Translated material
Last, last, charm
Galina Kovalskaya, Alexander Ryklin
Most Russians will trust Vladimir Putin with all their might, as long as he “holds a pause” and does nothing
Most Russians will trust Vladimir Putin with all their might, as long as he “holds a pause” and does nothing
Voters are in no hurry to refuse to trust Vladimir Putin. After all, all their hopes for a better future are connected with the new president. Only the Chechens are indignant: even those of them who believed that Russia would bring peace and order to the republic were deceived in their expectations. (Photo: Pavel Gorshkov )
An elderly professor, who constantly voted for the Gaidarites, and in March gave his vote to Vladimir Putin, is terribly annoyed: “It’s not true that he doesn’t do anything! It’s you, journalists, who can’t wait for voters to stop loving him as soon as possible, so you don’t notice the obvious. "He quietly, without scandals, changed the entire military command in Chechnya - is this, in your opinion, nothing? He appointed Illarionov as an adviser - this is a sign. Finally, he increased his pension. And all you care about is that he rides on different types of transport." It turned out to be a strange list of merits. Those few Putin voters who like the liberal Andrei Illarionov cannot help but understand that raising pensions is in no way a victory for the newly elected president. Our professor is not exactly enamored with Putin. He simply, like the vast majority of our fellow citizens, regardless of whether they adhere to liberal, patriotic or socialist views, is tired of hopelessness and wants to believe in the revival of Russia. And the vast majority of Russians associate this revival with the new president. He said to us: “Do you really dream that people will completely despair?”
hope dies last
Putin's presidential rating for the month and a half that passed from the day of his election to the inauguration remained unshaken. The trust rating, according to VTsIOM, even grew, although, it would seem, there was nowhere to grow: before the elections, the share of citizens who “fully” and “mostly” trusted Vladimir Putin totaled more than seventy percent, and at the end of April reached eighty. When asked “has your attitude towards V. Putin changed recently,” VTsIOM received exactly the same results as three months ago (then they asked whether the attitude had changed over the past three months): 10%, the same as before the elections , they say that their attitude towards Putin has worsened over the reporting period, 61% (exactly as in the last survey) - which has not changed, 24% (then there were 25) - which has noticeably improved.
So, voters have not yet shown any disappointment in their president. In fact, most did not expect decisive action from him. On the contrary, during the election campaign, when characterizing the positive qualities of their chosen one, people were one of the first to mention caution. The results of the VTsIOM survey show that only 2% of respondents hoped for changes for the better in the first month after the elections. The rest believed that positive changes would require much more time: 10% - six months, 20% - a year, 22% - 2-3 years, and another 20% - more than three years. And our compatriots don’t have any specific wishes: “How do we know? We are ordinary people. Let him organize production so that there is work, normal wages. Well, so that they don’t steal...” So no one gets angry and impatient: they say, They elected him, but he didn’t even introduce the Tax or Land Code to the Duma. On the one hand, everyone understands that the president does not have many opportunities to “improve life.” On the other hand, improvements are not expected from anyone except the authorities (and the authorities are the president). In addition to seventy years of Soviet habit, these paternalistic sentiments are strengthened by recent experience: Gaidar’s reforms left people with the firm conviction that their well-established life had been “collapsed” from above. Now they, consciously or unconsciously, expect that the “good” government will return to them at least part of what the “bad” one took.
In parallel with the autumn-winter growth of Putin’s rating, optimism grew in Russian society. Shortly before the elections, indicators of social optimism reached previously unseen heights: 32% of respondents claimed that, in their opinion, Russia is “moving in the right direction” (and not “going to a dead end”) - previously there were 10-12%. Almost half - 44% of fellow citizens - believed that they had adapted to their current life, and another 22% hoped that they would adapt in the near future. By mid-April, these numbers remained unchanged. Nothing similar has been observed over the past decade: those who have “adapted” numbered a maximum of 20-25%.
Vladimir Putin is not the first Russian politician whose rating has grown by leaps and bounds. This once happened to Yevgeny Primakov. Then, according to VTsIOM, Stepashin’s rating soared. Sociologists believe that, had it not been for the resignations, Primakov’s and Stepashin’s ratings could well have grown to Putin’s. The voting soul was not waiting for Putin at all, it was waiting for someone. For the last ten years, the citizens of Russia for the most part have done nothing but harp on how terrible and unbearable their life is. It’s no wonder that they got tired of it and wanted to believe in the best. To be disappointed in Putin means to lose this hope. There is no doubt that they will hold on to their faith in the new president with all their might. It is not without reason that when asked by VTsIOM whether Putin belongs to Yeltsin’s entourage, the majority answers negatively. Although, it would seem, everyone knows that none other than the hated Yeltsin blessed Putin for the presidency. In general, according to the famous sociologist Alexei Levinson, who recently conducted a series of focus groups in three Russian regions, Putin’s actions after the elections ceased to interest voters. They, for example, did not even notice how Putin handed over Peter to Yakovlev and offended Matvienko. Although, when Putin shed a tear at Sobchak’s funeral before the elections, everyone noticed.
