Translated material
Anthologies. Limits of power. #4. Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. Politics of outrage
THE POLITICS OF OUTRAGE
Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.
Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. is a lecturer and researcher in international relations at the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. John Hopkins.
Following the success of the eccentric Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the recent parliamentary elections in Russia, the view that Zhirinovsky is an imperialist, a fascist and an anti-Semite, and that those who voted for his Liberal Democratic Party, monstrously untrue to its name, are supporters these political trends. Much of the alarming commentary on December's elections makes it seem as if Russia were a country with an established constitutional order, in which strictly defined constituencies or groups of voters vote for politicians whose electoral platforms correspond to their ideas about the public good. These commentators go on to suggest that politicians paint tempting pictures in their campaign promises with the sole purpose of implementing them after winning the election. Even in the most established democratic systems such an assumption would seem extremely naive; As for Russia, mired in chaos, here it simply sounds like a phrase from a science fiction novel.
To begin with, the majority of Russian voters are becoming less and less interested in politics and are becoming increasingly cynical about politicians. They were raised by a system based on the contrasts between lofty ideals and the most authoritarian and brutal rule. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the popularity of Zhirinovsky, who does not even try to hide his cynicism.
The basic tenet of the Soviet system, which constantly called on people to behave better and never admitted its mistakes, is that if things go wrong in a country, it is the people, not the government, who are to blame. This is what underpins the powerful class prejudices of Russian society. Ordinary people feel despised and unfairly accused; The most common gestures of Russian proletarians express extreme contempt. People who have been accused of something, in turn, want to find others to blame. All this has led to the formation in Russia of a huge reserve of poorly hidden indignation, which is ready to spill out to the surface at any moment if a suitable object is found.
Until now, politicians have not been able to use this general indignation for their own purposes, since the communist system has instilled in its subjects extreme political apathy: a person knows that nothing he does can influence the monster that is methodically grinding him into powder. In order to decide to participate in political life, a person needs to overcome two crises: firstly, he must believe that politics can have a concrete impact on the conditions of his life, and secondly, that he himself can influence politics in some way. It is quite clear that the majority of Russians have not overcome any of these crises. In the absence of stable political parties, it is quite difficult to establish any connection between voting during elections and real politics.
I believe that much of the discussion about the December elections in Russia has left out the most important problem that underlies all the others. This problem is that it is better to have fascist politics than to have no real politics at all. At least you can fight fascism, but how can you make politics appear out of nowhere?
In the context of the collapse of the state, it is very difficult for politicians to fulfill their promises. Political decisions are especially noticeable at the local level, which is unfairly neglected by both Yeltsin and Western diplomats. A sense of the importance of politics can arise as a result of proper organization or support from leaders, but the general antipathy to “neo-Bolshevism” is an obstacle to the emergence of parties, especially the ruling party, and the creation of some semblance of a ruling coalition.
Some of those who voted for Zhirinovsky actually hold fascist views, which is not uncommon in Russia. However, the majority gives vent to their indignation without any thought about the possibility of serious consequences. I have noticed that Zhirinovsky's supporters often accompany the recognition of this fact with a nervous chuckle, as if wanting to say: “I know what I'm doing is bad, but I don't care.” Yes, Zhirinovsky is “bad”. But he is proud and revels in it - and it becomes part of his charm. Moreover, by exposing his mistakes and shortcomings, as he does in his autobiography, Zhirinovsky makes the despised and insulted feel much better about themselves.
In order to understand the social roots of the Zhirinovsky phenomenon, we would have to embark on reasoning that goes far beyond the scope of our Sovietology. West Indian writer V.S. Naipaul, in his book The Middle Passage, describes the society of colonial Trinidad after the introduction of universal suffrage as follows:
"The old ideas remained completely intact: government was seen as something very distant, local celebrities were treated with contempt. The new policy was intended only for enterprising businessmen who were already anticipating the enormous commercial opportunities that would open up for them. There were no parties - everyone was Corruption in itself, quite predictable, evoked only a mixed feeling of surprise and even some approval: Trinidad has always admired the “men with a strong grip” who, like the heroes of the Spanish adventure novels of the 16th century, survived and won thanks to their sharp minds in those places. where nobility and position in society are obtained only by dishonest means... It was an ugly world, a jungle where the hero-adventurer was doomed to starve unless he went to steal... where the weak were constantly humiliated; this was never seen in public and was out of reach; where no one was allowed to have any self-esteem and everyone had to impose themselves.”
