed Forces dated March 30, 1992. It was intended to be an analogue of the Presidential Advisory Council. According to the order of the Chairman of the Supreme Court, the goal was “deep scientific study of issues of the national state structure, socio-economic and political development of the Russian Federation.”
The Scientific Council was considered a fairly influential structure. Usually the Chairman of the Supreme Council was personally present at Council meetings and quite often met with Council members on a routine basis.
Among the members of the Council are the heads of the largest academic institutions dealing with economics and politics: Leonid Abalkin - director of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vitaly Zhurkin - director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Yuri Yaremenko - director of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The Council also included leaders of associations of industrialists and entrepreneurs, bankers who support the policies of the Supreme Council and its speaker: Gennady Semigin - Chairman of the Board of the Congress of Russian Business Circles, Alexey Shulunov - Head of the League of Defense Enterprises, Yakov Dubinetsky - Chairman of the Board of Promstroybank.
The Council was supposed to meet at least once a month, however, in practice, meetings of the Scientific Council in its entirety take place much less frequently. Thus, in 1993, only one meeting was held, dedicated to the results of the VIII Congress of People's Deputies.
At the end of 1992 - beginning of 1993. Thematic sections began to be created under the Scientific Council, in which the main work of the Council was concentrated.
The sections worked as advisory groups to the Chairman of the Supreme Council on one topic or another.
Each section of the Council was supervised by one of the economic consultants of Miliukov’s group. Thus, the section on industrial policy and entrepreneurship is supervised by Yuri Kashin and Evgeniy Buchelnikov; financial and banking - Yuri Kashin.
Formally, by September 1993, the Council had a financial and banking section, a political science section, and a section on industrial policy and entrepreneurship.
However, only the section on industrial policy and entrepreneurship was finally formed - its composition was approved by order of the Chairman of the Russian Federation dated January 21, 1993. It included: Chairman of the Board of Inkombank Vladimir Vinogradov, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the International Bank for Trade Cooperation, leader of the Entrepreneurial Initiative 92" Konstantin Zatulin, Chairman of the Board of Directors of MFO "Menatep" Mikhail Khodorkovsky, General Director of the NPO named after. Pleshakova, Chairman of the League of Defense Enterprises Alexey Shulunov and others.
The financial-banking and political science sections were in the process of formation. The political science section included: Chairman of the Executive Committee of the State Council Vasily Lipitsky, Chairman of the Congress of Russian Communities and head of the Union of Revival of Russia Dmitry Rogozin, political scientist Alexander Tsipko.
The role of the Council in decision-making during the crisis of September 21 - October 1, 1993 was probably not great. It is possible that some members of the Council took part in the preparation of draft compromise decisions, but the Council as a body was not mobile enough to make operational decisions.

4. Analytical group at the organizational department of the RF Armed Forces (Achalov’s group)
The group was formed in May 1992 with the aim of developing a strategy for the Armed Forces and its chairman in matters of state security, defense policy, national problems and conflicts. Head - Vladislav Achalov, Colonel General, former commander of the USSR Airborne Forces, People's Deputy of the Russian Federation.
Formally, the group was part of the Organizational Department of the Armed Forces (its head is the deputy head of this department), however, it worked directly with Khasbulatov. Achalov received assignments directly from the Chairman of the Supreme Council.
It is obvious that Achalov was extremely close to Khasbulatov and had a significant influence on the adoption of political decisions by the Chairman of the Supreme Court.
Until September 1993, the group specialized in analytical activities in the field of interregional and interethnic conflicts. Its specialists took part in the development of agreements during the Pridnestrovian-Moldovan, Georgian-Abkhaz, Russian-Georgian and other negotiations, during which the interests of Russia were and should have been preserved.

ANALYTICAL STRUCTURES OF THE CHAMBERS OF THE AF.

