First person: Conversations with Vladimir Putin. - M.: Vagrius, 2000. - 191 p.
When Alexey Venediktov gathered journalists at Ekho Moskvy who asked questions to Putin, his family, friends and colleagues - Natalia Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova and Andrei Kolesnikov - I listened to their conversations for about fifteen minutes, and then got bored. And after another five minutes I simply fell asleep: they did not seem to me like people to whom I would want to “open up,” much less “pour out my soul.”
This was the first impression with which I started reading the book.
The second impression was the only review of it that I read - by Anatoly Kostyukov, in Obshchaya Gazeta. The review ended with the words that why on earth should we elect a man as president just because he has a wife, two daughters and a dog. It’s cruel, but since a couple of pages later the editor of “OG” Yegor Yakovlev swore his love for Yavlinsky, it can be attributed to a pre-election political order.
The third impression was, naturally, all of Putin’s previous activities as prime minister, and then as acting prime minister. president.
From what the authors of the project said in a conversation with Venediktov, I remember only one thing: Putin’s answer to the question why he agreed to take part in this venture - because it was interesting or because it was necessary? Putin settled on the second.
Well, if so, it means that in answering, Putin was pursuing some goals and, obviously, not only from the category of “how I will go down in history,” but also others, more specific and down-to-earth. Calculating which ones exactly seemed like a useless exercise to me: I’m not a politician or even a political strategist, I’m a spectator of the process, I’m more interested in trends, not ambitions, but in the fact that by our actions we strive to prove something to someone, and it’s so clear .
A lot has been said about Putin in the sense that he is a black box and a secret behind seven seals. Recently, this cliche has begun to be replaced by reasoning of a completely different kind: they say, nothing of the kind, Putin is too well known and therefore you can expect this and that from him - usually meaning that nothing good is happening.
As long as I know our people (that is, those “all Russians” whose president Putin intends to become), such third-party judgments have extremely little impact on them. Wherever he puts first-hand information, in extreme cases - from eyewitnesses. My grandmother, when I excitedly told her about America as a child, listened patiently to the end, and then asked: “Have you been there?” That's it.
For these “all Russians”, who, no doubt, are waiting for this book and will certainly read it, it will be interesting and important as first-hand evidence. The fact that it is addressed specifically to them (and not the establishment) is guaranteed by the language in which Putin and its other characters speak: it is extremely simple, if not simplified. At times it even resembles a text from the school ABC: “The Putins had a dog, a Caucasian shepherd. Her name was Malysh. The dog lived in the country and was constantly digging under the fence...” (p. 91; story of Putin’s secretary in 91-96. Marina Entaltseva).
From the point of view of supporters of meritocracy, this is a minus and a reason for ridicule. From the point of view of “all Russians,” this is a definite plus and a reason to remember a similar story about your own or a neighbor’s dog. To be honest, there are many such reasons in the book.
As an experiment on myself, I began to note moments in Putin’s biography that intersect with my everyday experience (which turned out to be easy, since we are the same age).
For example, at the very beginning of the book, he talks about how his father served during the Great Patriotic War in the NKVD extermination battalion, which was engaged in sabotage behind enemy lines. And I immediately remember a story told about 25 years ago in Rossoshi by a distant relative who served in a similar structure: he, as part of a small group, found himself in a village where, according to them, there were no Germans, and went into a hut. And there was a Fritz. And so, so that he would not make a fuss, this relative jumped up to him, who had already opened his mouth to scream, put both palms into his mouth, grabbed his jaws with them, pulled them in different directions and simply tore his head into two parts.
Other parallels: Putin grew up in a communal apartment, where he often went to play with his neighbors, I grew up in a corridor system, where I was welcome in any of the neighbors’ rooms, despite their tiny sizes; he was not immediately accepted into the Pioneers, and I was not immediately accepted into the Komsomol; he was the chairman of the detachment council, I was a member of the squad council; Before being called to the KGB, he was given a meeting in the faculty lobby; when they tried to recruit me as an informant, the meeting was also scheduled in the lobby of the academic library where I was then working. Etc.