Of course, we do not see all the details of this picture in today’s Russia, but most of them are evident here. In such a society politics cannot exist in the usual sense of the word, because this society is not guided by the idea of the common good. Voters despise the politicians they put into power, and rulers resent having to serve those voters. The very fact that you are an ordinary citizen, and not a representative of the new elite, places you in the category of losers in the conditions of the fierce competition that replaced the communist regime.
Zhirinovsky gives ordinary Russians the opportunity to find a way out for their accumulated, but so far forcedly inactive indignation. Resentment is one of the main elements of the rather unusual new brand of nationalism that has taken root on the grave of communism. The essence of this nationalism is hostility towards other groups of the population, even to the point of demanding ethnic cleansing, but it differs from the nationalism of the 19th century in that it does not lead to the construction of a nation state. This nationalism, as the Hungarian thinker GMTamas noted, cannot be identified with patriotism. Zhirinovsky presented a long list of countries that should be occupied by Russia, but did not offer any means to create a combat-ready Russian army. Perhaps post-communist nationalism can be defined as the destruction of statehood in general. An ethnic group is a community that makes us significant, but at the same time frees us from the need to obey any instructions from the outside.
There is something unnatural and theatrical about this nationalism. It is hardly a coincidence that the new leader of Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism appears to be half-Jewish; after all, its previous leader, Ruslan Khasbulatov, was also not Russian by nationality, but a native of the Muslim republic of Chechnya in the North Caucasus.
Public opinion in Russia has always been extremely fickle, and it may well change again. Since its deep roots are mostly non-political in nature, it gets along quite well with many rather specific political trends. Politicians should seriously think about what democratic slogans could be used to channel at least some of these sentiments into a constructive direction.
Although we still do not have sufficient information about Zhirinovsky's past, from what we do know, the image of a fascist of a rather strange kind emerges. Zhirinovsky himself is a “Jew,” at least from the point of view of the anti-Semitic definition of the concept of “Jew.” Moreover, he even stood at the head of a Jewish organization that operated under the “roof” of the KGB until the collapse of the Soviet Union. As far as we know, he was not particularly famous among the cultural and political nationalists, whose activities were unusually active in the 70s and early 80s. There is no doubt that it was the KGB that put Zhirinovsky on the political stage as a candidate in the first Russian presidential elections in June 1991, in order to take away some votes from Boris Yeltsin and, perhaps, to frighten the West. It is very likely that Zhirinovsky’s statements, which cross all boundaries, are designed to attract general attention and shock the public, and are also generated by the inherent need for jesters to flaunt their inferiority.
Until more is known about Zhirinovsky's past, we should not deny the right to exist to other, alternative interpretations of this man's behavior. The idea of Zhirinovsky as a convinced fascist is not the only possible one: he may well turn out to be simply an unbalanced person, as well as a charlatan or buffoon. A native resident of the southern United States would rather compare Zhirinovsky not with Hitler, but with the eccentric Huey Long, who served as governor of Louisiana in the 30s of our century. Throughout his political career, Zhirinovsky served only a personally profitable cause. Russians who have met Zhirinovsky informally have remarked on the man's astonishing transformation from Mr. Hyde to Dr. Jekyll, as he goes from a pompous preacher on the podium at a rally to a calm, thoughtful interlocutor in his hotel suite. Of course, quackery can easily coexist with fanaticism, take Mussolini for example.
In countries with a democratic regime, the type of political opportunist is easily recognizable: it may be a legislator who is ready to say anything to please his voters and sponsors; a bureaucrat whose main concern is not to ruin his record in hopes of getting a promotion or a lucrative position in the private sector. In calm times, opportunism promotes moderate and respectable political life, while in periods of unrest and revolution it leads to extremism. It is typical for revolutionary times to develop such characters as Pierre Laval, who confidently walked the path from pacifism through socialism to Hitlerism, or Joseph Fouche, who underwent several successive transformations from an ardent Jacobin to the Minister of Police during the Directory , a post in which he managed to remain both under Napoleon Bonaparte and after the Bourbon restoration.