Council of Nationalities.
The analytical groups that served the chambers of the Supreme Court primarily included the analysis and forecasting sector of the secretariat of the Chamber of Nationalities of the Russian Federation, led by Edward Ozhiganov. The sector was created immediately after Abdulatipov was elected chairman of the Chamber, in the late spring of 1991.
Formally, the sector is subordinate to the head of the Chamber’s secretariat, Valentin Rumyantsev, but in reality, the sector’s analysts worked directly with the chairman of the Chamber.
In addition to Ozhiganov, 6 people worked in the sector, including qualified technical personnel. Leading analysts are sociologists specializing in the problem of interethnic relations: head of the sector Edward Nikolaevich Ozhiganov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Barsamov, political scientist Alexander Maksimovich Yusupovsky.
Sector analysts have prepared material on almost all significant events in the field of interethnic and interstate (within the CIS) relations since the organization of the sector.
The sector had a significant influence on the policy of the Council of Nationalities of the Armed Forces and its chairman, acting not only as the sole supplier of analytical products (this is the only analytical structure of the Chamber), but also as a collective author of Abdulatipov’s speeches. At the time of the crisis, Ozhiganov’s sector turned out to be almost the only professionally working structure of the Armed Forces. The recommendations of sector analysts formed the basis for Abdulatipov’s mediation activities, his attempts to change the balance of power in the conflict by bringing regional and trade union leaders and industrialists’ organizations to the side of the Armed Forces.

Council of the Republic
By September 1993, the analytical structures of the Council of the Republic were in the process of formation. They began to be created at a rapid pace after the election of Veniamin Sokolov as Chairman of the Council in February 1993. The creation of a new analytical structure under the Council of the Republic pursued a dual goal: on the one hand, Sokolov, the former head of the Council of the Republic Commission on Budget, Plan, Taxes and Prices, understood better than others the need to formulate the Armed Forces’ own economic doctrine and move from criticizing government programs to putting forward our own. On the other hand, Sokolov almost immediately took a position that did not coincide with the position of the speaker, which was expressed, among other things, in the desire to have an analytical center that was not under the control of Khasbulatov.
The Council's analytical group being created included experts from the Council's commission on budget, plan, taxes and prices, who had worked with Sokolov for a long time - Yuri Yarmagaev and Andrey Gilbo. Sokolov’s “political headquarters” also included the head of the sociological service of the Parliamentary Center of the Armed Forces, Korobeinikov, and the editor-in-chief of the Vozrozhdenie magazine, Kirillov.

WHY DID THERE NOT EXIST A SOLUTION CENTER IN THE WHITE HOUSE?

