Mikhail Remizov. Aporias of tolerance

Aporias of tolerance
Walzer Michael. About tolerance. Per. from English I. Mürnberg. √ M.: Idea-Press, House of Intellectual Books, 2000. √ 160 p.

Mikhail Remizov

Publication date: August 30, 2000

One must know that war is generally accepted, that enmity is the usual order of things, and that everything arises through enmity and borrowing.
Heraclitus the Dark

Do you notice the difference between “tolerance” and “tolerance”? You will say: a stupid question, a naive psychological artifact of excessive linguistic borrowing... In fact, borrowing sometimes seems to crack the bark of language and in the resulting crack gives life to that “multiplying of entities” that Occam warned against. A residual and imaginary, for the most part, effect of object novelty arises, a projection from the novelty of the signifier to the novelty of the signified. So, it seems, with “tolerance”. However, language borrowing can have a deeper meaning. Namely, in those cases when not only the bark of language is “hacked,” but, together with it and before it, the very bark of the world, that framework of givenness, whose integrity is captured by us in the word “culture.” Our world, the universe of our culture (after all, the world is always someone else’s ), seems to be woven with borrowings: symbolically, socially and structurally, the presence of our “Other”, the presence of the West, is tangible in it. The West carries its words with it - its presence in our world is formalized by the system of Latinisms in our language. This symmetry, this connection has its own protective logic - Latinisms are truly saving! Their co-presence, as usual with their Russian counterparts, leaves us with the happy right to distinguish the heterogeneous elements of our world - the opportunity to differentiate the West as another _ So why don’t we resort to this “right to difference” (and without it, what kind of “right to difference” can there be?) and allow ourselves to read in the word “tolerance” the presence of our “Other” optically built into our world, which “ tolerance" as such is not noted.

This hermeneutic possibility is all the more permissible since Walzer's book is precisely devoted to the phenomenon of cultural differences. More precisely, it is a consideration of cultural, ethno-religious differences in the aspect of “peaceful coexistence” of their bearers, that is, following the author’s logic, in the light of the issue of tolerance.

The book is pleasing in that it is far from abstract, leveling moralization on the topic of tolerance and, paying tribute to the specifics of differences, tends to think situationally. “Philosophy ,” says Walzer, “ must be historically enlightened and sociologically competent . ” In relation to the topic of research, this must means something quite definite: the author is inclined to contextual, historically relevant reflection on tolerance, which allows him to recreate the multivariate forms of its social implementation. As ideal-typical models, he identifies five versions of the “tolerant regime” (multinational empire, international community, consociational structure, national state, emigrant society) and, moreover, undertakes consideration of complex, mixed cases - France, Israel, Canada. This historical-typological part is complemented by a kind of factor analysis. A differentiated consideration of class, power, gender, and religious relations sets the space for “practical” problems - the author is genuinely interested in the practical side of the issue - the social implementation of tolerance.

In thematizing difference, Walzer avoids the doctrinal sin of the Enlightenment and its current, belated epigones. He does not subject cultural differences to theoretical “repression” and immediately rejects the “bad utopianism” of searching for the most “perfect” regime, in the sense of tolerance. “Even the best of political institutions ,” he admits, “ is such in relation to the history and culture of the people whose life it intends to improve . ” The statement is truly rare in the mouth of a left-liberal theorist and, perhaps, underestimated, in its “explosiveness,” by the author. Although cut off from the critical radicalism of the conclusions possible on this basis, the recognition of decisive differences in cultural pictures of the world nevertheless imparts to the text a healthy shade of relativism. However, the author himself does not believe that relativism is “great” and is in a hurry to limit it to something “absolute”. "Rampant relativism “,” he writes, “ ” I do not encourage, because not a single social structure and even not a single aspect of it will be the embodiment of moral choice if it does not provide one or another option for peaceful coexistence (thus affirming basic human rights) .