It is precisely these turbulent periods that we must focus our attention on if we are to understand the motivations that shape the character of today's politicians and voters. Think about what a person like Zhirinovsky had to go through in Russia. He grew up in a system where every statement was strictly regulated, and any deviation from orthodox norms was fraught with serious trouble for the apostate. And seven years ago, Gorbachev introduced such a concept as “glasnost”; out of the blue, permission is given to say almost anything. The first to take advantage of this new freedom to explain the essence of the democratic system were such principled people as Andrei Sakharov. But Gorbachev's attempt to build "reformed communism" failed; The Soviet Union fell apart, and the reformers who fought under Gorbachev's banner were defeated. The next wave of change, much more radical in nature, began under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, who used the Russian parliament to remove Gorbachev from power.
But soon Yeltsin also began to suffer setbacks, at least in terms of unfulfilled hopes and expectations. An opposition to Yeltsin arose with the accusations that he had so recently thrown at Gorbachev, and in the same way tried to use parliament as a weapon against him. In the final act of confrontation in the fall of 1993, both sides violated the Constitution and laws and decided to resort to the last resort - the use of force. In this brutal conflict, Yeltsin won, and those who fought in the ranks of the opposing camp were completely defeated, and some were even imprisoned. Their hopes for future dominance dissipated in the very smoke that shrouded the seat of the Russian parliament in the White House on October 4. For now, Yeltsin's supporters remain the victors, but the fate of the losers in the latest battle has left them apprehensive about their own future. But most troubling is the fact that the prize they fought so hard for - the Russian state - has been damaged in the fight to such an extent that repairs may no longer be worthwhile. First, the Soviet Union fell apart, now the same process is gaining momentum in Russia; Regions do not always follow the instructions of the central authorities and not in everything. Even in Moscow itself, the army still seems unable to decide whether to obey the president or not. This breakdown of the state is one of the neglected problems of the transition to democracy. In the period after October 1993, Yeltsin managed to achieve some rather modest successes, but the final result is still very, very unclear.
What lesson can be learned from this chain of events? The sincere democrat should conclude that it is necessary to take matters more seriously, learn from past mistakes and look for ways to combine increasingly disparate resources to achieve an elusive goal. But what can these events teach a smart, ambitious person who, like most residents of the former Soviet Union, is not a committed supporter of any particular political views? First of all, politics, which previously remained the preserve of a select few, is now open to everyone. Anyone and everyone can engage in political activities and can say whatever they want. Indeed, with hundreds of aspiring candidates, dozens of parties, many with only a few members, and more than a dozen party coalitions vying for seats in parliament, the only way to stand out from this almost faceless mass of candidates and parties is to say things that cannot be heard from anyone else, i.e. deliberate extremism and eccentricity. Even if the state is no longer able to enforce the laws, it can still grant privileges and give out handouts, which allows the politician to achieve wealth and fame. At the same time, however, it remains unclear whether he will be able to achieve any public goals. Social life is too chaotic, the position of the politician is too precarious, the people are too fickle, devastated and disappointed. This process was much better described by the famous historian of the last century, Hippolyte Taine, who dealt with the problems of the French Revolution:
“After ten years of mutual purges, among the three thousand legislators who have replaced themselves in the supreme assemblies, there is not a single one who could count on the loyalty of even a hundred Frenchmen. The social organism has disintegrated; among all the millions of atoms that have disintegrated into their component parts, not a single nucleus with spontaneous intermolecular connections or sustainable coordination. Civil France has lost the ability to restore itself; it is now as impossible to do this as to build Notre Dame or St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome from street dirt or road dust."
Zhirinovsky sees in front of him such examples of politicians as Ruslan Khasbulatov, who began his career as a young idealistically -minded defender of perestroika, and finished several years later as a corrupt satrap, who erupted the luxurious Brezhnev apartments, indulging communist and nationalist sentiments. My fragmentary narrative could be fully entitled "Education of Vladimir Zhirinovsky."