A special case
If anyone is disappointed in Putin, it is the Chechens. Although in Chechnya, no matter what official institution you go to, be it the commandant’s office or the district administration, at every step you are followed by the stern gaze of the new Russian president. By the way, this is not necessarily a ceremonial photographic portrait; it could also be a calendar for the year 2000, which was flooded throughout Chechnya in the spring. In it, in addition to the views of reviving cities and villages, a lot of space is devoted to Vladimir Putin. True, portraits of the leader are not yet displayed on the streets, and you certainly won’t see them on windshields.
Chechens for the most part do not perceive these attempts by the Russian authorities to impose a new idol on them as something blasphemous. Rather, as an inevitable attribute of change. Like checkpoints, access control or curfew. Moreover, Vladimir Putin had a chance to become a popular politician in this Caucasian republic. A significant part of the Chechens yearned for an orderly, predictable life and until recently showed the same, even, for obvious reasons, greater readiness than the Russians to grasp at straws. Vladimir Putin had the opportunity to turn out to be not even a straw, but a lifeline.
Last fall, in one of the refugee camps in Ingushetia, an elderly Chechen woman told an Itogi correspondent: “I don’t believe that Putin knows what’s going on here. He would punish the thieves and let people live like human beings.” The women standing nearby nodded their heads. True, even then many people called Putin the main culprit of their misfortunes. But, most likely, if Putin had shown at least a little goodwill towards the Chechens - the same refugees or the civilian population of Chechnya itself - many would have forgiven him even for bombed houses and injuries to loved ones.
Already in April, in Grozny, which had been completely destroyed, a young guy, desperate to get a pass for his car to enter the city, angrily said to an employee of the commandant’s office: “Putin is not on you, he would quickly restore order here.” And he was immediately ridiculed by other petitioners. There is almost no faith left in the good Putin. The point here is not even that during this time the capital of Chechnya was destroyed and many hundreds of civilians died under its rubble. We have met Chechens who quite sincerely justified the bombings, citing their military necessity. Like, how else could Maskhadov’s bandits be expelled? War is war, and not only soldiers die in it. Residents of Chechnya hoped that with the advent of the new government, legality and justice would be restored. During the reign of Aslan Maskhadov, most Chechens became accustomed to relying only on themselves and their loved ones. And they, like all other residents of Russia, would like to count on the state. If order had increased with the arrival of Russian troops... But, on the contrary, it has decreased: looting by federal troops, extortion at checkpoints, bribery in administrations. By refusing to introduce presidential rule, which was eagerly awaited by precisely those Chechens who were counting on order (remember: this measure, in addition, was advocated by almost all participants in the Chechen campaign), Putin essentially surrendered the republic, along with its loyal and disloyal population , at the mercy of the military and Koshman’s people, who do not have the best reputation in Chechnya. So the Chechens failed to fall in love with the Russian president.
It must be said that, having failed to establish a strict order (not in the sense of cruelty, but in the sense of legality) on the territory of the Chechen Republic, that is, turning out to be essentially a weak leader, Vladimir Putin lost in many ways in the eyes of the military themselves. The military leaders commanding Russian troops in Chechnya today have long understood that Putin can dictate his will and can set conditions. And publicly, in front of the whole country. You don't have to look far for examples. Suffice it to recall the recent statements of Gennady Troshev regarding possible negotiations with Maskhadov. And now the police captain at the checkpoint at the entrance to Achkhoy-Martan lets out the maxim: “There will be no negotiations with Maskhadov. We will not allow this. No matter how much Putin crucifies the West.” Of course, senior officials do not allow a disparaging tone when talking about the head of state - they, like their other compatriots, do not particularly remember Putin after the elections. But their subordinates do not mince words, and the phrase “The Kremlin is not our command” can be heard quite often from officers fighting in Chechnya. There is only one step from this formulation to the formulation “Putin is not a decree for us.” However, this is exactly what Putin wanted: he was not at all pleased with the prospect of being the main responsible for Chechnya, and by giving the army a certain independence, he acquired the opportunity to “strictly ask” someone at a time when public opinion can no longer turn a blind eye to an obvious failure of Caucasian pacification.
While Putin “holds a pause” - does not do anything that would allow some voters to see him as an “outsider” (for example, avoids unequivocal statements “for” or “against” the purchase and sale of land), the majority of Russians will continue to believe in him from last strength. Except for those who, like the Chechens, would like immediate action. While everything in the country is still moving neither shaky nor slow, the majority agrees to “stability.” If, God forbid, disaster strikes: another economic crisis, a shortage of fuel and energy resources, or something else, the new president risks losing the love of voters as quickly as he gained it. But not before.