What I mean is that “all Russians” will also certainly find such parallels in the book. And they can’t help but like their presence. We can say that this is how they realize their childish desire to try on their parents’ clothes. And the more opportunities there are, the more children like it.
As much as I traveled around Russia and noticed, the number of complaints against the authorities always noticeably exceeded the number of praises addressed to it. Perhaps one of the reasons for Putin's popularity is precisely that claims have simply become worn out from overuse. And they forgive him what they would not forgive, other things being equal, to another. Because the people ultimately want to love power - and not only irrationally, but also rationally: for something.
Here it should be said that the current generation of adult Russians is burdened by two curses: guilt for the collapse of the USSR and the shame of defeat in the first, five years ago, war with the Chechens.
Judging by the statements in the book, Putin, quite in the spirit of the current official interpretation of history, attributes the first guilt to the State Emergency Committee: “It was clear that with their actions they were ruining the country” (p. 84). However, having dissociated himself from the putschists, he nevertheless emphasizes that he was “terribly worried” about this collapse, and specifically emphasizes that it was then that the ideals and goals with which he went to work in the KGB collapsed.
That is, in fact, this is still an abdication of one’s share of the blame as a citizen of the USSR and a member of the organization that was its backbone for the collapse of this state.
Will this worry “all Russians”? The part that votes for the communists time after time will probably be agitated. The topic of restoring the Soviet Union has long been monopolized by these people. True, without any practical results. And therefore, if it worries you, it’s unlikely to be much, but the fact that you were “worried” can even calm you down.
Not at all like Chechnya. Firstly, this is a topic free from monopolization by anyone (after 1996 only political fringes claimed it). Secondly, is it a conquest? liberation? - Putin presents it as a personal matter of honor, for the sake of which (when he had just been appointed prime minister) he was ready to sacrifice all his posts - just to save Russia from creeping decay. And, unlike the communists with their restoration of the USSR, he managed to achieve practical results in this field.
The deliverer from the curse is a serious, symbolic role. Those who caricature her as daughters and dogs either cannot or deliberately do not want to understand this. And this, in fact, is the most important thing. Although, however, this is the only thing for now.
Claiming in the book that Russia is “part of Western European culture” (p. 156), Putin does not betray his own affiliation with it. The cultural component of “Conversations with Putin” tends to zero. The story of a Putin friend about how he taught him to listen to Shostakovich, translating the music into the language of naive realism, or Putin himself’s remark that the striptease he visited in Hamburg was performed to “good music” (p. 92), only deepen this impression .
So the enlightened monarchy does not threaten Russia. However, if there is no cultural favoritism, it will be for the best.
But Putin’s commitment to traditional values is evident, which, I am sure, will not go unnoticed by “all Russians”: the love of parents for their son and his reciprocal love for them, loyalty in friendship, a non-idle attitude towards marriage and family. And even slyness, which is a completely common thing among peasants.
Well, the answer to the question why he, Putin, supposedly did not go abroad as he became the acting one - is it not out of fear that “they will be killed for Chechnya” - “I will kill them all myself” (p. 175) - should be greeted with a bang. Our people don’t value those who don’t know how to fight back, but here it’s just the opposite case. And even if this is bragging, it is completely in tradition - as a necessary element of a people’s fight.
All. I consider it unnecessary to judge this book further. My diagnosis: it will be understandable and close to “all Russians,” and it is completely unnecessary for intellectuals to read it (except, perhaps, for the part where young specialists are promised a salary of $2,000).
As a politician, Putin appears in it as a man acting within the classical framework of the “art of the possible.” And directly, by the way, declaring (see p. 143) that he is burdened by expressions of excessive loyalty. If, however, they continue to go overboard with them (and such a possibility exists), then the best hopes of human rights fighters for Putin may come true. However, Alexander Zinoviev already managed to write an article twenty years ago entitled “What they fought for, that’s what they ran into.”