The success of the Zhirinovsky party in the December elections did not mean the victory of fascism; Nevertheless, he pushed back the moment of the onset of the democratic future even further in time. The victory of the "right" in the elections caused much less surprise than the complete failure of the centrists. The “Choice of Russia”, the Cosmopolitan Party, advocating a quick movement towards the market, showed quite tolerable results, given the mass discontent caused by the partial implementation of its program, its cultural isolation from the Russian public and the mistake of Yeltsin, which did not form the “ruling” party. On the other hand, those parties and leaders who attempted to combine democratic and market reforms in their programs with an increasingly popular “right” theme of Russian nationalism, preserving state subsidies for individual industries and social guarantees for the population, suffered a clear defeat: a Russian party The unity and consent, led by Sergey Shakhram, the Russian movement of democratic reforms Anatoly Sobchak and Gabriel Popov, as well as, although in a slightly different sense, Arkady Volsky and his Civil Union - all of them were in this last group. The defeat of the centrists is the same danger for Russia today as it was in Spain and Germany in the 30s. Nevertheless, Yeltsin chose to form a government from a narrow group of bureaucrats, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin from the environment of the right-handed election, although the victory in December was clearly left for the radical-populist and chauvinistic right circles.
As for Zhirinovsky, he could well become the president of Russia. Even if he really is a charlatan who does not believe in his own calls and ideas, he will certainly certainly be their hostage to some extent in the future. But even if Zhirinovsky is not able to get this post for himself personally, he has already significantly expanded the circle of political views, which can now take a strong place in Russian political life. More serious fascists who, of course, already exist, are inspired by his example. In addition, this example will probably push Yeltsin to imitate the methods of the political leadership of Zhirinovsky and some of his ideas in the erroneous conviction that the popularity of the latter is a consequence of certain political views, and not an expression of some, not yet an accurate diagnosis of social disease.
These events have yet to turn around in Russia, where a vacuum created by the absence of an effective constitutional system and a viable economic system is filled only with a vague desire to live in a “normal” country, which implies a country with Western constitutional practice, free elections, civil freedom and freedom of speech , market relations, non -aggressive foreign policy, etc. For most Russians, the desire for all these values is based not on their effectiveness, which has passed the test of time, but on the feeling that today this is the only possible way. However, after Yeltsin and the Supreme Council, during its internecine struggle, neglected most of these “rules” strictly observed in the West, it became clear that they were not the only opportunity. The take -off of Zhirinovsky threatens the further destruction of these already very fragile rules.
Many prerequisites for fascism already exist in Russia or should appear in the near future: hyperinflation, mass unemployment, growing indignation of the population, disappointment in democracy, dehristianized, but still longing for "spirituality", fierce border conflicts, constant struggle, which are not waged by state army , and education of the type of volunteer corps, as well as the inheritance from previous times, socialist and nationalist sentiments that are no longer related to any specific regime, but are waiting for the creation of new associations, the ideology of which they could become. The general rejection of violence, which has long remained a significant obstacle to the emergence of real fascism, gradually takes less and less categorical forms. The beginning of this process was laid by the May Day demonstration of 1993, when the Communists first resorted to open violence, and it was especially acute during the October events in Moscow, when the Supreme Council and Yeltsin followed their example.
The most insurmountable barrier on the path of fascism in Russia is a general aversion to any kind of ideology, organization and discipline. This disgust, apparently generated by communist extremes, underlies many Russian problems, but at the same time is a guarantee that the development of events in the country still does not reach its lower critical point. Not a single leader, even on the most acute thirst for power, can lead Russia, if he does not have a subordination to an organization with a clear discipline. Thus, the real need for organization and discipline would be a serious warning for the Democrats. The difference between today's Russia from the Weimar Republic is that the first one had happened in the conditions of real totalitarianism: Germany Wilhelm cannot be compared with Stalinist Russia. It should be repeated once again that communism was a unique phenomenon in the history of mankind. If something terrible and inhuman arises in his place, this system will be just as difficult to identify and confront him, as it was in due time with fascism.
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Anthologies. Limits of power. #4. Other options.
Charles H. Ferbenks the Younger. Policy of indignation.
http://old.russ.ru/antolog/predly/4/dem2-2.htm