The structure of the analytical services of the House of Soviets made it impossible to effectively mobilize the existing potential. It was impossible to form a single line of behavior for the parliament and its leaders, to organize systematized information flows that would allow decision makers to navigate the situation, control the implementation of decisions and adjust them based on feedback.
In the conditions of a communications blackout, the information vulnerability of the deputy corps and the leadership opposed to Yeltsin sharply increased. And the role of informational factors in the defeat of parliament turned out to be exceptionally great.
The existing “oligarchic nature” of the Supreme Council and the contradictions between parliamentary “tycoons” were reflected in the division between “irreconcilables” and moderate pragmatists who initiated the negotiation process. The main outlines of the compromise implied the achievement of a unified position on the conditions for overcoming the crisis of a broad coalition of the constituent entities of the Federation, associations of industrialists and commodity producers, trade unions, moderate movements and political forces not involved in the conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government, the involvement of authoritative and capable of maintaining neutrality, not allowing unleash a civil war, clergy, the Constitutional Court. All these forces could not only act as a mediator, but also, to a certain extent, dictate a compromise formula to the parties, having thought through the mechanisms of guarantees and implementation of the formula. Such plans existed, and, judging by the actors, they were developed in the analytical structures of the Council of Nationalities (Abdulatipov), discussed and adjusted in circles close to the Constitutional Court, Khasbulatov’s deputy (Ispravnikov). Even security forces, under certain circumstances, could act as guarantors of such an agreement on the side of the mediators.
We can also talk about searching for models of “tough” political confrontation. Such ideas, in particular, were worked out in expert groups close to the Smena - New Politics faction and in those committees where the positions of this faction were strong. The essence of this position is an adequate and symmetrical reaction to the escalation of political confrontation on the part of the radical presidential entourage. They intended to transfer the confrontation to a plane where the Armed Forces had greater chances of winning. In contrast to the unconstitutional actions of the Kremlin government, the creation of a parallel government, or even a symbolic figure of the prime minister, authorized by the congress to form a government with interested interest groups, is being initiated (no longer in Moscow). Thus, a lesson was drawn from Rutskoi’s unsuccessful (in the opinion of these groups) appointments of “power” ministers. This government could have tried, in alliance with the regions, to suspend or switch the transfer of taxes to the budget of the pro-Yeltsin government, to begin measures to block it economically (not only by blocking the Trans-Siberian Railway), to apply a whole range of economic sanctions...
But this option was not accepted by the leadership of the Armed Forces and was not even discussed. Perhaps because the division of committee portfolios has already shown that rational, strategic criteria are unlikely to become decisive in the current situation. In the matter of forming a government, a quarrel over portfolios would bring more disadvantages than advantages. And after October 3, all political options excluding the use of violence were devalued. (In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to the removal by unknown persons at gunpoint on September 30 of one of Khasbulatov’s advisers, S. Kurginyan, who also advocated positional political struggle, without the use of violence.)
When and why did military personnel replace political analysts in the White House? Which of the advisers and expert structures worked out the pros and cons of the storming of the mayor's office and Ostankino, not in the military, but in the political plane, and were there any such studies? Whether they were pure improvisation by Rutskoi, an act of desperation or an organized provocation is extremely difficult to say today, so we won’t guess.
In general, we can talk about a fiasco of the Central Committee-apparatus style of work of the Supreme Council. When everything was in place on paper, but in the reality of the blockade there was neither enough fuel, nor spare walkie-talkies, nor radiotelephones, nor alternative communication systems, nor even candles, the plans went to the basket, giving way to improvisations and the unprofessionalism of numerous bosses.
Therefore, if the debut of the confrontation was played out by the Supreme Council relatively quickly in terms of symbolism (convening a congress, adopting relevant resolutions, decisions, appeals and statements), then becoming an actual headquarters and effectively implementing any political plan even in Moscow, not to mention Russia, the Armed Forces simply could not. The deputies once again demonstrated their inability to establish the normal work of experts and apparatus, prepare and reproduce existing information materials, and carry out constant interaction with rally participants, while avoiding duplication, fuss and confusion.
The Armed Forces apparatus, with rare exceptions (consisting of employees who had gone through the school of democratic “informality”), acted in the best traditions of Soviet bureaucracy - they did not show any initiative, awaiting orders from their superiors. Many diplomatically fell ill just in case.
The structures that self-organized better than others were the ones that, even before September 21, set a course for developing themselves into an independent political force (they selected an apparatus, experts, had a press service and connections outside the parliament that were relatively autonomous from the Armed Forces) - “Russian Unity”, the Federal Tax Service, the Russian Russian Federation, “ Change - New Policy." But the Supreme Court as a whole, in the role in which it found itself unwillingly on September 21, did everything to disavow the official version of the “long-prepared and carefully planned” action. On the contrary, it seemed that the most unexpected events for parliament were the events that everyone was waiting for, about which everyone was talking after the president’s actions in December 1992 and March 1993.
Against the background of the president’s planned and well-supported information and analytical actions, the parliament’s attempts to accept the challenge thrown at him were quite chaotic in nature, which, coupled with the loss of management control over the processes in the White House, led the constitutional order to a tragic end.

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© Printed edition - "The 20th Century and the World", 1994. © Electronic publication - Russian Journal , 1997

October 1993. Chronicle of the coup.
M. Meyer, O. Solodukhin, A. Yusupovsky. Intellectual centers of influence in the Russian political crisis.
http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1993/meier.htm