Evgeny Kuznetsov. Will foreign countries help us?

Will foreign countries help us?
What is Russia's place in a future world war?

Evgeny Kuznetsov

Date of publication: September 19, 2000

The collapse of the “second world” and the loss of its superpower status knocked Russia out of the established global system of influence and obtaining foreign policy advantages. The completely natural attempts of the United States and NATO to include the remaining “unattended” countries and regions in their area of ​​control caused only offended grumbling - without ever encountering real actions by Russia to defend its interests. Moreover, for a long time the very idea that Russia’s interests could conflict with the United States and Europe was sedition, suppressed by all the might of the “democratic” media. Recent events give hope that this intolerable situation can come to an end.

The root of Russia's strategic defeat in the late 80s and early 90s was the unreasonable expectation of real help in reorganizing the country. The USSR had the opportunity to maintain the status quo, either by making a sharp leap in efficiency, or by inflating the degree of world tension. The first was impossible due to the characteristic features of the national economy of the USSR, the second - due to the lack of real motivation to pursue a tough confrontational policy. Currently, after a period of shock from the disappearance of one of the world’s “poles of power” and the wandering between times of immature global trends, a system of world relations is emerging in which a number of countries appear that challenge world security either in the first (economic growth) or in second (the emergence of motivations for global conflict). Russia, despite its difficult situation, retains in many ways a central role in the prospects for balancing the new world order.

The dismantling of the system of global confrontation was carried out under the complete control of the “strong”, and therefore led to the formation of a dependency scenario - “loans in exchange for loyalty”, which became the systemic poison that destroyed the complex system of organizing military and political stability. In an effort to enter the circle and system of relationships between the world's leading countries, Russia ceded those regions and interests that it had been earning for centuries, and wanting to adapt its structure to the needs of the modern economy, it destroyed some vital industries. It is difficult to say how irreversible these losses are, but any aggravation of them would be fatal.

Severe and sometimes brutal pressure on the USSR, which had entered a period of serious crisis, was motivated in the West by the need to minimize threats from its side. Since then, the collapse of a single industrial complex has led to the almost complete degradation of all growth factors and the destruction of military and technological security systems. There is nothing surprising here - all these systems arose in Russia during periods of accelerated modernization, and therefore were strictly centralized and introduced by constructive methods, without the necessary history of self-development and self-organization. No serious changes within such systems are possible without their almost complete destruction, and therefore the result was quite obvious.

On the eve of the presidential elections in the United States and in connection with the changing situation around European governments pursuing new policies, the question of rectifying their intentions towards Russia and separation from the diplomatic or media shell once again arises. Despite the possible tactical interest of the leading political forces of the West in some stabilization of the situation in Russia, in the absence of our own effective strategy for getting out of the tangle of internal contradictions and the presence of mistakes of recent years, an extremely unpleasant prospect awaits us. Indeed, it is not so important whether the policy of “expensive oil in a controlled crisis” or “political modernization according to a scheme beneficial to the West” will operate - what is important is that both do not correspond in any fundamental issue to the internal tasks and adequate mechanisms of existence of Russia, a country with specific conditions of existence and history. We do not fit into the “general flow”, first of all, due to the discrepancy between the phases and current development tasks - falling behind, we are underdeveloping the important mechanisms of “modern” society. As a result, it is advisable for us to develop, first of all, a concept for mobilizing internal development reserves, adaptable to the foreign policy of world leaders, but only to the extent that does not contradict the interests of Russia.

In fact, starting with the Kosovo crisis, through Chechnya and the general intensification of foreign policy activity, there is an attempt to return influence to vital regions, which can ensure at least temporary and local pacification. The desire to return the Caucasus and Central Asia to Russia’s sphere of influence is completely justified - and even though there are still very few real tools and opportunities for this; at least, it is important to indicate this desire. The desire to regain one's position on solving European security problems is completely justified - or at least to defend one's right to have and disseminate an opinion based on domestic interests. All this makes it extremely important to determine directions and methods for solving the described problems, for which there is neither clarity nor ready-made solutions.

When setting up the prognostic task of determining Russia's optimal strategy of action, it is important to take into account that the period of relative global calm, in which there are no real global opponents threatening each other with the possibility of total war, is temporary and short-lived. Already in the period 2020-2040, we can expect a serious escalation of tensions, which could lead the world to the threshold of a world war. A detailed analysis of the threats and forms of this confrontation is not within the scope of this material, however, it is important to note that the main characteristic of the conflict will be not so much the military-political as the ideological-religious component (the forecast itself is based on a study of both the macrocyclical nature of world crises in the last millennium and features of cultural and social processes in active regions).

