Mikhail Fishman: OVR as a non -banal decision

The Gusinsky case, as all enlightened commentators have already recognized, is more likely not to the category of obscurantist incident from the sphere of death of civil rights and freedoms and the first totalitarian call (the official version of NTV). It has become a major general political crisis - of those that provoke or de facto change the prevailing alignment of political forces. (In this regard, the formula Malashenko about the “first political prisoner” Gusinsky turned into a curious pun - the Gusinsky really political prisoner, but not in the sense that the dissident, but that his arrest was dictated by political motives - so the formula filled with Soviet connotations is returned to its literal value.) It is already clear that the arrest of the Gusinsky was very disturbed by the arrest of Gusinsky. Active political fronts - from intra -Krelev affairs to foreign policy and inter -party relations. The Gusinsky whirlwind walked through each focus of stress, everywhere he picked up the logs - in such quantities that the political landscape, which has already already discovered a craving for changes, risks deforming seriously and for a long time.

The strange story that happened in the Duma last week, when, according to Evgeny Primakov, the Duma adopted a law on a single social tax that greatly discouraged the government and Mr. Zurabov, not only clearly indicated the thoroughness of assumptions about the intra-Crelevo struggle, but, as it was rightly noted, showed Putin’s ability to build non-banal Duma constructions. It is significant that Putin used the OVR (47 mandates) and Primakov personally as the driving force of the anti-government attack, who until recently appeared exclusively in the form of a digital appendage in the “unity” scheme are right. Putin’s liberal approach to the formation of the government has already ceased to be a secret, and while it was a purely economic projects, the anti -communist majority was repeatedly run in. The OVR faction was not required, except for the incident with Zurabov.

Inexorably advancing second and third readings of federal bills, during which, according to general conviction, raw and bad bills should undergo serious changes, now, after the arrest of Gusinsky, Putin will again look for non -banal decisions. One of the leaders of the ATP Irina Khakamada has already stated that the scandal around Gusinsky was able to destroy the fragile political consensus that has formed around the most important event - a federal reform designed to radically weaken the governor's arbitrariness and generally put some order. The same Khakamada then noticed that the feasibility of adopting bills in the second reading, giving exclusive powers to the prosecutor’s office, in the light of recent events, already causes some doubts. Khakamada did not exclude that the ATP faction on the second readings of bills can insist on amendments to the law on the prosecutor's office - so that the functions of supervision recorded after it were transferred to the Ministry of Justice.

Indeed, the declared federal reform, even if you distract from all kinds of messages about the Kremlin and liberals that have taken place and liberals regarding the necessary amendments, cannot but be based on the trust of one political force to another - due to the authoritarian essence of the specified reform that gives the president and its structure additional powers to the detriment of the governors. The amendments, which collapsed precisely during the coordination of the amendments (the Kremlin shop to receive proposals from senators and deputies officially closed last night), a meteorite in the form of Gusinsky could not help but disturb this system. The essence of the federal reform, if briefly, was in two directions - the weakening of the influence of governors, on the one hand, on the center (reform of the Federation Council), and, on the other, to the estates (draft law on local self -government). There is reason to believe that the second direction of the reform no longer causes strong enthusiasm in the Kremlin - for the obvious reason: a decrease in the power of governors automatically increases demand with the Kremlin. Obviously, the arrest of Gusinsky, having given additional ground to the claims of one side to the other, could not but complicate the negotiations on these topics if they took place.

In this regard, Luzhkov’s leaks organized by Luzhkov’s services at Interfax about the meeting of the Moscow mayor with the Kremlin employee Surkov, who oversees the course of federal reform in the Duma, are noteworthy - it is precisely on the issues of passing three projects in parliament, as the source did not fail to notice. A simple calculation shows that if the ATP and the Yabloko refuse to ratify the bill rejected by the Federation Council (the "regions of Russia" refuse to determine), then the Duma can - and then with difficulty, completely mobilizing the voters - to collect the constitutional majority only with the help of the OVR faction. It can be assumed that if the administration, relying on the idea of ​​restricting the influence of governors on places, refuses to make the necessary amendments in the first two bills, the conflict in the issue of federal reform may apply to the third bill, and the Kremlin will confuse - either offer the upper house that arranges its reform, or return to the formula of the Communist Party, but with the necessary participation of the OVR. The consequences of such a frozen union in such an important matter will be difficult to predict - both the political climate in general, and the federal reform in particular can change beyond recognition. Theoretically.