The relativism and ethnopluralism allowed by Walzer are, in fact, strictly limited. Recognition of cultural differences does not go so far as to methodologically subordinate to him the very problematic of tolerance (to think of it as culturally relative). He introduces the phenomenon of cultural differences into the context of the problematic of tolerance, but in no way - the problematic of tolerance into the context of the phenomenology of cultural differences. And perhaps the stubborn, instinctive ear of the Russian reader will make up for this deficiency, distinguishing in the word “tolerance” the notes of someone else’s voice, the voice of our “Other”.

That the theme of “tolerance”, in the form in which it now circulates, including in Walzer’s book, belongs to the field of liberal political culture and grows on the basis of new European metaphysics and, let’s say more, Protestant theology - this understanding, of course, cannot not to be with the author. Moreover, his intellectual honesty extends far enough that in places he himself gives the reader a chance to doubt the cultural neutrality of tolerance. In particular, speaking about its religious aspect, Walzer notes: “Tolerance... gave all kinds of groups a certain template for adapting to the Protestant model . ” However, understanding is not enough, desire is needed, and Walzer is clearly not inclined to emphasize the cultural limitations of the issue of tolerance or to de-veil tolerance as an ideology. After all, “ideology” in its “critical” sense is a false claim to universality. And the claim to universality - don’t you think? - always false.

The author, although he finds the snares of classical philosophy of consciousness more comfortable (when the structures of thinking, one way or another, prevail over the structures of existence and at least are not “reduced” to them), does not at all exclude in relation to himself the use of one or another of the possible “hermeneutics” suspicion." “As an American Jew, ” he narrates, “ I grew up with the consciousness that I was an object of tolerance ,” is the first sentence of the book, and it seems almost to invite (perhaps not without a degree of provocation) idle “sociologists of knowledge” to the procedures "critics of ideology." While also the author of a survey of twentieth-century social criticism , Walzer himself seems to find little benefit or pleasure in it. In his reflection “On Tolerance,” his intellectual and personal position takes on a rather apologetic character. A well-known supporter of the doctrine of multiculturalism, Walzer is an ideologist of tolerance in the full, including the “critical” sense of the word “ideology”.

Firstly, he apologetically builds an idea of ​​the social functions of tolerance, trying to give it a universal normative meaning. Secondly - and this can be attributed to the “socially responsible position of the author” (his interest in the practical aspect of ideas) - Walzer accepts as a positive and to be preserved given the institutional model of tolerance that he finds in his “emigrant society”, in the USA, and, more broadly, in modern (in the sense of “modern”) society in general.

Thus, Walzer clearly seeks to impart to the idea of ​​tolerance the meaning of a universal ethical-political ideal. And this desire forces him to be postulative. “I’ll start ,” he writes, “ with the statement that peaceful coexistence (we are talking about a certain type of peaceful existence, which does not include the coexistence of masters and slaves) is always a good thing . ” This position, although it cannot be justified otherwise than, suppose, by reference to the “natural light of reason,” effectively imparts to tolerance the character of a universal and necessary condition of “good.” Let us not ignore the reservation regarding “ a certain type of peaceful coexistence.” Attached to the first value axiom, it actually hides a second, completely independent one (and, knowing the social-democratic sympathies of the author, we should not be taken by surprise by it). Actually, why the peaceful coexistence of masters and slaves is excluded from the absolute goodness of peaceful coexistence in general - this cannot be understood otherwise than in the light of additional prerequisites. Generally speaking - in the light of the demands of a non-hierarchical anthropology, more precisely - in the light of the (necessarily abstract) postulation of the equal dignity of all people. Taken together, absolute peacefulness and egalitarian anthropology form the foundation of the ideological construct of tolerance. In them - a gesture of metaphysical positing, under the guarantee of which tolerance enjoys the status of a universal moral imperative .

Yes, tolerance is ideological not only culturally, but also ethically. “Ideology,” the claim of the partial to the universal, also concerns virtues and is not slow to be born where a certain, generally quite modest, virtue somehow monopolizes the “good” and is put forward to the role of a universal social organizing principle. Truly, “every instinct is power-hungry; and as such, it tries to philosophize” (Nietzsche). Through the means of metaphysics, inclination becomes morality, virtue becomes ideology and, finally, regime.