Taking into account this forecast, which is close in conclusions to the forecasts of other researchers, the following fundamental conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, having lost its position as the leader of a group of countries with certain geopolitical interests, Russia is now forced to either regain its lost influence over them, or integrate itself into the emerging structures of world security. Secondly, Russia’s close proximity to many regional and potentially global centers of global instability brings the issue of ensuring its defense capability to the fore, despite the fact that most other countries will not be interested in helping Russia in the early stages of an escalation of the situation, and then traditionally bring it to the forefront.

All of the above requires Russia to answer two questions: how and with whom to integrate into complex security systems, and what mobilization mechanisms to restore after the thoughtless destruction of the last decade. In the first direction, two options are being formed, which have already been fully developed over the past few years.

Russia's first task is to motivate CIS countries to create joint security structures. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism is a formally compelling argument for the creation of such structures, at least in the Central Asian and Caucasian states, but in this situation the United States, which has successfully penetrated into key regions, becomes a strong competitor to Russia. The traditional connection between the CIS countries and Russia, the similarity of weapons systems and military organization is a strong factor for restoring the degree of coordination within the CIS, but this factor is not so decisive - especially considering that Ukraine successfully competes with Russia in many positions. The United States has the opportunity to financially, politically and organizationally make smaller regional unions under its patronage more attractive, depriving Russia of its central role. While there is no reason to believe that the situation is manageable and has positive dynamics, all key processes do not go beyond statements and declarations.

Another powerful direction for some restoration of Russia’s influence is the creation of motivation among European countries to include Russia in the emerging security mechanisms with partial displacement of the United States from them. Plans to create local missile defense systems could become a catalyst for this process. It is important to emphasize that in fact, by declaring the creation of such systems, the United States is solving at least two tasks, and not the one declared one, which is to minimize threats from the use of nuclear weapons by junior members of the “nuclear club.”

The hidden but traditional task of creating and deploying such systems is a classic “arms race”, which has proven to be one of the best methods of economic pressure. We can say that this faithful weapon has been uncovered again, but is now directed against United Europe, China and other countries potentially dangerous to the United States. The destruction of the principles of parity, as well as a breakthrough into a new generation of weapons systems, leading to a sharp loss of effectiveness of the weapons of other countries - all this is reasonably perceived as an indirect threat. And although so far they have no reason to predict the development of this process, which is dangerous for themselves, its undesirability is obvious to them. US policy pursues the goal, first of all, of increasing the gap from Europe and Southeast Asian countries in the field of high technologies and implementing large-scale super-projects. The demonstration and use of the mobilization and scientific potential of the United States is aimed at consolidating the role of the sole leader and arbiter of world processes, at blocking the very possibility of the emergence of real opponents in any key areas or regions.

In this vein, Russia’s proposal to create a local European missile defense system, which eliminates these problems of parity, but destroys all the principles of European security formed around NATO, is extremely timely. It can be argued that this proposal cannot be left without consideration, and it has already shaken some of the conservatism in relations between Europe and Russia, but it is too early to talk about the results - before the start of this or any other project of integrating Russia into European security structures.

The extremely high degree of Europe's dependence on the United States is determined both by the military power of the latter and by the significant amount of costs incurred for its status as a global superpower, which allows European countries to significantly “save” on security. The United States seeks to influence the situation in all regions of the world, and this brings them significant benefits, while its allies minimize arms costs. In general, there is only one reason for breaking the current situation: the weakening of the foreign military-political activity of the United States and, consequently, the need for other countries to search for other ways to minimize costs - for example, reorientation to relatively cheap, but very high-quality Russian weapons.

As a country capable of producing not only the most modern types of military equipment, but also complex weapons systems, Russia can also be in demand by many regional centers of power, which feel growing threats both from numerous centers of a regional scale, and in general from the expansion of US political will . When pursuing a naive policy of “beautiful ideas” - discussing with whom it is “good” to be friends and with whom “bad” - Russia completely loses the ability to manage processes in its near abroad, the aggravation of the situation in which inevitably increases the risk of direct military threats. In the same case, if Russia returns to the market of suppliers of regional and global security systems, it will have a strong position and the opportunity to determine which development of processes and in which direction meets the objectives of ensuring its stability and improving the foreign economic situation.

If the scenario of cooperation with Europe and third world leaders is realized, Russia will receive a colossal source of real investment and finance - not through the sale of resources, but through high technologies that allow the existence of many industries and the social sphere. In this case, both the “Islamic” and “Chinese” threats will be perceived not as an expectation of disaster, but as a fully controlled process. But for now, the feasibility of these positive changes depends on many little controllable factors, and therefore lies in the realm of hypothetical assumptions.

