Warsaw and Moscow have officially announced a meeting on July 10 in the Russian capital of Presidents Vladimir Putin and Aleksander Kwasniewski .
This will be the first meeting between Russian and Polish leaders after Putin’s inauguration and a significant complication in Russian-Polish relations, noticeable at least in the famous spy scandal with the expulsion of Russian diplomats from Warsaw and Polish diplomats from Moscow. In addition, the Chechen war, as was the case during the previous crisis in the North Caucasus, traditionally inclines Polish society in favor of curtailing contacts with Moscow. And the Poles here - this can be understood both from public sentiment and from publications in the media - operate rather not with Western categories of human rights protection, but with historical reminiscences associated with the struggle of the Polish national liberation movement against the Russian Empire - the struggle in which independence was declared Poland, and the war with the Red Army, and the liquidation of Polish statehood in 1939, and the subordinate position of socialist Poland after the Second World War. But nevertheless - if we continue the theme of public sentiment - today Polish public opinion is set not only against Russia, but also against its own right. Collapse of the bloc's government coalition Solidarity and the Freedom Union leave no hope for the Polish right: the upcoming parliamentary elections will most likely be won by the left bloc , over which President Kwasniewski traditionally has great influence. And in this sense, negotiations with the Polish leader are important for Vladimir Putin, primarily from a long-term point of view. If for the current Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek the President is, first of all, a difficult partner in governing the state, then for the Prime Minister of the left government, Leszek Miller, Kwasniewski will be, first of all, a party comrade and a person of similar convictions. Today, Kwasniewski can rather make promises for the future. Tomorrow these promises can be realized.
Of course, there is also no need to create illusions about a special warming of relations between Moscow and Warsaw as a result of future political changes in Poland. The process of Poland's integration into NATO took place precisely under left-wing governments, and President Kwasniewski was its devoted supporter and leader. And agreements on the construction of a gas pipeline bypassing Ukrainian territory, which for Russia is the “last argument of kings” in its long-standing energy disputes with Kiev, were reached precisely under the right-wing governments of Poland. But nevertheless, it is worth taking into account a completely different level of mutual understanding between the Russian and Polish elites in the event of a victory for the left. This level is associated with a rather general problem: in Russia the elite has practically not changed, it consists of the same bureaucrats, government officials, Komsomol graduates - only middle management who managed to make a successful career in the last decade. In Poland there are two elites. The “middle link” concentrated in the left block. The political biographies of Aleksander Kwasniewski and possible future Prime Minister Leszek Miller are perhaps the best proof of this. But the round table conciliation process between Polish communists and leaders "Solidarity" led to the emergence of another elite - workers of the labor movement, intellectuals, market economists... Lech Walesa , Tadeusz Mazowiecki , Jerzy Buzek, Bronislaw Geremek , Leszek Balcerowicz , Adam Michnik , Jacek Kuroń - from this "second elite". Among its representatives there are people who have a bad, indifferent, good or even very good attitude towards Russia, but the confidence of this part of the Polish political spectrum in the priority of Western political values is limitless. And a common language with this part of the Polish elite in Moscow will be found only after Russia itself - whether as a result of biological or political processes - has its own elite, oriented towards the West unambiguously, and not due to momentary conjuncture, and, moreover, authoritative in society .
Therefore, for now, it is much easier for the Russian leadership to try to find a common language with Alexander Kwasniewski. The Polish president himself is today interested in this mutual understanding, since he is a participant in the election campaign. And although almost all public opinion polls leave no doubt about the victory of the current head of state over any of his possible opponents - and the split between Solidarity and the liberals only increases Kwasniewski's chances of victory - the current president is not a relaxing politician. It will be very important for Kwasniewski to show that, unlike the Western-oriented cabinet of ministers, he knows how to find a common language both in Western capitals and in Moscow, that he is listened to in the Russian capital, and that he will be able to continue the dialogue with Vladimir Putin, which has turned out to be so difficult - primarily due to Moscow's negative reaction to Poland's entry into NATO - with Boris Yeltsin.
Kwasniewski's announcement of his own role in foreign policy comes at just the right time. Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, considered a symbol of his country's European orientation, was forced to resign due to a split in the ruling coalition. Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek appointed a non-partisan expert, Professor Wladyslaw Bartoszewski , who had once held this post, as the new minister. Bartoshevsky is a legendary personality, a brilliant intellectual, one of the first prisoners of Auschwitz, who then organized assistance to the exterminated Polish Jews (the Yad Vashem Institute in Jerusalem recognized the Polish scientist as a righteous man). But he is 78 years old and will be more a symbol of the immutability of Polish foreign policy than its engine - and it was in this role that the retired Geremek played. In addition, Bartoshevsky headed the foreign policy department in a minority government, essentially in a provisional government. It is in this situation that President and presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski reminds of his own foreign policy capabilities with a trip to Moscow. Will Vladimir Putin help his Polish colleague prove that these opportunities are not purely declarative?