A "regime of tolerance" can be understood as something more specific than a regime marked by tolerance. Among the latter, Walzer includes, in addition to modern societies, also multinational empires, where an atmosphere of ethno-religious tolerance is possible thanks to the special meaning of imperial power, which metaphysically elevates it above the cultural differences of the included communities. Empires are tolerant, but not because they adhere to the principles of tolerance . Tolerance of liberal nation-states and emigrant societies, on the contrary, necessarily presupposes and includes the professing of an ideology of tolerance. It is the ideology of tolerance that guarantees the social practice of tolerance here, and in this connection one with the other, tolerance reaches its fullness as a regime. A regime that is certainly tolerant in some respects and certainly not in others. This is the tension that arises in the gap between virtue tolerance and ideology or, if we talk about the effective social side of the issue, the regime of tolerance. Walzer does not ignore

He admits: the regime of tolerance - in the form in which it is implemented in liberal nation-states and emigrant societies - has a pronounced leveling effect. And therefore, tolerance does not escape paradox. Driven by the need to “protect differences,” the tolerant regime of modern societies eliminates them . The spread of the spirit of tolerance (with its accompanying philosophical and political load) through the education system, through the circulation of symbols in mass culture, is as necessary for the reproduction of a tolerant regime as it is destructive for the reproduction of the cultural identity of communities.

First and foremost - those communities that, by their history, their internal logic, are not liberal. Walzer captures the problem here: "Internally intolerant and illiberal groups (such as most churches, for example) can only be tolerated as voluntary associations. But should they be tolerated as autonomous entities that are given the power to exercise coercion over their members ?" Traditional empires, where cultural communities are the primary object of tolerance, tend to reserve such powers for them; The answer of liberal regimes that make the individual choice of a citizen the subject of tolerance is negative. Walzer does not gloss over the repressive implications of individual-centered legal universalism. “The possibility of preserving their way of life ,” he writes about the aboriginal peoples of Canada, “ is by no means obvious... in conditions of autonomy established within liberal boundaries: historically their way of life is not liberal.” . An excellent opportunity to make sure that there may not be a solution that is tolerant in all respects, and the fundamental choice is not whether to be tolerant or not, but at what level of consideration - and existence - to be tolerant.

The alternative, which clearly emerges from Walzer’s reading, looks something like this: tolerance, realized at the level of individuals considered in the mode of abstract humanity, turns into intolerance at the level of communities, taken as truly functioning living units. Theorists of ethnopluralism call intolerance of the latter kind “ethnocide.” In relation to communities such as Aboriginal peoples, the possibility of tolerant ethnocide is clear. Embalming a corpse is the best that a tolerant regime can offer them. But culture does not live under glass.

Susceptibility to “ethnocide” is hardly the privilege of “archaic” tribes. It remains in force - however, Walzer is unlikely to bless us to go that far - and for the widest range of cultural, ethno-religious communities, in relation to which the tolerant regime acts as a sophisticated form of neutralizing assimilation. One way or another (Walzer gives the reader many reasons to be convinced of this), in liberal nation-states and emigrant societies the operation of cultural differences is relegated to the realm of privacy. Custom, faith, nationality are a private matter of a citizen, a tool for the image specification of a pop star. The mutual guarantee of tolerance places cultural differences below the threshold of significance beyond which the functioning of living, effectively isolated and effectively consolidated groups is possible. By providing their space to the free, market-based circulation of heterogeneous cultural contents, pluralistic societies made impossible that closedness of the mythosymbolic horizon and that paternalistic discipline of cultural identification, which are the breeding ground of organic communities. Cultural - and along with it, gender - self-determination becomes a matter of situational, semi-game choice (similar to how a teenager chooses gender, race, type of weapon for his virtual substitute in a computer shooter). Hatred towards “strangers” is no longer possible, because you yourself are a “stranger”, everyone is a “stranger” (Walzer illustrates this tendency with passages by Kristeva).