However, this does not mean that the Russian leadership and society should not make every effort to realize this opportunity. For this, in addition to the policy of declaration and “unexpected” statements testing public opinion in areas of some “taboo” (such as the statement about Russia’s readiness to join NATO), it is important to formulate a real military-industrial policy that could stop the destruction of the military-industrial complex. This, however, is difficult to imagine simultaneously with measures to create a “clean market”, within the framework of which the most complex pyramid of the military-industrial complex is doomed to destruction.

The contradiction between the tasks of gaining external geostrategic advantages and creating a “modern” economy (which is more of a cliché than a real necessity) may become the main dilemma for Putin, who is equally interested in cooperation with the leaders of the camps of the military-industrial complex and big business. However, the strategic priority of returning Russia to leading geopolitical positions is undoubted - especially given that in the rapidly degenerating world economy, a new, informational era has already emerged, replacing the post-industrial one, and the most decisive breakdown of existing stereotypes and systems of influences will soon take place.

An adequate policy for Russia should be aimed at developing, first of all, its intellectual, technological and mobilization potentials, that is, what becomes a priority in the new information era. And although there remain many concerns about the irreversibility of degradation in this area, it is obvious that the current priority sectors (extraction and primary processing of raw materials, as well as low-tech manufacturing industry) do not create generally positive prospects for Russia as it integrates into the world economy. Also doubtful is the possibility of transferring to Russia a significant part of Western enterprises aimed at producing export products, since there are a sufficient number of other regions with more favorable conditions (in addition, many of Russia’s “priorities” turned out to be myths - for example, high qualifications of workers, which, like “human resources” in general, has significantly degraded over the past 10 years). That is why the speedy restoration of scientific and mobilization potentials is necessary to reverse the trends towards degradation and collapse of Russia. Moreover, it is precisely the mobilization potential - primarily in the form of the ability to implement large-scale technical projects, such as space exploration or the production of modern weapons and weapons systems - that distinguishes Russia favorably from other modern "centers of power", which will not be able to create objects of comparable scale without a sharp falling standard of living. If Russia becomes an ally for them, allowing them to join these advanced capabilities without following in the wake of the United States, within the framework of an equal partnership, the ability of the United States to “manage” the situation in Russia will be significantly weakened.

However, development in the direction of cooperation with Europe is hampered not only by its unwillingness to transform continental security systems, but also by the extreme unfavorability of public opinion in European countries - especially in connection with the war in Chechnya. Unlike the United States, European countries do not apply the “son of a bitch” formula to regimes that are unpleasant in terms of maintaining power, but cooperate in a particular region. European leaders of public opinion are focused either on completely forgetting the plans for “Russia's movement into Europe”, or on the acceptance by the Russian government and business of all systems of self-restraint and rules of the game characteristic of Western civilization. This will make impossible many of the usual methods of manipulative management, without which the entire pyramid of public relations in Russia is unthinkable, which makes it necessary to carry out not just a PR campaign, but a long-term constructive policy to solve this problem.

In addition, the question of the present period is whether the social situation in Europe will swing towards the development of right-wing conservative sentiments, or whether left-liberal ideas will continue to strengthen.

The first direction to a greater extent accepts Russia's right to independently determine measures to solve internal problems, but more traditionally does not trust Russia, perceiving it as a historical threat. In addition, right-wing conservatives are big skeptics about integration and joining forces on issues of security or economic development.

Left liberals do not accept deviations from modern norms for the protection of human rights; they are not going to take into account “Russian specifics” in business and politics and put up with distortions of democratic norms. However, it is they who are the locomotive of integration projects, and in addition, they are more inclined to the idea of ​​​​"improving Russia", seeing this as a certain stage in the "establishment of a progressive world order."

The study of systemic patterns of evolution of social systems allows us to assert that, despite the temporary revenge of right-wing conservative sentiments, strategic left-liberal ideas have significant prospects in the first quarter of the 21st century. This is motivated primarily by the fact that only they are capable of playing the role of integration ideology given the almost inevitable need to strengthen interstate cooperation in an atmosphere of growing global tension. Will Russia be able to contribute to the development of trends favorable to it and will by that time retain the ability to recreate an integrated technological complex capable of producing “superproducts”?

The above analysis, undoubtedly, does not fully cover the complex complex of problems and prospects for the development of the world security system. The situation needs careful and in-depth study. The main problem is that there is a need, on the one hand, to develop forms and methods of management that are adequate to Russia’s tasks, and on the other hand, to move closer to the European information and political space and to develop modern forms of organizing civil society. Solving these complex problems requires the creation of not so much modern, but rather forms and methods of government structure and management adapted to the problems of the future, which has not yet even been identified in the Russian expert community as a problem requiring an early solution.