Friendship of Peoples / Trumpet of Peace

Armenian crossroads

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war has been going on for almost ten years. Until now, foreign peacekeepers who have tried to bring the irreconcilable Caucasian leaders to the negotiating table have not succeeded. Now the saving recipe for the world seems to have been found: you just need to cross a gas pipe with an oil pipe.

At the end of the summer, Gazprom made a powerful push to the south. On August 29, Rem Vyakhirev visited Ankara, where he signed a framework agreement on gas supplies with the Turkish Minister of Energy Cumhur Ersümer. According to this document, the volume of Russian gas supplied to Turkey annually will amount to 8 billion cubic meters by 2000, will double starting in 2003, and should reach 30 billion cubic meters by 2010. Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz assessed this agreement as the largest gas deal in the history of his country.
Two routes for supplying Russian gas to Turkey were planned: through Bulgaria and through a new gas pipeline, which should be laid along the bottom of the Black Sea from Tuapse to Samsun. However, the day after returning from Ankara, Vyakhirev announced the existence of a more attractive third route - through Armenia.
In the presence of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, he signed an agreement with the Armenian Minister of Energy Gagik Martirosyan on the creation of a Russian-Armenian closed joint-stock company "Armrosgazprom", which will, in particular, export gas to Turkey.

Russia’s desire to prefer the Armenian route for gas transportation is quite understandable: of all the states in the region, Armenia is Russia’s closest ally, in fact the stronghold of Russian interests in the Transcaucasus. Nevertheless, it is obvious that of all the possible transit routes for Russian gas to Turkey through Transcaucasia, the Armenian one is the most problematic.
Armenia, which is in conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, is the only CIS country with which Turkey, which supports Baku, does not have diplomatic relations. Even the most cautious contacts between Ankara and Yerevan cause a painful reaction in Baku. But Türkiye cannot afford to ignore Azerbaijan’s position. And the point here is not at all about ethnic and cultural proximity. It’s just that the country’s authorities consider the implementation of another project – the transportation of oil from Baku through its territory – to be a priority of Turkish foreign policy. As is known, Russia has so far been Turkey's competitor for the right to transport Caspian oil through its territory.
The incomparability of the two projects for Ankara - the import of Russian gas and the transit of Caspian oil - is obvious. And she won’t risk the second for the first. And therefore, the only thing that can make the transit of Russian gas to Turkey through Armenia real is a serious breakthrough in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, that is, in the Karabakh conflict. And, apparently, such a breakthrough is planned.

In mid-August, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, receiving in Baku the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations of the US Senate Committee on Budget Allocations, Mitchell McConnell, announced that Baku approved the new plan of the OSCE Minsk Group, providing for a phased settlement of the Karabakh conflict.
In turn, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan on August 30, during his visit to Moscow, also recognized the new plan of the OSCE Minsk Group as the optimal option for resolving the Karabakh problem and reported “an impression that is growing into confidence” that Azerbaijan is also coming “to the methodology of a phased conflict resolution."

On July 18, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group presented a package of proposals to Azerbaijan and Armenia, according to which the Karabakh conflict will be resolved in stages: first, the six occupied Azerbaijani administrative regions around Nagorno-Karabakh are liberated and refugees are returned; then the liberation of the Azerbaijani cities of Lachin and Shusha is envisaged and at the same time the issue of determining the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved.

Ter-Petrosyan allowed himself to look into the more distant future, saying that “Armenia’s most natural economic partner” is Azerbaijan. And he expressed confidence that after the Karabakh issue is resolved, “mutual trust” and economic ties between the two countries will “quickly recover,” and Azerbaijan will again become “Armenia’s first economic partner.”

An even more compelling argument in favor of an Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement is the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. More significant because the United States, whose companies occupy leading positions in the Caspian basin, takes the floor here.
Washington insists that the oil pipeline run through Armenia. In Baku, such a prospect is not dismissed out of hand, emphasizing, however, that there is no point in talking about this until the Karabakh issue is resolved. As for Yerevan, there is no point in opposing the “Armenian” option. According to Ter-Petrosyan, the oil pipeline could become a “stabilizing factor” in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, as it would strengthen the interdependence of the two countries.
In this regard, the incompleteness of Russian-Chechen negotiations on the transit of Azerbaijani oil - the urgent demand of the Russian President in response to Chechnya's intransigence not to look for options bypassing the rebellious republic - acquires a logical explanation: Moscow is creating a good reason for the main oil of the Caspian Basin to go along the southern route — through Armenia and Turkey.

In such a context, recent events take on the outlines of some kind of multi-step plan for dividing spheres of influence.
Türkiye gives Russia a monopoly on its gas market (supplying up to 60% of Turkey's energy needs). In exchange, Russia, Turkey’s main rival in the fight for Caspian transit, cedes the main oil route to it.
Armenia is becoming a major transit hub through which the main flow of gas destined for Turkey will go. Moreover, in the future, up to 60 million tons of Caspian oil per year should be pumped through the territory of Armenia, which will bring tens of millions of dollars per year to the Armenian budget.
In turn, Azerbaijan receives the shortest route to the Mediterranean to export its oil. But at the same time, both Yerevan and Baku are making mutual concessions on the Karabakh issue.
The only one who in this situation does not lose anything, but only gains, is the United States, which has already declared the Caspian basin a zone of its vital interests. They not only provide a stable corridor for the export of oil, but also once again win the laurels of peacekeepers.
And the only one who only loses without gaining anything is Iran. Tehran, which flirted alternately with Moscow and Ankara, remains out of the game.

AZER MURSALIEV

Peace in Karabakh is real because without it the pipelines will not work

Magazine "Kommersant Vlast" No. 32 dated 09.09.1997, p. 20