In the ruins of cultural consciousness nests the fragmented identity of Walzer’s fellow citizens, forced to “compose their own selves from the tiny remnants of previous cultures and religions (and in general from everything that comes to hand) ,” and it seems as if multiculturalism is a gravitational collapse at the point of accumulation of suns; cultures tore apart, coming too close to each other, losing their orbits, losing distance. Distance of intolerance? Is it really possible to mourn “xenophobia”? Be that as it may, people who wander through the multicultural field (Walzer not without reason introduces the word “vagrants”) and assemble themselves from fragments will forever remain unfamiliar with the holistic experience of themselves, the experience of life-in-culture.

The author considers this situation of fragmented identity, a split and baseless Self under the label of a “post-modern” project of tolerance. In contrast to his growing movement - another moment of apologetic-protective inclination - Walzer defends a modern (modern) version of the tolerant mediation of differences. He does not hide a certain hostility to “postmodern vagrancy” and associates with it the prospect of impoverishment of individuals and a narrowing of the sphere of cultural life, arguing, moreover, the lack of self-sufficiency of the postmodern project: “The divided selves of the postmodern era seem to me to be parasitic on non-divided groups . ”

However, the tension that exists between individuals seeking emancipation or having found it and consolidated groups - this tension itself seems to him to be a defining, and a strong, feature of modernity. "Modernity... requires that the individual and the group, the citizen and the member of the community, coexist in a state of constant tension. Postmodernism requires a similar tension - but between itself and modernity . "

So, the entire construction of sociality in its modern structure and post-modern substructure requires the preservation and even artificial cultivation (for natural forces, the author admits, are weak) of group differences of a cultural order. This conclusion contains the meaning and background of the moderate pluralism that Walzer preaches. Like a true social democrat, he is obsessed with the tendency to go “in between”: to encourage the emancipation of individuals (within reasonable limits), to encourage the strengthening and consolidation of group ties (within reasonable limits) - and to judge from the height of something third about the proportions of compromise. Something third is probably the well-known general humanitarian concern for the problems of global stability, the responsible anxiety about maintaining good sleep and digestion.

The author's apologetics, his commitment to the given and the "golden mean" sometimes leaves him in a precarious position, turning into the eternally illusory "stop a moment, you are beautiful." Judge for yourself, trying to avoid the complete fragmentation of the “fractured selves of the postmodern era” and, at the same time, alienating the claims of the political and cultural community, Walzer asks: “Would it not be better in this case to perpetuate the current state of society, which I described above as living with the problems of the first generation non-indigenous citizens? Immortalize? It seems that this time the equilibrium of the left-liberal compromise, worthy of circus tightrope walkers, promises to give way to the prevailing forces of earthly traction (the question, therefore, is the availability of insurance).

Forms of group existence in the interval between the libertarian nihilism of fragmentation and the organicism of effective cultural consolidation tend to shift towards one or the other, especially since the first generation of non-indigenous citizens is usually followed by the second (shifting the emphasis from the word “non-indigenous” to the word “citizens”, and maybe vice versa). In any case, the paradox of tolerance, which neutralizes the differences given over to it to preserve, has its reverse side: a dilemma. The growth of strong, effective cultural communities brings intolerant communal resources into play . Since their demand is taboo, all that remains is to rely on the cultivation of shoots of “tamed” crops. But decorative life forms are weak, require greenhouse conditions, and the question of maintaining them comes down to climate issues, as well as whether gardeners have enough skill, patience, and money. Actually, the final part of Walzer’s thoughts is devoted to this last question, where he talks about the problems of subsidies, tax breaks - in a word, outlines the contours of a certain regime favoring well-intentioned cultural associations. He proclaims social democracy as a comprehensive solution to the problems of multiculturalism, that is, I add, the reduction of cultural and political problems to socio-economic ones. “Multiculturalism as an ideology is a program for the struggle to increase social and economic equality” - this is the somewhat unexpected denouement of the intrigue of Walzer’s thoughts on tolerance.

...The choice between the good of peaceful coexistence of people and the good of the existence of cultures, between total tolerance and prejudice reserving the right to everything - this choice remains, of course, a matter of taste. The only important thing is that sometimes we cannot help but choose and can never do anything about the fateful dialectic of enmity and life: tolerance protects differences, intolerance creates them .